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This dissertation explores the ways in which emotions shaped people’s understandings of the troubled
times they were living in. It focuses on northern South America – present-day Colombia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela – between 1808 and 1830. These years saw both the collapse of the Spanish Monarchy’s rule
over the region and the rise of new republican nations. Such an outcome was far from being inevitable or
from being one desired by all. The dissertation is both a history of emotions that focuses on early
nineteenth-century northern South America and a history of the region’s independence process studied
from the perspective of emotions. Throughout the dissertation, I reflect on how emotions shaped people’s
notions of reality and their conceptions of the past and the future. The dissertation poses two main
arguments. First, I argue that emotions are a constitutive part of cognition. Emotions shaped the
meanings people gave to the world around them at the same time that emotions helped express and
impute meaning to people’s actions. Second, the dissertation demonstrates that the emotions that
circulated during these years, particularly intense fear and confusion, gave form to the republican and
national projects that emerged at the time. It claims that independence and the onset of republicanism
did not bring about a critical break from the monarchical and colonial past. Widespread feelings of dread
and uncertainty led many of the region’s residents to seek stability and safety at the expense of their
aspirations for social and political reform. The dissertation carries out a microscopic analysis of a series
of events, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, panic attacks, and funeral rites, in order to grasp the
prevailing emotions of the time as well as to get a sense of the different ways in which people
understood, experienced, and expressed emotions.
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ABSTRACT
THE EBB AND FLOW OF REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF EMOTIONS IN EARLY
NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLOMBIA
Juan Pablo Ardila Falla
Ann Farnsworth-Alvear
This dissertation explores the ways in which emotions shaped people’s understandings of the
troubled times they were living in. It focuses on northern South America – present-day Colombia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela – between 1808 and 1830. These years saw both the collapse of the
Spanish Monarchy’s rule over the region and the rise of new republican nations. Such an outcome
was far from being inevitable or from being one desired by all. The dissertation is both a history of
emotions that focuses on early nineteenth-century northern South America and a history of the
region’s independence process studied from the perspective of emotions. Throughout the
dissertation, I reflect on how emotions shaped people’s notions of reality and their conceptions of
the past and the future. The dissertation poses two main arguments. First, I argue that emotions are
a constitutive part of cognition. Emotions shaped the meanings people gave to the world around
them at the same time that emotions helped express and impute meaning to people’s actions.
Second, the dissertation demonstrates that the emotions that circulated during these years,
particularly intense fear and confusion, gave form to the republican and national projects that
emerged at the time. It claims that independence and the onset of republicanism did not bring about
a critical break from the monarchical and colonial past. Widespread feelings of dread and
uncertainty led many of the region’s residents to seek stability and safety at the expense of their
aspirations for social and political reform. The dissertation carries out a microscopic analysis of a
series of events, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, panic attacks, and funeral rites, in order
to grasp the prevailing emotions of the time as well as to get a sense of the different ways in which
people understood, experienced, and expressed emotions.
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Introduction
In 1809, many Quiteños came to believe that a French takeover of Quito was
imminent. Around June and July, in social gatherings as well as in the city’s streets, people
talked about “reliable news that the French had disembarked a considerable number of
troops in the port of Esmeraldas.”1 By August, rumors of a French takeover intensified
even further. On August 9th, many claimed that there was a conspiracy underway that
would eventually lead to Napoleon’s takeover of Quito. On that day, a rumor spread
throughout the city alleging that the “Chapetones2, as European Spaniards are referred to
here, despite their very reduced number, intended to slit the throats of the Criollos3, and
would hand over this [Quito] to Bonaparte.” 4 The following day, on August 10th, amidst
widespread confusion and fear, Quito’s residents, led by the city’s patricians, established a
government junta. The junta swore allegiance to Ferdinand VII and the Spanish Monarchy
and promised to defend the Crown’s sovereignty. Its formation was a response to

1

“…avisos efectivos de que los franceses havian desembarcado en considerable numero en el puerto de
Esmeraldas.” (Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia (AGN), Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia
Colombiana de Historia, Serie Correspondencia de varias personas de Quito a Camilo Torres, caja 24, carpeta
47, ‘Relación de Xavier Montufar, hijo del marqués de Selva Alegre, en que explica lo que ocurrió en
Riobamba y la formación de la Junta. 1810.’, 74-75.) In this case, I translate the term aviso as news. I do so,
following the 1726 Diccionario de Autoridades first acceptation of the term: “Aviso. s. m. Notícia dada à
otro de lo que sucéde, ò acontece, ò le conviene para algun fin.” (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia
Española, 1726.)
2
The term was used in a derogatory way to refer to European Spaniards. The 1729 Diccionario de
Autoridades defines the term as “the European or Castilian, recently arrived and poor….” (“El Européo, ò el
Castellano recien llegado y pobre...”) (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1729.)
3
The term criollo was used to refer to people of European descent who were born in the Americas. The 1729
Diccionario de Autoridades defines the term as “he who is born in the Indies from Spanish parents, or from
another nation that is not Indian.” (“El que nace en Indias de Padres Españoles, o de otra Nación que no sean
Indios…”) (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1729.)
4
“… el que los chapetones, como aqui llama a los españoles europeos, no obstante de su reducidisimo
numero, intentaban degollar a los criollos, y entregar esto a Bonaparte…” (Archivo General de Indias (AGI),
QUITO,269, ‘Carta de Fuentes González y Merchante de Contreras al Rey sobre los juicios en contra de
quiteños. Quito. 21 de mayo de 1810.’, 2-3.)

1

Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and Ferdinand VII’s abdication. Many
Quiteños believed it was a way to prevent being governed by Joseph Bonaparte and the
afrancesados.5 In the absence of a rightful and legitimate ruler, Quito’s residents sought to
govern themselves until Ferdinand VII returned to throne. Quito’s Junta was the first
government junta established in the Americas. Similar to those that came after, the August
10 Junta sought self-government, but it did not pursue absolute independence nor a break
from the Spanish Monarchy. On the contrary, many of its supporters were convinced that
the junta’s establishment would lead to more autonomy while maintaining the Spanish
Monarchy’s rule over Quito and preventing Napoleon from taking over the province and
the rest of the Americas.6
With a difference of only a few months, rumors similar to those that appeared in
Quito in 1809 circulated in Santafé de Bogotá. In February 1810, stories of the arrival of
foreign troops spread throughout the city. Most accounts maintained that French ships had
been seen sailing up the Orinoco River into the Llanos 7 and that French troops would soon
disembark and begin their way towards Santafé. The story ended up being not true.
Apparently, someone in the Llanos mistook a small band of rebels for French troops.
Rebels from the town of Socorro who had been demanding the formation of local juntas

5

From the late 1800s and through most of the 1810s, throughout all of Spain and Spanish America, members
of the court, public servants, and other vassals who showed explicit or tacit support for Napoleon and the
French were referred to as afrancesados.
6
Federica Morelli, “Quito en 1810: la búsqueda de un nuevo proyecto político”, Historia y Política, no. 2
(July-December 2010): 132-137; Jaime E. Rodríguez, “Los Orígenes de la Revolución de Quito en 1809”,
Procesos: Revista Ecuatoriana de Historia, no. 34, 2011: 92-95, 113-117.
7
The Province of the Llanos was located to the east of Santafé and included most of the plains found between
the Andes mountains and the Orinoco River. (Marta Herrera Ángel, “Las divisiones político-administrativas
del Virreinato de la Nueva Granada a finales del período colonial”, Historia Crítica, no. 22 (2001): 77-83.)

2

ended up in the Llanos fleeing from the authorities’ repression. 8 Some months after this
incident, on July 19, just a day before the formation of Santafé’s Junta, rumors of a
conspiracy similar to that of Quito circulated throughout the city. Around 7 p.m., many
Santafereños began talking about an alleged scheme led by the city’s Chapetones to kill
Santafé’s Criollos and hand over the province to Napoleon. The rumor became so
widespread that Viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbón and the Royal Audiencia’s magistrates
were forced to concede to a town hall meeting. On the night of the 20th, after many hours
of disorders, protests, and rampant confusion, many of the city’s councilmen, patricians,
members of the Audiencia, and a few plebeians convened in a town hall meeting. The
assembly ended up voting in favor of the formation of Santafé’s government junta. Similar
to what happened in Quito, the junta declared its loyalty to Ferdinand VII and the Spanish
Crown. Viceroy Amar was appointed as its president. 9
The similarities and coincidences between the rumors and emotions that circulated
in Quito and Santafé are remarkable. Thinking in metaphorical terms, it is as if the stories
and fears that emerged in Quito in 1809 had taken a life of their own and travelled to
Santafé to continue their disruptiveness in New Granada. Of course, these rumors and
emotions did not grow and move by themselves. They did so thanks to people’s travels,
correspondence, and conversations. At the time, couriers, merchants, and muleteers were

8

José María Caballero, “En la independencia” in Posada, Eduardo (comp.). La Patria Boba (Bogotá:
Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, 1902), 119; José Antonio de Torres y Peña (ed. Hernández de Alba,
Guillermo), Memorias sobre los orígenes de la Independencia Nacional (Bogotá: Biblioteca de Historia
Nacional, 1960), 104-105.
9
AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Expediente caso Juan Jurado. Su paso por Caracas, Santafé, Panamá y otras
ciudades. 1808-1815.’, 12-14; “Relación de lo acaecido en la capital de Santafé desde el memorable 20 de
julio hasta el día de la fecha” in Pumar Martínez, Carmen. “Diario de un criollo anónimo sobre el 20 de julio
de 1810.”, Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura, no. 13-14 (1986): 313-314.

3

key actors moving rumors and emotions from one place to another. Yet, the expansion of
these stories and fears was not simply caused by individual interactions. They were given
meaning collectively. Their growth and the shape they took was the result of a series of
social, political, and cultural interactions and existing conditions.
This dissertation explores the ways in which emotions shaped how people gave
meaning to the troubled times in which they were living. 10 It focuses on northern South
America – present-day Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela – between 1808 and 1830.
These years saw both the collapse of the Spanish Monarchy’s rule over the region and the
rise of new republican nations. Such an outcome was far from being inevitable or from
being one desired by all. At the time, there were many different understandings of what
these political transformations meant and implied. Among many, republicanism and
independence were met with uncertainty and caution. For a considerable part of the
region’s residents, it was unclear what these political projects meant and what they could
bring about. Studying the tensions and contradictions of the time through the lens of
emotions sheds light on the milieu in which these discussions took place at the same time
that it helps us have a better understanding of people’s actions and the reasons guiding
them to support one faction or another.
In that sense, this dissertation is both a history of emotions that focuses on early
nineteenth-century northern South America as well as a history of the Colombian,
Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan independence processes studied from the perspective of
emotions. Throughout the dissertation, I reflect on how emotions shaped people’s notions

10

Throughout the dissertation, I use the terms emotions, feelings, and sentiments as synonymous. Most
historians of emotions do the same.

4

of reality and their conceptions of the past and the future. The dissertation considers how
emotions travelled and grew through rumors, collective remembrances, and particular
events. It studies the different ways in which specific nineteenth-century societies
experienced and understood emotions as well as the ways in which emotional expressions
shaped the meanings given to people’s decisions and actions. I understand emotions as a
constitutive part of people’s cognition. Emotions shape the meanings people give to the
world they live in at the same time that emotions help express and convey meaning.
Paying attention to emotions brings to light the widespread feelings of confusion
and fear that prevailed in northern South America during the first decades of the nineteenth
century. Uncertainty and fright, along with rage, grief, guilt, and hope, fluctuated during
these years. There were moments in which some emotions prevailed over others or in which
the pace of propagation of a particular emotion varied. At other times, parts of society
experienced fear and confusion with more intensity. Ultimately, such fluctuations shaped
the tides of revolution and reform. At certain times, emotions incited and accelerated
political transformations. At others, they halted social and political change.
The dissertation argues that the emotions that circulated in the early nineteenth
century, particularly the intense fear and confusion that many experienced, gave form to
the republican and national projects that emerged at the time. It claims that independence
and the onset of republicanism did not bring about a critical break from the monarchical
and colonial past. Widespread feelings of dread and uncertainty led many of the region’s
residents to seek stability and safety at the expense of their aspirations for social and
political reform. The emotional milieu that predominated in the second half of the 1810s
and throughout the 1820s hindered the revolutionary spirit that had spread some years
5

earlier. Such generalized sense of fear and confusion enabled the persistence of
monarchical and colonial notions of social order, political stability, and symbolic power.
This project considers the significance and implications of the rise of new
republican nations in Latin America. The onset of republicanism came with innovative
constitutions and novel endeavors, such as manumission laws and declarations in favor of
racial equality. Yet, opposition to these reforms came from a wide variety of sectors of
society. In some cases, even those promoting new reforms were sure to enact elusive and
malleable policies that would, at best, only bring about partial and gradual changes. In other
cases, strong factionalism between different notions of republicanism only led to conflict
and violence, delaying even further the implementation of reforms. Such relentless frictions
and the unfulfillment of republican promises help explain the persistence of royalist and
monarchist notions in the minds and hearts of many of the region’s inhabitants. Many
political leaders and citizens ended up favoring despotic projects similar to the monarchic
regime that had preceded independece. However, such setbacks should not be simply
conceived as failures or acts of betrayal to the liberal and republican projects that many
had supposedly supported. These apparent hindrances were, in part, the result of the wide
range of meanings and understandings that independence and republicanism were given
across society.
The history of emotions
The fears and rumors that circulated in Quito in 1809 and in Santafé in 1810 are a
good starting point to discuss some of the methodological, theoretical, and
historiographical discussions guiding this dissertation. Georges Lefebvre’s work on the
Great Fear of 1789 is especially relevant to think about the connections between these
6

rumors and fears. In 1932, Lefebvre published La Grande Peur de 1789 (translated into
English as The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France). The Great Fear
was one of the first historical works to pay attention to emotions. Perhaps only Johan
Huizinga’s 1919 The Waning of the Middle Ages could be considered a starting point
previous to Lefebvre’s work.11 In his book, Huizinga maintains that medieval emotional
life was, to a certain degree, childish as it was full of violent contrasts and impressive
forms. In medieval daily life, Huizinga argues, there was a perpetual oscillation between
opposite and extreme emotions and expressions.12 Lefebvre approach was somewhat
different from Huizinga’s. In The Great Fear, he analyzes a sense of fear that took over
the French countryside in late July and early August of 1789. During these weeks, rumors
of an aristocratic plot became prevalent. Both citizens and authorities believed that
aristocrats had recruited brigands to destroy crops, rob townspeople, and vandalize homes.
According to Lefebvre, this Great Fear had an identity of its own in the sense that people
held a total certainty that the rumor was absolutely true and that brigands would at any

11

The most comprehensive and complete work reviewing the history of the history of emotions and the field’s
main debates is probably Jan Plamper’s History of Emotions. (Jan Plamper, History of Emotions: An
Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015)). Other texts that discuss the field’s main authors,
concepts, and discussions are: Rosenwein, Barbara. “Worrying about Emotions in History”, The American
Historical Review, Vol. 107, no. 3, (June 2002): 821-845; Barbara Rosenwein and Riccardo Cristiani, What
is the History of Emotions? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (eds.), Doing
Emotions History (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014); Katie Barclay, “State of the Field: The History
of Emotions”, History 106, no. 371 (2021): 456-466; María Sierra and Begoña Barrera, “Historia de las
emociones: ¿qué cuentan los afectos del pasado?”, Historia y Memoria, Número Especial (2020): 103 - 142;
Margarita Garrido Otoya, “Historia de las emociones y los sentimientos: aprendizajes y preguntas desde
América Latina”, Historia Crítica, no. 78 (2020): 9-23. Another insightful text is the roundtable on the history
of emotions with German historians Alon Confino, Ute Frevert, Uffa Jensen, Lyndal Roper, and Daniela
Saxe. Ute Frevert, particularly, has examined the decay of certain emotions and feelings that came with the
advent of modernity. (Frank Biess, “Forum. History of Emotions. Roundtable.” German History 28, no. 1
(2010): 67–80.)
12
Johan Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought and Art in France
and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries, trans. by Frederik J. Hopman (London: E. Arnold &
Co., 1924 (©1919).

7

moment break in into their homes. These false stories and the fear they produced led many
to arm themselves at the same time that many peasants and townspeople began to question
the aristocracy’s authority and rights. As a result of this, some peasants even stopped
paying seigneurial dues.13 Lefebvre maintains that the Great Fear spread relatively quickly
thanks to couriers and a series of interactions between neighboring towns. Yet, he also
implies that there were times in which the fear moved as if it were a living organism. “To
travel from Clermont in Beauvaisis to the Seinea, distance of about fifty kilometres,”
Lefebvre explains, “it took twelve hours of daylight; it travelled the five hundred
kilometres from Ruffec to Lourdes in nine days; its speed here was lesser by a half, but it
obviously moved more slowly at night. During the day, it seems to have gone at about four
kilometres an hour.”14
Lefebvre’s close attention to the expansion of rumors and fears tackled a series of
questions Marc Bloch had posed some years earlier, in 1921, in his article, “Reflections of
a Historian on the False News of the War.” In it, Bloch analyzes some of the many false
stories that circulated among French troops and French society during the Great War.
Bloch’s fascination for deception and misperceptions is manifest throughout the article as
it would be later on in his 1924 Rois et Thaumaturges. “The masses are aroused by false
stories,” Bloch argues, “Items of false news, in all the multiplicity of their forms—simple
gossip, deceptions, legends—have filled the life of humanity. How are they born? From
what elements do they take shape? How do they propagate themselves, gaining strength as
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they pass from mouth to mouth or writing to writing? No question should fascinate anyone
who loves to reflect on history more than these.” 15
In 1941, almost a decade after The Great Fear’s publication, Lucien Febvre – a
colleague of Lefebvre and Bloch at the University of Strasbourg during the late 1920s and
early 1930s as well as the cofounder, along with Bloch, of the Annales journal – wrote an
insightful article titled “Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life
of the Past.” In it, Febvre sets out a series of guidelines on how to delve into the emotions
and sensibilities of the past. He claims that emotions are not merely automatic reactions to
external stimuli, but patterns of activity that can only take place where group relations and
social life exist.16 In the same vein as Lefebvre and Bloch, Febvre argues that emotions are
contagious. As Febvre explains, “emotions, by bringing together large numbers of people
acting sometimes as initiators and sometimes as followers, finally reached the stage where
they constituted a system of inter-individual stimuli which took on a variety of forms
according to situation and circumstance, thereby producing a wide variety of reactions and
modes of sensibility in each person.” 17
In his article, Febvre also maintains that emotions could be considered a sort of
institution and insists that emotions vary in intensity and shape throughout history.
According to Febvre, in a given society there are systems of emotions that set the codes as

15

Marc Bloch, “Reflections of a Historian on the False News of the War”, trans. by James P. Holoka,
Michigan War Studies Review, no. 51 (2013): 2. (Bloch’s essay was originally published under the French
title “Réflexions d’un historien sur les fausses nouvelles de la guerre.” It appeared in the 1921 volume of the
Revue de synthèse historique.)
16
Lucien Febvre, “Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past” in Peter
Burke (ed.) A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre (New York: Harper & Row, 1973): 14.
(Febvre’s text was originally published as: Febvre, Lucien. “La sensibilité et l’histoire: Comment reconstituer
la vie affective d’autrefois?,” Annales d’histoire sociale, vol. 3, no. 1–2 (1941) : 5-20.)
17
Febvre, “Sensibility and History,” 14-15.

9

to which attitudes and gestures are accepted and, thus, are prevalent. Febvre was perhaps
among the first historians to put forward the idea of thinking of emotions in terms of
structures and systems. Other scholars, such as Carol and Peter Stearns, William Reddy,
and Monique Scheer, would elaborate on these ideas several decades later. Likewise,
Febvre suggests that these systems of emotions evolved in time. He explains that within
them there is an ongoing tension between intellectual and emotional activity in which the
intellect gradually suppressed emotions. That is to say, much in line with the work of
Norbert Elias, Febvre implies that more civilized times were those in which members of
society were more successful putting their intellect on top of their emotional impulses. 18
This insinuation is problematic in many ways and has been the object of criticism among
historians of emotions, particularly from Barbara Rosenwein. Yet, the fact remains that
Febvre was one of the first to reflect on how emotions change in time and to raise questions
with regards to the relationship between emotions and the intellect. 19
During the three decades following Febvre’s article, emotions were mostly absent
from the historians’ research agenda. It was not until the second half of the 1970s and the
1980s that historians once again began to consider emotions as a subject worth paying
attention to. In France, Philippe Ariès and, particularly, Jean Delumeau explored emotions
from the perspective of mentalities. Ariès, for instance, studies the different ways in which
Western culture has conceived death and how these conceptions have changed over time.
Ariès’ work pays attention to the emotions and expressions that death produced. According
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to Ariès, there were certain times in the Middle Ages and early modernity in which death
was conceived as something ordinary. Most people were prepared for their death and
accepted their fate. Yet, towards the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was an
abrupt change in the way death was conceived. Ariès argues that death began to be feared
and avoided. Such rejection was accompanied with a sense of passionate sorrow that led
people to cry, languish, and even faint at the death of a loved one. 20 Delumeau, for his part,
claims that between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries Western civilization became
obsessed with guilt and sin. He argues that the religious and intellectual elites of the time
tried to change people’s behavior by crafting the notion of a vindictive and ruthless God
who was ready to punish every sinful act. What resulted from this conception was a shared
sense of fear and uneasiness that prevailed for close to five centuries. 21 In that sense, Ariès
and Delumeau’s mentalities perspective sought to understand a given civilization or
society, and the changes taking place within it through its feelings and expressions of fear,
guilt, sorrow, and anguish.
In the 1980s, a similar but somewhat different approach emerged on the other side
of the Atlantic. Carol and Peter Stearns proposed studying society’s attitudes and values
towards emotions and expressions to uncover social change. The Stearnses argue that
paying attention to changes in emotional standards can reveal social transformations and
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the ways in which these take place.22 Such approach, for which the Stearnses coined the
term “emotionology”, focuses “on the social factors that determine and delimit, either
implicitly or explicitly, the manner in which emotions are expressed.” By doing so,
emotionology tries to “illuminate how and why social agencies and institutions either
promote or prohibit some kinds of emotions, while remaining neutral or indifferent to
others.”23 In that sense, the Stearnses propose analyzing the ways in which diaries,
periodicals, and manuals of etiquette, among others, portray and assess emotions and
expressions. The goal of such an endeavor, they explain, is to grasp how these assessments
change over time and across class, gender, and racial boundaries to better understand social
change.24 This implies that historians studying emotions from an emotionology perspective
must examine relatively long periods of time, at least several decades or even whole
centuries, in order to recognize and get a sense of the ways in which emotional standards
change over time and how these variations are associated with other social transformations.
The Stearnses were careful to state that emotionology distinguishes between
cultural and social standards, on the one part, and the emotional experiences of individuals
and groups, on the other.25 In an interview with Jan Plamper, Peter Stearns explains that
emotionology’s emphasis on this distinction is simply a means to recognize “when we’re
dealing with culture and not pretend it necessarily describes actual experience.” Moreover,
he maintains that emotionology’s focus on society’s attitudes and values is partly due to
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the fact “that culture is a lot more accessible” than experience. 26 Nicole Eustace, one of the
leading historians from the emotionology side, argues that “there’s the practical problem
of how historians can ever determine what people in the past were experiencing
internally.”27 For Eustace, historians should focus on who expresses and has the right to
express emotions, which expressions are socially accepted, how each person expresses
emotions, and in what ways this reveals relations of power in a given society. 28
Over a decade after the Stearnses’ article on emotionology came out, several
historians of emotions began to move away from the emphasis placed on emotional
standards and their ensuing relations of power. Some of these historians, such as William
Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, Javier Moscoso, and Juan Manuel Zaragoza, have delved into
interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological discussions as part of their efforts to
approach emotional experiences. 29 In doing so, they sought to contribute to ongoing
conversations on the nature and essence of emotions. At the time, scholars had been
discussing if emotions were merely biological responses taking place in the human body
or if emotions were found in the brain and were part of human consciousness. 30 Other
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discussions mulled over the universal or relativist character of emotions. Those closer to
biological understandings claimed that emotions did not change throughout time and that
all societies, regardless of their cultural backgrounds, experienced emotions in the same
manner. Relativist views, usually closer to cognitive conceptions of emotions, stressed the
role of culture shaping emotions and bringing about a wide variety of emotional
experiences. Other scholars discussed if emotions should be deemed irrational or if they
should be understood as constituent of rational thought. In the meantime, others considered
the issue of understanding emotions as simply individual actions or as part of collective
social life.31 In these discussions, many cultural anthropologists argued that emotions are
socially constructed and insisted on the role of culture shaping emotions and informing the
ways in which society perceives them. Those who embraced stronger versions of social
constructivism ended up maintaining that “natural” and universal emotions do not exist.
For them, what exists are a wide variety of socially and culturally assembled ones. 32
Reddy sought to challenge strong relativist understandings of emotions without
denying that culture and social life shape emotions. Reddy’s criticism was aimed at
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anthropologists such as Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod 33 who, he explains, had
ended up espousing antiessentialist views of emotions that refused “to allow for any
physiological, psychological, or other universal determinant or influence in emotional
life.”34 Reddy also maintains that strong constructionist views of emotions disregarded the
fact that emotional discourses change over time. In that sense, Reddy claims that it is
necessary to acknowledge the “dynamic character of emotional utterances and gestures”
which are, he argued, “a universal factor, central to the shaping of and alternation of
emotion ‘discourse’ in every context.” 35
Reddy put forward the concept of ‘emotive’ as a means to bridge emotional
discourses and practices while also drawing attention on both the changing and universal
character of utterances and gestures. Reddy defines ‘emotives’ as utterances or speech acts
through which individuals describe and characterize emotions. When a person is feeling a
series of sensations, ‘emotives’ come into play in the moment in which the individual
decides to identify those feelings and label them under a particular category or term. In that
sense, an ‘emotive’ is the act in which a person names an emotion in accordance with
society’s terminology and understandings of what such emotion implies. 36 Thus,
‘emotives’ are “utterances aimed at briefly characterizing the current state of activated
thought material that exceeds the current capacity of attention. Such expression, by analogy
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with speech acts, can be said to have (1) descriptive appearance, (2) relational intent, and
(3) self-exploring and self-altering effects.”37 One of the main implications that comes with
Reddy’s definition is that the act of naming and labeling a feeling realigns an individual’s
emotions. When a person experiences a feeling and labels such sensation under a particular
term, that person’s feelings are readjusted to fit that term. As Reddy explains, an ‘emotive’
is also an attempt “to feel what one says one feels.”38
Reddy maintains that ‘emotives’ are central to historical change. Society is
constantly searching for and coining new ‘emotives’ that will more fully satisfy people’s
needs and desires. This process not only implies linguistic transformations and the
expansion of society’s lexicon. It also modifies the relation that individuals have with
themselves and, thus, it affects the world around them by bringing about new attitudes and
new social relations.39 Moreover, ‘emotives’ are also implicated in defining and shaping
political systems. Complementary to ‘emotives’, Reddy introduced the term ‘emotional
regime’ to describe “the set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and
‘emotives’ that express and inculcate them; a necessary underpinning of any stable political
regime.”40 In that sense, an ‘emotional regime’ is an ensemble of approved ‘emotives’,
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rituals, and practices in which – much in the vein of the Stearnses – those members of
society who conform to existing codes are rewarded while those who do not are reproached.
For Reddy, every political regime is supported by an emotional regime, but he also explains
that changes in ‘emotives’ may lead to transformations in political regimes. 41
In Rosenwein’s case, her inquiries were, in part, a response to her dissatisfaction at
the way in which previous historians had conceived emotions and her rejection towards
universalist views of emotions. For Rosenwein, the “hydraulic” model of emotions that
prevailed when Huizinga, Febvre, Bloch, and Elias wrote about emotions posed many
problems. This notion conceives emotions as if they were “great liquids within each person,
heaving and frothing, eager to be let out.”42 The “hydraulic” model still abounds today in
everyday language and popular conceptions of emotions. As Rosenwein explains, such
conception assumes that emotions are universal and “insofar as it recognizes a history, it
encourages a ‘binary’ one in which emotions are either ‘on’ or ‘off’ depending on social,
superego, or individually willed restraints. The hydraulic view lies behind the grand
narrative, validating its search for a turning point based on restraint.” 43 For Rosenwein,
new and alternative understandings of emotions were required not only to transcend
previous metanarratives but also to come closer to society’s emotional life and experiences.
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Rosenwein came up with the concept of ‘emotional communities’ as a way to
overcome this disjunctive. The concept highlights diversity over uniformity as it draws
attention on the different ways members of a given society experience and understand
emotions. Rosenwein defines emotional communities as groups in which “people adhere
to the same norms of emotional expressions and value – or devalue – the same or related
emotions. More than one emotional community may exist – indeed normally does exist –
contemporaneously, and these communities may change over time. Some come to the fore
to dominate our sources, then recede in importance. Others are almost entirely hidden form
us...”44 As Rosenwein explains, emotional communities define and assess what is valuable
or harmful to them, the nature of the affective bonds, and the expressions that they expect,
encourage, tolerate, or deplore.45 Communities “are not constituted by one or two emotions
but rather by constellations – or sets – of emotions. Their characteristic styles depend not
only on the emotions that they emphasize – and how and in what contexts they do so – but
also by the ones that they demote to the tangential or do not recognize at all.” 46
Amidst these discussions, Javier Moscoso and Juan Manuel Zaragoza have, for
their part, made a stand claiming that they are more concerned with exploring experiences
rather than standards and attitudes. They define their approach, the “history of experience”,
44
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as one that focuses on the cultural forms of subjectivity. Moscoso and Zaragoza claim that
they are not interested in identifying references to states of consciousness but rather in
studying the conditions that make experiences culturally significant. That is to say, they
explain that their approach seeks to study the cultural conditions that make emotions,
feelings, passions, and instincts possible, at the same time that these conditions allow for
their dramatic and rhetoric manifestations. More than a final product, Moscoso and
Zaragoza’s “history of experience” sets out a line of research for the future that eagerly
advocates for interdisciplinary research with medicine, public health, and philosophy.47
Yet, Moscoso’s published work hints at the where the “history of experience” is going to.
In his book about pain, Moscoso claims that, in given circumstances, experiences of human
suffering articulate with rhetorical strategies so that pain, as a subjective and intersubjective
reality, exist. For Moscoso, the cultural expressions of pain are not only demonstrative, but
also performative. Pain needs persuasive tools for the audience to be convinced that the
suffering is true. Only then does the audience emotionally respond to pain. 48
In general terms, this is where the field of the history emotions stands today.
Emotions as patterns of activity, emotions as biological responses, emotions as human
consciousness, emotions as offshoots of mentalities, and emotions as markers of social
change are some of the definitions that have been laid out by historians since the first half
of the twentieth century. Emotionology, ‘emotives’, emotional communities, and “history
of experience”, for their part, are some of the concepts and approaches that stand out as
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possible channels for historians to explore emotions and the ways in which they change
and bring about transformations throughout time.
Where, among these many definitions, notions, and approaches, does this
dissertation stand? I consider emotions to be a constitutive part of human cognition. That
is, emotions help us give meaning to the world that surround us at the same time that they
allow us to express meaning. This depiction builds on Andy Clark and David Chalmer’s
theory of the “extended mind” which claims that an individual’s cognition is made up of
the reactions taking place in the brain, the impulses moving throughout the human body,
and the stimuli coming from the surrounding environment. 49 In that sense, emotions take
place in both the brain and body, but they are stirred and inspired by the world that
surrounds them. Emotions are not contrary to rationality. Rather, they feed and inform
rational thought. My understanding is somewhat similar to what Martha Nussbaum argues
about emotions being a subcategory of thought. 50 I would add that emotions are integrated
to the thought process and not simply a subdivision of it. Likewise, I deem that emotions
exist and take shape in particular cultural and social settings. They are universal in the
sense that there are bodily and mental reactions and stimuli that, to some extent, are shared
by all human beings regardless of the period of time or the culture in which they take place.
Yet, such universalism has its limits. The cultural and social life in which emotions are
inscribed end up defining the ways emotions are experienced and expressed at the same
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time that they shape how emotions expand and the manners in which society assesses and
values them.
The dissertation picks up on many of the questions and reflections historians of
emotions have posed. It pays close attention to the ways in which emotions spread across
society and the reasons they grew as they did. Much in the vein of Lefebvre, I trace rumors
and false news and try to get a grasp of the feelings they incited and the ways in which
society gave meaning to these emotions and rumors. As Bloch explains, errors and false
news – and emotions, I would add – can only propagate and survive on the condition that
they find “a favorable cultural broth in the society where [they are] spreading.”

51

Throughout the dissertation, I try to immerse myself into the milieu of the time, trying to
get a sense of the conditions that made certain emotions, expressions, and meanings
possible. This milieu was hardly ever homogenous or uniform. There were, as Rosenwein
would put, different emotional communities that understood, evaluated, and expressed
emotions in different ways. Political divisions were important markers dividing one
community from the other, but there were also other elements such as religious
interpretations, scientific understandings, and social relations that were at play. Following
what scholars such as Catherine Lutz, Carol and Peter Stearns, William Reddy, and Joanna
Bourke have explained, I also consider that emotions – their expressions, evaluations, and
assessments – are part of relations of power. As Bourke argues, “emotions such as fear do
not only belong to individuals or social groups: they mediate between the individual and
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the social. They are about power relations. Emotions lead to a negotiation of the boundaries
between self and other or one community and another.” 52
This dissertation differs from previous work on the history of emotions in various
ways. Above all, it lays much more emphasis on the relationship between emotions and the
meanings they bring about than has been common in historiography. Throughout, I claim
that emotions shaped the meanings people gave to the world they lived in at the same time
that emotions, particularly people’s emotional expressions, helped express meaning to
people’s actions and strategies. Likewise, I shed light on how emotions shaped society’s
notions of the past and the future and brought about new understandings of their collective
memory and their horizons of expectation. In addition, somewhat in the same vein as
Moscoso and Zaragoza’s proposal, the dissertation is more interested in coming within
reach of people’s emotional experiences rather than studying how emotions changed in
time. For this reason, contrary to most historians of emotions who usually study long
periods of time to grasp changes in emotional standards, this dissertation focuses on a
relatively short period of just over twenty years. 53 Accordingly, throughout the chapters I
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carry out a fine-grained, microscopic analysis that focuses on concrete events and studies
the lives and testimonies of specific individuals. This approach seeks to analyze people’s
actions, expressions, and moods as well as the milieu in which they lived in. By doing so,
it seeks to get a better sense of the ways they experienced emotions and how these emotions
gave meaning to the world they lived in.
My work also builds on Monique Scheer’s invitation to think of emotions as
practices, following Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of the term. 54 To an extent, Bourdieu’s
practice theory does not leave much room for people’s subjective strategies. Yet, he
explains that the habitus sets the limits to what is possible but leaves the possibility for
individuals to have goals and intentions within the boundaries and conditions imposed by
the habitus.55 In that sense, emotional practices – such as gestures, body postures, and
verbal and nonverbal expressions – can also be strategic when individuals and
collectivities, within the limits and conditions imposed by the habitus, suggest specific
meanings by marshalling and guiding their emotional expressions in certain directions.
Lastly, the dissertation also differs from previous work because it underlines
moments of intense emotions and situations in which emotions spread at a frantic pace.
There were moments, such as Quito in 1815, in which fear and distrust grew day after day,
piling up until they finally burst into a panic attack. This by no means implies that my
dissertation subscribes to the “hydraulic model.” Rosenwein’s criticism of Elias and
Febvre’s conception of emotions was valid. Emotions, understood as a form of cognition,
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are always active and operating. They are never “off.” They are never above or below
rationality because they are part of rational thought. Yet, there are moments in which the
environment – with its particular social relations and cultural conditions – produces stimuli
and effervescence that eventually brings about intense experiences and passionate
expressions. Rosenwein does not deny this. Yet, her criticism of the “hydraulic model” has
drawn attention away from the fact that emotions are, at times, experienced more intensely
than others and that there are occasions in which certain emotions and their ensuing
expressions do not surface immediately. Rather, there are instances in which emotions
slowly amass in the hearts and minds of most of society until some sort of stimuli triggers
an emotional outburst.
Independence and the Age of Revolutions in Latin America
In as much as this is a dissertation on the history of emotions, it is also a history of
the independence process in northern South America. It offers a different perspective on
the troubled times the region lived in the early nineteenth century. Rather than focusing on
foundational constitutions, innovative policies and ideas, political and military leaders, or
the role of subaltern groups, this dissertation concentrates on the milieu of confusion and
fear that took over the region. It attempts to grasp society’s anxieties and uncertainties as
well as its feelings of rage, grief, guilt, and hope in order to get a better sense of people’s
decisions and their different understandings of what was happening at the time. Ultimately,
fear and confusion gave shape to the republican and national projects that emerged at the
time.
In that sense, the dissertation is in dialogue with the work of social and political
historians who, in the last few decades, have offered novel interpretations of the Age of
24

Revolutions in Latin America. In recent years, social historians have built on the pioneering
work of scholars such as Alberto Flores Galindo and C.L.R. James, to show definitively
that Indians, free blacks, and African slaves were not merely cannon fodder, but dynamic
and heterogenous actors who behaved according to their interests and ideas. 56 In an effort
to challenge nineteenth-century and traditional historiographies – which hardly mention
the role of Indians, slaves, free blacks, and popular sectors except to emphasize how their
alleged “unruliness” and “rowdiness” menaced the independence process –, 57 social
historians have underlined the capacity of nonelite sectors to make their own, rational, and
sound decisions.58 Yet, as a result of this, many social historians have ended up implying
that the actors of the time had an almost absolute certainty of what was happening and were
unequivocally sure of what was in their best interests. Thus, social historians have obscured
emotions in their work, usually taking them as antipodal to rationality. Many of them have
ignored the role of emotions shaping people’s decisions and their understandings of what
was happening around them. This dissertation attempts to tackle this gap.
Towards the end of twentieth century, social historians turned their attention
towards the role of peasants, plebeians, slaves, and Indians during the Age of Revolutions
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in Latin America.59 By doing so, many scholars have sought to highlight their contributions
to the revolutionary and independence processes. Peter Guardino, for instance, has claimed
that peasants in Mexico, particularly in Guerrero, made major contributions to the
independence efforts as well as to the liberal reform movements of the 1850s. Throughout
the first half of the nineteenth century, peasants gained access to local power thanks to their
alliances with regional elites. At the same time, these coalitions enabled liberal elites to
push forward reforms at the national level. 60 Eric Van Young argues that in Mexico in the
1810s many popular rural insurgents joined rebel armies with the goal of defending their
local culture and their communal autonomy from the growing intervention of Bourbon
authorities. Yet, rural plebeians did not completely reject the Spanish Monarchy as was the
case of most creole elites. Van Young notes that, at least during the first years of the
independence process, Indians made up over half of all rural insurgents. 61 On the other side
of the continent, plebeian political participation was also prevalent during these years.
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Lyman Johnson explains that Buenos Aires’ artisans growingly disapproved viceregal
authorities due to their inaction at the rising and unrestrained arrival of imports. Urban
workers’ opposition to viceregal officials radicalized throughout the first years of the
nineteenth century, helping create an environment favorable to the rise of insurgent
movements.62
In the Peruvian case, scholars such as Scarlett O’Phelan and Charles Walker have
revealed the complex network of alliances and tensions that came about during the Túpac
Amaru rebellion in the 1780s. Plebeian Indians pushed for the abolition of tribute and the
mita system while many Indian leaders opposed their elimination out of fear that it could
reduce their status as social and political brokers. Túpac Amaru, for his part, tried to
navigate these conflicting demands while continuously negotiating and clashing with
Spanish and religious authorities.63 Charles Walker has also argued that, during the wars
of independence, Indians from the Cuzco region tried to create alternative projects different
to the monarchical and republican systems. Following independence, Indians in Cuzco
supported one of these alternative endeavors, that of Agustín Gamarra. As a regional leader
and national president, Gamarra celebrated and acclaimed Cuzco’s Inca legacy. Yet,
Gamarra’s efforts to bridge the tensions between Indian and non-Indian population in Perú
were short-lived. Indians were, in the end, marginalized from full citizenship. 64 Cecilia
Méndez, for her part, explains that in Huanta, peasants found new avenues of social ascent
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in warfare and political office. During periods of war, peasant communities negotiated
material benefits, such as tax exemptions, rights to collect tithes, and control over the
agricultural surplus. Huanta’s peasants shifted positions depending on the benefits they
could obtain. From their initial monarchist position, many of them ended up fighting for
the Peruvian national army.65
Slaves and free blacks have also been at the heart of historians’ inquiries. Peter
Blanchard, for instance, has studied the role of slaves in royalist and rebel armies during
the wars of independence. He argues that warfare opened the possibility for many slaves
to gain their freedom at the same time that it offered them new opportunities for resistance.
Many of them took advantage of the prevalent turmoil to escape or to sue their masters
when these did not comply with their promises of manumission or with other basic rights.
Blanchard explains that in certain regions, such as present-day Colombia and Venezuela,
most slaves ended up fighting for royalist armies. In others, such as Buenos Aires, a
majority of them were recruited by rebel armies. Close to 40% of José de San Martín’s
army that invaded Chile was made up of former slaves. 66 Federica Morelli and María
Eugenia Chávez have explained that, in the Esmeraldas region, in present-day Ecuador,
slaves and runaway communities, for the most part, supported Quito’s insurgents. They did
so with the hopes of obtaining freedom and autonomy. 67
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Even though many slaves in northern South America ended up enlisted in royalist
armies, free blacks throughout the region were fundamental pushing provincial authorities
to form local government juntas and, later on, to declare independence from Spain. In the
case of Cartagena, Alfonso Múnera explains that on November 11, 1811, the city’s free
blacks pressured the city’s patricians, even with threats of violence, into signing the
province’s declaration of independence from Spain. Múnera argues that these first years of
republican life saw the rise of a mulatto consciousness that was in conflict with the
privileges of the city’s white elites.68 Aline Helg, for her part, highlights the diversity of
ideas and points of view among Cartagena’s people of African descent. She argues that
racial solidarity did not exist and that many of the city’s free blacks did not support slaves
in their demands for manumission and abolition. Yet, at the same time, most free blacks
supported independence and pushed for the adoption of racial equality in Cartagena’s 1812
Constitution.69 Similarly, Marixa Lasso’s work underlines that Cartagena’s free blacks
advocated for racial equality and played a protagonist role in the province’s declaration of
independence. She argues that creole elites appropriated the discourse of racial equality as
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a means to demand greater American political participation in the Córtes in Cádiz and,
later on, to incite patriot nationalism throughout New Granada and Venezuela. 70
In Venezuela’s case, scholars such as Alejandro Gómez and Cristina Soriano have
stressed the social and racial heterogeneity as well as the political dynamism of the region’s
black and mixed-race population. In Caracas and most of its proximities, people of African
descent ended up supporting the rebel faction. But they did not do so from the beginning.
Once the monarchical crisis began, most pardos beneméritos and pardo militias opposed
the creole elites’ projects. Their opposition grew from a series of rumors that claimed that
Caracas’ patricians would enslave all free blacks and pardos. Yet, in the following years,
most of the city’s mixed-race, free blacks, and slaves joined the rebel side after they were
convinced that republicans could better channel their aspirations. In Caracas’ case,
Francisco de Miranda’s tertulias and political associations, where racial equality and
abolition were constantly discussed, helped move public support in favor of republicanism.
In other regions, such as Valencia, many slaves and free blacks backed the royalist faction
as they believed it offered better chances of gaining manumission and access to land while
also limiting the political power of local patricians.71
In Venezuela, people of all social stratums and racial backgrounds ended up
immersed in dynamic political debates. As Soriano explains, in the late eighteenth century
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an incipient public sphere emerged in Caracas and neighboring cities. Venezuela’s diverse
population ended up in a “wide range of debates questioning the monarchical regime and
colonial rule, the socioracial hierarchies of colonial society, and the system of slavery.” 72
Amidst these discussions – and owing to the political and social tensions of the time – the
Haitian Revolution became not only a specter, but above all a “common language used by
both rulers and plebeian groups to make demands and negotiate change.” 73
In a variety of ways, plebeians, Indians, free blacks, and slaves played an active
and dynamic role backing the independence process and the rise of republicanism. Yet, as
has been mentioned, nonelite groups were not uniform nor homogenous. Many of them,
for a variety of reasons, ended up on the royalist side. In recent years, a number of historians
have turned their attention away from the rebel faction to study the different reasons why
many slaves and Indians defended Ferdinand VII’s authority and opposed independence
and republicanism. Marcela Echeverri, for instance, explores the complex networks of
alliances that developed in the Province of Popayán where most Indians, free blacks, and
slaves joined royalist ranks as a means to defend their privileges and gain benefits for their
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communities. As Echeverri explains, amidst the monarchical crisis, many slaves in
Popayán strategically decided to defend Ferdinand VII’s sovereignty in order to uphold
their legal right to freedom in a context in which slaveowners had decided to ignore the
king’s authority. Moreover, slaves recognized the existence of slavery as an institution only
insofar as it was mediated by the monarch’s justice. 74 Indian communities, for their part,
“were eager to participate in the military defense of the sovereignty of the king. In exchange
for military service, Indians gained certain concessions and benefits, particularly the
reduction of their tribute payment…”75 During the first years of republican life, Echeverri
explains, Indians in Popayán and in other parts of New Granada opposed universal
citizenship and the abolition of tribute. They did so to secure their autonomy and land as
well as to maintain the sovereignty of indigenous authorities and the rights of commoner
Indians.76
Similarly, Jairo Gutiérrez Ramos has delved into the web of alliances that emerged
in the Province of Pasto among monarchist elites, the province’s Indians, and the Patianos
(black communities made up of several generations of runaway slaves living in the
riverbanks of the Patía River and the shorelines of the Pacific Ocean). Amidst the tensions
of the time, each group pursued interracial and interclass alliances to defend their own
particular interests. The city’s patricians sought greater autonomy from Quito and Santafé.
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Indians attempted to maintain and increase their political privileges and their access to land.
Patianos sought political status and recognition of their autonomy. 77
Steiner Saether, for his part, studies royalist decorations given to Indians who
fought for the royalist faction. Saether argues that indigenous “support for monarchical rule
implied more influence, greater autonomy and more privileges than they had enjoyed
previously and certainly more than what they could hope for should the republicans be
victorious.”78 Tomás Straka makes a similar argument for the Venezuelan case. He argues
that most pardos, Indians, and slaves defended the monarch’s sovereignty partly out of a
sincere devotion to the king, but also because of their enmity towards Caracas’ patricians.
For many of them, the Spanish monarchy was a lesser evil when compared to the possibility
of being ruled by local patricians.79 In the Province of Quito, the situation was not much
different. Indians took advantage of the tensions of the time to put forward awaited
demands such as the reduction of tribute payments, access to the cabildos, and further
social status. At times, they supported the republican side, but, for the most part, their
allegiances ended up in the royalist faction, where they believed their demands could be
better met.80 In the end, historians studying popular royalism in the Americas have shown
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that it was heterogenous, diverse, and highly layered. There were many different versions
of popular royalism and not all of them can be considered conservative. Some of them even
took a distinctive liberal twist, particularly among those who endorsed the 1812 Cádiz
Constitution.81
Besides being in dialogue with social historians, this dissertation is also in
conversation with the work of political historians of the independence process. In recent
years, a series of political historians have challenged traditional, nineteenth century
narratives of the independence process as well as mid-twentieth century Marxist analyses.
While traditional historians portrayed independence as a heroic deed that should be
acclaimed, scholars from the mid-twentieth century called out the independence process as
an aristocratic or bourgeoise scheme that simply transferred power from the Spanish elites
to the creole elites. In the last few decades, political historians have shown a much more
complex and nuanced story. In doing so, they have paid close attention to nineteenthcentury thinkers and political leaders – their writings, ideas, aspirations, and projects – to
understand the historical significance of the rise of new republican nations.
The independence process has been a milestone in Colombian and Latin America
political historiography. Among political historians and public intellectuals, there is
probably no other historical process that has received as much attention. In 1827, only a
few years after the formation of the first Republic of Colombia, José Manuel Restrepo
published, the Historia de la Revolución de la República de Colombia. Some decades later,
José María Samper wrote Apuntamientos para la Historia Política y Social de la Nueva
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Granada in 1853 and José Manuel Groot published Historia Eclesiástica y Civil de la
Nueva Granada in 1889.82 Although each one offered different arguments, Restrepo,
Samper, and Groot all highlighted and praised the central role that creole elites played
during the wars of independence. Restrepo was critical of federalism and defended strong,
centralized governments such as the one that Simón Bolívar was erecting at the time.
Samper highlighted the French Revolution’s influence on New Granada’s creole elites
while Groot argued that Spanish and Catholic heritage were part of the nation’s essence.
Ultimately, their different accounts of the independence process portrayed creole leaders
as heroes and justified their rule – and that of their descendants – over the new country. 83
During the first half of the twentieth century, these narratives, particularly Restrepo
and Groot’s, continued to be prevalent in Colombian education and people’s imaginaries.
It was only towards the mid-century that new interpretations came about. It was during
these years that Colombian scholars and intellectuals began to adopt new historical
methods, with new questions and ways of understanding the past. Heroes and great leaders
stopped being at the center of historical inquiry and were replaced by questions concerning
social conflicts and classes.84 From a Marxist perspective, several scholars began to claim
that the independence process did not bring any significant transformation as it left
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economic structures untouched at the same time that land property, public positions, and
social standing continued in the hands of the same white, creole elites. 85 For instance,
Gerardo Molina argued that, during independence, the creole bourgeoisie was successful
maintaining the established order and upholding their control over political and social
power.86 Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, for his part, claimed that many leaders of the
independence process betrayed the aspirations of New Granada’s peasants and artisans to
maintain their own personal and family privileges. 87
Around the second half of the twentieth century, historians of Colombia and Latin
America slowly began to draw their attention away from the independence process. Yet,
towards the turn of the century, there was a reawakening in historians’ interest for this
period of time. Social historians, as has been discussed, began to explore the role of nonelite
groups during the independence process. Political historians, for their part, have tried to
push back against analyses that denied that independence and republicanism brought about
any sort of political or social transformations.
From a political culture perspective, François-Xavier Guerra was among the first
scholars to insist that independence and the revolutionary process brought about a
significant rupture from the colonial past. For Guerra, a manifest and irreversible break
took place during the 1810s and 1820s, regardless of the shallowness of some reforms or
the many setbacks the new republics faced. Guerra claims that this period brought about a
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new consciousness along with a new type of human being. As Guerra explains, this new
human was individualistic and far removed from the caste and hierarchical society that
characterized the colonial period. Guerra maintains that in the early nineteenth century, a
new sense of legitimacy emerged among Latin American societies. Legitimacy now came
from the sovereign people and the nation. Guerra encompassed all these transformations
under the term Modernity. For Guerra, Modernity did not spread uniformly among society.
It first consolidated among the elites and slowly spread through the rest of society. 88
Guerra’s work inspired many historians to think of the independence process not
only in terms of structural social and economic transformations, but also from the
perspective of political culture and political discourses. Among Colombian historians,
Isidro Vanegas and Daniel Gutiérrez have insistently highlighted that independence and
the rise of republicanism brought about dynamic and innovative debates concerning
people’s rights and the relation between the government and the people. For instance,
Vanegas argues that the dozens of new constitutions that were enacted during those years
were, by themselves, a radical rupture from the past. For Vanegas, the advent of these new
constitutions reveals the willingness of both notables and plebeians to create their own
political communities. Within these new spaces, they were able to rethink what justice and
equality meant for them. Moreover, these constitutions brought a new legal status, that of
citizenship, which implied a certain equality before the law. 89 Gutiérrez, for his part, has
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highlighted that during the 1810s there were challenging debates over the sorts of relations
of power that provincial governments should have with one another. Gutiérrez’s work
underlines the highly federalist spirit that prevailed during these first years of
independence. It was, to an extent, a break from the ways in which power had been
distributed in the past, when major decisions were usually taken in Santafé and overseas. 90
In a similar vein, Margarita Garrido has explained that independence and republicanism
brought about a new language through which people of all social stratums and races could
better channel their aspirations and demands for rights. Likewise, Garrido explains that
independence came with the advent of new, alternative notions of power. 91
Historians who have studied Latin America’s first decades of republican life have
made similar claims about the liberal spirit and the innovative republican institutions that
came about in the years following the independence process. James Sanders, for instance,
revolved around who should be granted citizenship and how a good citizen could be defined. (Jeremy
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argues that Hispanic American republican modernity was the bastion and vanguard of
popular, anti-colonial liberty in the Atlantic world. Sanders argues that, between the 1840s
and 1870s, the true home of liberty, equality, and fraternity was not France, but Spanish
America. It was in this region of the world, he claims, that these notions were actually lived
in the practices of the people.92 For her part, Lina del Castillo shows that, for the Colombian
case, the formation of the state was shaped by scientific knowledge. Colombia’s leaders
sought to legitimize and impose a scientific project that would place the country in the
global vanguard.93
In this vast literature about the independence process and the Age of Revolutions
in Latin America, emotions have been mostly absent. There are, however, several
exceptions. Margarita Garrido, for instance, has argued that fear of the mob led creole
leaders in Santafé in 1810 to contain, manage, and moderate both plebeian and patrician’s
aspirations for political change. Garrido has also analyzed a series of patriotic sermons
ordered by General Francisco José de Santander in 1819 after rebel troops took over
Bogotá. She claims that these homilies sought to ease people’s feelings of guilt by showing
them that republicanism was not sinful nor contrary to God’s will. 94 Pablo Rodríguez, for
his part, explains that the 1812 earthquake that shook northern Venezuela caused much
fear and guilt among republican supporters and, ultimately, enabled the royalists’ takeover
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of Caracas and other rebel cities.95 Daniel Gutiérrez has shown that José Manuel Restrepo’s
fears towards royalist repression during the monarchical restoration explains why the
creole leader abandoned his political activism towards the mid-1810s. 96
Christon I. Archer argues that around mid-1810 the Bajío region in México lived a
sort of collective neurosis. People of all social stratums shared the feeling that an
impending calamity was soon going to happen. Archer explains that this collective fear,
coupled with a sense of intense mistrust among different social group, helps explain why
so many people, particularly European Spaniards and creole elites, fled the countryside and
moved to urban centers once the Hidalgo rebellion began. 97 Peter Guardino, for his part,
maintains that the rumors and feelings of fear that spread after the onset of the monarchical
crisis heightened the sense of crisis that people felt at the time. Ultimately, this collective
anguish shaped society’s beliefs and what people considered possible and plausible. 98
Peter Blanchard’s recent work on Buenos Aires’ urban elite explores the patricians’
strong sense of loyalty towards the Spanish Crown and their class cohesion during the late
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. Blanchard argues that the elites’ fear and
anxiety of losing their privileges and ascendence incited a fervent loyalism among them.
Despite their many internal conflicts and tensions, such zealous loyalty kept patricians
together. With the advent of the monarchical crisis, the element bringing the elites together
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– that is, the Spanish Monarchy – vanished and conflicts between them flourished. Such
frictions and divisions, Blanchard argues, would afflict the region for decades. 99 Alejandro
Rabinovich, from a military history perspective, maintains that a panic attack among rebel
troops helps explain the royalist victory in the battle of Huaqui in June 1811. This battle,
he argues, was a major defeat to the most radical faction of Buenos Aires’ May Revolution
and hindered the rebel armies’ advance into Upper Perú. 100
Claudia Rosas Lauro, for her part, has shown that in Perú most people perceived
the French Revolution in a negative light. Lima’s residents were shocked and terrified with
news of Louis XVI’s execution and the revolutionaries’ constant attacks on the clergy.
Among Lima’s elite, there was a great fear that the French Revolution’s bloodshed could
spread to the other side of the Atlantic. This anguish was fed by memories of the violence
the region had recently endured during the Tupac Amaru Rebellion. Charles Walker,
studying a relatively earlier period, highlights the many feelings of guilt and anguish that
spread across Lima following the 1748 earthquake that destroyed the city. Walker claims
that the earthquake ended up shaping the city’s moral consciousness and brought about
new moral controls over its resident’s actions and thoughts. 101
Among these historians, it is probably Claudia Rosas and Margarita Garrido who
have made the greatest efforts to stimulate the history of emotions in Latin America. Rosas
has edited two multidisciplinary books that study emotions – particularly fear, hate, and
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forgiveness – in Peruvian history. Rosas also edited, with Manuel Chust, a book on the
revolutionaries’ misgivings and anxieties during the independence process. 102 Garrido,
along with Javier Moscoso, recently edited an issue of Historia Crítica dedicated to the
history of emotions. Most of articles deal with the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. In her opening remarks, Garrido explains that the history of emotions has been
steadily growing in Latin America history, particularly in the last decade. She concludes
that, among historians of Latin America, the field has a promising future in the years to
come.103
So much has been said about the independence process and the Age of Revolutions
in Latin America that it seems as if nothing new can be claimed about this period. Yet,
viewing these times from the viewpoint of the history of emotions offers fresh perspective
on how people experienced and understood the world that they were living in. Such an
approach sheds light on the prevalent uncertainty that was experienced during the early
nineteenth century at the same time that if helps understand the changing tides of revolution
and reform. Emotions were not mere reactions nor instrumental responses as is sometimes
implied. They were a constitutive part of how people understood and gave meaning to the
world around them.
This dissertation makes a contribution to the vast historiography of the
independence process in three ways. In the first place, this dissertation puts into doubt the
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sense of certainty that allegedly existed at the time. For François-Xavier Guerra, people in
the 1810s were fully conscious of the transformations they were living. They were aware,
he argues, that they were creating a new society with a new political order. Vanegas makes
a similar claim when he implies that basically everyone understood the language and
repercussions of the newly enacted constitutions. Some social historians, such as
Blanchard, Múnera, Gutiérrez Ramos, and Echeverri, tend to present a somewhat similar
scenario, although more nuanced, in which slaves unmistakably knew which side would
best keep their promises of manumission, Indians were certain of which faction would
reduce tribute payments and maximize their access to land, and free blacks were fully
aware of who offered better chances for them to improve their social standing.
Yet, such a scenario is not consistent with many accounts found in the historical
records. People at the time were trying to navigate the troubled times they were living in.
Some were simply trying to survive. Others, tried to gain some benefit from the tensions
of the time, but they did so with imperfect and, many times, false information. These were,
after all, times in which uncertainty and confusion were widespread. Former alliances were
constantly falling apart, power was continually changing hands, and legislation was
frequently being reformed. Not everyone had a clear sense of what was happening, of what
to expect from the future, or of how they and their communities could make the best of the
situation. In that sense, this dissertation simply tries to show a more nuanced picture that
considers the lack of certitude of the time and that takes into account that emotions,
particularly uncertainty and fear, informed and shaped people’s actions and decisions.
Individuals and collective groups belonging to all stratums of society assessed the situation
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the best they could. Yet, their decisions were informed and shaped by emotions,
particularly by the prevalent uncertainty of the time.
Secondly, with respect to the extensive literature on this historical period, my
dissertation stresses the persistence of monarchical and colonial notions of order, stability,
and power. Guerra, Vanegas, and Gutiérrez, among others, have highlighted the novel
constitutions, the innovative projects, and the new language of rights that arose during this
period. This dissertation does not completely refute their claims; however, I attempt to
present a more nuanced analysis that considers the ways in which different experiences of
fear, confusion, hope, and anger both inspired and deterred the establishment of democratic
and republican institutions. Despite the many pioneering and democratic ideas and projects
that emerged during these years, not all of them survived their establishment and many
were distorted and deformed once they were put into practice. Dread and uncertainty led
many of the region’s residents to seek stability and safety at the expense of their hopes for
social and political reform. The milieu of the time ultimately hindered the revolutionary
spirit, enabling the persistence of monarchical and colonial notions of social order, political
stability, and symbolic power.
In the third place, this dissertation invites historians of the independence process
and the Age of Revolutions who pay attention to emotions to avoid simplistic cause-andeffect evaluations. Among the few historians of the independence process who have
considered emotions, most have conceived them from a cause-and-effect perspective. That
is to say, they portray emotions as automatic reactions or as igniters to particular responses.
Rodríguez, for instance, explains that the 1812 earthquake brought about feelings of fear
and guilt and that these emotions ultimately led to the royalists’ takeover of Caracas.
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Blanchard claims that Buenos Aires’ elites feared losing their privileges and standing. Such
anxiety resulted in the patricians setting aside their differences and uniting around the
Spanish Monarchy’s authority to defend their status. These cause-and-effect analyses of
emotions are not necessarily incorrect, but they oversimplify what emotions are and how
they work. Emotions are much more than mere reactions and triggers. To better understand
the implications of the independence process and how people lived and understood this
period, historians should attempt to see beyond cause-and-effect analyses of emotions.
Those studying this period could benefit from conceiving emotions as part of human
cognition that helps give meaning to people’s world.
Dissertation organization
This dissertation is organized into five roughly chronological chapters. The first
chapter studies Santafé de Bogotá, between 1808 and 1810. During these months,
confusion and fear spread and took a life of their own thanks to the circulation of rumors
about the monarchical crisis that had broken out in the Iberian Peninsula. Among them
were claims of an impending French invasion of the Americas, the circulation of
conspiracies stating that top official had decided to betray Ferdinand VII, and false stories
that placed the Viceroyalty of New Granada under the control of the Portuguese monarchs.
Amidst this atmosphere of widespread misinformation, uncertainty, and fright, people’s
sense of what was real and plausible was distorted. Their horizons of expectations were
altered, giving rise to new possible futures. Under such circumstances, some even began
to envision the possibility of putting an end to the monarchy and obtaining absolute
independence from Spain. In such a context, emotions altered and shaped society’s
prevailing hegemonic frameworks.
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The second chapter studies the different emotions that emerged following an
earthquake in northern Venezuela and a series of volcanic eruptions in Popayán. Both
natural disasters produced fear and guilt throughout society. However, not everyone
experienced these emotions with the same intensity nor did they give them the same
meaning. Moreover, there were some who, amidst the atmosphere of dread and remorse,
expressed hope of better times to come claiming these natural phenomena were mere
obstacles towards success. The division between “emotional communities”, following
Barbara Rosenwein’s understanding of the term, was partly drawn following political lines.
Royalists tried to incite feelings of guilt and fear, accusing rebels of having brought about
God’s wrath with their sinful ways. They exploited the fact that the 1812 earthquake struck
on a Maundy Thursday, that rebel provinces were hit the hardest, and that the tremor killed
thousands and destroyed hundreds of buildings. In the meantime, republicans attempted to
ease such feelings explaining that republicanism and independence were not contrary to
God’s will. However, there was another factor separating one group from the other. It had
to do with people’s understandings of the natural world. Those who believed earthquakes
and volcanic eruptions were simply natural phenomena had fewer reasons to feel guilt or
to fear God’s wrath. Popayán’s different responses to the volcanic eruptions are evocative
of this division. While some authorities organized rites of repentance to calm God’s anger,
others ordered indigenous peoples to climb the Puracé to clear its cracks so that the volcano
could “breathe.”
Emotions are also closely connected to people’s recollections and their notions of
the past. The third chapter studies how collective memory shapes emotions and in which
ways emotions have an effect on people’s remembrances. On the afternoon of June 27,
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1815, a panic attack broke out in the streets of Quito. In previous days, a variety of rumors
had been circulating throughout the city. Some claimed that a revolt was soon to happen
and that rebels were planning to attack the military quarters. Others maintained that royalist
troops were going to ransack the city’s shops and residences. On the morning of the 27th,
these rumors gained even more strength. At around three in the afternoon, when the church
bells tolled, mayhem broke out. Quiteños ran in all directions trying to find cover. Royalist
troops stationed in the city’s outskirts marched into the city to put down the disturbance.
In a matter of a few minutes, Quito’s streets were left empty and in complete silence.
Royalist soldiers captured a few suspects and went back to their quarters. Besides this,
nothing particularly important happened on the afternoon of the 27th. The enquiries into
the uproar contain dozens of testimonies explaining some of the motives that led to the
panic attack. Many of Quito’s residents linked the rumors with remembrances of past
episodes of urban violence. Some claimed that when they heard stories of an impending
commotion, they felt that the tragic events of August 2, 1810, when royalist troops killed
hundreds, were going to repeat themselves.
In the fourth chapter, I examine a series of strategies employed in rituals and judicial
trials during the monarchical restoration (1815-1818). In both scenarios, emotional
expressions, such as gestures, body movements, and tone of voice, served as indicators of
a person’s standing in society. These expressions could convey someone’s fidelity or
disloyalty to the Crown. To improve their place, individuals had to accurately interpret the
circumstances surrounding them. In 1817, during the funerary rites of José María Morcillo,
a royalist priest killed by rebel troops, those who attended the funeral expressed feelings
of grief, rage, and awe. But it was ultimately a sense of elation that prevailed. During the
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funeral rites, the vicar’s sermon claimed that Morcillo’s death had been a glorious one that
should be celebrated rather than mourned. Thus, Popayán’s residents demonstrated their
loyalty to the Crown expressing jubilation over the priest’s murder. Almost a year after
Popayán celebrated Morcillo’s funeral, in Santafé, José Ángel Manrique, the priest of the
town of Manta, was interrogated for allegedly aiding the Almeyda Guerrilla. Manrique was
ultimately sentenced for betraying the Spanish Monarchy. His trial shows that emotional
expressions were strategically employed to demonstrate allegiances to one faction or the
other.
The fifth chapter studies a series of cases – such as the celebration of the 1821
Constitution in Bogotá when the constitution was placed on a throne – that together
illustrate the persistence of colonial and monarchical archetypes. In the 1820s, the
inhabitants of the newly formed republic constantly looked back to monarchical
representations of power, to colonial notions of what society should look like, and to past
events to strategically give meaning to the times they were living. Archetypes coming from
previous decades fed and informed political and social tensions at the same time that they
guided and shaped people’s emotions. A mental image of a prior symbol of power or of
bygone notions of society brought about emotions and emotional expressions associated to
those particular archetypes. Drawing on William Reddy’s notion of “emotives” – and
expanding on its implications – this chapter discusses how mental images hailing from the
colonial past gave form not only to the main debates of the time, but also to the ways in
which emotions were experienced, expressed, and understood.
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Methodological challenges and reflections
In 2008, José Saramago published The Elephant’s Journey, a historical novel about
an Indian elephant’s voyage from Lisbon to Vienna. Solomon – or Suleiman, as he would
be known during his last years of life – and his mahout, Subhro, were taken from India to
Portugal in the 1540s. Around the end of the decade, King Joao III offered Solomon as a
gift to Archduke Maximilian II of Austria. Saramago narrates the elephant’s travels from
Lisbon to Valladolid, from Valladolid to Catalonia, from Catalonia to Genoa, and from
Genoa to Vienna. Towards the end of the novel, as Saramago describes Solomon’s
struggles and those of all of his companions climbing up the Alps amidst snowstorms and
steep slopes, the author takes a short break from the actors’ physical strains and begins
digressing, posing a reflection on the different challenges that novelists and historians face.
“It must be said that history is always selective, and discriminatory too”, he explains,
“selecting from life only what society deems to be historical and scorning the rest, which
is precisely where we might find the true explanation of facts, of things, of wretched reality
itself. In truth, I say to you, it is better to be a novelist, a fiction writer, a liar. Or a mahout,
despite the harebrained fantasies to which, either by birth or profession, they seem to be
prone.”104
Saramago’s digression is pertinent to discuss the many challenges this dissertation
and the history of emotions, in general, face. Even though I have claimed throughout this
introduction that emotions are fundamental to grasp society’s experiences and people’s
notions of reality, emotions are mostly absent from historical accounts. And although I
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consider emotions to be central to the historians’ goal of finding “the true explanation of
facts” and the “wretched reality itself”, emotions have a relatively marginal place in the
historical records of the early nineteenth century. It is as if those who lived during this
historical period did not deem emotions to be important enough to write about them in the
records. Emotions occasionally make an explicit appearance in the few diaries of the time
which have survived, in sermons and religious treatises, in correspondence, in periodicals,
and in court trials. Their presence is explicit in the historical documents in the sense that
terms referring to particular emotions or to certain emotional expressions are present in the
text. There are other cases in which the text itself, without making any direct allusion to a
specific emotion or expression, hints to an atmosphere in which certain emotions are
prevalent. In these sorts of cases, labeling the milieu under a specific emotion poses several
difficulties as there is always the risk of characterizing it under a term that is distant from
what contemporaries actually experienced and felt. In these cases, it is necessary to have
as many testimonies as possible in order to have a better grasp of what people were feeling
and of the ways in which they would define the emotional atmosphere of the time.
The lack of sources referring to emotions is only one of the challenges that comes
up. A second difficulty arises when trying to comprehend what those terms meant and
implied at the time. In the past, terms referring to emotions did not have the same meanings
and connotations as they now have in the present. For instance, in the early nineteenth
century, the term emoción (emotion) that we use today was hardly ever used. Emoción does
not even come up in the Diccionario de Autoridades. The terms sentimiento (feeling or
sentiment) and, to a lesser extent, sensibilidad (sensibility) appear more often. Yet, they
did not always directly allude to emotions. The 1739 Diccionario de Autoridades offers six
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definitions to term sentimiento. The “action of perceiving objects through the senses”, “the
soul’s perceptions of spiritual things, with pleasure, satisfaction, or internal movement”,
and “the sadness, or pain, that gravely disturbs” are some of the most common
definitions.105 Terms such as fear and confusion are referred to as disturbances in the spirit.
For instance, the 1734 Diccionario de Autoridades defines fear as the “disturbance of the
spirit, originating from the apprehension of some danger or risk that is dreaded or
suspected.”106 Confusion, for its part, was defined by the 1729 Diccionario de Autoridades
as a “disorder, disturbance, disconcert, and revolution of things.” 107
These difficulties of trying to grasp the meanings of the early nineteenth century do
not imply that emotions, as we understand and conceive them in the present, did not exist
in the early nineteenth century. It is simply that they were referred to and defined using
terms that are not necessarily the same as ours and that these terms had somewhat different
connotations in the past. The definitions that come up in the Diccionario de Autoridades
hint at the diversity of meanings and understandings at the same time that they suggest that,
in everyday usages, emotions were usually conceived as alterations, perturbations, and
responses. These conceptions are, of course, different from the definition I use throughout
the dissertation. That is, of emotions as a part of cognition that help give meaning to
people’s lives. I have tried to avoid imposing my definition on the actors of the time, simply
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using my understanding of the term as a category of analysis to explore people’s emotions
and their comprehensions of the times they were living in.
A third difficulty was noted earlier when discussing Peter Stearns and Nicole
Eustace’s misgivings on grasping emotional experience. As they have explained, historians
face the practical problem of ever being able to determine what people in the past were
actually experiencing internally. 108 Sources offer hints of what a person might be feeling,
either because the documents tell us that a person is feeling a given emotion in a specific
moment or because they refer to a person’s emotional expressions and we are guided to
believe that that individual is feeling emotions associated to those expressions. Yet, the
historical records will almost always fall short of giving us a complete picture of what that
person was really feeling, what they felt in their bodies, what thoughts were in their minds,
the intensity of the emotion being lived, how they truly processed those emotions, and how
those emotions shaped their conceptions of the world.
One could add to Stearns and Eustace’s reservations that some historical documents
not only fail to describe a person’s internal and authentic experience, but they sometimes
portray people’s deceptive expressions and feelings as if they were truthful. For instance,
there are occasions in which individuals strategically alter their emotional expressions to
convey certain meanings. That is to say, there are moments in which historical sources only
seem to inform us of the “public transcript”, as James Scott would call it. In these cases,
the historical records only end up blurring people’s true feelings and experiences even
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further.109 Emotions, particularly the ways in which they are expressed, are mediums
through which power relations unravel. Subordinate and dominant groups employ their
public transcript in rituals and interrogations, among others, to contest or impose power.
From Scott’s perspective, one could claim that many of the emotional expressions that we
find in the historical records are merely performances to navigate power struggles.
To make matters more complicated, it is worth considering William Reddy’s
thoughts about how the act of naming or labeling an emotion leads to a realignment of
people’s sensations. That is to say, once we label an emotion that we are feeling, our
experiences and expressions of that emotion shift towards what society recognizes as
common ways of feeling and displaying such emotion. If an incident is considered to incite
happiness, we guide ourselves into feeling and demonstrating sensations that are in
accordance with those that society, with its particular cultural and social norms, accepts as
happiness.110 That is to say, Reddy’s claims suggest that the authenticity or sincerity of an
emotional experience is always mediated by society’s notions of what such emotion should
produce. In that sense, it is safe to say that historians studying attitudes, mentalities, and
emotionology, such as the Stearnses and Eustace, are walking on more solid ground than
those trying to grasp people’s experiences. Yet, this by no means implies that emotional
experiences should be discarded as a subject of historical inquiry.
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Throughout the dissertation, I try to tackle these challenges in several ways. For the
one part, I have kept the Diccionario de Autoridades in hand and have also tried to place
careful attention at how terms referring to emotions were used in written documents. In
doing so, I try to grasp – in as much as is possible – the meanings given by those writing
the historical records. More importantly, I have tried to delve into the milieu of the time. It
is for this reason that this dissertation, at times, carries out a fine-grained microscopic,
ethnographic analysis of concrete cases, trying to immerse myself – and hopefully the
reader – into the context and milieu of the time. To an extent, this method is much in the
spirit of Clifford Geertz’s “deep description” and Robert Darnton’s “history in the
ethnographic grain.”111 Through close analyses of funeral rites, judicial interrogatories,
rituals, and panic attacks, among others, I try to delve into the societies’ webs of
significance. My analyses and conclusions are not as all-encompassing and extensive as
Geertz’s when studying a cockfight or Darnton’s when examining a cat massacre. Yet, I
do try to plunge myself into the society of the time, closely looking at concrete events and
testimonies, with the hope of getting a better sense of the prevalent social relations and
cultural conditions.
At times, owing to the limited sources, I have had to recur to a less conventional
method, that which Natalie Zemon Davis calls “informed imagination.” In an article
discussing her book, The Return of Martin Guerre, Davis describes her method in the
following way: “I worked as a detective, assessing my sources and the rules for their
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composition, putting together clues from many places, establishing a conjectural argument
that made the best sense, the most plausible sense, of sixteenth-century evidence.” 112 In the
case of dissertation, there have been moments in which the sources offer plenty of valuable
information but they fall short of presenting enough evidence to put forward conclusive
arguments about a particular happening or a specific person. However, when one considers
a wider picture and takes into account the ensemble of documents and the context that they
refer to, the situation changes somewhat. In many cases, historical documents inform about
a given atmosphere – with the generalized feelings and moods. This information
complements the evidence that textually appears in specific documents. In such cases, the
sum of all this assorted evidence offers the conditions for historians to suggest a conjectural
argument. Throughout the dissertation, in the cases in which I have employed my
“informed imagination”, I have made sure to make this clear to the reader by using “the
conditional – ‘would have’, ‘may have’, ‘was likely to have’ - and the speculative
‘perhaps’, ‘maybe’” – and the speculative ‘perhaps’, ‘maybe’” as Davis does in her
work.113
These methodological approaches have helped me sidestep, at least partially, the
many challenges and difficulties that come about when one delves into the emotional life
of the past. Studying emotions and focusing on experiences brings about, without doubt,
many problems and difficulties. It might be easier, as Saramago claims, to be “a novelist,
a fiction writer, a liar.” Yet, as Febvre argued in a “New Kind of History”, “being a
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historian means never resigning oneself. It implies trying everything, testing out anything
that might possibly fill in the gaps in our information. It means exercising one’s ingenuity,
that is the word.”114
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Chapter 1: Emotions, Notions of Reality, and Imagined Futures in the Formation of
Santafé’s Junta, 1808-1810.
On February 10, 1810, a rumor spread throughout Santafé de Bogotá claiming that
foreign troops were seen in the Llanos115 moving towards the viceregal capital. The news
caused a terrible stir among the city’s residents. For months, many of Santafé’s inhabitants
had been dreading the possibility of falling into the hands of Napoleon and Joseph
Bonaparte or some other foreign power. As the rumor was propagated, people in the
streets116 speculated about what was actually happening. Some stated the foreigners spotted
in the Llanos were French. Others, that they were English. Some accounts claimed the
Viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbón had just found about the arrival of foreign troops while
others maintained that Amar had known of their presence for weeks but was concealing
critical information from the public. According to one version, the Viceroy had been
informed in previous weeks that fourteen French ships were sailing up the Orinoco River
and were eventually going to attack Santafé. The story claimed the French ships had been
repelled off the coast of Cumaná in Venezuela and forced to traverse the coast towards
Guyana where they entered the mouth of the Orinoco River and began their way up the
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river. It was said that Amar knew that the French troops would, at some point, disembark
their ships and begin to cross the Llanos towards Santafé. 117
Almost two weeks after the rumor began to circulate, Amar sent troops to the
Llanos. Colonel Juan Samano, who had recently arrived from Riohacha with a contingent
of soldiers, was given orders to repel the foreigners. Halfway into their expedition, the
troops were told to return to Santafé. A few days after Samano’s departure, the viceroy and
other officials had been informed that the alleged foreign troops seen in the Llanos were
neither French nor English soldiers, but a small group of rebels from the town of Socorro. 118
Even though the purported arrival of foreign troops in the Llanos ended up being a false
alarm, the episode seems to have given Santafereños and other New Granadians119 further
reasons to feel fear and mistrust.
This rumor was not unique in anyway. Ever since news of Ferdinand VII’s
detention reached the Americas, stories of this kind were common throughout Santafé as
well as other parts of New Granada and Spanish America. For example, the establishment
of Quito’s first junta on August 10, 1809 took place amidst growing rumors of a French
takeover of the Americas. In the weeks leading to formation of the first junta, stories
circulated throughout Quito claiming that thousands of French troops had disembarked in
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the port of Esmeraldas and were set to begin their conquest of Spanish America. 120 Other
rumors maintained that Quito’s Spanish Europeans were planning on slitting the throats of
the city’s most distinguished Criollos121 and then surrendering Quito to Napoleon. 122 Even
the city’s churches were sites of much hearsay. In the midst of growing turmoil, Josefa
Herrera, the marchioness of Maenza, prayed aloud almost every single day in the Church
of Santa Catalina for the soul of Ferdinand VII. Her rather ambiguous prayers sparked
rumors that the king had perished and, thus, the Spanish Monarchy was lost. 123 The
situation was not much different in Caracas. Rumors circulated among the city’s residents
claiming Napoleon and the English had agreed to divide Spanish America between the two
empires. Others maintained that Spain and all its possessions were now in the hands of
Carlota, Princess of Brazil. In Caracas, speculations regarding an impeding French
invasion were common.124 Such rumors spread throughout Spanish America, from capital
cities all the way to towns in the provinces of Neiva 125 in New Granada as well as in
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Oaxaca126 and the Bajío127 in New Spain. As these rumors were propagated, so did people’s
feelings of fear, confusion, and mistrust.
Suspicion and distress continued to spread as more news of Ferdinand VII’s
abdication and the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula reached Spanish America.
Besides the fear and confusion that arose from the prospect of an acephalous monarchy
and the possibility of falling into Bonaparte’s hands, mistrust spread quickly among
Spanish America’s residents. Many Americans suspected that European officials were
betraying Ferdinand VII and selling out to Napoleon and Joseph Bonaparte. On the other
hand, numerous Europeans in the Americas believed Americans were unfaithful to the
Spanish Crown and that some among them were French spies and envoys. 128
Mistrust also arose over the circulation of information and the arrival of
correspondence coming from Europe. Rival factions constantly accused each other of
concealing and distorting news from the Iberian Peninsula. Such accusations were not
completely unfounded.129 Officials frequently discussed ways to regulate and even ban
correspondence and news coming from Europe out of fear that it could lead to unrest and
ungovernability. For example, in October 1808, a fiscal from Cartagena advised Viceroy
Amar to publish and disseminate all news concerning Napoleon’s tyrannical ways but to
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prevent the diffusion of any paper or report that could lead New Granada’s public to doubt
reports of Napoleon’s cruelty and mischiefs. 130
This chapter explores the emotions that circulated throughout Santafé during the
months leading to the establishment of the ‘Junta Suprema de Gobierno de Nueva
Granada.’ The chapter studies the period between August of 1808, when news of Ferdinand
VII’s imprisonment reached the capital, and the last days of July of 1810, shortly after the
junta’s formation. It attempts to grasp the emotions that many of the city’s residents
experienced at the time by paying close attention to people’s public displays of emotions
as well as to the many rumors, false news, and catastrophic stories that circulated
throughout Santafé. In tracing these intense years, I seek to contextualize the establishment
of a junta that advocated self-government and higher levels of autonomy from the Iberian
Peninsula. In the years leading to its formation, reigning feelings of confusion, unrest,
mistrust, and fear shaped people’s support and misgivings for the junta.
Santafé, as the Viceroyalty’s capital, became a nucleus for the propagation and
intensification of emotions and rumors. Mariano Sixto, Santafé’s royal accountant at the
time, explained in a sworn statement that the capital “was the focal point where
revolutionary bolts of lightning got together, and where they acquired the highest levels of
malevolence to, once again, spread throughout the whole circumference of the Kingdom
of New Granada.”131 Although Sixto might be overstating Santafé’s political fervor and its
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influence over the Viceroyalty’s territories, it seems that Santafé did gather and reproduce
many of the rumors and emotions that were circulating throughout New Granada.
The chapter poses two main arguments. In the first place, I argue that many of
Santafé’s residents supported the establishment of a government junta mainly out of fear
of a Napoleonic takeover of the Americas. Perhaps even more important than disdain for
Spanish rule or antipathy towards the monarchical system, it was a rising suspicion
between Spanish Americans and Europeans – who constantly accused each other of treason
– and the looming threat of falling into the hands of Napoleon and Joseph Bonaparte that
led to the formation of a junta aimed at temporary self-government. During the months
leading to its establishment, these feelings of fear and mistrust became even more intense
as a result of the confusion and expectation produced by rumors, false stories, catastrophic
narratives, and the tardiness with which news from Europe reached Santafé. In that sense,
the formation of a junta did not represent a break with the Spanish Monarchy. Sympathy
towards the Spanish Crown continued being prevalent. Such political rupture would
gradually come about during the years to come.
These claims are not completely new. Other historians, such as Jaime Rodríguez,
Margarita Garrido, and Daniel Gutiérrez, among others, have also claimed that the
formation of government juntas did not seek absolute independence from Spain and that
their establishment was the result of the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula as
well as of the growing mistrust between Americans and Europeans. However, by focusing
on the emotional milieu of the time, I show that the juntas were not only the result of
creoles’ pursuits for autonomy amidst times of crisis, but also the outcome of the
widespread uncertainty and fear that came with Ferdinand VII’s abdication.
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In that sense, this chapter shows that emotions played a significant role on Santafé’s
political culture. This chapter argues that the emotions surrounding the establishment of
Santafé’s Junta disrupted society’s existing conceptions of reality, its horizons of
expectation, and notions of symbolic violence. That is to say, emotions shaped the ways
people gave meaning to the world they were living in. Certain emotions were experienced
with such intensity that they altered people’s notions of what was possible and what could
be expected from the future. Emotions produced new imagined futures in which the idea
of being ruled by a political entity other than the Spanish Crown became more plausible
than ever before.132 However, for many, such possibilities entailed catastrophic prospects.
Many Santafereños imagined lawlessness overriding the much-desired public peace they
hoped for. In that sense, the redefinition of existing conceptions of reality ended up blurring
certain relations of power while reinforcing others.
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My analysis about people’s notions of reality – of what they consider possible and
plausible – is inspired by reconsiderations of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as well as
by Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence. In the 1990s, scholars such as James Scott and
William Roseberry, among others, reassessed the use of the term hegemony, offering new
understandings that contrast from the ones originally posed by Antonio Gramsci and some
of his closest successors. More traditional notions of Gramsci’s hegemony consider that
dominant groups impose consent and conformity on the rest of society thanks to their
control over the material basis of production as well as society’s symbolic production. In
other words, through a common discursive framework – including shared education,
language, and symbols – dominant groups legitimize their power over society. Under a
literal understanding of this theory, hegemony produces a widespread consent in which
political and social conflict are basically eradicated.133
Both Scott and Roseberry are critical of such closed conception of hegemony
because it implies a social equilibrium in which social conflict and change seem
implausible. Roseberry, for example, explains that the concept of hegemony should be used
“not to understand consent but to understand struggle, the ways in which the words, images,
symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and movements used by subordinate
populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate themselves to, or resist their
domination are shaped by the process of domination itself.” In that sense, Roseberry
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explains that hegemony constructs “not a shared ideology but a common material and
meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders
characterized by domination.”134 Scott, for his part, argues that a more nuanced
interpretation of the concept leads to an understanding of the term in which hegemonic
domination does not accomplish absolute consent but rather the capacity to “define for
subordinate groups what is realistic and what is not realistic and to drive certain aspirations
and grievances into the realm of the impossible, of idle dreams.” 135
For his part, Bourdieu explains that symbolic violence is the coercion that makes
relations of domination seem natural. For Bourdieu, consent is not only imposed from
above as the dominated may, at times, contribute to their own domination by tacitly
accepting relations of domination as inherent to social life. In Pascalian Meditations,
Bourdieu claims that the habitus creates a series of conditions in which the dominated end
up recognizing and acknowledging that there is magical border separating them from the
dominant classes. Such recognition predisposes them into domination. As Bourdieu
maintains, “the practical recognition through which the dominated, often unwittingly,
contribute to their own domination by tacitly accepting, in advance, the limits imposed on
them, often takes the form of bodily emotion (shame, timidity, anxiety, guilt), often
associated with the impression of regressing towards archaic relationships, those of
childhood and the family.” Bourdieu argues that such practical recognition manifests itself
in “blushing, inarticulacy, clumsiness, trembling, all ways of submitting, however
reluctantly, to the dominant judgement, sometimes in internal conflict and ‘self-division’,
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the subterranean complicity that a body slipping away from the directives of consciousness
and will maintains with the violence of the censures inherent in the social structures.” 136
These reflections about hegemony, consent, and symbolic violence are useful in
thinking about the tensions and conflicts that arose in Santafé between August 1808 and
July 1810. During these close to twenty-four months, the capital’s social and political
structures went mostly unchanged; however, that was not the case for the city’s notions of
reality nor its horizons of expectation. Between 1808 and 1810, the intensification and
propagation of emotions, such as fear and confusion, gradually altered people’s
conceptions of what was realistic, plausible, and acceptable. Many of Santafé’s residents,
both dominant and subordinates, began to imagine and think of prospective futures that
were unconceivable a few years earlier. The imagined border dividing the dominant from
dominated – and the relations and conducts revolving around it – was temporarily blurred
and displaced. In the end, the institution of Santafé’s Junta did not bring immediate and
profound transformations in the city’s power relations. Yet, temporary disruptions in
people’s notions of political and social order opened the way for a series of political
transformations.
Rumors, hearsay, gossip, and pamphlets stirred emotions and conflicts among the
city’s residents and, ultimately, prompted the disruption of people’s conceptions of reality.
According to James Scott, rumors are some of the techniques through which subordinate
groups anonymously present their claims and complaints in public. For Scott, rumors are
located somewhere in between what he terms the “hidden transcript” and the “public
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transcript.” In other words, they are somewhere in between what subordinate groups may
only say, act, and display secretly among themselves and what they are allowed to say and
perform in public. That is, rumors constitute a public act of disguised resistance. As Ranajit
Guha explains, they record the political consciousness of subaltern groups. 137
Rumors not only reveal tensions between dominant and subordinate groups, they
also uncover perceived threats that a society faces as a whole. Rumors usually thrive under
circumstances of uncertainty in which critical events are taking place and no reliable
information or only ambiguous one is available.138 To a certain extent, rumors tend to
emerge as a solution to problems of collective relevance and help make the unknown
comprehensible. They are not simply a burst of fantasy, they are also rational acts that
emerge within a continuum of habitual forms of shared knowledge. 139 In that sense, they
have the capacity to bind people by inciting shared understandings and interpretations of
the world.140 That is, rumors create a reality of their own, one that combines and blends
with what is considered to be the “normal” or “real” reality. 141 The rumors that propagated
throughout Santafé between 1808 and 1810 created a sense of community among the city’s
residents as a result of the widespread belief that a Napoleonic takeover and the fall of the
Spanish Monarchy were soon to come. Yet, frictions also arose from within these shared
feelings and beliefs. While some believed the French conquest would happen as a
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consequence of the treacherous European officials who had sold out to the Bonaparte, there
were others who considered the takeover would come about because Santafé’s most
prominent patricians were in fact Napoleon’s envoys. These rumors and the fear and
confusion they produced ended up shaping people’s sense of reality, their expectations of
the future, and their tacit acceptance of existing relations of domination.
Emotions and rumors during the formation of juntas have not been completely
absent from the historiography of the independence process and the formation of
government juntas.142 For instance, in the case of the establishment of Santafé’s Junta,
nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century historians such as José Manuel Restrepo
and José Manuel Groot sporadically refer to the unrest and fear that came with the
institution of the junta. Yet, in their accounts it seems as if only people of lower ranks
experienced and expressed emotions. These nineteenth-century thinkers portray plebeians,
particularly Indians and blacks, as unruly people whose actions were merely led by their
emotions rather than their intellect. They depict the populace as an uncontrollable horde
that threatened both political stability and the incipient republican projects. In the
meantime, Criollos are portrayed as rational leaders who stood up to the European’s
mistreatments and prevented the mob from destroying society. 143
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Historians such as Marixa Lasso, Sergio Mejía, and Daniel Gutiérrez have argued
that nineteenth-century thinkers depicted popular sectors in such a manner to justify the
elites’ rule over the new nations and to deny plebeians from partaking in political life.
Lasso claims that a prejudiced representation of the populace’s emotions led traditional
historians to overlook the interests, agency, and rationality of a wide diversity of non-elite
groups.144 Lasso’s reflections serve as a useful warning to recognize the preconceptions of
contemporary witnesses as well as those of nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century
thinkers. Nonetheless, Lasso’s caution should not lead us to disregard emotions as a whole
when studying this historical period. The few historians who have paid some attention to
emotions and rumors during the formation of government juntas – such as Christon I.
Archer and Peter Guardino for Mexico, Alberto Flores Galindo and Claudia Rosas Lauro
for Peru, and Margarita Garrido and Pablo Rodríguez for New Granada – have implied that
emotions were more than mere catalysts of disorders. As they suggest, emotions ultimately
molded the political culture and public debates of the time. 145 By the same token, this
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chapter argues that, in Santafé between 1808 and 1810, emotions shaped the behavior,
notions, and frameworks of people of all social stratums. Likewise, the chapter explains
that the seemingly irrational actions and ideas that nineteenth-century historians
exclusively attributed to popular sectors were actually experienced and conveyed by people
of all social statuses.
Paying attention to emotions also allows us to reflect on the historical ruptures that
took place amidst the formation of juntas. Nineteenth-century historians depict the
establishment of juntas in New Granada as foundational events in a teleological timeline
leading to independence, republicanism, and the Criollos’ warranted rule over the new
nations. Manuel Pareja Ortíz, who has probably written the most detailed account of the
formation of Santafé’s Junta, also views July 20th as a breaking point leading to
independence and to the creation of a new republic.146 Social, political, and conceptual
historians have presented more nuanced understandings and have argued that the
establishment of government juntas produced new languages and practices of rights and
equality.147 Political historians such as Isidro Vanegas and Daniel Gutiérrez have argued
that the formation of juntas came with revolutionary and innovative ideas and
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institutions.148 Francisco Ortega, for his part, analyzes the concepts of “colony” and
“constitution” to conclude that the establishment of Santafé’s Junta did not bring about a
profound rupture with the Spanish Monarchy. Moreover, Ortega explains that
independence and republicanism were not unescapable outcomes as they were simply one
of many possible paths.149 The Brazilian and Mexican cases are illustrative of the fact that
monarchism could have also been an outcome after independence.
Viewing the institution of juntas from the perspective of the history of emotions
presents additional layers to this question. Fear and confusion, among other emotions,
disrupted, at least temporarily, people’s notions of reality, their existing conceptions of
symbolic violence, and their horizons of expectation. Yet, for the most part, Santafé’s Junta
did not transform prevailing social and political structures.
In this chapter, I have attempted to include sources from different social sectors and
political stances. The existing source base is mostly made up of documents written by
Spanish and Criollo officials as well as by patrician leaders. Among the records that exist,
very few accounts were written by women, plebeians, Indians, and blacks. Additionally,
not many sources refer directly or indirectly to emotions or emotional expressions. Thus,
we are left with a rather limited collection of sources in which women, Indians, and blacks
only come up marginally and urban patricians and plebeians, to a lesser extent, are the main
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protagonists. One of the sources most often cited in this chapter is a diary written by José
María Caballero, a tailor and shopkeeper from Santafé. Caballero’s entries for the period
between 1808 and 1810 do not offer many insights about his political opinions. However,
Caballero joined Antonio Nariño’s republican army around 1813 and continued to be a
republican supporter throughout the 1810s and 1820s. 150
Another source constantly used in this chapter is José Antonio de Torres y Peña’s
1814 Memorias de la revolución. Torres y Peña was a priest and fervent royalist born in
Tunja in 1767 to an upper-middle-stratum family. When he wrote his account, he was no
longer living in a Spanish colony but in the independent and republican State of
Cundinamarca. By then, Santafé and its surroundings had endured nearly half a decade of
violence and political strife. Throughout northern South America, thousands of people had
been killed and displaced. Even churches and clergymen had been attacked and harassed.
It is possible that such circumstances explain Torres y Peña’s hostility towards anyone who
in past years had shown any sympathy for liberal or republican ideas. Throughout the text,
he accused advocates of Santafé’s Junta of promoting profane beliefs and of supporting
Napoleon and portrayed independence and republicanism in apocalyptic terms. 151
I have also resorted to a series of letters written by Camilo Torres Tenorio, Antonio
de Villavicencio, and the Viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbón. In addition to these dispatches,
I occasionally draw on correspondence and reports from magistrates of the Audiencia as
well as from a few mid-level officials. Camilo Torres – a patrician from Popayán who had
been living in Santafé since the late eighteenth century – was, at the time, a famous and
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distinguished lawyer. His abundant correspondence deals with a wide range of issues: legal
matters with his clients from Santafé and other cities, business with his associates, political
discussions and gossip with his family and friends in Popayán, and even astronomy and
botany with his brothers and close friends.152 Torres was among the signees of the act
establishing Santafé’s Junta. Some months earlier, on November 20, 1809, he wrote the
Memorial de agravios (Memorial of Grievances) denouncing the Junta Suprema Central
for disproportionately limiting American participation in the debates taking place in the
Iberian Peninsula.153 Around 1808 and 1810, one could hardly argue that Torres was in
favor of absolute independence from Spain. Yet, he did make manifest his position in favor
of greater autonomy and self-government as well as in support of liberal reforms.
Antonio de Villavicencio, a creole patrician from Quito, had been living in Europe
since the early 1800s where he attended the Colegio de Nobles and joined the royal navy.
In 1810, the Supremo Consejo de Regencia selected him as the comisario regio that would
travel to New Granada. Villavicencio was sent as a direct representative of the king, with
full autonomy from the viceroy, to put an end to Santafé’s growing disturbances. 154
Villavicencio did not categorically oppose the formation of government juntas in the
Americas, as was the case of Viceroy Amar and other top Spanish officials in Santafé and
throughout all of New Granada. In fact, Villavicencio came to believe that it was useless
to oppose their formation and that the juntas could actually help maintain the monarchy’s
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authority over the region. He arrived at Santafé when the government junta had already
been established.155 For his part, Viceroy Amar ardently opposed the formation of
government juntas in the Americas. Amar, who had been in Santafé since 1803, believed
the juntas would ultimately disavow the monarchy’s authority. By 1808, Amar’s good
standing with the city’s patricians was already beginning to crumble. The monarchical
crisis accelerated this process. Frictions between them would continue to grow until he left
Santafé in August of 1810.
Confusion: misinformation and the monarchical crisis
News of Ferdinand VII’s detention reached Santafé on August of 1808, just a few
weeks after news of his ascension to the throne had arrived in the capital. The city’s first
reactions to the fall of Ferdinand VII were of distress and concern. Demonstrations proving
the city’s loyalty were carried out during most of September 1808. As of the first week of
the month, magistrates, high-ranking officials, clergymen, and nuns began to wear rosettes
with Ferdinand VII’s insignia. On September 10, cannons were fired and a portrait of the
King, in a frame made of silver and wood, was displayed in the streets. That afternoon,
coins with the inscription “Majestic proclamation of Our King Ferdinand VII” on one face
and Ferdinand VII’s seal and the label “King of Spain and the Indies” on the other, were
thrown to the crowd.156 The following day, the swearing-in was carried out. Santafé’s
streets and balconies were decorated with banners and flags. Around noon, the city’s
patricians rode their best horses and followed the regidor decano (interim mayor),
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Fernando Benjumea, through the city’s main streets. Once in the main square, the regidor
proclaimed the city’s allegiance to Ferdinand VII. Following the oath, a group of soldiers
discharged their rifles. The same ceremony was repeated in the San Francisco, Santo
Domingo, and San Agustín squares. That night, Santafé’s streets were illuminated and the
city’s notables and main authorities gathered at an alcalde’s residence to continue the
celebrations. The city’s streets were once again lighted on September 13 when a bando was
published declaring war on Napoleon for betraying Charles IV and Ferdinand VII and for
usurping the Spanish throne. Several balconies exhibited messages against Napoleon and
in support of the Bourbon House. During the following days, civil and religious authorities
invited the city’s residents to offer donations to finance the war against France. According
to Caballero, half a million pesos were collected.157
During the coming weeks, the city’s authorities read aloud a series of proclamations
coming from the Iberian Peninsula as well as others issued by Santafé’s officials. One of
the declarations that arrived from Seville encouraged the city’s residents to murder their
rulers if these dared submit to the French. Another proclamation coming from Cádiz invited
the provinces to elect their own representatives and made allegations against the viceroys
and governors who had oppressed the Americas in the past. Such public statements shocked
and puzzled many of the city’s residents and officials, but they also incited discussions
with regards to the future of Spain and the Kingdom of New Granada. 158 For their part,
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Santafé’s officials made additional proclamations, including one concerning the French
living in the city. The city’s authorities declared that French denizens could continue living
in Santafé as they had been doing so before the war began. However, the officials stated
that if French residents were seen carrying out suspicious activities or heard making
questionable comments, they would be expelled from the city. It seems that during the
remaining of the year, Santafé’s French did not raise serious suspicions. Nonetheless, later
on, when conflicting news from Europe began to arrive, that began to change. 159
Information from the Iberian Peninsula arrived in Santafé in dribs and drabs,
encouraging the propagation of rumors and untruthful news. Among the city’s residents,
hope of Spain’s victory over Napoleon was fed by false stories of military feats. The first
of such instances took place on November 20, 1808. That afternoon, news arrived claiming
that the Spanish army had been victorious and Ferdinand VII would soon be sitting, once
again, on the throne.160 According to Santiago de Torres y Peña – a native of Tunja, priest
of Las Nieves Church in Santafé, and brother of José Antonio –, when the city’s officials
announced the news, thousands of Santafereños went out to the streets to celebrate despite
the pouring rain. During the remaining of the afternoon, church bells did not stop tolling
and fireworks exploding. Santiago claimed to have seen many of his parishioners
“shedding tears out of joy and affection”, thanking God and the Virgin Mary for their
protection.161 Ten days later, as part of the thanks offerings being carried out, Santiago
invited his brother José Antonio – priest in the town of Tabio, near Santafé – to offer a
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sermon at Las Nieves. José Antonio’s homily praised Spain’s past, such as the expulsion
of the Moors and the conquest of the Americas and suggested that the Spaniards were
God’s chosen people. José Antonio claimed that “if God is with us, no one will prevail
against us.”162 The sermon was praised by Santafé’s worshipers to such extent that
Santiago, with the endorsement of ecclesiastic and civil authorities, got it published in one
of the city’s printing shops. Unfortunately for Santiago and José Antonio, mail refuting the
alleged victories reached Santafé during the first weeks of January, about the same time
that copies of the sermon were being printed. 163 Despite the upsetting news, 1809 began
with new demonstrations of loyalty towards Ferdinand VII and the ‘Junta Suprema
Central’, which by now governed Spain and all of its dominions from Seville. 164
In his Días de la Independencia, José María Caballero, the tailor, claims a second
case of untrue military exploits reached the city in April of 1809. On the night of April 19
officials received news that Spanish troops had defeated Napoleon and pushed his
diminished troops to the city of Ferrol in Galicia. Spain’s victory seemed imminent. At
around 10 pm, Santafé’s authorities ordered the city’s church bells to be tolled and the
streets and balconies to be illuminated. Thousands of the city’s residents celebrated in the
streets while hundreds of fireworks were lit. Music bands with drums and flutes went
around the streets and squares. In the midst of the excitement, the San Francisco friars,
while standing in the convent’s main entrance, offered the musicians and other people in
the streets wine from their pitchers. Cheers in favor Ferdinand VII and the Spanish Crown
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were heard all night throughout the city. Reports claim Santafé’s residents celebrated in
the streets until four in the morning. The following two nights, additional celebrations were
observed. This state of jubilation came to an end on April 23 when letters disproving
Spain’s supposed military victories reached the city. 165
In a letter written on April 20, 1809, the renowned lawyer Camilo Torres Tenorio
explained to his brother Gerónimo that, despite certain skepticism among Santafé’s
residents, the reports that arrived on the night of the 19th had been given credibility due to
the alleged trustworthiness of the source. It was said that an English admiral stationed in
Jamaica had sent the Governor of Santa Marta a letter and a clipping from a Spanish
gazette. From Santa Marta, the letter and clipping were sent to Santafé. Torres’ details
concerning Spain’s victories are somewhat different from those offered by Caballero, but
both agree on the fact that the recently arrived news gave the impression that Spain’s
triumph over Napoleon was just around the corner. According to Torres, the English
official in Jamaica stated that Spanish troops had surrounded Napoleon and his army in
Segovia. Napoleon was trapped and was offering to reinstitute Ferdinand VII to the throne
if his troops and himself were spared. The English admiral also stated that Joseph
Bonaparte had been cornered in Madrid and would soon have to surrender. The note
coming from Santa Marta explained that letters from the Junta Suprema Central
announcing the good news had already reached Puerto Rico and it was only a question of
days for the Junta’s mail to arrive in Santafé. Torres claims that this news coincided with
growing rumors that the Habsburgs had declared war on Napoleon and that the French
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Senate was asking the Emperor to return to France. Thus, when church bells began clanging
and the city’s authorities announced the news of Spain’s victories, hundreds of people
instantly went out to the streets to celebrate with fireworks and music. 166 The letters from
the ‘Junta Suprema’ mentioned in Torres’ dispatch finally reached Santafé on the 23 rd.
Rather than confirm Spain’s victories, they revealed a dramatic situation: Spanish troops
were on the run after suffering numerous defeats. 167
During 1808 and the first months of 1809, news arriving from Europe was received
without much questioning. For many Santafereños, such reports fed their hopes that the
Spanish Monarchy would soon be victorious. 168 Yet, after this second episode of
misinformation and disillusion, the relative unanimity and harmony surrounding the Junta
of Seville, the viceroy, and the city’s main officials began to crumble. Many began to feel
that Santafé and New Granada should organize to deal with this exceptional situation. On
the dawn of June 3, 1809, pasquines were posted on the doors of the Viceregal Palace as
well as on the bridges over the San Francisco River. The authors of the ephemeral texts
suggested that French troops would move on from the Iberian Peninsula to the Americas
to continue their invasion of Spain’s dominions. The papers urged authorities to establish
militias to defend the patria (motherland) from the French armies.169 In this case, the term
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patria was used ambiguously for it could allude to Spain and its dominions as well as to
more concrete territories such as New Granada and the city of Santafé. 170
As news of Spanish defeats reached the capital, many Santafereños began to
suspect the French residents living in the city. Some pasquines enthusiastically demanded
their expulsion from Santafé and other parts of New Granada. Several ephemeral texts even
claimed that in previous days a group of Frenchmen had held a gathering in a residence in
the San Victorino neighborhood where they had had a fancy dinner, gotten drunk, and
celebrated Napoleon’s victories.171
Apprehension towards French residents was complemented by growing frictions
among the city’s inhabitants. In his Memorias sobre la revolución y sucesos de Santaté de
Bogotá, en el trastorno de la Nueva Granada y Venezuela, José Antonio de Torres y Peña
– the same clergyman who offered a sermon to celebrate the alleged victories of the Spanish
army – stated that ever since Santafé received news that Napoleon had captured Ferdinand
VII, the city’s residents had divided into three main factions. On one side, there were those
who “conspired in favor of independence and liberty of consciousness.” 172 According to
Torres y Peña, within this group there were so many different opinions and views that its
advocates were constantly arguing among themselves. The clergyman claimed that among
this first group there were at least three parties. One of its factions was clearly in favor of
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the French system and the “barbarous” Napoleon. “They were French at heart”, Torres
explains, “or to put it more clearly, they were freemasons, who paid no attention to religion
or honor”.173 A second party was composed of republicans who had been “blindly
captivated by the false premises of Rousseau’s Social Contract.”174 They did not seek to
follow the example of the British colonies in North America, but rather that of Ancient
Athens and Laconia. For Torres y Peña these were “frivolous and gullible men, effeminate
schoolboys and pettifoggers whose thoughts had been inspired by a farce and a comedy.” 175
Thirdly, there was a faction composed of simple men who, without any mischievous
intentions, had been deceived by false promises of prosperity and security. 176
Besides this first faction, which Torres y Peña accused of being insurgents and
heretics, there were two additional groups. One was made up of people who were
somewhat neutral in these discussions. Some of them had, at certain moments, shown
sympathy towards revolutionary ideas, but in other instances had proven their loyalty to
Ferdinand VII and the Spanish Crown. Torres y Peña states that many of them had been
deceived by the revolutionary leaders but at some point had discovered the rebels’ ill
intentions and now opposed their conspiracies. Thirdly, there were those who energetically
defended the King and the Spanish Crown. They were known as the Regentistas.177
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Torres y Peña depicted independence and republicanism in apocalyptic terms. 178
Yet, he was not alone in this respect. Other accounts also reveal that, towards late 1808 and
the first half of 1809, political intolerance and catastrophic visions of the future were on
the rise. The intermittent arrival of news and the circulation of rumors and ephemeral texts
exacerbated existing frictions among Santafé’s residents. Rival factions accused each other
of disloyalty and of joining ranks with Napoleon. Such antagonism got even worse when
news of the establishment of Quito’s Government Junta reached Santafé in early
September. Such news was not a surprise for most Santafereños. Rumors that Quito’s
notables were organizing a plot to establish a junta had been circulating in Santafé since at
least April 1809. A story that spread at the time claimed that Juan Pío Montunfar, the
Marquis of Selva Alegre, and several of his accomplices had been detained for organizing
a plot to declare Quito’s absolute independence from Spain. Similar rumors were heard
with regards to Caracas. Camilo Torres and his brother Gerónimo believed these stories
were mere exaggerations. However, it seems that there were people in Santafé, Popayán,
and other parts of New Granada who believed that all those in favor of establishing local
juntas held such radical views that they were actually in favor of ending Spanish rule over
the Americas.179
In early September, a letter from Juan Pío Montufar arrived in Santafé informing
the city’s officials that a junta had been established in Quito. Shortly after receiving the
letter, members of the Cabildo as well as several city notables urged the Viceroy Antonio
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Amar y Borbón to convene a temporary junta to discuss a response to the Marquis’s letter.
Two meetings were carried out: one on September 6 and another one on September 11.
The temporary juntas were not without controversy. On September 6, a wide variety of
Santafé’s residents (Audiencia magistrates, Cabildo members, clergymen, army officials,
landowners, and other city notables) convened at the Viceregal Palace to discuss the
situation. Once the meeting was set to begin, nearly two hundred guards surrounded the
Palace and eight of them entered the meeting hall. The attendants complained about this
act of intimidation, but the viceroy assured them they could speak freely. 180 In the midst of
the discussion, some argued that growing frictions would cease if a junta similar to that of
Quito was established in Santafé. Others claimed that Santafé should prepare itself to
confront Napoleon if all of the Iberian Peninsula fell in his hands. At some point, someone
pressed one of the Audiencia’s fiscales, Diego Frías, for his views on this issue.
Apparently, the Spanish magistrate responded that “the Americas should follow the fate of
Spain, whichever that is.”181 At some other moment, Frías ambiguously claimed that if
Spain was defeated, “we will have an assembly and stipulate what is most convenient.” 182
Eventually, a majority of those attending the meetings of the 6 th and 11th pushed for
the establishment of a ‘Junta Suprema Provincial.’ They proposed a junta led by the
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Viceroy Amar and composed of deputies from all of the Viceroyalty’s provinces. However,
the viceroy and Audiencia rejected this idea. Moreover, the magistrates and Amar decided
to keep the meetings’ minutes under secrecy out of fear that they might stimulate pernicious
ideas among Santafé’s residents and that they could give the impression that the viceroy’s
authority was at risk.183 In the end, the temporary juntas ended up exacerbating existing
frictions. It is unclear why the viceroy agreed to these juntas knowing that they would
probably intensify political antagonism even further. Some claim that Amar agreed to them
in order to identify his opponents and those who he considered disloyal to the Spanish
Crown.184 With regards to the response that was to be given to Selva Alegre, Amar decided
to send a “minister of peace” – José María Lozano, the Marquis of San Jorge – to negotiate
with Quito’s leaders and convince Montufar to put an end to the Junta. Nonetheless, some
days after Lozano had left Santafé, the viceroy ordered troops from Cartagena to travel to
Popayán and Pasto to confront Quito’s armies. 185
Between August 1808 and September 1809, confusion became one of the prevailing
emotions among Santafé’s residents. After news of Ferdinand VII’s detention arrived in
Santafé, many of the city’s denizens responded with denial. It seems that many doubted
that the Spanish Crown could actually be on the verge of falling into the hands of the
Bonaparte brothers. This state of mind helps explain why so many residents intuitively ran
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into the streets to celebrate false stories of Spanish victories. Nonetheless, towards April
1809, more news of Spain’s defeats arrived, and discussions about how to face this looming
threat and defend the Spanish Crown only worsened tensions and frictions. Those in favor
of establishing local juntas were accused of betraying Ferdinand VII and favoring
Napoleon’s ambitions while those against their formation were indicted of the exact same
wrongdoings. As confusion and unrest became widespread, most of Santafé’s residents
began to question what to expect from the times they were living in and the future. Fear
and uncertainty began to shape their understandings of the world around them.
Mistrust: treason, corruption, and the breakdown of the Spanish Monarchy
Political tensions in Santafé intensified soon after the temporary juntas came to an
end. Accusations and rumors sprung from all sides. A letter from Antonio de Villavicencio
to the Crown’s Secretary of State in May 1810 sums up the many stories and conspiracies
that were circulating. Villavicencio explained that the fiscal Diego Frías became the subject
of much hearsay among Santafereños. Due to his controversial statements during the
juntas, people in the streets argued that Frías had in fact offended all Americans by
implying that they were mere slaves who could not defend themselves nor the Spanish
Crown from Napoleon. Others claimed that Frías was willing to sacrifice Spain’s
dominions and swear allegiance to Joseph Bonaparte in order to maintain his position in
the Audiencia. Many accused Frías of corruption and of ruling in favor of his network of
friends, brokers, and clients. In Santafé’s streets, it was rumored that one of his close
acquaintances was the Governor of Pamplona, an alleged afrancesado who boasted of his
admiration for Manuel Godoy, Charles IV’s favorite. Many of Santafé’s residents also
condemned Frías for his hostility towards Quito’s notables. Those in favor of the Quiteños
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and their junta argued that, contrary to what Frías and others claimed, Quito’s residents
were loyal vassals who had formed a Government Junta to uphold Ferdinand VII’s right to
the throne. These Santafereños maintained that the Iberian Peninsula would probably fall
and that the Americas would become Spain’s only stronghold. Consequently, if they
organized to defend the Spanish Monarchy as Quito’s residents had done so, Napoleon
would never be able to conquer Spanish America. 186
Other rumors hinted that there would soon be a fight to the death between several
magistrates of the Audiencia and the viceroy. Around late September 1809, stories claimed
that the Audiencia’s justices were planning on detaining Amar y Borbón and beheading
him. The word on the streets maintained the magistrates had found out that the viceroy held
secret correspondence with French officials and, thus, were going to execute him. It
appears that Amar found out about this alleged plot to behead him thanks to a lieutenant
from the town of La Mesa, about 60 kilometers west of Santafé. Apparently, the lieutenant
overheard two commoner women talking about Amar’s looming detention and
decapitation. The army officer warned his superiors who immediately sent a note to Santafé
informing the viceroy of what was being said about him. When the rumor reached Amar,
he ordered the number of guards protecting the Palace to be doubled and instructed more
patrols to watch the city’s streets.187
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In his Memorias, José Antonio de Torres y Peña brings up a similar story with some
variants. Towards the last week of September, a tailor and a young woman coming from
La Mesa to Santafé were overheard saying that that night the viceroy was going to be killed.
The two of them were captured and taken into custody. That night, towards 10 p.m., Frutos
Joaquín Gutierrez, an American-born magistrate of Santafé’s Audiencia, rushed into
Amar’s Palace with news that the viceroy’s life was in danger. The Palace’s sentinels were
immediately doubled and other precautions were taken to secure Amar’s life. Yet, these
measures were not enough to calm down the old viceroy. Torres y Peña claims that Amar
“was up all night, so uneasy that he did not sit down until the crack of dawn, when he was
finally appeased. At that point, he could not even articulate a word.” 188
On September 28, Amar was notified once again of rumors concerning the
Audiencia and himself. Yet, this time the stories alleged an agreement between the
Audiencia’s magistrates and the viceroy to hand over New Granada to the French. In
previous days, pasquines had been posted in Santafe’s streets claiming Amar and the
Audiencia would soon surrender the Viceroyalty to Napoleon. On the 28 th, Luis Caicedo,
alcalde de primer voto of Santafé’s Cabildo, visited the viceroy with a written note from
his cousin Joaquín Ricaurte. Ricaurte’s letter explained that the word on Santafé’s streets
was that Cartagena’s Governor had intercepted Amar’s secret correspondence with
Napoleon and French officials. The governor had sent the seized correspondence to one of
the Audiencia’s magistrates, Juan Hernández de Alba, who had supposedly opened a
formal investigation into this matter. The rumor claimed Hernández de Alba had informed
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the viceroy of his inquiries and that Amar had then organized a secret meeting with most
of the Audiencia’s members and several reputed Spanish Europeans. Apparently, in that
meeting the viceroy and the magistrates decided they would hand over the Viceroyalty to
Joseph Bonaparte once he conquered the whole of the Iberian Peninsula. The conspirators
supposedly labelled their plan the ‘Reconquista.’ 189
Amar dismissed the rumor brought up in Ricaurte’s note. That same day he
summoned a meeting with the Cabildo and the Audiencia. Ricaurte’s text was read aloud
and the assembly decided that a committee should visit Hernandez de Alba’s house to
search for Amar’s supposed correspondence with the French as well as for the magistrate’s
papers regarding his alleged investigation into the viceroy’s actions. No papers were found
in Hernández de Alba’s residence. Amar and the magistrates publicly announced these
findings trying to demonstrate that the so-called ‘Reconquista’ was an invention made up
by their political rivals. Yet, it appears that many in Santafé believed the purported plot to
be true.190 In the following weeks, not only Amar, but also many of the Audiencia’s
magistrates began to feel that they were in serious danger. Some magistrates decided to
sleep in the Viceregal Palace out of fear that they would be attacked in their residences.
Most of them only went out to the streets escorted by armed guards and soldiers. 191
It seems that in November of 1809, Amar continued to face sleeplessness as that
long September night when he had been warned that there were plans to behead him. The
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viceroy had reasons to fear the worst. When Amar decided to send troops to the south to
confront Quito’s Junta, he instructed Santafé’s troops to stay put and instead ordered a
company stationed in Cartagena to travel to Popayán. When Cartagena’s troops took longer
than expected, Amar decided to dispatch a company of soldiers from Santafé. A group of
them left on October 27. On the 28th and 29th, two additional squadrons left the city.192 In
a letter to the Crown’s Secretary of State, Amar claimed that, as the number of soldiers
stationed in the city decreased, social “fermentation grew, so did pasquines, while seditious
letters reappeared with even more audacity.”193 As the viceroy explains, “I was forced to
feel as if I were in an enemy country and passed many nights without sleep. The few troops
that I had left were constantly on guard. All this for nearly twenty days until reinforcements
from Cartagena arrived and imposed some respect, giving us the possibility to have some
tranquility.”194
According to José Antonio Torres y Peña, the arrival of soldiers from Cartagena
actually worsened the city’s growing unrest. In his Memorias, the clergyman complains
the troops went around “hungry and naked” and that most of them were dishonorable
pardos (free people of color). Torres y Peña argues that, due to the soldiers’ material
hardships and lack of honor, city notables easily gained the troops’ trust and esteem by
giving them handouts and inviting them to eat at their homes. Ultimately, from the
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clergyman’s perspective, Amar had simply given Santafé’s dissidents three hundred men
to aid them in their plots.195 The available sources do not offer any information with regards
to the pardos’ feelings and their political opinions. Yet, it is possible that they – as
happened with many pardos from Cartagena – viewed the monarchical crisis as an
opportunity to improve their social standing and gain further legal rights. Moreover, it is
likely that many of them ended up showing their tacit support to anyone who helped them
endure Santafé’s cold climate.
During the second half of 1809, the authorities’ measures to stop the propagation
of rumors and seditious papers throughout Santafé seemed to have been inefficient. Some
weeks after news of Quito’s Junta reached the city, Amar published a bando forbidding the
city’s residents from reading and sharing proclamations and papers coming from Quito.
The viceroy believed texts related to Quito were deepening social unrest and political
antagonism. Several weeks after the publication of Amar’s bando, the Holy Office of the
Inquisition read an edict from the Cathedral’s pulpit stating that all those in possession of
letters and proclamations from Quito’s insurgents would be excommunicated. 196 Based on
what happened in the ensuing months, it appears that neither the viceroy nor the
Inquisition’s decrees had much effect. Rumors, pamphlets, and other texts multiplied as
mistrust and political intolerance grew. For example, on November 20, Santafé’s Cabildo
signed and published Camilo Torres’ Memorial de agravios in which Torres denounced
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the Junta Suprema Central’s discrimination against Spanish Americans. When the Junta
summoned representatives from all of the Spanish Empire, it decided that American
viceroyalties and general captaincies could each send one representative to the Junta while
European kingdoms could send two delegates. Ultimately, this meant that thirty-six
Peninsular and only nine Americans representatives would join the Junta. As soon as the
Memorial was published, the text quickly circulated throughout the city. Even though
Amar and the Audiencia promptly took the memorial out of circulation and prohibited its
diffusion, the text and its content continued circulating through underground manuscript
copies and oral means.197
As rumors spread and tensions escalated, both Amar and the Audiencia began to
seriously suspect the alcalde Caicedo and other city notables. Caicedo had already raised
suspicions when he showed up at the Viceregal Palace with Ricaurte’s note. About a month
later, his name was once again discussed by the viceroy and several magistrates. One of
Amar’s advisors was informed that Caicedo and a multitude of Santafereños were going to
gather, without previous notice, in the corner of the alcalde’s house and march to the
Viceregal Palace to compel Amar to establish a government junta. The gathering never
took place. The viceroy’s advisors claimed it that their precautions had been effective in
preempting the protests.198
Towards mid-November of 1809, the viceroy and Audiencia summoned Caicedo
to discuss the growing tensions and political intolerance that were spreading throughout
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the city. Several magistrates and the viceroy’s advisors had heard rumors that Caicedo was
leading a conspiracy to establish a junta with him as its president. Amar and the magistrates
hoped to appease Caicedo and have him reveal the names of those creating unrest in
Santafé. During the conversation, the alcalde told them that he had not seen or sensed any
particular animosity among the city’s residents, but that the clergyman Andrés María
Rosillo had been acting suspiciously and had expressed some discontent concerning the
viceroy and the magistrates’ governance.199
A few days later, responding to the Audiencia’s insistence, Amar ordered the
detention of Rosillo, Antonio Nariño, and Baltasar Miñano. Nariño and Miñano were
captured right away and sent to Cartagena.200 Their detention prompted rumors that
Spanish officials were planning on decapitating Santafé’s notables. 201 Rosillo, for his part,
was not found anywhere in the city. Perhaps anticipating trouble, the clergyman had left
the city in early November.202 Rosillo was captured some weeks later in his hometown,
Socorro, approximately 275 kilometers northeast of the capital. Some accounts claim that
in Socorro, the clergyman made public proclamations accusing the magistrate Juan
Hernández de Alba of leading a conspiracy to take control of New Granada and surrender
the Kingdom to Napoleon. Rosillo invited his fellow countrymen to join him and establish
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an alliance with the English to get rid of the “treacherous tyrants.” He argued that they
needed to act promptly, for if they did not do so, they would soon be governed by the
French. Some weeks later, when Rosillo was finally captured, he was found hiding beneath
a bed and dressed up as an impoverished woman. According to Amar, dozens of papers
were found among his possessions. The texts allegedly included many alarming claims:
that the Kingdom was in imminent danger of being invaded by the French, that New
Granada’s authorities had sold out to Joseph Bonaparte, that a magistrate from the
Audiencia – probably referring to Hernández de Alba – aspired to be crowned King of
Spain, and that Santafé’s authorities were concealing information of Spain’s defeats to
facilitate the Kingdom’s surrender to the French. 203
During the last months of 1809, many of the viceroy’s critics noted that Amar’s
response to the growing unrest and political strife could be summed up by the publication
of several bandos and the detention of Nariño, Miñano, and Rosillo. Caicedo, who was
becoming one the most visible leaders of the faction opposing Amar’s leadership and the
authority of European magistrates, believed the viceroy’s lack of character would result in
a catastrophe. On December 14, 1809, the alcalde wrote a confidential letter to the Council
of Indies denouncing the viceroy and the magistrates’ “criminal conduct.” Caicedo
maintained that they had been oppressing the city’s inhabitants for years. The alcalde
warned the Council that if timely and prudent decisions were not taken soon, the Kingdom
of New Granada’s liberty and security would be at risk. To begin with, Caicedo argued that
the viceroy was not taking any measures to defend the Kingdom from a foreign invasion,
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nor had he taken matters in hand to stop the “scandalous behavior” of several magistrates.
Such lack of governance, Caicedo stated, was generating fear and mistrust among Santafé’s
people. Second, Caicedo accused Amar of secretly corresponding with French officers
through a navy officer stationed in Cartagena. Third, Caicedo claimed that the Vicereine
Francisca Villanova had publicly stated that, with regards to the war in Europe, “the
Americas should follow the strongest party.” 204 Fourth, Caicedo informed the Council that
Amar’s response to Ricaurte’s note had been deliberately slow and ineffective, almost as
if he had been trying to conceal something. Caicedo closed his dispatch stating that he had
interviewed several Santafereños about these matters. Most of them claimed that Amar had
consistently showed sympathy for the French. Some noted that he even had a French butler.
Others stated that the viceroy had offered numerous gifts to Manuel Godoy. Godoy had
been Charles IV’s favorite and was considered one of the main culprits behind the
monarchical crisis. Godoy was the object of numerous accusations of corruption and
treason throughout the Spanish Empire. Many others also shared the belief that that the
magistrate Hernández de Alba sought to take control of the Kingdom by killing Amar.
Several claimed that the magistrate had already tried to carry out his homicidal plot in at
least three occasions but had been unsuccessful due to unexpected circumstances. 205
A few weeks later, another of the Santafé’s notables, Ignacio Herrera, wrote a letter
to the Junta Suprema Central censuring Amar and several of the Audiencia’s magistrates.
In his dispatch, Herrera – a native of Cali and recently elected síndico procurador general

204

“… que la América debía seguir el partido del más fuerte…” (AGI, SANTAFE,746, ‘Relación sobre el
movimiento del 20 de julio. Santafé. 18 de septiembre de 1810.’, 4)
205
AGI, SANTAFE,746, ‘Relación sobre el movimiento del 20 de julio. Santafé. 18 de septiembre de 1810.’,
4-5; Gutiérrez, “Revolución y diplomacia”, 360.

94

(a sort of judicial advisor) – explains that many Santafereños shared his impression that
numerous officials in Spanish America, particularly in New Granada, had been appointed
by the favorite Godoy. According to Herrera, the viceroy was a mere hechura206 of Godoy.
The procurador also claimed that suspicions regarding the loyalty of many officials were
aggravated even further by the comments they and their acquaintances made in public. For
instance, Herrera maintained, city residents usually saw Amar in the company of
Frenchmen, including his butler, Francisco Laviña, who allegedly sold vacant posts at a
bargain price. Herrera argued that the fiscal Frías and magistrate Herndandez de Alba were
not much better off. Apparently, the two of them were constantly heard saying that the
Americas’ fate rested on the outcome of the war in Europe and that if Bonaparte ended up
being victorious, New Granada would simply have to acknowledge their new ruler. 207
Caicedo and Herrera were not alone in their criticism of Amar. Even some of the
Audiencia’s magistrates that the alcalde and procurador accused of terrorizing Santafé’s
residents were critical of the viceroy’s management of the crisis. The magistrate Joaquín
Carrión y Moreno’s patience with Amar seems to have reached its limit towards the last
days of 1809 and first days of 1810 when the Cabildo’s elections took place. In a letter to
the Secretary of State, Carrión explains that he had been debating with other members of
the Audiencia and the viceroy over how to put an end to the rising unrest that had been
spreading throughout the city. Likewise, they had discussed how to stop the growing
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influence of individuals they considered to be dangerous to public peace in the Kingdom.
According to the magistrate, they had all agreed to actively endorse a group of candidates
in the coming elections to the Cabildo. They hoped that the city’s rising political
antagonism would soon fade away if candidates close to the viceroy and the Audiencia
formed a majority in the city’s council. Despite their efforts, their candidates did not reach
a majority. What infuriated Carrión was Amar’s passivity. Even though they had agreed
that they would not allow the Cabildo to be under the control of their political rivals, the
viceroy did not make use of his legal authority to impede certain appointments and
nominations. Ultimately, those suspected of intriguing against Amar and the Audiencia
ended up dominating the Cabildo.208
Similar to what Caicedo intimated in his note to the Council of the Indies, Carrión
was also exasperated with Amar’s incapacity to put to trial those accused of treason and of
inciting unrest in Santafé. The exceptions seemed to be Rosillo, Nariño, and Miñano. In
his letter, Carrión explained that, even though there were numerous reports of individuals
propagating defamations and of carrying out treacherous activities, the viceroy had not
taken any measures to hold them accountable. Such was the case of a Manuel Silvestre,
who was found spreading news that the Junta Suprema Central agreed with the French in
many respects and that around thirty bishops in Spain were preaching in favor of Joseph
Bonaparte. Amar had Silvestre detained only to release him shortly after. During his brief
detention, Silvestre explained that he had made up those stories just to see their effect on
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the city’s public. Amar accepted this answer as true and set him free, at least according to
Carrión.209
Such passivity and indifference, Carrión claimed, generated much mistrust and
murmuring among the city’s residents. According to the magistrate, many commoners
believed that Santafé’s main authorities had betrayed Ferdinand VII and that high-ranking
officials were actually encouraging people’s disloyalty to the Spanish Crown. In the midst
of this growing uncertainty, rumors of the viceroy and the magistrates’ secret alliances with
French officers quickly spread. Carrión insisted that the Audiencia had done what they
could to resolve this situation, but that not much could be done with a sick and old viceroy
such as Amar. As Carrión put it, the viceroy “was deaf and inseparable of his wife, who
informed everybody who visited the Palace of the Audiencia’s propositions and made
everyone believe that the golillas210 were harassing her husband and forcing him to issue
rulings.”211 Such was the growing repudiation towards Amar that when news reached
Santafé that Francisco Venegas had been named New Granada’s new viceroy, most of the
city’s residents received the appointment with relief and hope. According to Carrión, many
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believed that with a new viceroy, New Granada would no longer be under threat of falling
in the hands of the French.212
During the last months of 1809, allegations of treason and corruption spread
throughout the city. Regardless of social status or political affiliation, it seems that most of
Santafé’s residents ended up hearing and talking about these accusations and intrigues. As
rumors and hearsay multiplied, so did feelings of mistrust and fear. These emotions spread
throughout the city with intensity. It appears that for many, the “reality” depicted by rumors
and allegations displaced previously shared conceptions of what was considered to be true
and real. Previously shared understandings of the present and the future became blurred by
the spread of rumors and accusations arising from all sides. Viceroy Amar’s case
exemplifies the effects that growing mistrust and fear had on conceptions of reality. It
seems that during Amar’s sleepless nights, the numerous intrigues and rumors that
circulated at the time altered his comprehension of what was actually happening in Santafé
and Spanish America. Amar was not alone in this respect. Fear and uncertainty shaped
many Santafereños’ understandings of what was happening and what they could expect
from the future.
Fear: Napoleon’s envoys and threats of a foreign invasion
News of Venegas’ appointment arrived in Santafé towards the second half of
February 1810, about the same time that rumors spread claiming that foreign troops were
in the Llanos moving towards Santafé. According to priest Torres y Peña, it was an
hacendado from the town of Firavitoba in the proximities of Tunja and Sogamoso who
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warned the viceroy of the presence of foreigners in the Llanos. José María Caballero, the
tailor and shopkeeper from Santafé, explained that once the word reached the streets, a
terrible stir broke out. People in the streets did not know if the foreigners were French or
English. One of the rumors that gained force claimed that fourteen French ships had sailed
up the Orinoco River and the French troops were now crossing the Llanos towards Santafé.
Many believed Amar was hiding vital information from the public. After several days of
growing uncertainty, Amar ordered Colonel Juan Samano to lead a contingent of troops
that had recently arrived from Riohacha into the Llanos. Halfway into their expedition,
Samano and his troops were told to return to Santafé. 213
Amar’s decision was based on recent news claiming that the troops seen in the
Llanos of Casanare were neither French nor British soldiers, but a band of agitators led by
Andrés María Rosillo’s nephews, José María Rosillo and Vicente Cadena. According to
another of Rosillo’s nephews, Antonio Obando, locals from the Llanos confused the group
of rebels with French troops due to the red uniforms many of them wore. This group of
men arrived in the Llanos towards mid-December of 1809, around the same time of
Rosillo’s detention.214 Apparently, Rosillo and his nephews as well as other Socorreños
were supposed to meet in the town of Sutatenza, about 100 kilometers northeast of Santafé,
to begin their journey into the Llanos. However, this encounter never took place. The
clergyman left Sutatenza before the others had even arrived. Fearing his detention, Rosillo
returned to Socorro where he was finally captured and driven to a cell in the Convent of
the Capuchins in Santafé. Despite Rosillo’s absence, his nephews and other Socorreños
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met in Sutatenza and moved on to the Llanos. Apparently, they were aided by a several
natives of Socorro who had been living in the Llanos since the early 1780s when dozens
of them fled the repression that broke out after the Rebellion of the Comuneros was
appeased. After finding out that Andrés María Rosillo had been detained and taken to
Santafé, the Socorreños carried out several attacks. The most violent one took place in the
town of Pore, where they allegedly killed seven people and forced its officials to flee. 215
Troops from the Llanos and a squadron sent from Santafé brutally put down the
Socorreños. Rosillo’s two nephews were captured, executed, and beheaded. It was said that
the two of them were shot without even giving them the opportunity to confess their sins.
In a letter to his brother Ignacio, Camilo Torres explains that one of those executed in the
Llanos, José María Rosillo, was the young cadet that the two of them had often seen in the
corner of the Calle Real. According to Torres, Rosillo and Cadena were executed “without
any review of their sentence, and probably without even hearing them, or without any
defense of any sort, for in the Llanos there is no one who can read. And to add insult to
brutality, they have brought their heads to the capital.” According to Torres, the 13 th of
May, when their heads arrived in the city, was a day of “weeping and of mourning for all
of Santafé, even for those Caribes216 who gave the orders but were then incapable of
presenting them to the public, and much less of imposing the same sentence on the other
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youngster, their partner, the kid Salgar.” 217 Three days after their arrival, José María Rosillo
and Vicente Cadena’s heads were buried in the chapel of one of Santafé’s prisons. 218
According to José Antonio Torres y Peña, when the troops arrived from the Llanos,
rumors spread throughout Santafé claiming that Amar and the Audiencia’s magistrates had
given orders to display Rosillo’s and Cadena’s heads in the city’s streets and squares. Some
people added that these officials also had plans to execute their accomplice, Carlos Salgar,
and behead the clergyman Andrés María Rosillo in Santafé’s main square. Yet, neither
Salgar nor the clergyman Rosillo were executed and the two heads were not displayed in
public. In his letters, Camilo Torres argued that recent news of further Spanish defeats as
well as the “humanist reflections” offered by the magistrate Francisco Cortázar y Lavayen
convinced Amar and the Audiencia’s justices otherwise. 219 Other accounts suggest that
Amar was not in favor of such bloody displays and was actually responsible for stopping
them. In a letter to the viceroy, Antonio de Villavicencio – the comisario regio sent to New
Granada by the recently instituted Consejo de Regencia – thanked Amar, “in the name of
the Your Majesty and all of the Kingdom”, for not allowing the heads of the “miserable
Rosillo and Cadena to be fixed in the city’s square.” As Villavicencio explained, “it would
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have been the final insult and the greatest vexation carried out against the capital and the
whole Kingdom.”220
The incident in the Llanos marked a breaking point. For many Santafereños, the
decapitations of Rosillo and Cadena testified to Amar and the magistrates’ cruelty against
Spanish Americans. Some noted that such pointless brutality was an indication of European
officials’ hopelessness. They claimed that their despair was probably due to the fact that
Spain had been lost and the French would soon take over the Kingdom of New Granada. 221
News of the beheadings spread throughout northern South America and became a part of
the region’s collective memory. When the Province of Cartagena declared its independence
on November 11, 1811, the authors of the declaration alluded to the two decapitations. 222
About the same time that Rosillo and Cadena’s heads arrived in Santafé, so did
news that the Junta Suprema Central had been abolished and a Consejo de Regencia
(Council of Regency) had been established in its place. Apparently, in Santafé the news
was met with mixed feelings. For some, such as the magistrate Joaquín Carrión, news of
the Consejo’s establishment produced relief and comfort. According to Carrión, most of
Santafé’s inhabitants understood that the Consejo was the only institution that could save
the Spanish Kingdom and maintain it under Ferdinand VII’s rule. Moreover, as Carrión
220
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explained, the fact that the Council was composed of so many worthy and respectable
individuals made many residents feel hopeful that Spain would ultimately prevail. 223
Yet, there were others who felt quite the contrary. According to Camilo Torres’
letters, news concerning the dissolution of the Junta Suprema Central produced
bewilderment and uncertainty in Santafé. To make matters worse, Torres explained,
information from the Iberian Peninsula arrived in the city only intermittently. In
correspondence with his brother Ignacio, Camilo Torres stated that Santafé first received
news that French troops had crossed the Sierra Maestra and entered Andalucía, forcing the
‘Junta Suprema’ to flee from Seville to the Isla de León. 224 Some days later, letters from
Europe claimed that in the midst of the chaos produced by the French advance, the ‘Junta
Suprema’ had been dissolved and a Consejo created in its stead. Some of the dispatches
stated that the Junta’s dissolution had produced riots in Seville. Throughout Andalucía,
people accused the Junta’s members of treason and implored Andalucía’s Provincial Junta
to assume power. Another wave of correspondence raised even more confusion in Santafé.
Many Santafereños were surprised to hear the reasons justifying the Consejo’s formation
as well as the names of its new chairpersons. Many noted that there seemed to be no legal
basis for the Junta’s dissolution and added that those individuals who had played a key role
in the Junta Suprema Central were absent from the newly formed Consejo. Some
questioned if the new Consejo had obtained the King’s endorsement and recognition as had
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been the case for the Junta. Ultimately, Torres concluded, the arrival of such baffling
information simply produced further confusion, for it was “unclear who was truly in charge
nor whom we should support.” Everything seemed to indicate, Torres added, that “disorder,
confusion, and anarchy” now reigned in southern Andalucía. 225
For his part, José Antonio Torres y Peña, explained in his Memorias that news of
the Junta’s dissolution intensified the proliferation of speculations and defamations.
Ephemeral papers and rumors spread throughout the city claiming that Spanish officials in
the Iberian Peninsula had betrayed Ferdinand VII and joined Napoleon’s ranks. Other
stories maintained that several of the Audiencia’s magistrates had publicly stated that New
Granada’s fate depended on the outcome of the war in the Iberian Peninsula. The word in
the streets was that magistrate Diego Frías had once again claimed that if the French took
control over the whole of the Peninsula, the viceroy and Audiencia should surrender New
Granada without any sort of resistance. Other rumors stated that the European members of
Santafé’s Cabildo were also suggesting that New Granada should capitulate to the French.
Years later, Torres y Peña maintained that neither the viceroy nor other top officials did
much to disprove these rumors and, by doing so, ended up stimulating suspicions of their
alleged disloyalty to the Spanish Crown.226
Ultimately, news of the Junta’s dissolution deepened the city’s growing political
divisions. Torres y Peña’s fervid description of the factions and reactions that arose in

225

“De suerte que no sabemos quién manda verdaderamente, ni por quien se debe estar… y todo indica el
desorden, la confusión, y la anarquía.” (AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de
Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 2, folios 49-50, ‘Carta de Camilo a Ignacio Torres sobre
creación de Regencia y asesinatos en los Llanos. Santafé. 21 de mayo de 1810.’, 2-4.)
226
de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes de la Independencia Nacional, 107-108.

104

Santafé after the institution of the Consejo are revealing of this rising antagonism. The
clergyman explained that some of the city’s residents received the news with dismay and
distress. Torres y Peña described them as “reasonable men” who did not sympathize with
the newly formed Consejo for they considered it an irregular corporation, unknown in
Spanish legislation. These denizens, first and foremost, felt fear for the fate of the Spanish
Monarchy and continued to demonstrate their allegiance to Ferdinand VII in spite of
growing uncertainty. Yet, there were also those who Torres y Peña labeled the
Napoleanistas. According to the clergyman, this group received the news of the Junta’s
closure with certain reassurance and satisfaction. In his Memorias, Torres y Peña accuses
them of openly sympathizing with France. Many of the so-called Napoleonistas constantly
stated that Spain did not stand a chance against the Bonaparte brothers and most of them
willingly approved of the possibility of being ruled by France. 227 The clergyman faults
them for “taking advantage of the noble and simple character of the people… dazzling
them with ideas of liberty, independence, inalienable rights, and sovereignty of the peoples,
and by repeating – to annoyance – stories regarding chains of tyranny, three hundred years
of slavery, and recurring to the same old frauds and lies.”228 For Torres y Peña, the
Napoleonistas incited political intolerance through false stories and, thus, generated unrest
and discontent as a means to “ease the way for the universal usurper” to conquer the
Americas and fulfill his “insatiable ambitions.” 229
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Besides Torres y Peña, there were others in Santafé who also suspected of the
existence of Napoleonic conspirators within the city. Such was the case of the magistrate
Joaquín Carrión. He believed that José Acevedo y Gómez, 230 regidor in Santafé’s Cabildo,
was perhaps one of Napoleon’s covert agents. Carrión had several reasons to suspect
Acevedo. In a letter sent to the Secretary of State, the magistrate claimed that José Acevedo
and his family had been agitating Santafé’s populace for months, trying to convince them
that Spain could not hold long against Napoleon’s most recent offensives and that New
Granada would have to come to peace with whomever sat upon the Spanish throne.
Moreover, Carrión argues that in a private conversation with Acevedo, the regidor had
claimed that Mexico and La Habana were also discussing what to do in case Spain was
defeated as was Santafé. Carrión took such remarks as an indication that Acevedo had
confidential information and was probably in association with other individuals throughout
the continent, paving the way for Napoleon’s takeover of the Americas. Carrión grounded
such conjectures on reports claiming that Acevedo’s brother in law, Tejada, was part of
Joseph Bonaparte’s court in Madrid. According to Carrión’s account, Tejada was plotting
with envoys throughout New Granada, Mexico, and Cuba in an effort to generate unrest
and political divisions that could lay the foundations for a Napoleonic invasion of Spanish
America.231
Other accounts allude to the presence of French envoys and conspirators throughout
the Americas. In May 1810, the Viceroy Amar wrote a letter to Quito’s Audiencia – at the
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time based in Cuenca – informing its magistrates of the imminent arrival of French spies
to New Granada and other parts of Spanish America. In previous days, Amar had received
a letter informing him that several individuals coming from France had arrived in Baltimore
and were soon going to depart to Spanish America to clandestinely spread revolutionary
ideas and advocate for Joseph Bonaparte’s reign over the Americas. The dispatch offered
the names and physical traits of the French envoys and warned viceroys, governors, and
other top officials throughout Spanish America to be vigilant over their ports. 232 Antonio
de Villavicencio, the comisario regio, also believed that covert French emissaries had
scattered throughout the Americas. According to Villavicencio, through intrigues and
machinations, French envoys had been inciting a vicious animosity between Spanish
Europeans and Spanish Americans. Such growing rivalry, the comisario maintained, would
eventually lead to a civil war that would enable Napoleon’s takeover of the Americas. 233
Amar had been warned of the arrival of French spies by Luís de Onís y González,
Spain’s ambassador to the United States of America between 1809 and 1819. Given that
the US did not recognize the Junta Suprema Central nor the Consejo de Regencia, the US
Secretary of State did not acknowledge Onís as Spain’s ambassador until 1815. Despite of
his initial setbacks, Onís settled in Philadelphia and personally assumed the responsibilities
of a rightful ambassador. From the Fall of 1809, when he arrived in the US, until 1812,
Onís’ great obsession became Napoleon’s alleged network of envoys and spies in the
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Americas. A few weeks after his arrival, Onís began to search for spies and conspirators
among the French and Spanish diasporas as well as among passengers disembarking ships
from Europe. In December 1809, Onís was informed that a French ship, Tilsit, apparently
coming from Bayonne, had recently disembarked in Norfolk. Among its passengers, Onís
identified one he believed to be the head of Napoleon’s schemes in the Americas: Joseph
Desmolard. Captain Desmolrad established in Baltimore from where he supposedly
coordinated hundreds of secret agents in the American continent. Through a covert spy,
Onís was able to infiltrate’s Desmolard closest circle and obtain a copy of Joseph
Bonaparte’s purported instructions to French envoys in the Americas. In March 1810, Onís
sent copies of Bonaparte’s instructions to viceroys, captain generals, and governors
throughout Spanish America. The ambassador also informed them of additional details he
had recollected, such as the names and traits of certain spies, their tactics, and the places
where each one of them would try to settle.
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Around early May, Santafé’s viceroy

received one of Onís’ letters coming from Philadelphia with a copy of Bonaparte’s
instructions. Amar’s reaction to the warning was of both concern and optimism. He hoped
such a threat could encourage “the unanimity and good order that has been so shattered.” 235
During those months, rumors of foreign invasions did not revolve exclusively
around France and Napoleon. It seems that several of Santafé’s residents also considered
that falling into the hands of the English or the Portuguese was plausible. News of battles
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between French and British ships in the Caribbean and reports of England’s conquest of
Guadalupe intensified the belief that the English also had an eye on Spanish America. 236
Despite being Spain’s main ally in the war against Napoleon, the prospect of an English
invasion did not seem too farfetched for many of the city’s residents. They could bring to
mind the dozens of attacks the British had staged in past centuries against Spanish
American ports, the constant threat of an English incursion during the Seven Years’ War
and subsequent years, and the 46-day takeover of Buenos Aires in 1806. 237
Regardless of the motives behind the presence of English and French fleets in the
Caribbean Sea, their naval movements generated further suspicions and rumors in Santafé.
Among the many stories that spread at the time, one of them claimed that Napoleon was
not really planning to invade the Americas but merely offering the Spanish colonies
protection from an impending English invasion. At least in the case of Camilo Torres, such
a rumor produced more outrage than fright. Torres energetically rejected the idea of
receiving any sort of aid from Napoleon. As he explained to his brother Ignacio, “we don’t
want it, and we don’t need it.”238 Torres’ remarks replicate the feelings of self-pride and
sense of worth that frequently were part of discussions concerning New Granada’s fate.
Many of Santafé’s American residents claimed that their future did not solely depend on
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the war in Europe, for they too were Spaniards who could uphold the Spanish Monarchy
and defend the Kingdom from the Bonaparte’s ambitions. The insinuation that Spanish
Americans could not partake in the war in the Iberian Peninsula or even worse, that they
could not defend themselves and needed Napoleon’s aid, infuriated many.
Other rumors posed the possibility of Spanish America ending up under the control
of the Portuguese. In May 1810, pamphlets circulated throughout Santafé claiming that, in
accordance to the laws of royal succession and the fact that Ferdinand VII and his two
brothers might never be set free, either Doña Carlota or her son Pedro should be appointed
as Spanish America’s new ruler. Carlota, Princess of Brazil and sister of Ferdinand VII,
and the Infant Dom Pedro had moved to Brazil in 1807 along with the Portuguese court
after Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal. One of the ephemeral texts that spread in Santafé
stated that once the Iberian Peninsula fell into the hands of Napoleon, the viceregal capitals
should summon delegates from all of their provinces to elect either Carlota or Pedro as
their new monarch. The papers maintained that governing officials would continue in their
posts for the time being and that anyone who opposed these plans should be considered a
rebel.239
The word in the streets was that many of New Granada’s officials and magistrates
backed this plot because it would allow them to maintain their positions of power. Such a
prospect produced an almost unanimous rejection among the city’s residents. For instance,
in his correspondence, Camilo Torres suggests that corrupt officials, to keep their posts,
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were going to turn Spanish Americans “into the slaves of the Portuguese of Brazil.” 240 The
comisario Villavicencio, for his part, added that the hostility towards Doña Carlota was so
manifest that if she ever ended up ruling over Spanish America, civil wars would almost
immediately break out in all of the American provinces. 241
After almost three centuries of Spanish rule, a complete rupture from the Spanish
Crown seemed unconceivable and baffling to many of the city’s inhabitants. For most
Santafereños, the natural response to news of a French invasion was to reaffirm their
loyalty to the Spanish Monarchy and to Ferdinand VII. Yet, despite their faithfulness to the
Crown, during the first months of 1810, the possibility of an absolute collapse of the
Spanish Crown became more likely than ever before. The confusion and mistrust that had
been growing ever since the city learned of Ferdinand VII’s detention were complemented
with the mounting fear that New Granada was soon going to be governed by the French,
the English, or the Portuguese. The rumors that Napoleonic spies could already be found
within the capital and that basically any of the city’s inhabitants could be a French emissary
sparked further anxiety, mistrust, and confusion among Santafé’s residents. Amidst
growing uncertainty and fear, new understandings of the times they were living in and new
imagined futures emerged. Many began to acknowledge the possibility of being ruled by
someone other than the Spanish Monarchy.
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Expectation: growing animosities and the arrival of the ‘comisionados regios’
During the following weeks of May 1810, feelings of confusion, fear, and mistrust
in Santafé grew even further with the news that the comisionados regios Carlos Montufar
and Antonio Villaviencio had arrived in the Americas and that Caracas had recently
established its own junta. The regal commissioners Montufar and Villavicencio were sent
to the Americas with two major endeavors: putting an end to growing political divisions
and obtaining New Granada’s recognition of the Consejo de Regencia, Spain’s new
supreme governing body which had replaced the Junta Central Suprema. Yet, it seems that
their presence in the Americas simply stirred up political tensions. Some reports maintain
that the comisionados triggered mistrust and unrest in all the cities they passed through.
Montufar and Villavicencio first arrived in Caracas on April 18. One day later, Caracas
established a government junta. On May 8, they reached Cartagena de Indias. About a
month after their arrival, on June 14, when Montufar was already on his way to Santafé,
Cartagena’s Cabildo removed Governor Francisco Montes from office and put him on a
ship to La Habana. Montufar arrived in the capital on June 17 and remained there for the
following two weeks before departing to Quito. Villavicencio, for his part, stayed in
Cartagena, attempting to reconcile a divided city, until the first days of July. 242
Villavicencio reached Santafé until August 1st, when Montufar was already on his way to
Quito and Santafé had, by then, established a junta that had declared its independence from
the Consejo de Regencia.243
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There are several reasons why the arrival of Montufar and Villavicencio produced
so much strife. In the first place, their coming coincided with the arrival of troubling news.
Both comisionados were bearers of information concerning Spain’s most recent defeats
and updates regarding the Consejo de Regencia’s status. Secondly, the commissioners were
delegates of a Council that aroused uneasiness and distrust. The Consejo had not been
recognized by the Spanish American provinces and many shared the impression that it
illegitimately claimed to rule in the name of Ferdinand VII. Finally, the comisionados
appeared to favor the establishment of government juntas in the Americas. These issues
produced conflicting views among many and led to false allegations that Montufar and
Villavicencio were probably Napoleonic agents.244
Those who had praised the Consejo but opposed the formation of juntas had a
difficult time trying to make sense of the commissioners’ standpoints. Such was the case
of the magistrate Joaquín Carrión, who described Montufar and Villavicenio’s
responsibilities as inexplicable and mysterious. The magistrate could not understand the
reasons why both of them approved of the formation of government juntas or why they
were so critical of Spanish Europeans. According to Carrión, ever since they arrived in the
Americas, the comisionados had been publicly blaming European officials for fueling
animosity between Europeans and Americans. Carrión argued that the commissioners
seemed to be instigating hatred towards Spanish Europeans instead of promoting
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reconciliation. When Montufar reached Santafé, Carrión was even more baffled.
Apparently, during his short stay, the comisionado publicly stated that Quito’s example
should be followed by other American provinces. Montufar allegedly argued that when
Quito formed a junta in August 1809, it was merely doing what many Spanish provinces
had done when they found out of Ferdinand VII’s detention. During those two weeks,
Carrión was shocked to see Montufar having frequent meetings, both publicly and
clandestinely, with individuals suspected of being insurgents. It seems that other
magistrates shared Carrion’s concerns and suffered every day of Montufar’s visit. Yet his
arrival and some of the news he brought also produced hope among the Audiencia’s
members and other of the city’s officials. News that the recently nominated Viceroy
Francisco Venegas was on his way to the Americas, that Santafé’s archbishop Juan Bautista
Sacristán was finally headed to the capital,245 and that the comisionado Villavicencio would
arrive before long made many believe that the city’s divisions and animosities would soon
fade away. Carrión had high hopes that Villavicencio would be able to appease the Cabildo
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and the city’s dissident factions.246 Yet, such prospects vanished on July 20, before either
Venegas, Sacristán, and Villavicencio had reached Santafé.
The expectation and uneasiness caused by the arrival of the commissioners was
intensified by news of the establishment of Caracas’ Junta. According to the clergyman
José Antonio Torres y Peña, in late May Santafé began to receive countless letters and
papers coming directly from Caracas. Correspondence from Caracas to Santafé usually
travelled by sea to Cartagena and then sailed up Magdalena River. Yet, in order to prevent
the seizure of their correspondence, Caracas’ rebels sent their letters and papers to Santafé
through a long and rugged trek across the Llanos and Andes Mountains. In his Memorias,
Torres y Peña claimed that the papers coming from Caracas were mostly “offensive and
incendiary bandos… with revolutionary language that… in reality simply exhaled
dissension, hate, mistrust and suspicion, persecution, fury, blood, fire, devastation, ruins
and widespread disruption, oppression, and violence.” 247 In addition to bandos and
pamphlets, stories concerning Caracas also spread throughout Santafé. Some accounts
praised the new Junta, while others denounced the mischiefs and sinful crimes the rebels
were committing. The feeling among many Santafereños was that Venezuela was literally
burning in flames.248
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Camilo Torres shared similar catastrophic views with regards to the fate of the
Spanish Kingdom and the effects its fall would have in the Americas. In a letter to his uncle
Ignacio Tenorio dated on June 20, Camilo Torres discussed Montufar’s arrival in Santafé,
the establishment of Caracas’ Junta, and the latest news from the Iberian Peninsula. Torres’
distress is manifest. In his letter, Torres claims that “Spain is about to be lost, and if that
does come to pass, it would be like the Cotopaxi 249 erupting! And what a shock it would
produce in that territory!... Heaven forbid that my fears have any basis whatsoever and that
such event ever come about. On the contrary, let us hope things calm down and peace be
restored.”250
Others sensed that not only the Iberian Peninsula was about to erupt, but that
Spanish America’s growing tensions and animosities were soon going to spiral out of
control. The comisionado Villavicencio was surprised to see that most Spanish Americans
still maintained an untainted loyalty towards the Monarchy in spite of Spain’s most recent
setbacks and what he considered to be many years of inequity. Nonetheless, the
commissioner argued that New Granada’s standing allegiance was mainly due to the
upcoming arrival of the newly appointed Viceroy Francisco Venegas and, in part, to the
comisionados’ instructions to appease enmities and dismiss officials who had abused of
their authority.251 Shortly before departing from Cartagena to Santafé, the comisionado
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Villavicencio wrote a letter to Venegas, cautioning him about the deplorable state in which
he would find New Granada at his arrival. The commissioner began his letter to Venegas
noting that he “wished he could fly” to Santafé to save it from an impending disaster. 252
Villavicencio informed Venegas that a “storm loomed over the capital and the whole
Kingdom, and that only His Excellency’s arrival could bring peace to its unfortunate
residents.”253
During the nearly two months since his arrival in the Americas, Villavicencio had
witnessed the conformation of a junta in Caracas and the removal of Cartagena’s Governor
after a rowdy uprising. Even though the commissioner was able to convince the
Cartagena’s notables and officials to swear allegiance to the Consejo de Regencia, he was
aware that such endorsement was fragile as it was obtained in the midst of growing political
intolerance and rising frictions among the city’s Europeans and Americans. Furthermore,
during his stay in Cartagena, Villavicencio received numerous reports from Santafé, Quito,
Popayán, and other cities throughout New Granada with complaints accusing top officials
of despotism, corruption, and incompetence. The accounts sent to the comisionado gave
Villavicencio the impression that authority in New Granada was crumbling and that a tragic
outcome was unavoidable.254
As Villavicencio sailed up the Magdalena River, uprisings broke out in Pamplona
and Socorro. On July 4, ongoing frictions between Pamplona’s corregidor, Juan Bastús y
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Falla, and the town’s notables led to riots that resulted in the official’s destitution.
Following his removal from office, Pamplona’s Cabildo provisionally assumed control
until July 30, when Pamplona established a government junta. A few days later, on July 9,
a brawl broke out in Socorr’s streets between a group of soldiers and passersby. The scuffle
left eight people dead. For months Socorro’s residents had been protesting the corregidor
José Valdez’s despotism as well as the Viceroy Amar’s inability to defend New Granada.
Socorro’s notables and commoners, and those from surrounding towns, used the incident
of the 9th as a pretext to demand Valdez’s resignation. On the 10 th, hundreds of people
gathered to protest against Valdez and his oppressive actions. The corregidor and his
troops sought safety in the Convent of the Capuchins for hours until Valdez surrendered.
On the 11th, Socorro formed a government junta composed of local delegates as well as
other deputies from the neighboring town of San Gil. 255 The statute instituting Socorro’s
Junta declared that “Socorreños were committed to upholding Ferdinand VII as the
province’s legitimate sovereign.” The charter also rejected “the favorite Godoy and all of
Bonaparte’s envoys who sought to enslave us by first dividing us.” 256 In a sermon offered
during the following days, a parish priest reminded Socorro’s Junta that they had
undertaken the responsibility of “sustaining the three sacred objects of our
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independence…: Religion, Fatherland, and the unfortunate Ferdinand VII and his
dynasty.”257
News of Pamplona and Socorro’s uprisings quickly spread throughout New
Granada. In a matter of days, the news reached Santafé as well as towns along the
Magdalena River on Villavicencio’s route to the capital. In Santafé, the news produced a
combination of fear, expectation, and hope. According to the clergyman José Antonio
Torres y Peña, stories concerning the Socorreños’ ruthlessness propagated throughout the
city. One account claimed that during the disorders, a group of rebels had surrounded a
sick soldier and asked him if he would join their ranks. When the soldier answered that he
would not, his head was smashed with a saber. As this story spread throughout Santafé,
José Acevedo y Gómez – the Cabildo’s regidor who magistrate Carrión suspected of being
a French envoy – published a text discussing these recent events. Torres y Peña argued that
Acevedo’s text condoned and minimized the Socorreños’ brutality.258
Yet, it seems that Acevedo was not at all pleased with the latest news coming from
Socorro and Pamplona. The regidor feared that these events could spark a tragedy in
Santafé. Acevedo had dreaded the possibility of other provinces establishing juntas before
the capital for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the regidor feared that Amar and the
magistrates might repress the city’s notables as a retaliation against other provinces
forming their own juntas. In a letter written to the commissioner Villavicencio on July 19,
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Acevedo states that, after the latest events in Pamplona and Socorro, he felt as if his “life
and that of other citizens were being ambushed from all flanks.”259 On the other hand,
Acevedo also believed that some provinces might make questionable decisions. Some
might resolve to disallow the capital’s authority, disregard the Consejo de Regencia, or
adhere to Napoleon’s envoys. To a certain extent, Acevedo feared that divisions and a
dispersion of power could lead to strife and war and, eventually, to the capital’s ruin.
Consequently, the regidor insisted that the only way to end the city’s growing antagonisms
and avoid a catastrophe was through the establishment of a government junta in Santafé. 260
In his letter to Villavicencio, the regidor pleads the commissioner to arrive promptly,
implying that his presence was needed to institute a junta and avoid a tragedy. As Acevedo
tells Villavicencio: “God permit that Your Mercy arrive in time to avoid this storm.” 261
Besides hoping that the comisionado’s arrival could enable the formation of a junta,
Acevedo also believed that Villavicencio’s arrival would help put an end to the growing
antagonism between Americans and Europeans. Acevedo himself resented European
officials for a series of reasons. In letters to Villavicencio, the regidor charges Viceroy
Amar and several of the Audiencia’s magistrates of corruption, despotism, and
incompetence. According to Acevedo, officials such as Valdez in Socorro and Bastús in
259
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Pamplona had not been appointed out of merit, but thanks to their close ties to European
officials and the favorite Godoy. Instead of worthy and commendable Americans,
European afrancesados were being employed in key posts. In his letters, the regidor even
blames Amar and other tyrannical European officials of ruining his business by thwarting
his cacao and cotton enterprises with arbitrary restrictions and fees. 262 By July of 1810, it
seems that Acevedo’s resentment towards European officials was a feeling shared by many
in Santafé. Despite the regidor’s hopes that Villavicencio could help reconcile the growing
animosity between Americans and Europeans, these enmities had reached a point of no
return.
During the weeks leading to July 20, most Santafereños hoped that someone could
alter or bring a halt to this dramatic course of events. As they waited for more news from
the Peninsula and for the arrival of the comisionado Villavicencio, Viceroy Venegas, and
the city’s archbishop Sacristán, the capital’s residents learned that cities such as Caracas
and Socorro had established their own government juntas. However, this state of
expectation simply led to the propagation of more rumors and catastrophic stories and,
thus, exacerbated feelings of fear, confusion, and mistrust. For most of Santafé’s residents,
the future seemed more and more uncertain and calamitous. It was under such
circumstances that many became convinced that Santafé needed some sort of higher
authority that could bring stability and public peace and prepare New Granada against an
imminent foreign invasion. If Amar and the Audiencia could not provide that, and the
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officials coming from the Iberian Peninsula were taking too long to arrive, someone else
should take the lead. Under these circumstances, the formation of a junta became the most
reasonable option for many Santafereños. Such an alternative did not denote a break with
the Spanish Crown, but it led many to imagine new possibilities and prospective futures.
Unrest: July 20 and the establishment of Santafé’s Junta
News of Pamplona and Socorro’s uprisings and the impending arrival of
Villavicencio immersed Santafé in a state of collective confusion, mistrust, fear, and
expectation. By July 19, many residents, such as Acevedo, felt their lives were at risk. At
the same time, many – including the regidor – hoped that Villavicencio’s arrival could save
them from a catastrophe. An anonymous contemporary witness explains in his diary that
by mid-July “everyone awaited Villavicencio as the liberator of the patria.”263 It was in
such a tense atmosphere that on the night of the 19th, rumors spread throughout Santafé’s
streets claiming the Chapetones264 were soon going to massacre dozens of Santafereños.
The rumor inflamed emotions even further. According to the anonymous diarist, most of
the city’s residents accepted the rumor about the Chapetones as true.265
That same night, as rumors of a Chapetón massacre spread throughout the city, a
group of conspirators met in the city’s Astronomical Observatory. For over a month some
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of Amar’s most vocal critics had been secretly gathering in residences and in the
Observatory to discuss ways to depose Amar and institute a junta in Santafé. On the night
of the 19th, those in attendance decided that they would once again push for the
establishment of a junta as they had done on previous occasions since August of 1808. 266
Past events – such as the conformation of Quito’s Junta and the disintegration of the Junta
Suprema Central – had offered opportunities to force Amar and the Audiencia to agree to
the formation of a junta. Yet, for a variety of reasons, these past attempts had failed. The
news that Caracas and Socorro had recently established their own juntas while Cartagena
and Pamplona had deposed their ruling officials offered yet another breach. July 20 th
offered an ideal setting to carry out their plans since it was market day when many of
Santafé’s residents and those of nearby towns would probably be in the city’s streets. In
his Memorias, José Antonio Torres y Peña maintains that the plotters also selected the 20 th
to symbolically emulate the French Revolution, which he deemed as sinful and immoral. 267
Although July 20th is not an important date in the history of the French Revolution, Torres
y Peña was probably referring to the Tennis Court Oath of June 20, 1789 and the journée
of June 20, 1792.268
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The conspirators who met in the Observatory on the night of the 19 th devised two
courses of action. They decided that a group of members of the Cabildo would first meet
with the viceroy and try to convince him of the urgent need to summon an assembly to
establish a junta. If that plan failed, they would incite disorders and, in the midst of the
unrest, push for the conformation of a junta. On the morning of the 20 th, around 10 to 11
am, several councilmen visited the Viceregal Palace. Amar once again rejected their
proposal and dismissed the members of the Cabildo. The conspirators moved on to their
second alternative.269
The second plan consisted of instigating a quarrel with the Spanish European
merchant, José González Llorente. Around noon, two men – the patrician Luis Rubio and
Lorenzo Marroquín, a close friend of González – passed by the merchant’s store in the
corner of Santafé’s main square. Marroquín had been entrusted with preparations for
Villavicencio’s arrival. Rubio and Marroquín visited González to ask him if he could lend
them a vase for a banquet in honor of the comisionado regio.270 The merchant rejected their
request arguing that he was no longer letting others use the vase for it had been damaged
from the many times he had lent it. Rubio, who was part of the plot, made a scene after
hearing the merchant’s answer, exclaiming that González had not only denied them the
vase, but also insulted and humiliated the city’s Americans. Several of Rubio’s
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accomplices stood close by, making sure that Rubio’s outcries would promptly spread
through the main square and nearby streets. A few minutes after Rubio’s tantrum, González
was attacked by the crowd and forced to hide in a contiguous house. An hour or two later,
a wounded and disguised González Llorente tried to covertly reach his home but was
identified and chased down the Calle Real all the way to his residence. A crowd quickly
formed around his house. The multitude shouted insults and exclaimed that justice should
be done. The alcalde José Miguel Pey intervened and imprisoned González. 271
During the following hours, at least three other Spanish Europeans were taken to
prison. They were accused of organizing a plot with González to massacre dozens of
Santafereños. As sunset approached, hundreds of people were still in the streets protesting
against Amar and other officials. To maintain the uproar in the streets, some of the plotters,
such as the regidor José Acevedo y Gómez, hurried into the main square and began making
proclamations in favor of the formation of a junta. At around 6 p.m., church bells tolled
peals of fire. Hundreds rushed into the main square hoping to control the conflagration
before it was out of control. To their surprise, they did not find a fire but widespread unrest
and strife. Councilmen, city notables, and hundreds of plebeians were gathered around the
Viceregal Palace, urging Amar to summon an open assembly (cabildo abierto) to discuss
the establishment of a government junta. According to magistrate Carrión, pickets with
sticks and batons were standing in the square’s four corners, allowing people to enter the
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main square, but preventing anyone from exiting. Those who attempted to leave the square
were violently forced back inside.272
As the multitude continued growing, so did the intensity of the protestors’ demands.
Several commissions composed of magistrates, councilmen, and city notables visited
Amar, urging him to summon an assembly. However, the viceroy continued refusing to do
so. Apparently, it was only until magistrate Juan Jurado spoke to Amar that the viceroy
agreed to hold an open assembly. It appears that Jurado told Amar to concede to the
multitude’s demands if he wanted to save his life as well as the Crown’s authority over
New Granada. The crowd, which by then reached the thousands, celebrated Amar’s
decision. Several notables requested the viceroy to preside over the meeting, but Amar
refused to do so claiming he was feeling ill. The viceroy ordered magistrate Jurado to lead
the cabildo abierto.273 The assembly convened in the Cabildo’s building, also located on
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the main square. Almost straight away, the cabildo abierto exceeded its faculties and called
for the conformation of a junta. From one of the building’s balconies, José Acevedo rallied
the crowd and asked it to elect the representatives that would take part in the government
junta. In the midst of shouting and yelling, delegates were elected and invited to join the
assembly in case they were not already a part of it. As the assembly quickly turned into a
junta, several of those participating in the cabildo abierto, such as Jurado, tried to put a
halt to this dramatic turn of events. They argued that such an assembly did not have the
legal authority to establish a junta. If the cabildo was going reach such a transcendental
ruling, Amar’s authorization was indispensable. 274
A commission was sent to the Viceregal Palace to ask the viceroy for his approval
to debate and decide on the conformation of a junta. The envoys returned with Amar’s oral
endorsement, but Jurado asked for a written confirmation from the viceroy in order to
continue. At 10 p.m., Amar sent a letter to Jurado authorizing him and the assembly to
make the “decisions that the circumstances demanded.” 275 During nearly five hours, the
cabildo abierto discussed questions regarding New Granada’s recognition of the Consejo
de Regencia and Amar’s place in the junta. Jurado claims it was thanks to his persistence
that the participants appointed Amar as the Junta’s president and recognized the Consejo
de Regencia’s authority. Towards three and half in the morning of July 21, those present
signed the act establishing the ‘Junta Suprema de Gobierno de Nueva Granada.’ The
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Junta’s members swore to defend the Catholic religion and the sovereignty of Ferdinand
VII as well as to prevent divisions among the provinces and to avoid further conflicts
between Spanish Europeans and Americans. 276
The confusion, fear, and mistrust that had been growing for months created the
necessary conditions for the establishment of a government junta; yet, its institution did
not appease the rising animosity nor the proliferation of rumors and misinformation.
Margarita Garrido argues that during the days following July 20 th, many of Santafé’s
patricians felt as if their plot had backfired. Garrido explains that before the establishment
of the Junta, many city notables had been instigating resentment towards Spanish
Europeans and also inciting commoners to partake in political affairs. Once the Junta was
finally instituted, these same patricians began to fear that Santafé’s populace was out of
control. In several incidents, the capital’s notables even took sides with the Europeans.
Many patricians condemned what they considered to be an unreasonable rage against
Spanish Europeans as well as what they thought to be excessive demands for justice on
behalf of the populace. When Spanish Europeans were detained, several notables
intervened to make sure that violence would not erupt, and that Europeans would not suffer
any sort of humiliation. Santafé’s notables complained among them that the commoners’
effervescence and intransigence was producing chaos and impeding them from properly
governing New Granada.277
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During the week following the formation of the Junta, dozens of Spanish Europeans
were detained in Santafé’s prisons. In the meantime, several Americans, such as the
clergyman Andrés María Rosillo, were released from custody. On July 22, responding to
demands from a multitude that gathered in the main square, the Junta ordered the detention
of magistrates Diego Frías and Juan Hernández de Alba. Rumors had been circulating for
months claiming that both justices were planning to hand over New Granada to the
Bonaparte. The crowd was not satisfied with news of their detention and insisted on seeing
them with shackles. Members of the Junta told the multitude that the magistrates would
only be displayed if everyone maintained their composure. After sunset, and following
hours of discussions, the magistrates were exhibited to the public from a balcony.
According to José María Caballero, the tailor, despite the animosity that Frías and
Hernández de Alba produced, the crowd maintained a respectful silence when the
handcuffed magistrates were presented to the crowd. 278
That same night of the 22nd, a rumor spread throughout the city claiming that an
army of black men was approaching the capital. Some claimed the arriving troops would
release the European prisoners and attack the Junta’s advocates. Many Santafereños,
already concerned with the mounting popular turbulence, feared the city’s destruction.
Perhaps, some imagined they would suffer the fate of Saint-Domingue. As the story
propagated, Santafé’s residents began to organize to defend the city. In his diary, José
María Caballero explains that dozens of women formed squads and insisted on being the
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capital’s first line of defense, declaring they were willing to sacrifice their lives to save the
patria. The story of the incoming black troops ended up being false. Those approaching
the capital were simply the residents and priests of neighboring towns travelling to Santafé
to offer their allegiance to the newly instituted Junta.279
Unrest and confusion would continue during the following days. All sorts of
proclamations were heard from the city’s balconies and squares. According to Caballero,
it was all very puzzling “because some said, ‘death to!’, others ‘long live!’. Some
demanded one thing, while others something else. One could hardly hear what was said.
These moments… were used by others to muddle us and plunge us into disorder and
anarchy.”280 In the midst of such uproar, the Junta also made public proclamations and
published bandos upholding Ferdinand VII’s authority and the Catholic religion. Amar, as
president of the Junta, made sure to display an image of the captive king during these public
events.281
During the next days, a spiral of accusations and denunciations led to further unrest
and even more detentions. On the 24th, the royal mail administrator was captured under
charges of hiding mail and concealing information in collusion with Amar. On the 25 th, a
rumor spread claiming that Amar was preparing an assault against the Junta. Apparently,
someone heard cannons being loaded inside the Viceregal Palace and saw Amar’s guards
preparing for battle. In a matter of minutes, nearly three thousand people ran into the main
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square and surrounded the Palace and Cabildo. People in the streets pleaded the Junta’s
members to search the Palace. In the meantime, a mob stormed an army garrison and took
dozens of rifles and sabers as well as six cannons. Four of the cannons were placed in main
square facing the Palace to counter those allegedly placed inside. As confrontation seemed
unavoidable, a group of six delegates from the Junta282 walked to the Palace and compelled
the guards and soldiers defending the Palace to yield. The six men then spoke to Amar and
the Vicereine Francisca Villanova and convinced them to accept imprisonment to avoid a
tragedy. The people in the streets formed guards of honor through which Amar was taken
to the Aduana (customs office) and Villanova to the Convent of La Enseñanza. Caballero
claims the people in the streets maintained a deferential silence as the two of them were
taken into custody.283
Such respectful conduct would not be witnessed on August 13 th when hundreds of
people forced the Junta to transfer the vicereine from the convent to a cell in El Divorcio
prison. That day, as Villanova was taken to the prison, commoner women in the streets
insulted the vicereine and even pinched her. One day later, the city’s most recognized
patricians tried to make up for the affront. A group of them gathered in the main square
and asked the Junta’s members for the liberty of both the viceroy and vicereine. The Junta
consented to their demands and ordered they be set free and sent to the Viceregal Palace.
According to Caballero, that same day, while most of the city’s residents were busy in the
marketplace, some of the most reputed women in the city – the wives of Antonio Nariño,
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Camilo Torres, and the marquis of San Jorge – escorted the vicereine from prison back to
the Palace.284 Amar and Villanova left Santafé a few days after their release. On October
25, 1810, after waiting for several weeks in the outskirts of Cartagena, they boarded a
commercial ship that took them back to the Iberian Peninsula. 285
On July 26th, just one day after Amar and Villanova’s detention, the Junta decided
to declare its opposition to the Consejo de Regencia and to dis-acknowledge it as Spain’s
supreme authority. Consequently, the Junta instructed Cartagena’s officials to detain
Viceroy Francisco Venegas, with the upmost respect and decorum, once he reached the
city. The orders were to prevent the newly appointed Venegas from travelling to Santafé.
Likewise, the Junta requested that Santafé’s officials stop all preparations for the awaited
arrival of the comisario regio Antonio Villavicencio.286 In the meantime, Villavicencio was
making his way up the mountains on his journey from Honda, on the banks of the
Magdalena, to Santafé. When the commissioner finally arrived in Santafé on August 1 st,
he encountered the scene he had dreaded. A junta had been formed without his presence
and, to make matters worse, it no longer recognized the Consejo de Regencia as Ferdinand
VII’s legitimate surrogate. Yet, Villavicencio knew that not everything was lost. The
commissioner believed that with due time and with the Consejo’s wise decisions, they
could eventually regain Santafé’s allegiance. 287 For the time being, Villavicencio urged
loyal officials not despised by the Santafereños, such as magistrate Juan Jurado, to stay in
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the capital to prevent the situation from worsening. The commissioner commended them
to uphold Ferdinand VII’s authority and to aid all the Europeans who had recently been
sent to prison.288
The participation of popular sectors during the commotions that broke out on July
20th and subsequent days have given rise to a variety of interpretations in Colombian
historiography. Some public intellectuals, such as Indalecio Liévano Aguirre and Rodrigo
Llano Isaza, argue that class conflict was underway. Both Liévano and Llano claim that
the movement leading to the formation of the junta was in fact a popular upheaval against
the city’s oligarchy.289 However, evidence suggests otherwise. Although there were several
incidents in which plebeians harassed Santafé’s most important officials and, to a certain
extent, menaced the city’s patricians, there are hardly any indications that the plebeians
sought to overthrow patricians and take control. Moreover, the Santafé’s Junta of July 20
and the process leading to its formation did not bring about social and political ruptures.
Yet, the emotions that circulated at the time did shape people’s notions of reality,
their sense of the future, and their conceptions of symbolic violence. The fear and
uncertainty that came about from the circulation of false news and conspiracies made many
doubt what was actually happening and what they should expect from the future.
Villavicenio, Jurado, and most of Santafé’s residents were uncertain of what to expect of
Spain’s fate nor that of New Granada. The possibility of being governed by someone else
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different than the Spanish Crown became more plausible than ever before. At least
temporarily, the imaginary line dividing the dominant from the dominated was blurred to
such an extent that the dominated ended up insulting and harassing the Vicereine. Amidst
such a milieu of anxiety and mistrust, society’s understandings of what natural social
relations and the given social order should look like were briefly altered.
The establishment of the junta offered hope and a sense of stability to many and
produced new imagined futures. Numerous Santafereños now believed they could defend
themselves from the Bonaparte brothers without having to deal with the alleged
incompetence and treacherousness of Amar and many of the Audiencia’s magistrates.
Moreover, the formation of the junta was also an opportunity to negotiate more autonomy
from the metropolis and to regain posts that Spanish Americans had lost to Europeans. In
that sense, it can be claimed that the process leading to the establishment of the junta
produced new imagined futures. Even though a complete rupture from the Spanish
Monarchy was not among the ambitions of most of the city’s residents – as a matter of fact,
it was inconceivable to many of them –, the possibility of further autonomy and of new
relations of power began to appear in the horizon of expectations of many of the city’s
residents.
Conclusions
In his Memorias, José Antonio Torres y Peña refers to those who promoted the
formation of Santafé’s Junta as contemporary Quixotes. “Instead of magicians, giants, and
scoundrels,” Torres y Peña explains, “our Quixotes have recognized kings, princes,
captains, and magistrates as despots, tyrants, satraps, viziers, and pashas.” The clergyman
charges the leaders of the junta with behaving as though they were characters in a chivalric
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romance, repeating over and over the same ballads and “hallucinating with the novel voices
and terms that were arising from the system of the new knights-errant.” 290 In his text, Torres
y Peña accuses the city’s dissidents of tricking Santafé’s plebeians into misery and
suffering as a result of their fixations and obsessions.
Torres y Peña used the metaphor of Don Quixote to ridicule and condemn those
who had promoted and taken part in the junta. Yet, his allegory serves to reflect on the
continuities and transformations that were taking place towards July 20, 1810. According
to the clergyman, those who had actively encouraged the formation of the junta had lost
their grasp on reality and were seemingly living in a parallel world. For Torres y Peña, their
cognitive capacity and understanding of reality had been distorted to such an extent that
they could only speak, without respite, of sovereignty, constitutions, liberty, and
unalienable rights.291 Torres y Peña’s satire is not completely mistaken. Of course, those
who supported the formation of Junta Suprema de Nueva Granada were not foolish knightserrant who had lost touch with reality. However, the clergyman’s comments highlight that,
towards 1810, new conceptions of reality, of the present, and of the future as well as
innovative languages and concepts were emerging in Santafé and New Granada.
This chapter has argued that during the almost twenty-four months between August
1808 and July 1810 emotions transformed society’s notions of reality as well as its
imagined futures and conceptions of symbolic violence. I maintain that the spread and
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intensification of emotions such as fear, expectation, confusion, and mistrust altered
people’s understandings of the world they were living in and their horizons of expectation.
The rupture allowed many to conceive the possibility of being ruled by someone other than
the Spanish Monarchy and to imagine living under a form of government different from a
monarchical one. Yet, these prospective futures also produced certain apprehension and
resistance among some of Santafé’s residents. Many feared that chaos and anarchy would
end up spreading throughout New Granada. Consequently, many of the city’s inhabitants
also began to imagine and desire relations of power that could ensure stability, security,
and public tranquility.
In that sense, the redefinition of existing conceptions of reality ended up displacing
certain relations of power while reinforcing others. As Joanna Bourke explains, emotions
may create and reproduce relations of subordination at the same time that they can also
unravel them. For Bourke, emotions such are fear are social performers through which the
distribution of power takes place. 292 In the case of the formation of Santafé’s Junta, this
seems to be true. Emotions’ redefined people’s understandings of the world around them.
This allowed many of the city’s residents to imagine being ruled by new entities and forms
of government. Yet, fear of chaos and disorder impeded many from imagining the
possibility of bestowing power on Santafé’s plebeians and other subordinate groups. In the
long run, prevailing conceptions of how power should be distributed favored the rise of
strong, authoritarian figures that could fill in the gap left by European officials and the
Spanish Crown.
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Chapter 2: Shaking Revolution. Emotional Communities and Diverging Experiences
of Fear, Guilt, and Hope in Venezuela and New Granada, 1812-1818.
On March 26, 1812, at around four in the afternoon, while thousands of parishioners
celebrated Maundy Thursday, a tremor shook northern Venezuela. The earthquake caused
destruction, pain, and grief throughout the whole region. Thousands died and hundreds of
buildings, including cathedrals and churches, fell to the ground. Many linked the natural
disaster to recent political events. Caracas, the capital of the Captaincy General of
Venezuela, had formed a government junta on April 19, 1810. During the following weeks,
neighboring provinces did the same. About a year later, on July 5, 1811, Caracas and six
other provinces declared their absolute independence from Spain. 293 Among them was the
Province of Mérida. In the city of Mérida, located about 650 kilometers southwest of
Caracas, the tremor destroyed a substantial part of the city’s buildings and apparently killed
over 1,500 people. The city’s bishop, Santiago Hernández Milanés, was among the
victims.294 News of the earthquake spread throughout northern South America. Both
royalists and insurgents in Venezuela and New Granada claimed the natural disaster
hastened the collapse of republican territories into the hands of royalist troops. The
earthquake incited discussions over republicanism, monarchism, and independence that
intertwined with debates concerning God’s wrath, eternal damnation, and salvation. For
some, the earthquake was simply a natural phenomenon. For others, it was unequivocally
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a punishment sent by God to admonish Venezuelans for their many sins and their disloyal
behavior.
At the time, seismic events were considered mysterious phenomena without a
certain explanation.295 In the Iberian Atlantic world, the 1746 earthquake in Lima and the
1755 earthquake in Lisbon were emblems of catastrophic tremors. This was so not only
because of the destruction they caused, but also because of the debates they produced
among those trying to find a scientific explanation to seismic activity and those insisting
on religious and moral explanations of the tremors. 296 Although direct allusions to the Lima
and Lisbon earthquakes are marginal in the sources concerning the 1812 quake, people in
Caracas and Mérida possibly had them as references as they tried to give meaning to the
natural disaster they were facing.
The 1812 earthquake was one of many episodes in which people in Venezuela and
New Granada struggled to give meaning to the troubled times in which they lived. In the
1810s, throughout northern South America, recent political events and the emotions they
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produced disturbed people’s understanding of the world they lived in. To try to
comprehend and give meaning to what was happening, many looked back in time to
understand how they had reached this state of affairs. At the same time, they envisioned
possible paths society could take towards the future. As people grappled to understand their
place in time, a wide variety of narratives emerged. Different partisan groups and social
sectors tried to impose particular interpretations of the times they were living.
All over the region emotions were stirred as a result of growing political and social
frictions, conflicting narratives, and the advent of new political projects and symbols.
Several concrete episodes are revealing of such emotional effervescence. For instance, on
July 16, 1813, in a question of about an hour, Santafé de Bogotá’s residents celebrated
Cundinamarca’s declaration of independence from Spain, performed a series of republican
rites, and witnessed an execution. A few minutes after planting a myrtle tree in the main
square to praise freedom and equality, as French republicans had done in past decades,
Antonio Nariño, Cundinamarca’s president, ordered the execution of a slave accused of
murdering his master. In a matter of minutes, all sorts of emotions circulated throughout
the main square. Gestures of intense joy and happiness were seen among many when
Cundinamarca’s independence was proclaimed. However, those who were already hesitant
of this political venture became even more concerned as they saw symbols and rituals of
the French Revolution propagating through Santafé. Some even began to dread the violence
and persecution that had spread through France. The slave’s execution, which was carried
out without a trial, shocked many at the same time that it inspired fear and disillusion
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among others who began to see their hopes of equality vanishing.297 Another revealing case
of emotional ferment is that of Pasto in southern New Granada. A sense of deep fidelity to
the Spanish Crown and passionate religious fervor led the city’s residents to change their
patron saint from Our Lady of the Immaculate Conception to Our Lady of Mercy. At the
time, many Pastusos believed the miraculous intercession of Our Lady of Mercy had saved
them from falling into the hands of Nariño’s rebel troops in 1814. During the following
years, every May 10th Pasto’s authorities celebrated their new patron saint by lighting up
of the city’s main streets and buildings, tolling church bells, offering music in the streets,
and inviting its residents to religious celebrations and to observe fasting. 298
This chapter studies the different experiences of fear, guilt, and hope that emerged
during the years following the institution of government juntas and their subsequent
declarations of independence in Venezuela and New Granada. The chapter poses two
arguments. First, it argues that mounting discrepancies in understandings of the present,
past, and future led to dissimilar emotional experiences. Times of intense political and
social unrest such as the ones lived in Venezuela and New Granada in the early 1810s
widened the gaps between emotional communities, to use Barbara Rosenwein’s term.
Different social groups, in part owing to their own, particular notions of reality, conceived
and experienced emotions in different ways. Yet, their own emotional perceptions and
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experiences also shaped the meanings and understandings people gave to the world they
were living in.
The chapter insists on the diversity of emotional experiences, but it also stresses the
extent to which these emotions of fear, guilt, and hope, in their many variations, became
widespread across society. In that sense, the chapter also argues that, during the years
following the formation of government juntas, intense feelings of guilt and fear became
ingrained in the hearts and minds of most Venezuelans and New Granadians to such an
extent that intense emotions shaped people’s understandings of the times they were living
in and contributed to the fall of republican governments throughout the region. This
argument puts into question the claims made by nineteenth-century historians and presentday social historians about the role of emotions during the independence process.
Nineteenth-century historians, such as José Manuel Restrepo and José Manuel Groot,
allege it was only the “naïve” and “superstitious” populace whose thoughts and actions
were shaped by feelings of fear, rage, and confusion.299 In recent years, several social
historians have implied that popular sectors acted rationally and that deep emotions did not
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affect their views and behaviors.300 This chapter shows that intense fear and guilt were
widespread among all of society, regardless of social standing.
To explore the ways in which emotional experiences diverge from one another and
how emotions shaped people’s notions of reality, this chapter focuses on the 1812
earthquake that shook northern Venezuela as well as on a series of volcanic eruptions that
disturbed Popayán in 1817. Among many possible episodes and incidents that could serve
as case studies, such as Cundinamarca’s declaration of independence or Pasto’s institution
of a new patron saint, the chapter concentrates on these two natural phenomena because
they motivated discussions about the humane and the heavenly, the natural and the
supernatural. That is to say, these two events offer insights into people’s beliefs,
expressions, and practices that allow us to identify and examine an emotional
community.301
In the 1810s, as emotions intensified and political and social tensions grew
throughout Venezuela and New Granada, the gaps between narratives giving meaning to
what was happening became more manifest and so did the differences between the ways
people experienced emotions. Guilt, fear, hope, pain, and grief were not experienced in the
same ways by all members of society. A particular incident or idea could trigger fear and
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guilt among some at the same time that they might incite hope among others. Moreover,
this divergence among emotional experiences shaped and deepened political and social
struggles, stimulating certain narratives, contesting others, and pushing others out of sight.
During these years, the split between what Barbara Rosenwein has termed ‘emotional
communities’ widened even further. Rosenwein uses the term emotional communities to
refer to the different systems of feeling that coexist within a given society. As Rosenwein
explains, there are groups or communities that share similar notions of what is valuable
and what is harmful, hold the same modes of expressing emotions, and evaluate others’
emotions in similar ways. Rosenwein claims emotional communities are not sealed
clusters, but rather fluid groups in which individuals easily move from one community to
another. An emotional community constantly interacts with other communities and, in
certain cases, overlaps with those nearby. For Rosenwein, emotional communities are not
static but are rather continually changing and adapting.302 This chapter studies some of the
emotional communities that existed in Venezuela and Popayán in the 1810s. It explores the
different understandings of the world that prevailed in each community and the different
ways in which emotions were experienced and conceived within them. Throughout the
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chapter, I suggest that the gaps between emotional communities tend to grow when
political and social tensions intensify.
Although Rosenwein’s notion of ‘emotional communities’ is compelling in many
ways, its use poses several difficulties. Identifying an emotional community, its members,
and its main features is not an easy task. Trying to delimitate a community from others
poses further obstacles as divisions between one community and another are blurry. Part
of the difficulty also arises from the dynamism with which emotions are constantly
changing. Political, social, and even natural events continuously give shape to people’s
understandings of the world and, thus, to their emotional experiences. This blurs the limits
between one community and another even further.
Another challenge arises from society’s heterogeneity. In the case of Venezuela and
New Granada, racial and social diversity was complemented by marked hierarchical
divisions which, despite their rigidity, did not completely impede social mobility. Other
factors, such as gender, lineage, education, and wealth also helped give form to people’s
emotional experiences. If one considers such dynamism and diversity, the task of clustering
individuals and social groups according to their ways of experiencing emotions is
undoubtedly a challenging and equivocal one. This is particularly true when the historical
records offer limited information with regards to certain sectors of society. For instance, in
the particular case of this chapter, the documents only make marginal references to
Venezuelan and Payanés women, blacks, pardos, and Indians. Unavoidably, such archival
gaps obscure the perspectives of many, leaving us in a situation in which we cannot say
much about the particular experiences of these social sectors and individuals. We can
assume that their emotional experiences resembled in one way or another that of other
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members of society. However, there is a breach in our knowledge that holds us back from
posing more definite conclusions. Even if one attempts to employ the term with much
caution, using the concept of “emotional communities” comes with the risk of obscuring
and leaving out many emotional experiences. Even more, there is the possibility that, in an
attempt to highlight differences and diversity, the historian may end up homogenizing
whole sectors of society by assuming that experiences that were predominant among one
cluster of people also prevailed among other groups with which they simply share some
common traits.
Nonetheless, if used broadly, Rosenwein’s concept allows us to acknowledge the
variety of emotional experiences that coexisted at the time and some of the reasons behind
such heterogeneity. Moreover, it invites us to consider how frictions over understandings
of particular events shaped the ways different groups experienced emotions and how
emotions, for their part, shaped people’s understandings of what was happening around
them. In that sense, the concept also reminds us that emotions are not only individual
experiences, but they are part of collective and communal ones.
Throughout the 1810s, in Spanish America, discussions concerning independence
and republicanism were interwoven with debates regarding salvation. Detractors and critics
of independence were quick to claim that an individual or a community’s salvation was at
risk if such political endeavor persisted. In the early nineteenth-century Spanish world, as
during most early modernity, people were continuously told by the clergy and theologians
that no quest was more important than the search for salvation. As Stuart Schwartz
explains, “life was all too short and eternity endless, and securing the soul’s salvation was
a matter of the utmost urgency. But soteriology, the understanding of salvation, was a
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contested issue.”303 In the face of tragedies such as the 1812 earthquake, even those who
tried to ignore forewarnings of eternal damnation from clergymen and officials could not
help to avoid feeling some sort of guilt over their views and actions. 304 More frightening
than death itself, the prospect of being condemned to eternal damnation due to one’s
conduct and opinions was by far the most pressing matter in the minds and hearts of many,
regardless of their social status and political views. 305
By the early nineteenth century, many Spaniards, in both Europe and the Americas,
shared the notion that loyalty to the Spanish Crown went hand in hand with faithfulness to
the Church and God.306 It is worth noting that Spanish political culture did not conceive of
the monarch as drawing his authority from God alone. Rather, there was a shared belief
that power came from God and was transmitted from God to the people who, to preserve
social stability, transferred power to the monarch. 307 This conception is somewhat different
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from the one that prevailed in England and France during medieval times and the first
decades of early modernity in which the predominant notion was that the monarch’s power
and authority solely came from God. Moreover, as Ernst Kantorowicz, explains, French
and English kings were at times even conceived as ‘persona mixta.’ That is, monarchs were
viewed as individuals who held both spiritual capacities as well as absolute temporal
authority.308 In the Spanish world, that was not the case. Nonetheless, Catholicism and the
Spanish Monarchy were closely integrated. God and the Catholic religion were viewed as
elements that gave unity and stability to society and reinforced the union between the
monarch and the people. In that sense, religion was the basis for the triad “God,
Motherland, and King.” As William Taylor explains with regards to the Spanish world,
religion “provided a focus for authority, a cosmic model for human order in a society where
one’s dying thoughts still turned to confession and salvation, and an institutional
framework for expressing social relationships and mediating inequalities.” 309 All over
Spain and its dominions, the commonly used phrase “serving God and the King” was
equated with serving the public and the motherland. 310
Thus, when provinces throughout Venezuela and New Granada began to declare
their independence from the Spanish Crown and Ferdinand VII, many, including Bishop
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Hernández in Mérida, were faced with a frightening moral predicament. People from all
social stratums believed that a political rupture from Spain inevitably implied a break in
the sacred union between God and the people. Many considered an act of disloyalty
towards the king as one of unfaithfulness to God at the same time that an attack on the
Crown was conceived as one against the social order and God himself. That is, an
interruption in the relationship between the Spanish Monarchy and its vassals also implied
a break in the union between God and his congregation. Consequently, many assumed that
a rupture of this implicit covenant, which had existed in the Americas for close to three
centuries, could only bring about chaos and eternal damnation. 311
Such religious background permeated almost all discussions that came about in
early nineteenth-century Venezuela and New Granada. Nonetheless, fear, guilt, and hope
did not spring exclusively from a spiritual grasp of the world. Emotions also emerged from
earthlier matters. Frustration at being unable to organize an army, anxiety at not handling
relief efforts efficiently, or annoyance at the incapacity to operate a well-ordered
government were some of the feelings that many Caraqueños faced around the time of the
1812 earthquake. These different emotions, including those triggered by religious
sensibilities as well as those originating from more mundane matters, shaped people’s
grasp of the world around them. Their decisions and understandings were mediated by
these emotions.
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The onset of guilt and fear in Mérida
On March 26, 1812, the residents of Mérida observed Maundy Thursday with
processions, prayers, and mass. That afternoon, Mérida’s Bishop, Santiago Hernández
Milanés, led the washing of the feet and gave mass in the city’s cathedral. A few minutes
before four in the afternoon, Hernández and several priests walked from the cathedral to
the episcopal palace. Shortly after going inside, an earthquake shook northern Venezuela,
destroying dozens of Mérida’s buildings and churches, including its episcopal palace and
cathedral. The palace’s walls and ceilings crumbled, killing Bishop Hernández and the
clergymen that had been accompanying him that afternoon. Hundreds of the city’s residents
suffered the same fate. Some were able to reach the streets and squares before being buried
under the ruins of the city’s edifices. Only a few were lucky enough to see their homes and
shops standing after the earthquake. During the following hours, aftershocks continued to
shake the city. While some of Mérida’s residents tried to rescue survivors from beneath the
rubble, others simply awaited with anticipation in the city’s squares. That night, almost all
of the Mérida’s inhabitants slept in the streets and squares out of fear that their residences
might collapse at any moment or that another tremor would finally demolish their homes. 312
On the morning of Friday March 27, many of Mérida’s residents moved to
haciendas and empty plots of land in the city’s outskirts trying to seek safety and escape
possible outbreaks of disease. Those who stayed in the city woke up to a conflagration on
the morning of Saturday 28. Fortunately for them, they were able to put out the fire before
it caused yet another tragedy. By then, many began to fear imminent famine. As an
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eyewitness explained, many of those who survived had been forced to ask for handouts and
most believed that if nearby towns and villages did not send food and provisions, Mérida’s
residents would soon perish. Many sent letters to Maracaibo, Caracas, and New Granada
asking for aid and giving reports of widespread desolation. They were unaware that other
cities such as Caracas and Barquisimeto had also been destroyed by the tremor. One of the
dispatches sent during those days stated that Mérida no longer existed and that half of its
inhabitants were buried beneath ruins.313 Another account claimed that more than 1,500
people had perished and that most of the city had been destroyed. 314 Other reports placed
the death toll somewhere between 400 and 5,000 people. 315
Among the hundreds of deaths, beyond those of family and friends, it was probably
Bishop Hernández Milanés’ decease that caused the most distress and anguish among
Mérida’s residents and those of neighboring towns and cities. The city’s inhabitants could
hardly believe the bishop had died. On the 26th, soon after the earthquake came to an end,
hundreds of people from all over the city arrived at the main square looking for their loved
ones while they tried to understand what had happened. In the square, they found a
shattered cathedral and episcopal palace. There was much confusion with regards to who
lay beneath the debris. Almost instantly, speculations of the bishop’s death began to be
heard. Through word of mouth, the rumor quickly spread throughout the square and
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surrounding streets all the way to Mérida’s fringes. Stories of the tragic death continued
circulating for two to three days until the tragic news was finally confirmed in a sermon
given on the city’s outskirts.316
Hernández’s death caused affliction and anguish not only due to his rank, but also
to his avid loyalism and his well-known reservations concerning the establishment of
Mérida’s Junta and its subsequent declaration of independence from Spain. His life and
death are revealing of some of the feelings of guilt and fear that many in Venezuela had
been nurturing since 1810, when provincial juntas were established throughout the region.
To an extent, the 1812 earthquake simply brought to the surface the emotions many had
been nourishing for months. Hernández had arrived in Venezuela towards mid-1802 when
he was appointed Mérida’s Bishop. In 1806, Hernández became renowned among many
Venezuelans for his fierce opposition and criticism of Francisco de Miranda, who on
August 3, 1806 had disembarked in the proximities of Coro with an army of close to four
hundred men. At the moment of Miranda’s landing, Hernández was visiting the Province
of Coro, one of the territories ascribed to his bishopric. Hernández and his companions fled
the region out of fear that they might fall into the hands of Miranda. During the following
weeks, Hernández offered several proclamations and sermons against Miranda, accusing
him of being “unfaithful to the Sovereign and his fatherland, an irreligious man, an atheist,
a monster accompanied by a gang of foolish men.” 317 Hernández even indicted and
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ridiculed Miranda for allegedly having Jews and Protestants among his troops. Weeks later,
the bishop enthusiastically celebrated the rebel’s defeats and then his retreat from
Venezuela.318
A few years later, Hernández fared a conundrum when Venezuelan provinces began
to form government juntas and then declared their independence from Spain. The bishop’s
correspondence documents his unwillingness to adhere to Caracas’ 1810 Junta and his
suspicions and fears with regards to Caracas’ 1811 declaration of independence. As a
matter of fact, his correspondence shows that Hernández began to nurture a sense of
remorse ever since discussions regarding the formation of government juntas reached
Mérida around 1809. Following the example of Caracas’ Archbishop Narciso Coll y Prat,
who on September 14, 1810 unwillingly swore allegiance to Caracas’ Junta, Hernández
pledged his adherence to Mérida’s Junta on September 21. In his oath, Hernández
explained that given the demanding circumstances, “he vowed once again to recognize
only the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII and his dynasty, and to obey those governing in his
name, in this case the Junta Suprema established in this capital…” 319 Almost a year later,
on July 5, 1811, the provinces of Caracas, Mérida, Cumaná, Barinas, Margarita, Barcelona,
and Trujillo declared their absolute independence from Spain and established the
‘Confederación Americana de Venezuela.’ On August 21, Hernández sent a letter to a
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group of Mérida’s clergymen consulting them whether he should embrace Mérida’s
independence, bearing in mind that he had previously sworn allegiance to Mérida’s Junta.
Under these new circumstances, he inquired, what was he to do to maintain his loyalty to
Ferdinand VII, the Spanish Crown, and the Catholic Church while also upholding his vows
of allegiance to the junta that now governed the Province of Mérida? 320
The clergymen’s response came two days later. In their answer, they argued that
Hernández was not obliged to endorse Mérida’s independence because his previous vows
had been made under the assumption that the junta would maintain its loyalty to the King
and the Spanish Monarchy. Moreover, the clergymen claimed that two of the bishopric’s
provinces, Coro and Maracaibo, had not declared independence and still continued to be
loyal to the Spanish Crown. If Hernández embraced independence, they explained, he
would be leaving these provinces without its rightful spiritual leader. The letter urged the
bishop to follow the example of Pope Pio VII who lost his liberty as well as his authority
over the Papal States after Napoleon’s invasion but refused to concede to the emperor’s
immoral desires.321 Despite the clergymen’s arguments and Hernández’s manifest
unwillingness to support independence, the bishop ended up reluctantly adhering to
Mérida’s declaration of independence a few days after receiving their reply. 322
Hernández’s doubts and worries are revealing of the concerns shared by many
Venezuelans and New Granadians. For many, recent events not only meant a rupture from
Spain; they also implied a break from the Catholic Church and from God. From their
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perspective, not only political and social stability were at risk, so was people’s salvation.
It seems that some in Hernández’s flock, the parish priests, and the city’s friars evaluated
and assessed the juntas and their independence in similar ways. Apparently, a number of
Mérida’s residents were beginning to nourish similar feelings of guilt and fear and also
believed these political ventures would lead to chaos, misery, and eternal damnation. Yet,
it is worth noting that not all in the city shared these sentiments. Some of Mérida’s nuns
enthusiastically supported the provincial junta and its declarations of independence despite
catastrophic warnings coming from other members of the clergy. 323
Once the earthquake took place on March 26, remorse became widespread among
Mérida’s residents, regardless of whether their allegiance to the provincial junta and to its
independence from Spain had been halfhearted or enthusiastic. The devastation caused by
the tremor almost immediately made many imagine that their disloyalty to Ferdinand VII
and the Spanish Crown had brought about this tragedy and condemned them to eternal
damnation. Shortly after the earthquake, horrified residents “ran out of their homes,
screaming in the streets, ‘mercy Ferdinand VII!’” 324 Perhaps the city’s inhabitants had, for
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months, been nurturing a certain sense of guilt that they only expressed after the tremor.
According to students from Mérida’s seminary, on the evening of March 26 th, many of the
survivors who were gathered in the main square cried and pled for God’s mercy and
forgiveness. Rumors of Bishop Hernández’s death deepened fears that residents’ sufferings
were the result of the city’s disloyalty. Some of those standing in the main square
commented that the bishop’s unfaithfulness had brought about his tragic end. Maybe, some
even speculated that Hernández’s last thoughts and feelings were of remorse for having
endorsed Mérida’s junta and its independence. In the following days, many seminary
students fled to Maracaibo where they claimed God had destroyed Mérida in wrath. 325 In
the meantime, Mérida’s residents made “public displays of repentance, proclaiming that
the tremor had been a visible punishment from God for the revolution.” 326 In Mérida and
neighboring towns, people commented on “the coincidence that it [the earthquake] had
occurred the same Maundy Thursday, and at the exact same hour in which the insurrection
was published two years before.”327
Emotional communities and widening gaps: Caracas after the Maundy Thursday
earthquake
Similar remarks and emotional outbursts were seen across most of Venezuela after
the earthquake. Caracas, along with Mérida and Barquisimeto, was probably the city that
suffered the most from the tremor. In the capital, the quake destroyed the city’s cathedral
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as well as nearly two thirds of its buildings. Approximately 10,000 of the capital’s 30,000
inhabitants perished on the afternoon of the 26th and subsequent days. Some claim the death
toll would have been higher had most of the city’s residents been in their homes instead of
out in the streets and squares. That day, Caraqueños were not only celebrating Maundy
Thursday, but also the second anniversary of the formation of Caracas’ Junta. The city’s
streets and houses had been decorated with flags and banners. 328 In Caracas, as in Mérida,
displays of fear and guilt were seen soon after the earthquake. Royalists, particularly
clergymen, were quick to argue that the tremor could only be understood as divine
punishment and insisted that it was not a coincidence that the quake had taken place on the
same date that the province’s junta was instituted.329 Shortly after the tremor came to an
end, a Franciscan friar was seen in Caracas’ street with a crucifix in his hands claiming that
the earthquake was a punishment sent by God for their many sins against Ferdinand VII.
The friar apparently pronounced a phrase that quickly spread throughout Venezuela and
New Granada: “On Holy Thursday they did it! On Holy Thursday they paid for it!” 330
Many in Caracas and surrounding cities embraced such understandings of recent
events. The revolutionary government had a relatively poor reputation and people in
general were predisposed to believe independence was sinful and corrupt. 331 These sorts of
preconceptions were so ingrained among some Venezuelans that proclamations arguing
the tremor was the result of God’s fury found an ample reception soon after the earthquake
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came to an end. On the 26th, in addition to the Franciscan friar with his crucifix, a
Dominican abbot was seen in Caracas’ streets preaching against the republican
government. An audience quickly formed around him. Witnesses claimed that many in the
crowd nodded their heads in approval as they listened to the cleric argue that that quake
had been caused by the rebels’ immorality.332 It seems many in Caracas had also been
nourishing feelings of guilt and fear similar to those Bishop Hernández and Mérida’s
residents experienced but that they only began to express them after the tremor came to an
end.333 Most of Caracas’ residents, however, were somewhat more constrained than the
Dominican and Franciscan friars when voicing their views and emotions.
As happened in other regions of Venezuela, not all Caraqueños shared the same
understandings of what was happening, nor did they experience emotions in the same
manner. Similar understandings of the times being lived brought about analogous
experiences of remorse and dread. Three broad emotional communities, to use
Rosenwein’s concept, became visible in Mérida, Caracas, and other Venezuelan cities in
the months leading to the earthquake as well as during its immediate aftermath. Each of
these groups assessed their place in time and interpreted recent events in their own manner.
Correspondingly, each group experienced guilt and fear in their own, particular ways.
Hernández and his congregation as well as Caracas’ friars and their closest parishioners are
but an example of one of the emotional communities that surfaced during these years. In
their case, they linked recent political happenings and republican projects with divine
punishment and eternal damnation. Despite the extent to which these understandings and
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feelings of guilt and dread spread, they were not shared by all members of society. Others
also experienced religious guilt and fear, but they did so in a more individual manner. They
believed it was their personal behavior, rather than collective political ventures, which had
unleashed God’s wrath. Several republicans, however, felt fear and guilt that their internal
divisions and their incapacity in governing were bringing down the Venezuelan
Confederation.
In Caracas, frictions about the meaning of the earthquake began almost
immediately. That same afternoon, the rebel government began to repress and censor those
who blamed it for the natural disaster. For instance, the Franciscan friar seen in the streets
with a crucifix – and who accused republicans of being responsible for the quake – was
captured and sent to prison. It seems that the friar’s words and insolence enraged republican
officials. Some even pushed for his execution. Apparently, among those insisting on an
exemplary punishment was Simón Bolívar. Several scholars argue that on the 26 th and
subsequent days Bolívar led a counteroffensive to stop the diffusion of proclamations
claiming the earthquake was the product of God’s wrath. At the time, Bolívar was a midlevel army officer relatively unknown in Caracas. Traditional Venezuelan historiography
as well as several contemporary scholars claim that Simón Bolívar was present in Caracas
on the 26th and was seen picking up debris and helping rescue those found beneath the
ruins. It is said that at some moment, Bolívar exclaimed “if nature opposes us, we will
struggle against her and force her to obey us.”334 Although the phrase has become part of
Venezuelan historical memory, it is unlikely that he uttered such words. Historians such as
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Michael Zeuske claim that it is possible that Bolívar was not even in Caracas when the
earthquake took place. Zeuske argues that the renowned phrase belongs to the vast
mythology surrounding Bolívar’s figure. Among these numerous myths one finds claims
such as that Bolívar and Alexander von Humboldt were close friends and inspired each
other in their political and scientific ventures. 335
Regardless of Bolívar’s whereabouts on the afternoon of March 26 th, the fact is that
immediately after the tremor came to an end, republican officials did what they could to
put a stop to the spread of stories asserting the earthquake was God’s punishment for
Venezuela’s many sins. Through different means they attempted to transmit the idea that
the earthquake was merely a natural disaster unrelated to divine will or political events.
Giving meaning to the tremor as well as to the feelings of guilt and fear it produced became
yet another battleground between royalists and republicans. In their efforts to spread their
message and appease growing feelings of dread and remorse, republican officials ended up
locked up in an argument with Caracas’ Archbishop, Narciso Coll y Pratt. 336 The
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authorities’ infructuous efforts and the clergyman’s obstinacy are revealing of a growing
gap between dissimilar understandings of recent events as well as of the widening of the
breach between different experiences of guilt and fear.
Coll y Prat was one of the most ardent advocates of the narrative claiming the
tremor was a consequence of God’s wrath. On a report written to Ferdinand VII on August
25, 1812, Coll y Prat maintains that the earthquake was a horrendous disaster, but
ultimately, a warranted one. According to the archbishop, as Caracas’ residents fell into
greater “depredation, pride, and disturbances, the divine omnipotence chose to look upon
them with clemency and to admonish these residents so that they return to the bosom of
their former common mother, and graciously acknowledge their two sovereigns, both
celestial and human.” For Coll y Prat, the destruction of Caracas merely “corroborated the
prophecies that God had revealed to men, upon the ancient, sinful, and arrogant cities of
Babylon, Jerusalem, and the Tower of Babel.” 337 In his letter, the archbishop claimed that
all sorts of immoralities had been on the rise ever since ideas of independence began to
circulate throughout Venezuela. The archbishop’s list of grievances included the closure
of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, the new government’s “exacerbated religious
tolerance”, a series of measures restricting the regular clergy’s disciplinary jurisdiction
over its own members, and proclamations on behalf of rebel officials favoring a
“democratic” Gospel. 338
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On the top of Coll y Prat’s list of complaints was the suppression of a pastoral in
which he depicted the earthquake as a fair punishment by which God sought to morally
cleanse Caracas from its many sins. Interestingly enough, the sermon was originally
requested by republican officials. In order to put a halt to the growing feelings of fear and
guilt that were spreading throughout Caracas and Venezuela, authorities asked Coll y Prat
to prepare a pastoral explaining that earthquakes were natural phenomena not related to
political affairs. In a petition sent on April 4, 1812, rebel officials complained that the
enemies of the republic had been creating unrest by spreading superstitions and by
convincing many of the city’s “simple-minded” that the natural disaster was God’s
message in favor of the monarch’s restitution. In their letter, officials implored the
archbishop to explain to his flock that earthquakes “were as common in the natural order
as rain, hail, or lightning.”339 Just a day after their first dispatch, republican officials sent
another letter to Coll y Prat insisting on the urgency of the matter and explaining that
ruinous falsehoods and rumors condemning Caraqueños to eternal damnation were out of
control among the less educated people. Moreover, authorities asked the archbishop to
order all his priests to preach against these noxious superstitions and to explain to their
congregations that the revolutionary government was, contrary to what its enemies
claimed, striving to extirpate all sorts of vices and immoral customs. 340
Coll y Prat intentionally delayed his response as well as the preparation of the
pastoral. He believed that by doing so he could provide enough time for rumors to spread
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claiming the tremor had been God’s penance for Venezuela’s independence and its
adoption of republicanism. On April 10, the archbishop responded to the officials’ request
arguing that he knew quite well that earthquakes were natural phenomenon and that he was
also aware of the republican government’s dispositions to eradicate sinful and immoral
conduct. Yet, in his reply the archbishop claimed that God was the driving force behind
nature’s actions and that God admonished sins and aberrant behavior through natural
disasters as had happened with the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Corruption,
arrogance, lust, and irreligiosity, the archbishop argued, had propagated among the
capital’s residents to such an extent that he could only be thankful that God had been so
merciful and had not unleashed all his wrath on the city. What is more, he explained he
was making the most of the fear the earthquake produced among his flock, urging them to
stop their sinful ways and exhorting them “to put an end to all cases of concubinage, to
abandon enmities, to retract from impiety and erroneous philosophical libertinage, to
maintain order and public tranquility, and to aid each other as good citizens...” 341 The
archbishop closed his dispatch saying he had been spreading this message among his
congregation and had ordered his bishopric’s priests to do the same. 342
During the following month, republican officials continued pressing the archbishop
for a pastoral and Coll y Prat kept on eluding the commission with all sorts of excuses. On
April 13, authorities sent a letter to the archbishop claiming a pastoral from him would help
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“destroy the bad impressions that the discourses of some evildoers have produced on these
inhabitants. Such enemies of our liberty and independence have tried to blame the
phenomenon that took place on March 26 on the sacred cause we have undertaken.” 343
Three days later, Coll y Prat responded claiming that he had not forgotten the task assigned
to him, but that he had fallen ill and had been awfully busy. On May 10, republican official
sent a new request framed as a gentle kind of ultimatum. In the letter, rebel officials claimed
that more than ever Caracas’ congregation needed some sort of reassurance from someone
as respected as the archbishop and, that they hoped he would not snub their request once
more. A couple of days later, Coll y Prat replied that he was working on the pastoral but
had not been able to finish it because of his poor health and his many responsibilities as
archbishop.344
It was only on June 8 that Coll y Prat finally sent his much-promised pastoral. In
the dispatch, the archbishop excused himself for his delay but claimed that, to a certain
extent, he had already begun complying with their request. The clergyman argued that, as
already stated in his letter from April 10, he had been offering encouragement and support
to his congregation since the earthquake took place. In the dispatch, Coll y Prat somewhat
sarcastically praised the government’s generosity and wisdom for allowing him to remain
close to his flock to offer them the reassurance they needed in these uncertain times. Yet,
going along with the unwillingness he showed in previous letters and adopting a rather
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cynical tone, the pastoral came nowhere close to fulfilling the officials’ wishes. Coll y
Prat’s sermon insisted that the suffering Caraqueños were undergoing was without doubt
a punishment from God. Nonetheless, he maintained that God had acted as a loving and
merciful father who simply sought the repentance of those who had behaved licentiously.
The archbishop argued that Caracas’ residents had brought the disaster on themselves for
they had been informed multiple times to put an end to their pride and sins but had ignored
all forewarnings. Coll y Prat accused Caracas’ people of having “run without restraint and
without fear along the path to iniquity”, “adding crime to crime, scandal to impudence, and
irreligion to sacrilege.” Some of its denizens, he maintained, “iniquitously believed that the
almighty was one of their equals.”345 The archbishop sustained that he had perceived the
city’s intolerable corruption ever since he disembarked in the port of La Guaira – about 30
kilometers north of Caracas – and found himself among Caraqueños. Since then, he had
been advising them to change their customs and end their depravation, but his many edicts
and admonitions had been ignored. In the end, Coll y Prat believed that, given Caracas’
rampant sinfulness and immorality, the earthquake or some other natural disaster had been
bound to happen.346
Although the archbishop’s pastoral did not allude directly to the government junta,
republicanism, or the declaration of independence, Coll y Prat blamed the new government
for the tragic earthquake and the imminent damnation Venezuelans would suffer in the
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future. Coll y Pratt had arrived at Caracas in April 1810 shortly after the formation of its
government junta. He had been received in the port of La Guaira amidst the widespread
confusion caused by news of the junta having been established in the Venezuelan capital.
Thus, in alluding to decadence sensed since his arrival, Coll y Prat is implicitly referring
to the new government.347 Moreover, the archbishop’s sermons suggests that the spread of
immorality, pride, and decadence coincided with the propagation of licentious ideas and
the rise of rebel governments. The archbishop took aim not only at Caracas’ Junta but also
at a series of civil societies that had been established in previous years. Among them was
Francisco de Miranda’s Sociedad Patriótica, an organization that outraged both royalists
and republicans, particularly white aristocrats, clergymen, and certain middle sectors. To
them, the Sociedad Patriótica was promoting Jacobin ideas and inciting racial friction with
its lectures and texts about equality and manumission. Moreover, free blacks and pardos
were invited to join its meetings and to become members. 348
In the end, republican officials were quick to claim Coll y Prat’s pastoral
encouraged narratives maintaining the earthquake had come about as a result of
Venezuela’s independence and its adoption of republicanism. Ultimately, they decided to
censure the sermon and notified the archbishop of their decision stating that “the pastoral
Your Honor has sent does not fulfill the part that this government desires and has requested
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from you. Hence, it has decided to inform you that it has archived the pastoral for being
antipolitical, and it has absolutely prohibited its circulation.” 349
The pastoral seems to have been the straw that broke the camel’s back. On May 16,
1812, republican officials decided to banish Coll y Prat from Caracas and to send him to
either the United States or Gibraltar. Authorities hoped his absence would stop the rumors
that were generating so much unrest and mistrust towards the new government. To avoid
an outbreak of disturbances that could upset public peace even further, officials came up
with a plan to capture the archbishop at midnight and carry him to the port of La Guaira
with an escort of around seventy-five soldiers. To prevent neighbors and bystanders from
hearing or seeing the archbishop’s detention, officials would announce curfew for after
sunset and would order Caracas’ residents to shut their doors and windows after dusk. Once
in La Guaira, Coll y Prat would be shipped out in the first vessel leaving to the United
States or Gibraltar. In the end, despite their careful planning, republican officials decided
not to banish the archbishop.350
There are several reasons why Caracas’ authorities might have changed their minds
with regards to Coll y Prat’s exile. One reason clearly had to do with their concern that
such a measure could eventually deepen divisions and animosities. But it also seems that
officials concluded that the archbishop’s banishment would be useless. Even before the
sermon’s censorship, narratives blaming the republican government for the earthquake
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were already widespread throughout Caracas and other Venezuelan regions. As seen in
Mérida and Caracas, several of the city’s residents were seen in the streets asking for God’s
mercy and Ferdinand VII’s forgiveness only minutes after the earthquake. 351 Feelings of
guilt and fear surfaced immediately after the tremor, but they had been growing in the
hearts and minds of Venezuelans for months. In the end, censoring the sermon had been a
pointless undertaking as would be the archbishop’s exile.
Coll y Prat left Caracas in November 1816, when his appointment came to an end,
amidst displays of gratitude and esteem. Many Caraqueños saw him as the man who had
saved them from impiety and chaos. In a farewell pastoral letter, the archbishop claimed
that during his time in Venezuela he witnessed the rise and fall of immoral political projects
and suffered the violence and persecution they brought about. 352 Coll y Prat died in Madrid
on December 30, 1822. On his deathbed, the clergyman asked for his heart to be removed
and shipped to Caracas so that it could be buried in the city where he faced so many ordeals.
In 1844, Caracas’ Cabildo unexpectedly received a wooden container with Coll y Prat’s
embalmed heart. Such was the resentment the citizens of the new nation felt towards the
royalist clergyman that the Cabildo abstained from carrying out his last wishes. At the time,
Venezuelans remembered him as the archbishop who paved the way for the royalist
takeover of 1812. It was only in 1892 that Coll y Prat’s heart was buried in Caracas’
cathedral with proper funeral rites. 353
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Coll y Prat’s correspondence with republican officials offers a glimpse into the
growing gaps between different interpretations of recent events as well as an increased
divergence between experiences of guilt and fear. For people such as Caracas’ archbishop,
Mérida’s bishop, and part of their flock, recent political happenings had broken the holy
union that linked their polity to God. For them, divine punishment and even eternal
damnation were likely results. Yet, for others, experiences of guilt and fear were not closely
tied to discussions of republicanism and independence. This does not mean that those
defending the juntas and their declarations of independence did not experience any sense
of religious guilt or fear of eternal damnation. After all, in the nineteenth century Catholic
world, these feelings were inscribed in the hearts and minds of almost everyone. Following
a disaster such as the Maundy Thursday earthquake, it was almost inevitable for people to
suspect that their thoughts and actions might have unleashed God’s wrath. Yet, there were
many who believed their endorsement of republicanism and independence did not explain
the divine penance they were facing. Rather, their individual, everyday conduct – such as
immoral and sinful behavior they might have committed – would have set off God’s fury. 354
In the days following the tremor, dozens of Venezuelans showed repentance for
their moral conduct, but not for the political transformations that were taking place. The
documentary records refer to Caraqueños who sought spiritual consolation but in doing so
did not express any view in favor or against republicanism or independence. Joseph Felix
Roscío, a priest in Puerto Cabello, claimed that during the weeks following the earthquake,
his congregation asked him to hear confessions for days and days. On some occasions, he
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listened to his flock nonstop from three in the morning to midnight. Apparently, politics
were mostly absent in the confessionals. Stuart McCook claims that, above all, Roscío’s
congregation repented their own personal conduct. Another account from a British witness
residing in Caracas suggests that Venezuelans’ behavior changed. He noted that many
living in concubinage decided to marry while others made public displays of penitence and
poured into the confessional, promising to change their immoral ways. Other accounts from
Caracas mention thieves returning stolen goods, women discarding their luxurious clothes
for more modest ones, and men carrying wooden crosses on their backs. As McCook
argues, this introspective twist in people’s conduct suggests that there was a considerable
group of people who were interpreting God’s punishment in individual terms rather than
collective ones.355 That is to say, they believed it was up to them to avoid further divine
punishment and to shun eternal damnation by changing their own conduct. Such selffocused understandings differed from some of the displays seen in the streets of Caracas
and Mérida, in which people blamed the whole of society for their sufferings and begged
King Ferdinand VII to forgive Venezuelans for their disloyalty. However, interpretations
that centered on individuals’ actions should not be counterposed to collective ones as
though the two were opposed. Archbishop Coll y Pratt had criticized both Caraqueños’
sinful “philosophical libertinage”, including their adoption of republicanism and
independence, as well as their concubinage. 356
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Yet, republican officials’ epistolary exchange with Coll y Pratt as well as some of
the displays of emotions seen in the streets also suggest that for others, feelings of guilt and
fear had even fainter religious overtones. Many republicans and critics of Spanish rule
insisted that the earthquake was merely a natural phenomenon. The guilt they felt hardly
had to do with divine punishment, but rather with their own incapacity to organize and
efficiently respond to the tragedy. 357 More than dread of God’s wrath or of eternal
salvation, it was fear that the government would soon collapse and that they would once
again fall into the hands of royalist forces. That is to say, conceiving the earthquake as a
natural event brought about experiences of guilt and fear that were different from those
prompted by religious interpretations. They were, to a certain extent, earthlier notions that
revolved around people’s physical survival as well as that of the recently established
republican government. Such feelings of guilt and fear came about with hints of both
powerlessness and hope. At the same time that many fell into despair and impotence seeing
that they were unable to resolve urgent matters, there was also hope that their political
endeavors would ultimately prevail as many of them became convinced that republicanism
and independence were not sinful in the eyes of God.
Such notions of guilt, fear, and hope ended up surfacing in different mediums.
Despite their failed attempt to have the archbishop write a pastoral that would help them
spread their arguments, republican authorities used other channels to disseminate their
claims. One of the means used was the Gazeta de Caracas, a periodical that royalist
government officials founded in 1808. The tabloid circulated until 1822. During the
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troubled 1810s, the Gazeta continually changed political sides: from being the
spokesperson of the Captaincy General to one of the republican’s main written channels of
communication.358 On April 25, almost a month after the earthquake, the Gazeta’s front
page reproduced a seventeenth-century report written by the city’s procurador general,
Juan de Revolledo y Ponte. In it, Revolledo described the state of destruction and misery
in which Caracas had befallen after an earthquake shook the city on June 11, 1641. The
procurador explained that over two hundred people perished, most of Caracas’ buildings
collapsed, and scarcity and hunger spread throughout the city and surrounding towns. The
Gazeta’s edition inserted three descriptive footnotes to Revolledo’s text arguing that the
1641 tremor had been fiercer and stronger than the 1812 one, proportionally killing more
people and destroying more buildings. For the editors, the fact that the 1641 quake had
taken place when Caracas was ruled by the Spanish Monarchy simply proved that
independence and republicanism were not to blame for the 1812 tremor. “Let’s hope it
serves as a lesson to the superstitious”, one of the footnotes claims, “so that they understand
that in all times we have had earthquakes, phenomena that undoubtedly contribute to
embellish nature.”359 Another footnote drew attention to Spanish officials’ purported
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cruelty following the 1641 earthquake, accusing them of collecting taxes and fees in spite
of the desolation and scarcity that Caracas’ residents were facing. 360
Of the four pages that make up the April 25 edition of the Gazeta, close to three are
dedicated almost exclusively to the earthquake. In addition to Revolledo’s account, the
edition includes a letter written by an anonymous citizen to a friend, a short news article,
the transcript of a ‘bando’, and a copy of a decree. The letter, which was probably
apocryphal, echoes some of the same arguments posed in the footnotes to Revolledo’s
report. The anonymous citizen, who was perhaps one of the Gazeta’s editors, brings up a
conversation he recently had with a wise, one-hundred-year-old friend. 361 In what appears
to be a fictitious dialogue between the two, the elderly friend informs the citizen of the
many earthquakes that shook Venezuela and other parts of the Americas in past centuries.
The old man explains that the 1641 earthquake caused as much destruction as the 1812
one. With regards to the 1737 tremors, which he personally experienced, the elderly friend
claims that quakes shook Venezuela for over a month. Most of them were shorter than the
one they recently suffered on March 26, but some were as harsh in intensity. They were so
intense that the 1737 tremors completely destroyed Barquisimeto while they also tumbled
dozens of Caracas’ buildings. The old man’s account continues with descriptions of a
longer but less destructive tremor that shook Venezuela in 1766, the 1746 earthquake that
devastated Lima, a 1751 quake that is described as having sunk half of Guatemala, and a
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1797 earthquake that struck Quito. His relation carries on with other earthquakes that shook
Lisbon, Egypt, Jerusalem, and other regions of the world. Ultimately, both the wise man
and the anonymous citizen conclude that these sorts of movements of the earth “had no
connection whatsoever with ancient and old governments, with kings and republics, with
evildoers or good men. God rewards and punishes in his kingdom as we do our own in
ours. The Earth always moves, there have always been tremors, causing greater or lesser
movements of the Earth, depending on the larger or smaller fires it holds in its entrails…” 362
Besides making the case that the earthquake was a natural phenomenon unrelated
to political intrigues, the Gazeta’s editors also drew attention to the government’s
numerous foes and accused them of inciting fear and turmoil against the republic. An article
in the April 25 edition talks about nine Franciscan friars who were seen on the afternoon
of March 26th rescuing dead bodies from the ruins, carrying the corpses on their shoulders,
and then performing funeral rites. Such commendable conduct, the Gazeta explains, was
in no way similar to that of “many other individuals who have relentlessly intimidated and
disturbed the city’s miserable inhabitants by proclaiming views that were absolutely
contrary to reason and to Religion.”363 The Gazeta’s insinuation was above all an attack on
royalist clergymen who they accused of spreading baseless rumors and superstitions
against the republican system.
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Seeing that the rebels’ control of Caracas and other provinces was beginning to
falter, the Gazeta’s editors included texts enumerating the most imminent threats they were
facing. Besides pointing out what they believed to be their rivals’ lies and bad blood, the
Gazeta’s pages also discuss the government’s military and financial troubles. The bando
published in this edition suggests that with the spread of catastrophic prophecies and news
that royalist troops were subjugating rebel territories, republican soldiers had begun to flee
the army garrisons. As the bando explains, despite the numerous punishments against
deserters, countless pusillanimous soldiers had abandoned their posts in past weeks,
ignoring their responsibilities to society and, in many cases, falling prey to the “ill
advertisement by some of the perverse enemies of the Venezuelan cause.” 364 The prospect
of enduring God’s wrath or falling into the hands of royalist troops seemed to be on the
minds of many of these defectors. The bando encouraged deserters to return to their posts
claiming they would be pardoned for their crimes because of a recent amnesty proclaimed
by the Venezuelan House of Representatives.365 In addition to the bando, the Gazeta also
published a decree regulating the price of gold and silver and creating a mechanism through
which the city’s residents could pawn their valued objects for cash and aid. By doing so,
the government sought to have access to pawned gold and silver to finance its many
needs.366
A sense of despair coupled with hope surfaces in the Gazeta’s pages. While the
editors included an article, a bando, and a decree alluding to the troubling times they were
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facing, they also added pieces implying that, contrary to what most royalists claimed, God
was not against republicanism or independence and the earthquake had no relation
whatsoever with their political projects. Yet, hints of guilt also surface. It is a sort of
remorse different from the religious guilt experienced by those who believed that either
their sinful conduct or their betrayal of the Spanish Monarchy had unleashed God’s wrath
and brought about the Maundy Thursday earthquake. Rather than remorse for having failed
God, it was a sense of guilt for being unable to fulfill the ambitions and aspirations they
had set out to accomplish. In other words, the Gazeta’s editors expressed feelings of
remorse for their inability to govern and to put an end to internal divisions and fulfill the
futures they had envisioned.
The collapse of the Venezuelan Confederation: guilt, remorse, and blame
It is not easy to measure the degree to which each of these different interpretations
of the earthquake were accepted as true. Nonetheless, we can claim that within specific
clusters, certain narratives prevailed over others, and thus the emotions attendant on a given
interpretation outweighed others. As will be seen in this section, as time moved forward,
some of these interpretations and emotional experiences began to put down roots, others
faded, and many took on new forms. For some, feelings of guilt grew into a sense of
collective repentance. For others, remorse ended up peppered with hints of reproach.
Among other Venezuelans, hope, compassion, and fear became prevalent. In the meantime,
some others took advantage of this widespread sense of guilt to improve their standing with
the Crown and God himself. The persistence and adaptability of such understandings and
emotional experiences are revealing of both the narratives’ multiple receptions as well as
of the ebb and flow of emotions and that of the revolutionary tides.
175

In the months following the earthquake, Venezuela’s political situation changed
dramatically. On April 23, amidst growing despair and chaos, Francisco de Miranda was
named dictator of Venezuela. Those promoting the dictatorship hoped that a stronger, more
centralized authority could save the newly founded republic. Almost three months later,
following the royalist troops relentless advance, Miranda’s government signed the
Capitulations of San Mateo and surrendered Caracas to General Juan Domingo de
Monteverde. On July 29, Monteverde entered Caracas while Miranda and republican
officials fled to La Guaira. On July 31, Simón Bolívar and other army officers organized a
conspiracy to hand Miranda over to Monteverde. After almost two years of existence, the
first Republic of Venezuela had come to an end. By then, hundreds of republicans were on
the run, fleeing to islands in the Caribbean, the southern Llanos, and New Granada.367
These political happenings substantiated and encouraged some of the narratives and
emotional experiences that had surfaced since the Maundy Thursday earthquake. During
the second half of October 1812, Caracas celebrated a series of religious rites and acts of
penitence to plead for God’s forgiveness. An article published in the November 8 edition
of the Gazeta de Caracas – which now endorsed royalism – offers a detailed description
of these ceremonies. The piece begins by claiming that after months of disavowal, the
capital’s residents had finally “distinguished the physical causes of earthquakes from the
moral ones” and had at last “been persuaded that all of Earth’s harms were the product of
people’s sins.” Ever since Caraqueños came to terms with their misdeeds, the article
continues, many had tried “to heal these harms from their roots” and had accepted “their
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penitence to sooth God’s wrath.”368 Nonetheless, as the Gazeta explains, Caracas’
collective acts of contrition had had to wait weeks because the destruction caused by the
earthquake and the outbreak of war had impeded city residents from properly celebrating
the much-awaited rites of penitence.369
It was only in mid-October that Archbishop Coll y Prat considered it appropriate to
begin Caracas’ long-due acts of repentance. On October 15, the archbishop published an
edict decreeing three days of fasting, ordering public prayers, and inviting all the city’s
residents to take part in praying of the holy mysteries. On the 19th, the image of Our Lady
of the Rosary, considered by many as a patron saint for protection against earthquakes, was
taken from the chapel of Saint Dominic to that of Saint Peter. That same afternoon,
Franciscan and Capuchin friars led public prayers in Caracas’ main square. Fasting was
observed on the 21st, 23rd, and 24th of October. From the 19th to the 30th, the sacrament of
penitence was offered day and night while rites of rogation were performed without
interruption. On the 30th, the archbishop personally offered the holy communion to
hundreds of members of his flock. That afternoon, the image of the Our Lady of the Rosary
was returned to Saint Peter’s chapel. According to the Gazeta, “Caracas had not witnessed
such an inspiring religious act in over one hundred years. An infinite crowd, with the
upmost order, the greatest composure, and profound silence” escorted the virgin back to
Saint Dominic’s. Choirs, Hail Marys, and prayers embellished the procession every time it
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came to a stop.370 With such acts of repentance, the article concludes, Caracas was sending
a message to people on both sides of the Atlantic, warning them that God rewards virtue
and punishes vices in the present and throughout eternity. As the Gazeta maintains, those
who had abandoned their alliance with the Spanish Crown or who had distanced themselves
from the Catholic Church could find in Caracas’ repentance an example to follow. 371
To an extent, Caracas’ acts of penitence were manifestations of feelings of guilt
and remorse that had gestated since the formation of government juntas and their
declarations of independence. Moreover, narratives claiming the Maundy Thursday
earthquake had been the result of Venezuela’s betrayal of the Spanish Monarchy and of its
residents’ sinful conduct found additional grounding after the fall of the first Republic of
Venezuela. For many, the collapse of the rebel government simply proved its immorality.
Yet, there are some differences between the experiences of guilt that were attendant
on these rites of repentance compared to those feelings that appeared soon after the
earthquake. Many acts of penitence carried out in October sought to soothe both individual
and collective feelings of guilt. Certain rites, such as fasting, were both personal and
communal acts. Their observance depended on each individual’s compliance, but it was
the shared spirit of fasting that gave it its significance. Correspondingly, there were
individuals who decided to take their observance of public prayers and shared rogation a
step further: publicly weeping and overplaying their gestures to share with others their
remorse for their past immoral conduct. It is as if many of Caracas’ residents believed they
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had to repent for their own personal behavior as well as for the fact that Venezuela’s
provinces had together endorsed “sinful” political ideas and government systems.
Some months earlier, during the weeks following the earthquake, people’s displays
of guilt had suggested a slightly different picture. March and April had seen a clearer
separation between those who believed the earthquake was God’s penance for their
individual sins, for whom guilt was more personal and private, and those who claimed the
tremor had occurred due to Venezuela’s adoption of republicanism and independence. The
latter felt remorse not for their individual actions but for those committed by society as a
whole. By October 1812, this division between different understandings of the earthquake
as well as between distinct emotional experiences seems to have faded. When Caracas’
residents celebrated public prayers, processions, and fasting, it appears that their expression
of guilt encompassed both their own individual sins as well as Venezuela’s alleged
wrongdoings.
This variation is meaningful in the sense that it implies that emotional communities
are not and that the already hazy lines dividing them at times blur even further. In this
particular case, it is as if two distinct but similar emotional communities, both with
manifest religious undertones, ended up merging. The insistence with which many
clergymen maintained that republicanism and independence were immoral as well as their
endless claims that Caracas’ residents had been behaving immorally might have converged
in many people’s subjectivity. Furthermore, one must also consider meanings of selfhood
in the early nineteenth-century Spanish world when most people still understood their place
in the world in collective terms. Although these were decades of seeming transition toward
an emerging individualism, many aspects of an individual’s life were still shaped by a sense
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of collectivity.372 Individualistic experiences were, to an extent, shaped and determined by
collective experiences of guilt.
Towards late 1812, other experiences of guilt, those without manifest religious
undertones, had also taken on new forms as hints of reproach began to be apparent in them.
Among many republicans and critics of the Spanish Monarchy, the earthquake inspired a
combination of despair, hope, and remorse. Soon after the tremor, many felt guilt because
they thought that their internal divisions and the government’s ineptitude was leading to
the inevitable fall of the Confederación Americana de Venezuela. Among many
Caraqueños and Venezuelans, this sense of guilt became even more manifest months later
when the first Republic of Venezuela collapsed. By late 1812, however, these feelings seem
to have morphed into a sense of remorse peppered with feelings of anger against those who
they believed had enabled the fall of the republican government.
Simón Bolívar’s Cartagena Manifesto, for example, is revealing of such combined
feelings of guilt and reproach. Written on December 15, 1812, the Manifesto warns New
Granadians of the threats they face, explains the reasons behind the fall of the short-lived
Venezuelan Confederation, and sets out a plan to reconquer Venezuela. Bolívar’s text is
one of the most thorough analyses of the causes for the collapse of the first Republic of
Venezuela. The Manifesto considers a variety of elements such as the government’s
excessive use of paper money and the distortions it caused for the value of goods, the
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Republic’s lack of military strength, its adoption of a federalist system, its many political
divisions, and the Maundy Thursday earthquake. Bolívar begins his declaration claiming
that the greatest mistake the Venezuelan government committed was its “fatal adoption of
a system of tolerance. A system that is disapproved of and was known to be weak and
inefficient by all sane people from the beginning but was tenaciously maintained until the
last moment with unequalled blindness.” 373 Following this line of thought, Bolívar
condemned the government’s incapacity to censure and control the spread of narratives
blaming republicanism and independence for unleashing God’s wrath. Furthermore, he
argued that the clergy played a central role inciting uprisings in dozens of towns and cities
and opened the way for the arrival of enemy troops by propagating deceitful stories about
the quake as well as all sorts of allegations against republicanism. According to Bolívar,
many clergymen “sacrilegiously took advantage of the sanctity of their ministry in favor
of those instigating civil war.” Yet, he explains that these “treacherous priests” committed
such crimes because the republican government had allowed them and even encouraged
them to do so. As Bolívar put it, “the impunity of such crimes was absolute, even finding
outrageous support in Congress.” 374
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“la fatal adopción que hizo del sistema tolerante; sistema improbado como débil e ineficaz, desde entonces,
por todo el mundo sensato, y tenazmente sostenido hasta los últimos periodos, con una ceguedad sin
ejemplo.” (Simón Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena.” (1812) in Manifiesto de Cartagena. Memoria dirigida
a los ciudadanos de la Nueva Granada por un caraqueño. Exposición temporal. Casa Museo Quinta de
Bolívar. (Bogotá: Ministerio de Cultura de la República de Colombia, 2012), 26-32). In this case, I take the
term ‘improbado’ to mean disapproved of. (“IMPROBADO, DA. part. pass. del verbo Improbar. Lo assí
reprobado, desaprobado o reprehendido.” (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1734.))
374
“…abusando sacrílegamente de la santidad de su ministerio en favor de los promotores de la guerra civil.
Sin embargo, debemos confesar ingenuamente, que estos traidores sacerdotes, se animaban a cometer los
execrables crímenes de que justamente se les acusa porque la impunidad de los delitos era absoluta; la cual
hallaba en el Congreso un escandaloso abrigo.” (Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena,” 30.)
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Throughout the Manifesto, Bolívar insistently blamed Venezuela’s former
government for its downfall explaining that officials’ lack of authority and determination
smoothed the way for Monteverde’s invasion. He criticized them for their lack of military
strength and for not subjugating the loyalist Province of Coro when they had the chance.
Bolívar also questions why republican rulers adopted a federalist system rather than a
robust, centralized government that could inspire respect among all peoples. Furthermore,
he scorns their lack of pragmatism and their misapprehension of the society they were
ruling. “We had philosophers for chiefs”, he explains, “philanthropy for legislation,
dialectics for tactics, and sophists for soldiers. With such subversion of principles and of
things, social order was profoundly disturbed. And of course, the State ran towards its
complete dissolution with giant steps.”375
For Bolívar, the Maundy Thursday earthquake was an immediate cause of the
Confederation’s downfall. The tremor simply hastened the Republic’s inevitable collapse.
Throughout his Manifesto, Bolívar insists that the tremor would not have had the
catastrophic effects it had, had republican provinces been governed by one single,
centralized authority capable to act with promptness. As Bolívar proclaims, “if Caracas,
instead of a languid and insubstantial confederation would have established a simple
government as the political and military situation merited, you, Venezuela, would still exist
and would still enjoy your freedom!”376 Bolívar was not alone in his belief that the
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“Por manera que tuvimos filósofos por jefes; filantropía por legislación, dialéctica por táctica, y sofistas
por soldados. Con semejante subversión de principios y de cosas, el orden social se resintió extremadamente
conmovido, y desde luego corrió el Estado a pasos agigantados a una disolución universal…” (Bolívar,
“Manifiesto de Cartagena”, 27.)
376
“Si Caracas, en lugar de una Confederación lánguida e insubsistente, hubiese establecido un gobierno
sencillo, cual lo requería su situación política y militar, tú existieras ¡oh Venezuela! y gozaras hoy de tu
libertad.” (Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena”, 30.)
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earthquake was circumstantial to the Republic’s collapse. For instance, Fiscal José Costa
y Gali claimed that the immediate causes of Caracas’ defeat could be found in the
earthquake and the misuse of paper money, but that it was ultimately the republicans’
foolishness and incompetence that led to its downfall. 377 For his part, royalist official Pedro
de Urquinaona argues that the earthquake was not the main cause behind the
Confederation’s collapse, but claims that the widespread dread that overtook Caracas and
other provinces certainly eased their conquest. 378 Many present-day scholars seem to agree
with such analyses of the earthquake’s share in the collapse of the Confederation. McCook,
for example, argues that the tremor was somewhat incidental in the first Republic’s fall.
As he explains, the natural disaster possibly helped tip popular opinion in favor of the
royalist flank, but that the main shift was motivated by the republican government’s
incapacity to deal with the military, economic, and political crises. In that sense, the
earthquake simply aggravated these crises. 379
Along with Bolívar’s many grievances and reproaches, a certain sense of personal
guilt is implicit in his declaration. After all, Bolívar could hardly claim he held no
responsibility whatsoever in the fall of the Venezuelan Confederation: as an army officer
he actively took part in the intrigues against Francisco de Miranda during the last days of
the Venezuelan Republic.380 By pointing out the many errors supposedly committed by the
Confederation and by insisting on the urgency of reconquering Venezuela, Bolívar was
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perhaps trying to redeem his own faults. Bolívar insists on freeing “New Granada from
Venezuela’s fate” and on rescuing “Venezuela from its current suffering.” 381 Throughout
the Manifesto, Bolívar urges New Granadians to join his efforts to reconquer Venezuela,
telling them that Caracas’ peoples impatiently await them as their redeemers. As he
proclaims, “let us all run together to break the shackles of those victims that cry in the
dungeons awaiting your salvation… to give life to the dying man, to set free the oppressed
and to give freedom to all.”382 To a certain extent, Bolívar is the one seeking redemption
and liberation from the guilt he is experiencing.
Much more explicit in the Manifesto is Bolívar’s aversion to and apparent fear of
federalism and of certain republican traits that he considered to be too advanced for
Venezuelan society. As he explains at one point, “our fellow citizens do not have the
aptitudes required to fully practice their rights by themselves, because they lack the
political virtues that characterize a true republican. Such virtues were not acquired during
absolutist governments for these do not recognize the rights and duties of the citizen.” 383
Bolívar’s mistrust of both republicanism and of the capacities of his “fellow citizens” was
a recurring concern in his political life and that of other leaders of the independence
process. As chapter 5 explains, Bolívar was among those who avidly opposed granting
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“Libertar a la Nueva Granada de la suerte de Venezuela, y redimir a ésta de la que padece, son los objetos
que me he propuesto en esta Memoria.” (Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena,” 26)
382
“Corramos a romper las cadenas de aquellas víctimas que gimen en las mazmorras, siempre esperando su
salvación de vosotros; no burléis su confianza; no seáis insensibles a los lamentos de vuestros hermanos. Id
veloces a vengar al muerto, a dar vida al moribundo, soltura al oprimido y libertad a todos.” (Bolívar,
“Manifiesto de Cartagena,” 33.)
383
“… todavía nuestros conciudadanos no se hallan en aptitud de ejercer por sí mismos y ampliamente sus
derechos; porque carecen de las virtudes políticas que caracterizan al verdadero republicano: virtudes que no
se adquieren en los gobiernos absolutos, en donde se desconocen los derechos y los deberes del ciudadano.”
(Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena,” 29.)
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slaves their freedom and who resisted the expansion of rights to people of all social and
ethnic groups. Furthermore, towards the late 1820s, Bolívar even sought to put an end to
the republican government and to reinstate the monarchical system. 384 It seems that some
of his apprehensions towards republicanism and equality grew from the feelings of guilt
and fear he endured in 1812 when he witnessed the collapse of the Venezuelan
Confederation. In the end, Bolívar, as many of his contemporaries, came to associate
republicanism and independence with a sense of turmoil and instability. The earthquake
helped shape these misgivings, pushing Bolívar and many others into viewing social and
political transformations in a negative vein.
While exiled republicans reproached their former rulers for the Confederation’s
downfall and many in Caracas joined the city’s collective acts of repentance, there were
others, particularly in cities and provinces not as affected by the tremor, who gave such
feelings of widespread guilt, fear, and reproach other meanings. Valencia and Guayana’s
officials, for instance, sought to distance themselves from insurgent cities and aspired to
portray themselves in a more favorable light to gain the Crown and God’s indulgences. A
few months after the fall of Caracas into royalist hands, Valencia’s Cabildo wrote a letter
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to General Monteverde – who by then had been designated Venezuela’s new Captain
General – asking him to consider moving the Captaincy’s capital to Valencia. In the
dispatch, the councilmen claimed that it was not a coincidence that a loyal city such as
Valencia – located about 175 kilometers west of Caracas and 200 kilometers east of
Barquisimeto – was spared from God’s wrath while Caracas and other disloyal cities were
destroyed by tremor. In the dispatch, the members of the Cabildo accused Caracas’
residents of harboring a rebellious spirit and of continuously sponsoring independence.
“Despicable principles have reproduced in their bosoms”, the letter explains, “and these
have spread among the city’s youth to such an extent that they cannot assure us that Caracas
will not surprise us once again and depose their legitimate authorities.” Or at least this will
be the case, the councilmen clarify, “until many years pass by and they regenerate from
their libertine customs and ideas.” 385
The Cabildo’s members maintained that, in addition to Caracas’ incessant
insubordination, there were other reasons why Valencia should be designated as the
Captaincy’s capital. For one part, Valencia’s loyalty deserved some sort of reward in the
same manner that additional admonishments against Caracas – more earthly ones, such as
losing the status of capital – were also merited. In the second place, they explained that
while Caracas’ port, La Guaira, had been devastated by the quake, Valencia’s port, Puerto
Cabello, was left intact, including its castle and fortresses. Moreover, the councilmen
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“… y que en su seno ha procreado inmensa juventud, nutridas con principios tan detestables, no puede
asegurarnos (sin que transcurran muchos años, que hayan regenerado sus libertinas costumbres e ideas) que
no volverá a sorprender y deponer las legítimas autoridades.” (AGI, CARACAS,459, ‘Los miembros del
ayuntamiento de Valencia le piden a Monteverde que considere mudar la capital de la capitanía general a
Valencia. 7 de septiembre de 1812.’, 2.)
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foresaw future natural catastrophes happening in Caracas due to the city’s proximity to
Mount Ávila.386 The letter ends stating that Valencia’s “innate fidelity, calm, quietness,
submission, and its residents’ zeal in favor of the conservation of the King’s sovereignty
will maintain this province’s harmony without ever exposing the government to
vacillations of any sort.”387 Despite their insistence, the Cabildo’s aspirations were only
partially accomplished. Around August of 1812, magistrates from Caracas’ Royal
Audiencia began to move, one by one, from Caracas to Valencia. Some weeks later, the
Audiencia began to preside from Valencia. Yet, it only remained in the city for close to
two years. From 1814 to 1821, the Audiencia settled in Puerto Cabello. Despite the
Cabildo’s insistence, Monteverde and other top bureaucrats and army officers continued
governing from Caracas as they prepared future expeditions to subjugate rebel
provinces.388
In Guayana, about 650 kilometers southeast of Caracas, officials also stressed the
fact that the city had not suffered the same fate as Caracas and other rebel cities. On
December 1, 1812, the province’s governor, Matías Barrera, issued a bando underlining
Guayana’s loyalty and peacefulness as opposed to Caracas’ alleged sinful and criminal
conduct. Although the governor reproached the insurgents’ behavior, he also pled the city’s
residents to feel compassion towards rebels who had survived the earthquake. As the bando
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The councilmen erroneously refer to Mount Ávila, a 2,750-meters high mountain looming over Caracas,
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it be a volcano that would one day explode and destroy Caracas.
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“… la innata fidelidad, reposo, quietud, sumicion, y zelo de sus habitantes por la conservacion de la
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states, “there is no reason to hate those victims who suffered from God’s admonitions,
those who had their towns ruined, even if they caused you any sort of harm.” Furthermore,
the governor demanded the city’s residents to abstain from hurting anyone who happened
to arrive to Guayana fleeing territories devastated by the earthquake, regardless of their
former political ideas and conduct. “Treat them like brothers, I tell you once more,” the
governor insists, “for the Almighty has left them for you so you can exercise charity with
them. But be wary. Watch their conduct, propositions, words, and seductive songs, and
promptly and discretely report them to the judges so they take the appropriate measures.” 389
In the end, what Barrera’s decree demanded from the city’s residents was “patriotic” and
“respectable” conduct that would eventually be rewarded by both God and the Spanish
Crown.390
Valencia’s Cabildo and Guayana’s governor offer a glimpse into the ways in which
royalists residing in regions that were hardly touched by the earthquake tried to gain some
sort of benefit from the natural catastrophe at the same time that they reveal other sorts of
emotions that emerged in the months following the tremor. Valencia’s councilmen
highlighted the city’s loyalty as a way to inspire Monteverde’s confidence and that of other
officials, while they also underscored Caracas’ long-established unfaithfulness and turmoil
to stir up a sense of fear. Governor Barrera spoke of the compassion that Guayana’s
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“Ya comprendeis (no obstante) que no hay motivo de odiar a aquellas victimas que libró la prevencion de
mi Dios, de la ruina de los pueblos, si les causó daño alguno… tratados como a hermanos vuelvo a decir pues
que el altisimo los ha dejado para que exersais con ellos la caridad pero estad alerta, velad sobre su conducta,
su parte, palabra y canciones seductivas y denunciad con presteza y reserva a los magistrados, para que tomen
providencias oportunas.” (AGI, CARACAS,437A. ‘Proclama que el gobernador publica como bando en que
resalta la fidelidad de los guayaneses. Guayana. 1 de diciembre de 1812’, 2.)
390
AGI, CARACAS,437A. ‘Proclama que el gobernador publica como bando en que resalta la fidelidad de
los guayaneses. Guayana. 1 de diciembre de 1812’,.1- 2.
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residents should feel towards former insurgents while he also implied that the city’s
benevolent conduct could gain them both God and the Crown’s grace. Thus, Valencia and
Guayana’s efforts to gain confidence and offer compassion also sought to give a sense of
hopefulness. Provincial authorities were trying to offer a sense of assurance and stability
to republican refugees and those living in territories recently occupied by royalist troops.
Towards late 1812, the feelings of fear and guilt associated with the earthquake had
begun to take on new forms and meanings. In some cases, guilt was transformed into a
certain sense of repentance as was the case of many Caraqueños. Among others, feelings
of guilt ended up peppered with reproach against former governors and, implicitly, against
their own past actions as was Bolívar’s case. In other cases, particularly in regions not as
affected by the tremor, hopefulness and compassion may have prevailed as seen in
Barrera’s bando. In the months to come, as violence intensified, other emotional
experiences became widespread. Rage as well as fear of physical violence spread
throughout the region. Royalist officials failed to fulfill the armistice established in the
Capitulations of San Mateo and began an outright persecution of republicans. 391
Complaints and protests against Monteverde and his officials arose throughout the
Americas. Some of them even reached the Iberian Peninsula. In Cádiz, delegates in the
juntas discussed allegations claiming Monteverde was not complying with the armistice as
well as accusations charging him of defying the Constitution of Cádiz and the liberal
principles it represented. Reports claimed that those who had surrendered and capitulated
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AGI, CARACAS,459, ‘Concepto del fiscal José Costa y Gali sobre el indulto que se debe dar a los rebeldes
de Venezuela. Valencia. 16 de diciembre de 1812.’, 1-7.
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were being arbitrarily detained and that some were even tortured and executed. 392 Yet,
brutality did not arise only from the royalist flank. On June 15, 1813, Bolívar issued his
infamous decree of “War to Death” proclaiming that all Spanish Europeans, including
natives from the Canary Islands, would be killed unless they publicly demonstrated their
support for the republic and independence. 393
Throughout most of 1813 and 1814, violence reached new levels of cruelty and
viciousness. In the beginning of January of 1813, Venezuelan rebels, with the support of
New Granadians, began an unceasing advance toward royalist territories. The so-called
Admirable Campaign successfully came to an end towards early August 1813 when
republican troops conquered Valencia and Caracas. This military campaign led to the
formation of the short-lived Second Republic of Venezuela. The Republic lasted from
August 1813 to December 1814. Throughout this period, mass executions, decapitations,
and other acts of brutality multiplied throughout the region. In September 1813, Bolívar
had hundreds of Spaniards and Islanders rounded up and detained in La Guaira. Witnesses
claimed that at least five hundred Europeans were beheaded and that those prisoners who
were not executed died from suffocation caused by the thick smoke from the burning
bodies. Royalist General José Tomás Boves undertook his own retaliation. In July 1814,
after conquering Valencia, Boves invited the city’s patricians to a formal dinner and ball.
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At some point during the evening, he had the wives of republicans stand up and dance
while their husbands were escorted outside and shot. Apparently, Boves repeated similar
acts in other sites. Boves was also charged of having human heads paraded through city
streets. Apparently, republicans did the same on more than one occasion. 394 Cruelty also
spread throughout the battlefields. Rape and theft proliferated as invading armies
conquered rival territories.395 Soldiers from both sides began to collect the ears of dead and
gravely wounded enemies. In an inquiry into Boves’ abuses, royalist soldier Esteban
Guevara claimed that, after a battle with rebel troops, soldiers received “the order to leave
no one with ears.” As Guevera explained, “amidst the heat of victory and the joy we were
feeling, we left no one alive… we put their heads down and cut many ears.” 396 Another
witness summoned to the interrogatories, María de Jesús, a Spaniard woman living in
Cumaná, explained that she heard stories that royalist official Antonio Suazola would “cut
the ears [of rebel soldiers] with an old razor, and would then sit them in a bench and would
laugh at them telling them ‘you look so pretty now’, and then others would come and would
cut their heads [of the rebel soldiers].” 397
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“dio orden… para que no le dejara a nadie con orejas… calientes con la victoria y con la alegria que
tenian, no dejaron viviente… y les hecharon abajo la cabesa y cortaron muchas orejas…” (AGI,
CARACAS,437A, ‘No. 3. Interrogatorio que hace Andrés Level, jefe político de la provincia de Cumaná, a
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“cortando las orejas con un pedaso de navaja vieja, y despues los sentaba en un banquillo y les hacia burla
diciendo 'que bonitos estas ahora' y despues venian otros y les cortaban las cabesas;” (AGI,
CARACAS,437A, ‘No. 4. Declaración de María de Jesús, española de Cumaná, sobre la orden de cortar la
oreja a los rebeldes. Cumaná. 28 de julio de 1813, 1-2.)
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Karen Racine argues that the armies fighting over the control of Venezuela used
symbolic forms of corporeal humiliation to gain military advantages and “also to define
who belonged to the national body and to eliminate those who did not.” 398 For her part,
Véronique Hébrard explains that Bolívar and Monteverde’s rhetoric exacerbated existing
divisions and vindicated the extermination of the rival faction. 399 To a certain extent, such
symbolic and physical violence was an extension of the different interpretations and
disagreements that arose in previous years when each side accused the other of being
immoral, unpatriotic, and of not being on God’s side.
In the end, the earthquake would not be easily forgotten. The physical devastation
it caused continued to be visible to people’s eyes for decades 400 at the same time that the
different understandings, emotional experiences, and frictions that arose from the quake
persisted during the years to come. Ultimately, the tremor’s memory and the interpretative
and emotional divisions that emerged from it ended up justifying and even encouraging
extreme violence at the same time that they helped perpetuate prevailing notions of reality
and understandings of the world.
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Puracé and Popayán: convergence between the natural and the divine
The different understandings and emotional experiences that followed the Maundy
Thursday earthquake offer a glimpse into the ways emotional communities are shaped, how
they interact with one another, and how they evolve in time. Such analysis is possible
thanks to the existence of numerous historical sources alluding to the tremor, particularly
to its reverberations in Caracas and Valencia. Other cases of seismic activity that took place
during these troubled times are not as well documented. This is probably so because the
destruction they caused as well as their magnitude were nowhere close to that of the
earthquake that shook northern Venezuela in 1812. However, a few documents referring
to Puracé Volcano’s activity in 1817 offer additional insights into some of the emotional
experiences that surface among different social groups when tremors and deep political
tensions coincide in time and place.
Popayán – located about 550 kilometers from Santafé and one of the most important
cities in southwest New Granada – was frequently shaken by the Puracé in the early
nineteenth century. Contrary to Caracas and Valencia’s case in 1812, at the time of the
tremors, Popayán was under the control of royalist troops. In Popayán’s case, feelings of
religious fear and guilt intertwined with naturalist understandings of volcanic activity.
Interestingly enough, both interpretations were seen as complementary rather than
conflicting notions. From this combination emerged a certain sense of assurance that
deemed that, despite the city’s alleged previous sins, God’s mercy and their knowledge of
nature would keep them out of harm’s way. Such eclectic understanding of the volcano’s
activity, and the emotional experiences it produced, arose in a milieu in which political and
social tensions were not as manifest as in the Venezuelan case. These frictions were not
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completely absent. They were merely concealed under a prevalent sense of fear and
repression as well as beneath the avid royalism of many of Popayán’s inhabitants.
Soon after the formation of government juntas throughout New Granada, Popayán
became a battleground territory. Between 1811 and 1816, the city constantly fell into the
hands of belligerent armies. All through 1810, Popayán, contrary to what happened with
many provinces throughout the region, maintained its allegiance to the Consejo de
Regencia. In January 1810, the Consejo had replaced the Junta Central Suprema as Spain’s
governing body in the absence of Ferdinand VII who was held captive by Napoleon.
Popayán was first occupied in 1811 when rebel troops from the ‘Ciudades Confederadas
del Valle del Cauca’, a coalition that was loyal to Ferdinand VII but rejected the Consejo’s
authority, invaded the city. In August 1812, troops backing the Regencia’s authority
conquered the city only to lose it once again in October. A few weeks later, in November,
loyalist armies retook Popayán once again but lost its control in December. On July 1,
1813, royalist Juan Samano reconquered Popayán. About six months later, on January 16,
1814, Cundimarca’s republican troops invaded the city. Popayán would fall back to royalist
hands in December 1814 and then back to republican control in July 1815. Samano retook
the city once again on May 13, 1816.401 Amidst such political instability, most of Popayán’s
Indians, slaves, and free blacks ended up joining the royalist side. 402 Similar to what
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happened throughout the region in 1815 and 1816 during the monarchical restoration, many
republicans were detained, expelled, and, in some cases, executed. 403 Yet, the violence
inflicted by Samano’s troops were but the continuation of a bloodshed that had begun in
previous years.404
It seems that in 1817 many of Popayán’s residents viewed Puracé’s activity and the
tremors it produced both as a natural phenomenon as well as the product of God’s wrath.
On September 8, 1817, Matías Cajiaó, the city’s síndico procurador, issued a letter urging
the Cabildo to take actions to calm people’s grave concerns after the “terrible explosion
and the movement of earth that was felt yesterday during the early hours of the night.” In
his dispatch, Cajiaó invited the Cabildo to declare a day of public prayers and processions
so that the city’s “faithful could raise their pleas to the Father of Compassion”, hoping that
he would take pity on such an afflicted city. The procurador also advised the Cabildo to
organize a committee that would “travel to the town of Puracé, climb to the paramo with
the town’s Indians, and thoroughly clean its mouths in order to vent this volcano that is so
close to us.”405 Cajíao – and apparently others in Popayán – believed that if the volcano’s
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crevices and cracks contiguous to the Puracé’s crater were kept clear and unclogged it
would properly vent its fume and lava and, thus, would not erupt as often nor would it
explode with excessive intensity.406
Popayán’s Cabildo agreed with the procurador’s proposal. That same day, the
Cabildo decreed a day of public prayers and pleas. In its edict, the Cabildo explained that
there is no “Christian or religious means as powerful and worthy as that of running to the
temple to prostrate ourselves and ask with all our hearts to the All Mighty so that he appease
his anger and look upon us with benevolence and compassion, even in these times of
extensive calamities so as to soothe divine justice, which has manifested itself irascibly
through such horrible tremor.”407 Hence, the city council called for public prayers and
communal acts of repentance to be carried out on September 20 th. Likewise, it requested
city convents to celebrate their own acts of supplication and to then lead public processions
throughout Popayán’s main streets and squares. The archbishop, for his part, was to
perform similar acts on the 21st. Additionally, the city council commissioned two alcaldes
de barrio to travel immediately to Puracé, find assistance among the local Indians, and
clear the volcano’s “mouths” so that it could breathe appropriately. One of the alcaldes
appointed to this duty asked to be spared from this responsibility claiming that he was
tan inmediato a nosotros.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, folio 69, ‘Rogativos y
procesiones para calmar la ira de Dios. Popayán. 18 de septiembre de 1817.’)
406
Thus far, I have not been able to determine if this was a shared belief as well as a common practice that
was carried out with the hope of taming volcanic activity. Alexander von Humboldt and Francisco José de
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‘Rogativos y procesiones para calmar la ira de Dios. Popayán. 18 de septiembre de 1817.’)
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already in charge of collecting donations for the victims of the tremor and that he himself
was occupied repairing the cracks the eruption caused on his house. The second alcalde
accepted the commission and asked for beasts of burden and a travel allowance for him to
begin his way up to the town of Puracé. 408
A year later, the Cabildo saw itself discussing a similar issue. The Puracé and its
crevices come up in the minutes of the September 17, 1818 session. On the 17 th, the city
council was mostly busy examining requests to attest the loyalty and good conduct of
several Payaneses. These individuals sought some sort of official document confirming
that during the past revolution they had not supported the rebels nor endorsed
republicanism. Amidst such requests and other administrative issues, a plea from the
procurador and regidor asking for the maintenance of the mouths of the Puracé comes up.
As the officials explain, “it is an urgent need to clean the mouths of the paramo of Purace,
for they are clogged with the sulfur the volcano sprouts. A whole county will be exposed
to an unexpected ruin, and above all, the inhabitants of the town of Puracé.” 409 The Cabildo
backed the request and immediately sent out orders to clear the volcano’s crevices.
Whereas in Venezuela there seemed to be a rather manifest division between those
who believed the 1812 earthquake was nothing less than divine punishment and those who
considered it to be a natural phenomenon with no relation whatsoever to God’s will, in
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Popayán such a split was not as evident. It seems that many in Popayán believed the
Puracé’s eruptions had come about both as a divine punishment for the city’s past support
for independence and republicanism as well as a consequence of the volcano’s congested
and clogged crevices. That is to say, such religious and naturalist understandings were seen
as complementary rather than opposing interpretations.
Venezuela and Popayán’s different grasps of seismic activity are partly explained
by the political context in which the tremors took place. On April 26, 1812, most of
Venezuela was governed by republicans who had recently declared independence from
Spain. When the tremor took place, not even a year had passed by since the provinces’
declaration of independence. Following the earthquake, many royalists, such as Coll y Prat,
continued inhabiting republican cities and towns where they persisted in their defense of
the Spanish Monarchy through rumors, pamphlets, and sermons. Frictions were
exacerbated even further as disagreements inside the republican faction became rife. In
such a context of widespread political antagonism, notions of the natural world also ended
up diverging. Popayán’s political context in 1817 and 1818 was somewhat different from
that seen in Caracas and Valencia in 1812. In most of New Granada, the monarchical
restoration was swift and merciless. Several former leaders of the republic were detained
and executed. Many others fled to the Llanos or the Caribbean. Countless of them sought
to be pardoned by either denying any involvement in the juntas and the republican
governments or by claiming they had been forced to support the republic but that deep in
their hearts they had never fully endorsed the rebels’ political undertakings. 410 Thus, by
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1817, within Popayán one could hardly find voices openly criticizing the Spanish Crown
or royal authorities. Perhaps some did not speak up out of fear of repression while others
were possibly convinced that the monarchical system provided the stability and order they
sought for. Although Popayán’s political tensions had not disappeared, it seems they had
been buried and put out of sight. Such a context of relative political uniformity, even if
superficial, created the conditions in which natural and religious interpretation of seismic
activity could more easily converge.
Such dissimilar grasps of the political context and the natural world also brought
about different emotional experiences. As seen earlier, in Venezuela some experienced
religious fear and guilt while others sensed earthlier feelings of fright and remorse. Some
understood these emotions in relatively individual terms whereas for others a certain
communal consciousness gave meaning to such feelings. The limited number of documents
referring to Puracé’s activity and the emotions it produced in Popayán does not allow us to
classify and trace emotional communities in the same manner as I have attempted to do for
the Venezuelan case. Yet, this handful of historical sources reveals that in Popayán fear of
divine punishment circulated along with feelings of guilt for having endorsed
republicanism and, thus, having inflamed God’s wrath. That is to say, a communal sense
of remorse similar to that seen among some Caraqueños seems to have prevailed among

monarchical restoration, Restrepo took advantage of his family’s wealth and social contacts to avoid being
sent to prison. During the following years, Restrepo concealed his past political views and tried to keep a low
profile. In the 1820s, Restrepo wrote the first texts on the history of the Colombian Independence. His
somewhat traumatic experience towards 1815 might help explain some of the conservative views that come
up in his texts as well as his avid defense of Simón Bolívar. (Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila, “El arrepentimiento de
un revolucionario: José Manuel Restrepo en tiempos de la Reconquista (1816-1819)”, Anuario Colombiano
de Historia Social y de la Cultura 40, no. 2, (2013): 49-76. For more information on the monarchical
restoration in New Granada, see: Gutiérrez Ardila, La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819), pp.
37-104.)
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many Payaneses. However, other forms of guilt that surfaced in Venezuela apparently did
not come about in Popayán. Guilt peppered with reproach became widespread among many
Venezuelan republicans who considered that their incapacity to govern and to put down
their rivalries had hastened the republic’s downfall. It seems such a form of guilt was not
produced in Popayán. If it did arise, it is not present in the sources. Its absence is possibly
due to the fact that many republicans fled the city and those who stayed would not have
publicly expressed any sort of disapproval concerning the republic’s breakdown.
Both in Popayán and Venezuela a sense of hope arose in the months following the
Puracé eruptions and the Maundy Thursday earthquake. Nonetheless, while in Venezuela
conflicting factions experienced a sense of confidence for being on God’s side, in Popayán
such assurance was complemented by the belief that their naturalist knowledge would also
protect them from the Puracé’s ire. The experience of hope that spread through Popayán is
one of assurance that they could eventually tame the volcano’s activity through God’s
mediation as well as with their efforts to maintain its crevices clear and unclogged.
The absence of perceptible political tensions in Popayán’s case partly explains why
emotional communities and the gaps between them are not as visible when compared to
the Venezuelan case. Together, these two cases demonstrated that political frictions tend
to widen and accentuate the differences between one community and another. When such
tensions are not as manifest, disparities between emotional communities tend to decrease
and distinct communities tend to blend with one another.
Conclusions
During the first decades of the nineteenth century, social and political strife
coincided with intense seismic and volcanic activity. The 1812 earthquake and the Puracé’s
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eruptions were but two episodes among many others. As a matter of fact, two of the most
explosive volcanic eruptions of the last two centuries took place during these years. One
of them came about during the last days of 1808, just a few months after Napoleon’s
invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. The exact location and date of this eruption is unknown,
but it apparently took place somewhere in the tropics, possibly in the southwest Pacific
Ocean, around late November and early December of 1808. Scholars refer to this volcanic
explosion as the ‘unidentified eruption of 1808.’ The other eruption came about on April
1815 when Mount Tambora in Indonesia exploded. In fact, this eruption is considered to
be the largest one to have happened in the last millennium. Such was the magnitude of
these two volcanic explosions that temperature decreased throughout the whole globe.
Recent studies have shown that the 1810s were the coldest decade the Earth has faced in
the last five hundred years. The decline in global temperature was particularly manifest
after the eruption of Mount Tambora.411 Following the 1815 volcanic explosion, global
temperature dropped between 1 and 2.5° C. In some places, this descent was close to 10°
C.412 It is due to such circumstances that 1816 has been labeled ‘the year without summer.’
This situation was particularly palpable in large parts of Europe and North America. 413
Two of the most recognized Spanish American scientists at the time, Francisco José
de Caldas in Santafé and José Hipólito Unanue in Lima, wrote about the anormal opacity
of the sun and other odd meteorological happenings that took place between late 1808 and
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early 1809 as a result of the ‘unknown eruption of 1808.’ Naturally, people at the time were
unaware that an unidentified eruption was behind these phenomena. Unaune reported
having seen vivid afterglows at sunset during the last weeks of 1808 and first ones of 1809.
Caldas described his observations in an article written in the Semanario del Nuevo Reino
de Granada414 in February 1809. The piece explains that a thin cloud obscured the sun in
Santafé as well as in other New Granadian cities such as Neiva, Pasto, Popayán, Santa
Marta, and Tunja. As Caldas explains, “as of 11 December of last year, the disk of the sun
has appeared devoid of irradiance, its light lacking that strength which makes it impossible
to easily observe without pain. Its natural fiery color has changed to that of silver, so much
so that many have mistaken it for the moon.” Caldas highlighted that this unusual
phenomenon was particularly manifest at sunrise and sunset. According to his report, when
the sun is at “its zenith, it shines more brightly and cannot be looked at with the naked eye.
Near the horizon, it has been seen to take on a light rosy hue, [or] a very pale green, or a
bluey-grey close to that of steel.” This thin cloud even disturbed Santafé’s temperature.
Caldas writes that, “we have experienced very cold mornings, far colder than should be the
case in this city, given its altitude and geographic location. Many mornings the fields have
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been covered in ice, and we have all seen trees and other particularly sensitive crops
damaged by the frost.”415
In the Semanario, Caldas explained that many in Santafé believed this strange
phenomenon to be an omen of countless tragedies that were soon to come. Many city
residents approached him and anxiously consulted him about the matter. Caldas had to
reassure many, telling them that there was no reason to fear because this natural happening
conformed to the basic principles of physics. He explained that they should not be alarmed
by the effects of this atmospheric phenomenon for it was simply the result of vapors that
would sooner than later disappear without leaving any disastrous consequence. In the end,
Caldas concludes that, “when we are as enlightened about other phenomena as we are about
eclipses, then we will look on the opacity of the sun and the loss of its rays as calmly as we
do a rainbow after a storm.”416
In the small town of El Trapiche, about 100 kilometers southwest of Popayán,
clergyman Domingo Belisario Gómez also noted that the sun’s glow had changed and
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turned more opaque. In a letter written on February 28, 1809, Gómez discussed a
hypothesis posed by his interlocutor and friend, Santiago Pérez de Valencia, an alcalde
ordinario in Popayán. Pérez believed the sun’s opacity was caused by vapors set off by the
winter. It is not clear if Gómez and Pérez were referring to the Northern Hemisphere’s
winter or to the rainy season in present-day southern Colombia. In any case, Gómez’s
answer is one of disbelief. As Gómez argues, “during other winters, even stronger than the
current one, when the sun found itself in the tropics as it is right now, the same incident
should have had happened. But I am speaking without knowing much about this matter.” 417
Almost twenty years later, Gómez would present a series of observations that could
have helped him explain the sun’s opacity in 1808 and 1809. During the last months of
1827 and 1828, Popayán, El Trapiche, and their surroundings were shaken by a series of
tremors. Apparently, these were caused by the Puracé’s activity as well as that of other
volcanoes. Gómez’s letters mention explosions that were heard south of El Trapiche, in
direction of Putumayo. It is possible that the clergyman is referring to the Doña Vieja
Volcano, located about 55 kilometers south of El Trapiche. Gómez noted in his letters that
on the nights of 22nd and 27th of November, he observed strange figures and colors when
looking at the moon. On the 22nd, the clergyman claimed to have seen a second, scorchedyellow semicircle at the feet of the waxing moon during close to five minutes. Gómez’s
impression was that there was a second, smaller moon beneath the moon. The two

417

“…en otros mas inviernos, acaso maiores que el actual y quando el sol hubiera estado en el trópico como
ahora, havbria avido igual suceso. Pero ya sabe V. que yo hablo sin conocimiento de la materia.” (Archivo
General de la Nación (AGN), Sección Colecciones, Fondo Canónico Domingo Belisario Gómez, folios 1213, ‘Carta a Santiago Pérez de Valencia sobre asuntos de negocios, temas eclesiásticos y opacidad del sol. El
Trapiche. 28 de febrero de 1809, 2-3.)

204

semicircles later joined, but there was still a clear demarcation between them, as if the
moon were cut in two. Gómez states that on the 27 th the moon turned red and orange for a
matter of a few minutes. It seemed as if were on fire, the clergyman maintained. At the
same time, red, curved lines appeared in the sun’s center. 418 Gómez believed these
anomalies were brought about by some sort of alteration in the light. 419 Although the
clergyman did not pose a connection between the tremors and the moon’s abnormalities, it
is highly possible that, similar to what happened in late 1808 and early 1809, recent
volcanic activity produced a disturbance in the atmosphere that eventually created the
moon’s odd shapes and colors.
In early nineteenth-century Venezuela and New Granada, natural phenomena, such
as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and atmospheric disruptions, brought about awe, fear,
guilt, pain, grief, and even a sense of hope and confidence. Yet, in the face of natural
catastrophes as well as social and political conflicts, not everyone experienced the same
emotions, nor did they live through them in the same manner. Nonetheless, despite this
diversity of emotional experiences, fear and guilt became prevalent throughout Venezuela
and New Granada. These were experienced with such intensity that they ended up shaping
people’s understandings and meanings of the world they were living in, enabling the
collapse of republican governments throughout the region.
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Chapter 3: Quito. June 27, 1815: Emotions and Memory.
On June 27,1815, Francisco Cruz left his house around two in the afternoon and
began walking down Quito’s streets. Shortly after he crossed the threshold, Cruz, a
secretary to Quito’s President, felt a certain uneasiness in the atmosphere. Although it was
still relatively early, he saw several street vendors picking up their goods and shopkeepers
abruptly closing their stores. During the short walk from his residence to a shop where he
had to run an errand, Cruz heard people murmuring that disorders were soon going to take
place. Cruz finished his business and started on his way to his office in the Presidential
Palace. It was only a few seconds after he was back on the street that Cruz heard a deafening
uproar. Dozens of people began running up and down the street. Cruz was shocked. Panic
had taken over the city. He rushed into the Presidential Palace and stood by a window
looking towards the main square. From it, he saw Indian women warning one another as
they picked up the potatoes and fruits they had been selling during the morning. As the
Indian women disappeared from his sight, he saw people clumsily running out the cabildo
(city council) as well as out the shops surrounding the square. It seemed as if some serious
incident had taken place inside.420
When the church bells rang at three in the afternoon, confusion grew even further.
People ran out of the main square, some towards Quito’s hills, others simply hid behind
the square’s corners where they could take a glimpse at what was happening around. In the
middle of the commotion, the army’s call to arms was rallied. When the troops marched
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into the main square, Cruz saw that many of those who had been running around in despair
stayed completely still. The troops remained in the square for about half an hour. Gradually,
people began to disperse. Cruz claims that during the following hours, absolute silence and
tranquility took over Quito. When he walked back home around 11:30 pm, Quito’s streets
were empty and quiet.421
Although Francisco Cruz was stunned by what happened, he cannot claim that this
disturbance took him by surprise. During the days leading to June 27, people in Quito had
been expecting either an insurrection or widespread ransacking to break out at any moment.
Cruz had been warned by acquaintances of imminent disorders in the city. However, when
questioned about these rumors, he explained that he had not paid much attention to them
because he considered them to be “vague voices.”422 Cruz, as most of Quito’s inhabitants,
heard news of the forthcoming revolt by means of the “common voice.” 423 That is, through
everyday conversations, murmurs, and oral exchanges. For many Quiteños, it was not only
what was being said that made them fear an impending upheaval, it was also what they saw
that concerned them. Certain gestures, meetings among the city’s notables 424, people
lowering their voices when others approached them, and outsiders coming into the city
reinforced the feeling that looting or a revolt were going to break out any day. Many
Quiteños ended up viewing basically any broadside, news, gesture, and unusual behavior
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as a prelude to mayhem. When the city woke up on the 27 th, Quito was immersed in an
atmosphere of widespread and collective unrest and panic.
Despite the emotional explosion that broke out on the 27 th, nothing particularly
important happened that day. As Cruz’s testimony explains, some minutes after the
disorders began, peace and silence took over Quito’s streets and squares. When the army
division stationed in El Panecillo, a hill located in the southside of the city, marched into
the main square, not a single shot was fired. In the meantime, most of the city’s inhabitants
ran up the hills or hid in their homes and shops waiting for things to calm down. While the
army surveilled the streets, it detained two of Quito’s notables, Manuel Larrea y Jijón and
clergyman Don Francisco Rodríguez Soto. By sunset, the streets were, once again, calm
and quiet. During the night and early hours of the following morning, army officials
imprisoned a few other individuals, including a couple of notables.
The inquiries into the disturbances that broke out on June 27, 1815 began shortly
after the crowd had dissolved. That same afternoon, Toribio Montes, President of Quito’s
Royal Audiencia, summoned an investigation to find those responsible for the commotion
that had just taken place. The President put León Pereda de Saravia, the Asesor General,
in charge of the investigation.425 Several days later, after interrogating dozens of Quito’s
residents, Pereda reached the conclusion that what had taken place on the 27 th had been a
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failed uprising. Nonetheless, he explained that there was not enough evidence to point out
who had led the insurrectionary plot nor what had actually sparked the disorders. Despite
this, as a precautionary measure, Pereda sentenced several of Quito’s notables to prison
and others to exile. Montes approved Pereda’s verdict and stamped his signature on the
Asesor’s ruling.426
However, about four months later, President Montes submitted a letter to the
magistrates of Quito’s Audiencia, who, at the moment, were stationed in Cuenca, 427
denouncing that the judicial process had been seriously flawed and that he had only
endorsed it to prevent a tragedy. Montes accused Pereda and army officials of altering
testimonies and of pressuring witnesses to make false claims. Moreover, he charged several
army officers of insubordination and of unlawfully detaining Quito’s most loyal and
respectable notables. To prove his claims, Montes ordered new interrogations. A first series
of inquiries were carried out during November 1815. A second set took place during the
first months of 1816. Some of the new testimonies claimed that they had not really seen
signs of an uprising. Rather, they explained that the rumors that had been circulating were
about a group of soldiers planning to ransack the city’s stores and homes. During the new
interrogations, some stated that on the 27th army officers defied the President’s authority.
Others claimed that during the first interrogation the inquirers had altered certain details of
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their accounts to give the impression that a failed uprising had in fact taken place on the
27th.428 Accusations of wrongdoing, disloyalty, and insubordination sprung from all sides.
The Council of the Indies, annoyed with the situation, urged Quito’s President to reach a
definite and unequivocal ruling. Finally, in November 1817, Juan de Ramírez, Quito’s new
President, put an end to the inquiries citing a royal decree of January 24, 1817 which
declared general pardon for the crime of insurrection in all of the Spanish territories.
Nonetheless, in his closing remarks, Ramírez argued that it was clear that on the 27 th an
unsuccessful insurrection had taken place and that some army officials, in an act of
insubordination, had defied the President’s authority. 429
The confusion and widespread panic that took over Quito on June 27, 1815 are thus
obscured even further by these seemingly conflicting and ambiguous testimonies. Even
though such contradictory accounts might prevent us from getting to the root of what
actually happened on the 27th, they offer a glimpse into the emotions that were flowing
among Quito’s residents, into people’s memories, and into what they considered to be
plausible under the circumstances they were living in. These testimonies make manifest
the atmosphere of mistrust and fear that propagated throughout Quito, the existence of
underlying tensions among royalist factions, and the fact that the threat of a rebel uprising
or generalized ransacking were impending prospects for many of the city’s inhabitants.
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In this chapter, I pose two arguments. First, I argue that there is a symbiotic relation
between collective memory430 and emotions. The disorders that broke out on June 27th can
only be understood if one considers that previous episodes of violence and repression left
a stamp on the collective memory of Quiteños. Remembrances of the past shaped people’s
emotions at the same time that fear and confusion gave form to their understandings of the
past. In that sense, emotions informed people’s conceptions of the times they were living
in. This argument implies that emotions such as fear, confusion, anger, and panic spread
and reproduced not only through rumors, but also through memories of past events. Thus,
when the panic attack broke out on June 27th, it was in part the result of the circulation,
multiplication, and intensification of both emotions and remembrances of the past.
In the second place, I claim that this episode highlights the persistence of animosity
and mistrust among Quito’s competing royalist factions. Despite being considered by
traditional scholars as a hotbed of the independence movement in the Spanish America,
and in spite of being accused by royalist authorities – such as the Asesor Pereda de Saravia
– of being an epicenter of revolution, this incident shows the prevalence of royalism among
most of the city’s inhabitants. Nonetheless, the events of the 27th reveal the growing
tensions and fractures among royalist factions. Resentment and suspicion within royalist
ranks were prevalent, particularly between one faction composed mostly of Quiteños and
another made up mainly of outsiders hailing from the Iberian Peninsula, Guayaquil, Lima,
and other parts of the Americas. In the years to come, such divisions between these two
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factions would enable independence leaders to gain support for their cause. Yet, as studied
more closely in the fifth chapter, independence did not necessarily bring an end to royalist
feelings and archetypes in northern South America.
Perhaps because of its apparent historical irrelevance, most scholars who have
studied Quito during the independence process have ignored the commotion of June 27,
1815. I have only found two references to this incident in published texts. In La Revolución
de Quito del 10 de Agosto de 1809, José Gabriel Navarro, a twentieth-century Ecuadorian
diplomat and intellectual, explains that the events of the 27 th were a spiteful intrigue led by
General Brigadier Juan Samano and Colonel Juan Manuel Fromista, both royalists, to
challenge Montes’ authority, also a royalist. Navarro explains that Samano was bitter with
Montes for having ordered the Brigadier to return to Quito after Samano’s defeats in Palacé
and Calibío in late 1813 and early 1814. Moreover, Navarro argues that Samano resented
being in trial for misconduct during the military campaign in Popayán while at the same
time Montes had pardoned the Quiteño notables involved in the Juntas of 1809 and 1810.
Navarro concludes that Samano and Fromista’s plot was but a “weave of lies” that proved
their vicious and treacherous ways.431
The commotion of the 27th also comes up in Pedro Pérez Muñoz’s Compendio de
la rebelión de la América, a collection of thirty-five letters in which Pérez offers his
account of some of the main events that took place in Quito during the tumultuous period
between 1809 and 1815. The letters were presumably written in Guayaquil during the last
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months of 1815, just before Pérez’s departure to Spain. 432 In 1998, historian Fernando
Hidalgo-Nistri transcribed and published these letters. In his introductory remarks, Hidalgo
does not refer to the disorders that broke out on the 27 th. He does explain that Pérez Muñoz
was one of Quito’s most fervent royalists. In his letters, Pérez mentions the commotion in
one paragraph in which he claims that the disorders were simply a rebel plot to kill Quito’s
royalists, their children and servants, and even President Montes. Pérez maintains that the
scheme was discovered in time and some of the culprits, such as Manuel Larrea y Jijón and
other nobles, were captured while the remaining rebel notables fled the city. Throughout
the letters, Pérez implies, without proof, that President Montes had become an ally of
Antonio Nariño and of Quito’s main insurgents. 433
The scant attention given to this episode has focused on the intrigues among army
officials, President Montes, and Quito’s notables. Yet, this incident offers an opportunity
to explore more profound aspects of Quito’s society beyond these political machinations,
such as its collective memory and the relation between emotions and remembrances. This
chapter tackles these questions through a fine-grained ethnographic study of the
commotion that broke out on the 27th. I try to disentangle and bring to light the experiences,
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meanings, and significance that this emotional outburst had for the inhabitants of Quito
and those of neighboring towns and cities. In that sense, its methodological approach is
both an “incident analysis” and a “history in the ethnographic grain”, to use Robert
Darnton’s terms. Darnton refers to “incident analysis” as one in which a historian focuses
on a specific incident, narrates it as a story, traces the different paths leading to its
manifestation, and then follows its repercussions through the social order. 434 In that sense,
this chapter’s approach is also inspired by Karl Jacoby’s Shadows at the Dawn and Frances
Ramos’ article on the 1744 riots that shook in Puebla in New Spain. In his work, Jacoby
studies one event, the Camp Grant Massacre of 1871, and offers four different narratives. 435
In the case of the 1815 panic attack, there are two grand narratives – that the disorders were
the result of a failed insurrection or that they were the consequence of alleged looting –
and several complementary accounts. Ramos, for her part, poses a connection between
emotions and memory to understand why a festive celebration ended up in violent riots. 436
Before plunging into Quito in 1815, a short note concerning the source base is
warranted. This chapter is based on a relatively limited number of documents. Carlo
Ginzburg argues that there are cases in which the reading of a relatively small number of
texts related to a circumscribed phenomenon can be more rewarding that the massive
434
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accumulation of repetitive evidence.437 With regards to this chapter’s goals, his reflection
seems to be true. The chapter studies the three interrogatories concerning the commotion
of June 27th: the one led by Asesor Pereda shortly after the disorders broke out and the two
succeeding inquiries that Montes ordered in November 1815 and the first months of 1816.
In addition to these records, I also turn to several letters between Pereda, Montes,
magistrates of Quito’s Audiencia, and members of the Council of the Indies. These
documents all sit in in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville.
During the first inquiry, seventy-six people were interrogated by a small tribunal
led by the Asesor Pereda. Of the seventy-six people interviewed, twenty-nine are women
and fifty of them are referred to as “Doña” or “Don”. The youngest person interviewed is
a 10-year old girl by the name of Vicenta Rojas. The oldest person is the 62-year old
Colonel Juan Manuel Fromista, who had first arrived at Quito in 1809 along with the troops
sent from Lima to put down the Government Junta that was established in Quito on August
10, 1809. He returned to Quito in November 1812, when royalist troops took over the city
and put an end to the short-lived State of Quito. Of the seventy-six people interrogated,
two are described as “black”, four of them as clergymen, and forty-nine knew how to sign
their name. Thirteen were interrogated on June 27, just a few hours after the disorders broke
out.438 During the second set of interrogations that took place in November, twenty men
were summoned to court. They are all clergymen, army officers, and bureaucrats. In the
third group of inquiries, twenty-six people were interrogated. Twenty of them had already
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been questioned during the first inquiry in June and July of 1815. Of the six new witnesses,
two are women, three belong to the army, and five are referred to as “Doña” or “Don.” 439
I highlight these details simply to draw attention on the number and diversity of
witnesses and observers of the commotion of June 27 th and of the events leading to it.
Groups that are usually underrepresented from “official” sources, such as women, servants,
and low-ranking military and bureaucratic officials, have a somewhat relevant voice in this
inquiry. Throughout the interrogation, those summoned were asked if they had heard
rumors of upcoming disorders and if they had seen suspicious activities or behaviors during
the previous days. Likewise, they were told to describe what they had been doing on the
27th and what they saw and heard during the course of the day. Their different backgrounds
seem to have shaped their understanding and experience of these events. However, the
growing feelings of fear and confusion crossed all social and political divisions and was
shared by basically all of Quito’s inhabitants. The existence of contradictory testimonies
simply underscores the state of collective panic, mistrust, and unrest that had spread
through Quito. Their accounts reveal the ways in which rumors and memories of past
events fed these feelings of fear and uneasiness.
Emotions are perceptible in the documents in more than one way. In addition to the
many allusions to the panic and confusion people experienced on the 27 th, the
interrogatories themselves seem to have incited fear and consternation among many of
those summoned to trial. Carlo Ginzburg uses the term “archives of repression” to refer to
the documents produced by inquisitorial trials and other sorts of hearings in which the
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interrogators resorted to torture, threats, and intimidation. Although in this particular case
there are barely signs of physical punishment or violent threats, one cannot ignore that the
prospect of suffering some sort of judicial sentence – such as prison, banishment, or a
simple verbal reprimand – was a possibility feared by those summoned to the courthouse.
After all, many of them had witnessed previous cases of extreme repression such as those
that took place on August 2, 1810. Likewise, most of those interrogated in the days
following the 27th knew that as a consequence of the commotion some of Quito’s notables
had been imprisoned. As Ginzburg explains, the characters who spoke in these sorts of
hearings – in this particular case, President Montes, the Asesor Pereda, other judicial and
army officials, and the witnesses who were summoned – were not on equal footing. 440 This
helps explain why some answers seem to be mere echoes of the interrogators’ concerns
and why many witnesses in June and July of 1815 declared to have seen signs of an
insurrection but six months later claimed otherwise. In some cases, it seems as if the
crossexaminers transmitted their mistrust and resentment to the witnesses, either to make
them claim that a failed uprising had taken place or to state that army officers had acted
inappropriately. However, there are also several exceptions in which dialogues takes place
and we can see challenging voices in which the interrogators seem to be shocked by what
the witnesses are talking about.
Ultimately, as Ginzburg explains, these documents are not neutral and do not
convey entirely objective information. They are the product of a “peculiar utterly
unbalanced interrelationship.” To decipher them, Ginzburg suggests, historians must try to
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grasp the “subtle interplay of threats and fears, of attacks and withdrawals”. 441 At the same
time, we must take advantage of these unbalances of power to explore the emotions and
memories that emerge from within the inquiry itself.
Antecedents and memory
By 1815, Quito had a relatively long tradition of social and political strife. As Jaime
Rodríguez explains, this does not imply that Quiteños unceasingly challenged Spanish
sovereignty. On the contrary, Rodríguez argues that throughout these disturbances, Quito’s
residents demonstrated strong feelings of loyalty to the Spanish monarchy. At the core of
these disturbances, however, there was a long and gradual process of economic and
political decline. Towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, Quito was one of the
most prosperous cities in South America. Through most of the seventeenth centuries, its
textiles and ceramics supplied the silver mines in Perú as well as other parts of the
Americas. However, towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, Quito’s once thriving
economy began to decline due to a sharp fall in the demand for its products. Peruvian mines
had recently entered a state of stagnation. At the same time, due to the transition from the
Habsburg dynasty to the Bourbon House, cheap French textiles began to flood Peruvian
markets and those of other South American regions. Quito’s economic problems were
followed by political setbacks. When the Viceroyalty of New Granada was established for
a short period between 1717 and 1723 and definitely in 1739, Santafé rather than Quito
was picked as its capital. On 1717, Quito’s Royal Audiencia was closed down for a period
of five years. During the century, Quito’s bishopric also lost provinces under its influence
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as well as the collection of dues coming from them. In 1779, Cuenca’s bishopric was
established. In the following years, several other territories that used to respond to Quito’s
bishopric passed to be under the jurisdiction of Lima, Cuenca, and Popayán’s bishoprics.
In few words, for Quito, the eighteenth century was one of economic and political decline.
Its aspirations of autonomy as well as of economic and political status were constantly
frustrated.442
Such situation led to social and political conflict. The first significant indication of
discontent broke out on May 22, 1765 when a group of rioters attacked and raided the royal
sales tax administration and aguardiente distillery. The so-called ‘Rebellion of the Barrios’
was one of the largest urban rebellions ever experienced in the Americas. Anthony
McFarlane claims that the revolt was both a constitutional crisis and a response to the fiscal
measures imposed by Santafé’s Viceroy Pedro Messía de la Cerda. To a certain extent,
Messía de la Cerda’s tax reforms challenged the patrician’s traditional right to negotiation
and consultation that had existed under the Habsburgs. Not only did the Viceroy overlook
their observations and criticism, he also ignored Quito’s notables in the implementation of
the tax reforms. However, the strongest opposition against the reforms came from the fiscal
measures themselves. In the midst of the Bourbon Reforms and the Spanish Crown’s
efforts to increase tax revenue, Messía de la Cerda decided to put an end to a system
controlled by private tax-farmers and replace it by one in which royal officials would have
direct management over tax collection. By doing so, Messía de la Cerda sought to reduce
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corruption and tax evasion. The reforms were mostly focused on the collection of the
alcabala (sales tax) and the establishment of a new aguardiente monopoly. 443
By May 22, when the riots began, tax collectors had begun to enforce the alcabala
on goods and economic areas that were previously exempt from its payment. Such a
situation led to higher taxes on Quito’s residents, particularly on the city’s poorest
inhabitants. Rumors began to spread throughout the city claiming that authorities were
planning to impose taxes on the river stones used by washerwomen as well as on children
still in the womb. Others asserted that officials were going to establish government
monopolies on salt, tobacco, potatoes, sugar, and maize. The imposition of an aguardiente
monopoly also generated discontent, especially among Quito’s landowners who provided
most of the sugarcane used in the distilleries as well as among shopkeepers and monasteries
who were involved in the unauthorized distilling and selling of aguardiente. In the end, the
new aguardiente monopoly meant higher prices for most consumers and left many former
manufactures and traders out of business.444
On May 22, thousands of people hit the streets. Some of the rioters threatened
Quito’s officials. Others attacked and ransacked the alcabala and aguardiente monopoly
offices. Magistrates of the Audiencia and royal officials, with the help of clergymen and
several of the city’s notables, were able to regain control of the situation after promising a
general pardon and the suppression of Messía de la Cerda’s tax reforms. Nonetheless, in
the following days, Quito lived in a state of commotion. Several mobilizations took place
and pamphlets and pasquines spread throughout the city. On June 19, following the sound
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of bells and fireworks, rioters stormed a jail and tried to release prisoners taken into
custody. Guards and soldiers forced the multitude to disband and the assault ultimately
failed.445
On the night of June 24, another riot broke out. That day, Quito’s streets had been
filled with people celebrating Saint John’s Day, one of the city’s main festivities. Indians
from Quito’s vicinities had come into the city to pay their half-yearly installment of tribute.
During the day, rumors began to spread claiming that a riot was probably going to break
out later that day. In the midst of large gatherings and celebrations, a clash broke out
between the crowd and a patrol composed mostly of Peninsular Spaniards. The row turned
into a massive riot. Thousands of people attacked the Audiencia’s Palace as well as the
residence of a Peninsular merchant. Several rioters and at least two people defending the
Palace were killed. This second riot was not only more violent than that of May 22, antiEuropean sentiments as well as the enmity of the poor toward the wealthy were more
manifest. Moreover, after St. John’s night, royal officials basically lost control of Quito.
During the following days, an informal government ruled the city and the Audiencia had
to rely on creole notables to sustain some influence over Quito’s residents. Only until
October, royal authority began to be reinstated. Creole notables were successful negotiating
with the leaders of the populace and convincing them to expel the unruliest individuals
from their ranks. Most rioters accepted the notables’ authority at the same time that Messía
de la Cerda acknowledged them as intermediaries. During the following months, tensions
persisted, but the city lived a state of relative peace. Royal authority was slowly
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reinstituted. Quito was definitely pacified on September 1, 1766 when troops from
Guayaquil arrived at the city. That same year, an army garrison was permanently
established in the city. Finally, on February 14, 1767, the aguardiente monopoly was
reinstated.446
In the 1780s, when the Tupac Amarú rebellion exploded in Upper Perú and the
Comunero Revolt in New Granada, Quito did not experience any serious disturbance.
Likewise, during the 1790s, when several conspiracies broke out in Caracas and Santafé,
Quito continued to live in a state of apparent peace and harmony. Yet, following
Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, Quito was the first province in the Americas
to establish a Government Junta. On August 10, 1809, conspirators swiftly apprehended
high-ranking civil and military officials and deposed the president of Quito’s Audiencia,
Manuel Ruiz de Castilla. That same afternoon, without shedding blood, a Junta was
established. Jaime Rodríguez claims that the leaders of the conspiracy deliberately
prevented the participation of popular sectors out of fear that the plot could get out of
control as had happened in the 1765 ‘Rebellion of the Barrios.’ During its nearly three
months of existence, the Junta maintained its loyalty to the Spanish Crown; however, it did
eliminate and reduce certain taxes and levies. On October 24, under the pressure of rival
troops laying siege on Quito, the Junta’s members decided to reinstate Ruiz de Castilla
under the agreement that he would absolve them of any crime. In the following days, Ruiz
de Castilla dissolved the Junta and reversed its tax reforms. By early December, troops sent
from Lima arrived at Quito and arrested the main leaders of the Junta and dozens of
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residents who had been involved in its establishment. The Fiscal in charge of the trial,
Tomás Aréchaga, resolved that forty-six of them should be sentenced to death and thirty to
exile. Ruiz de Castilla was supposed to confirm the verdict but preferred to leave such
decision in the hands of Santafé’s Viceroy, Antonio Amar y Borbón. 447 By August 2, 1810,
when violence and repression broke out, Amar had not reached a decision.
During the months leading to August 2nd, the existing animosity between Peninsular
Spaniards and Americans intensified even further. Quiteños’ resentment towards royal
officials such as Aréchaga and Ruiz de Castillo, as well as towards the army troops that
had arrived from Lima, grew by the day. This was particularly true among imprisoned
notables and their families. To make matters worse, some of Quito’s residents complained
that zambo, mulatto, and black soldiers were stealing livestock, not paying acquired debts
at stores, and breaking into houses to steal valuables. Quiteños also claimed that soldiers
verbally harassed them in the streets, accusing them of disloyalty and other wrongdoings.
Such was the growing mistrust towards the troops from Lima that on July 7 rumors spread
that the soldiers were going to ransack the city’s shops and houses. A short-lived
commotion broke out in the San Roque neighborhood where people began running to
protect their homes and shops. Fortunately for them, that day looting did not take place. 448
The disorders of July 7 were but a forewarning of what would happen on August
2nd. During the following weeks, other rumors began to propagate. Among Peninsular
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Spaniards and fervent royalists, news that Carlos Montufar – the regal commissioner sent
from Cádiz by the Regal Council – would soon arrive at Quito caused unrest. Some
believed he would offer a general pardon to all those involved in the August 10 conspiracy.
At the same time, people in the streets began to claim that some of the prisoners had already
been executed. In the midst of growing uneasiness and uncertainty, a group of Quiteños
organized a scheme to free the detainees. On August 2, shortly after the church bells tolled
at 2 p.m., a band stormed the main prison while another one attacked the army barracks
where the troops from Lima were stationed and where most political prisoners were held
captive. The mutineers were successful in freeing several prisoners from the prison, but
their assault on the quarters failed. Soldiers and guards responded by executing nearly all
the inmates of the August 10 plot. Following Ruiz de Castilla’s commands, the troops
marched into the city’s streets. It is not clear what the soldiers were ordered to do, but the
fact is that troops fired at will, killing somewhere between 200 and 300 people. At the same
time, soldiers ransacked several houses and shops.449 According to Quito’s Bishop, José de
Cuero y Caicedo, army officers merely stood by while zambo soldiers shot innocent
bystanders and finished them off by beating them with their rifle butts and running over
them with their horses.450
News of the events of August 2nd travelled through South America. Rebel leaders
in Santafé and Caracas wrote stories of the carnage as a way to exacerbate the growing
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enmity between Europeans and Americans. Simón Bolívar’s 1813 “War to Death”
proclamation portrays August 2nd as a foundational event that not only justified the
American’s violent retaliation but placed all blame of future tragedies on the Spaniards. In
several cities in New Granada, funeral rites were celebrated to honor those killed in Quito.
In Caracas, a monument was erected in their honor.451
In Quito, the consequences of August 2nd were twofold. For one part, it paved the
way to the conformation of a second government junta. On August 4, 1811, an open cabildo
was instituted. Members of the Audiencia, army officials, city notables, and clergymen
took part in this assembly. The cabildo concluded that peace could only be obtained if
authorities put an end to the persecution of those involved in the conformation of the first
government junta. Likewise, most voices claimed that the troops from Lima should leave
the city as soon as possible. President Ruiz de Castilla and other officials were receptive to
these claims. The detachment from Lima was expelled and judicial trials concerning
August 10 were suspended. It was in this more peaceable atmosphere that a second
government junta was established on September 18. The junta appointed Ruiz de Castilla
as its president, recognized the authority of the Consejo de Regencia (Regal Council),
declared the province’s autonomy from Santafé, and conferred on junta viceregal authority.
In December 1811, Ruiz de Castilla was forced to resign as president and the junta formed
the State of Quito. The newly established state declared its independence from the Regal
Council and the American Juntas but continued to recognize Ferdinand VII as its sovereign.
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The short-lived State of Quito came to an end on November 8, 1812 when Toribio Montes
and his troops took control of the city.452
A second consequence of August 2nd was that it left a long-lasting imprint on the
memory of most Quiteños. In some cases, such memory made itself manifest in acts of rage
and vengeance. Such was the case of the events leading to Ruiz de Castilla’s death. Even
though Ruiz de Castilla submissively endorsed the establishment of the second Junta and
did not oppose his deposition, by mid-1812 many still held him in their minds as the main
culprit of the tragedy of August 2nd. On June 15, after rumors spread denouncing that Ruiz
de Castilla was involved in a plot against the State of Quito, a riot stormed La Recoleta del
Tejar convent where the former president had retired following his removal from power.
The multitude beat Ruiz de Castilla with sticks and batons, leaving him a dying man. He
passed away three days later.453
By June 27, 1815, when the panic attack took place, Quito’s residents had
accumulated countless memories of disorders and riots. These recollections were part of
the city’s collective memory. Of course, due to its cruelty and proximity in time, August
2nd was in the foremind of most Quiteños. However, it was not only remembrances of
concrete events that were in the memory of the city’s inhabitants. Certain atmospheres,
feelings, and codes also made part of a common repertoire or inventory shared by most
Quiteños. The swift propagation of rumors was seen by many as a forewarning to disorders.
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During tense moments, the clanging of church bells or the sound of gunpowder was
understood by many as the secret signal used by conspirators to launch their plot. White
and mixed-race Quiteños considered the arrival of large groups of Indians or the presence
of zambos and blacks in the streets as a premonition to trouble. This prejudiced depiction
of Indians, zambos, and blacks as dangerous troublemakers is partially explained by the
racial discrimination that existed at the time. Some Quiteños saw these groups as part of
the mob and rabble and, thus, associated their presence in Quito with disorders. Moreover,
it is also likely that some of the city’s residents made a connection between the arrival of
Indians and zambos and the racialized violence that took place in Upper Perú during the
Tupac Amaru Rebellion and in Haiti during Revolution.
The city’s residents knew that once disorders broke out, they could take a wide
variety of turns: from widespread looting to an organized uprising. To use Maurice
Halbwachs terms, Quito’s inhabitants recollected from the “common domain” – that is,
from a repertoire of shared remembrances and experiences – to understand what was
happening.454 When the disorders broke out on June 27, Quiteños recalled past
disturbances, particularly the violence that took place on August 2 nd, to try to give meaning
to what was happening and to envision what could come to pass. During the inquiries into
the commotion of June 27, the testimonies continually alluded to the city’s collective
memory, to its shared remembrances, experiences, and perceptions.
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A prelude to pandemonium
It seems that on the morning of June 27 practically everyone in Quito knew that
that day or the following, or perhaps sometime during the coming week, disorders were
going to take place. Rumors, written notes, and broadsides disseminating news of an
imminent revolt had been circulating for weeks. Likewise, in the days leading to the 27 th,
rumors began to spread claiming that the soldiers stationed in El Panecillo were planning
to ransack the city’s shops and residences. Street brawls, the retailing of knives, and
meetings among the city’s notables set off feelings of fear and restlessness among the city’s
residents.
On the morning of June 27, Quito’s Cabildo prepared a decree urging President
Toribio Montes to take the necessary precautions to ensure Quito’s peace and advised him
to pay attention to the many rumors and pamphlets that had been disturbing the city’s
harmony and proper order. The decree only reached Montes’ hands a few days later.
Although the decree was ready to be sent to Montes, it had not been signed by most of the
councilmen and the Cabildo’s secretary decided to postpone its delivery until the following
day. The decree insisted that Quito was a “peaceful city, loyal and subordinate to Ferdinand
VII” and grateful of Montes’ authority and government. It claimed that a few “enemies of
public tranquility” were spreading, at their desire and without any basis whatsoever, libels
and slander against Montes. These false accusations, they claimed, were breaking the city’s
peace. The Cabildo urged Montes to discover the persons behind the seditious messages
and to impose on them a severe and exemplary punishment so that Quito’s inhabitants
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could continue living their “simple and judicious lives, demonstrating day by day their
truthful vassalage to the sovereign.”455
As the decree explained, during the days leading to the 27th, many of Quito’s
residents had been speculating about a forthcoming uprising in the city’s streets, markets,
shops, and residences. For example, about a month before the disorders broke out, a Doña
María Bandembergh was in a store when two men came in talking about the many people
that had been coming into the city. At one point, she believes to have heard one of them
mention that some people were coming from Cuzco. It is possible at that precise moment,
this reference to Cuzco made Bandembergh remember stories of the violence that Upper
Peru experienced during the Tupac Amaru Rebellion. When these noticed she was paying
attention to their conversation, the two men turned around and began whispering. Some
weeks later, while standing by the window of her room, Bandembergh saw a black man
and Indian walking down the street. They caught her attention because they were speaking
loudly. She was not able to understand most of what they said but she picked up a phrase
that startled her: “we have armed the houses” as they pointed towards her residence. 456
Another woman, Josefa Carrera, declared that on the morning of the 23 rd she
overheard three unknown men speaking loudly in the street saying that there was going to
be an uprising on Saint John’s Day – that is, on June 24. Carrera, full of fear, shared this
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news with the first person she saw walking down the street: Doña María Manuela Vicuña’s
housemaid. Both Carrera and the domestic servant informed Vicuña of the news, who, for
her part, notified some of her neighbors of what was being said in Quito’s streets. 457 On
the night of the 23rd, Margarita Navarro, a shopkeeper, heard similar remarks. While sitting
on her store in the proximities of the Merced Church, she saw the silhouette of three tall
men. At one point, one of them cried out that they would soon “stage an attack on the army
barracks, death or victory!” She was unable to identify the men. It was dark and they left
soon after.458
During those days, these sorts of public and impulsive comments were not at all
uncommon. About a week before the commotion, a Feliciano Santos went out to buy wood
to repair his master’s house. Santos’ master, Don Juan José Guerrero y Matheu, 5 th Count
of Selva Florida, had held the presidency of Quito’s first Junta for twelve days in 1809. He
received office from Juan Pío Montufar and, once in power, offered the position to the
deposed president of the Royal Audiencia, Count Ruiz del Castilla. He was considered by
most Quiteños the reputed monarchist who had returned power to Ruiz del Castilla after
the fall of the first Government Junta in 1809. 459 After walking around the city trying to
find wood suitable for the repairs, Santos decided to take a break and sit on the corner of
the San Roque Square. At that moment, a woman by the name of Josefa came out a house
and began chatting with him. When Santos told her that he was looking for wood for his
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master’s house, Josefa smiled and asked him why he was wasting his time on such errands
seeing as his master’s house was going to “tumble anyways.” 460 According to Santos,
Josefa was suspected of favoring the insurgency. 461
It seems that the fate of Guerrero’s house was the source of much hearsay. A Doña
María Ruiz claimed that one day, not long before June 27, she was walking down a street
when an unknown Indian man passed by and greeted her. At that instant, the Indian pointed
towards Guerrero’s house and told her that it “was soon going to be over.” Ruiz did not
know what to answer and simply responded “we will all be over.” The Indian told her to
be careful given that she was known to be a royalist.462
Others were more cautious when talking in the streets about the impending
disorders or so they recalled. One night, three or four days before the commotion, a Don
Juan Guerra was walking by the San Francisco Square when he saw Gabriel Puente
walking with a group of people. As soon as Puente noticed Guerra, he gave a few steps to
the side and approached Guerra. Speaking softly, making sure his companions would not
hear him, Puente told Guerra that he should be careful and seek shelter because there was
going to be an uprising in the following days. Puente briefly explained to Guerra that at a
social meeting someone said that the revolt was against the royalists and that Antonio
Nariño was coming to take over the presidency of Quito. 463
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In the midst of the proliferation of idle talk and the circulation of pamphlets and
other written notes, many began to share the feeling that rebels were covertly preparing an
uprising. Someone such as Colonel Juan Manuel Fromista, for instance, believed that these
rumors, gestures, and actions hinted the existence of a synchronized and coordinated
insurrectionary scheme. When interrogated by the tribunal, Fromista argued that in the days
leading to June 27th he had had too many premonitions indicating that an uprising was
going to break out before long. In the first place, groups of Indians – some of which were
unfamiliar to Quito’s residents – had been coming into the city in higher numbers than
usual. The presence of these cholos and cholas (Indian men and women) became even more
suspicious after some of them were seen repeatedly visiting Don Guillermo Valdivieso, a
reputed rebel. The Indian’s involvement in some kind of conspiracy became even more
manifest, according to Fromista, when some of them launched threats to the troops on the
streets, yelling at “the troops that they would soon be finished.” 464
Fromista’s long list of forewarnings continued with accounts of attacks and insults
on the President and his troops. On the night of June 19, 1815, a group of people gathered
outside Toribio Montes’ residence. They knocked on the door several times asking if
Montes was home. Surprised by their outrage, the sentinels inside the Presidential Palace
asked them if they were drunk. The group outside vociferously responded by shouting that
Montes was a “scoundrel, deceitful man who would soon pay for his misdeeds.” After
hearing such insults, the guards promptly opened the door with the purpose of capturing
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these men, but by the time the sentinels set foot on the street the crowd had dispersed and
disappeared from their sight.465 Yet, it is also possible that the guards imagined having
heard these insults as a result of the tense atmosphere they were living in.
Some weeks earlier, on the night of May 12, Lieutenant Colonel Don Miguel de la
Piedra was attacked by a group of six men who had been following him on his way from
the army quarters to his residence. De la Piedra heard their footsteps behind him once he
left the barracks and started walking down the streets. On the corner of the San Francisco
Square, he decided to confront them. De la Piedra took out his saber and turned around.
One of them asked him if he had fire for his cigarette and approached de la Piedra. The
Lieutenant Colonel slapped the man and the other five men swiftly joined the brawl. Three
of them threw rocks and mud at the officer, while the remaining three used their swords to
attack him. Fortunately for de la Piedra, he was successful defending himself, stabbed one
of the attackers, and made them retreat. De la Piedra was only left with a minor wound in
one of his fingers.466
In a similar case, Lieutenant Juan Bautista Heredia was also assaulted in Quito’s
streets on June 25. That night, Heredia was walking around the city with his sister, Josefa,
and a friend. Unexpectedly, an Indian jumped towards them and tried to steal the cigar that
Josefa had just lit. Juan Bautista slapped the man, but a group of Indians came out in the
man’s defense. Seeing that the Lieutenant was unarmed and had been wounded in his arms,
Juan Bautista and his companions were forced to withdraw. As they retired, the Indians
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yelled at Juan Bautista: “you scoundrel, we know who you are, you’re day will soon come,
you’ll die!”467 Only a few days before the 27th, another soldier was verbally assaulted while
walking down Quito’s streets with two women. As they strolled along the city’s streets, the
three of them got caught up in an argument with a youngster. The young man, who
apparently was inebriated, screamed at the soldier that “within fifteen days no one was
going to be left breathing.”468
Fromista’s list of misgivings continued with Don Antonio Ante’s suspicious
purchase of sixteen razons during the first days of June. News of this purchase quickly
spread among retailers and customers and, eventually, reached Quito’s officials.
Apparently, after selling the razors to Ante, the black merchant Toribio Palencia was left
with only one razor in stock. When his customers passed by to ask for razors and saw that
there was only one left, they questioned Palencia about this, pushing him to talk about
Ante’s ample acquisition. It seems that during the days leading to June 27, the tribunal tried
to interrogate Ante to ask him why he had bought so many razors, but Quito’s authorities
were unable to locate him.469
For Fromista, these were not isolated events, but rather symptoms of a coordinated
insurrectionary plot. The conspirators, the Colonel argued, were the same notables who
established the government juntas and who, on August 2, 1810, had led a mutiny against
the royal authorities. In the course of the first months of 1815, Fromista, other members of
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the army, and city officials shared a growing concern over the recurring clandestine
meetings among Quito’s notables. They worried that these meetings were ideal venues for
the propagation of rumors as well as the site where notables such as Pedro Montufar and
Guillermo Valdivieso were planning an uprising. 470
According to several testimonies, Don José Barba’s residence was one of the
settings where most of the intriguing among notables was taking place. Soldier Manuel
Castro, who owned a small shop located on the first floor of Barba’s house, claimed to
have seen visitors constantly going into Barba’s home, both at daylight and nighttime.
Castro never heard a word of what was being discussed, but he knew that most of those
visiting Barba were reputed rebels and that basically everyone living in Barba’s residence
– including all the servants except for one – were known to “have ideas in favor of uprisings
and to have an aversion towards the legitimate government.” 471
Don Andrés Fernández Salvador’s testimony corroborated the soldier’s allegations.
A couple months before the events of June 27, Fernández visited Barba’s house to talk
about a question concerning the upcoming festivities of St. John’s Day. The Cabildo had
designated Barba to find pasturelands where the bulls could graze during the days before
the bullfights. When he entered Barba’s house, one of the servants ran ahead to notify his
master. Fernández tried to follow the servant’s pace but was quickly left behind. From afar,
Fernández noticed people leaving the room where Barba was expecting him. He was able
to greet Guillermo Valdivieso and recognized several Popayanejos who had been banished
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from Popayán in 1813 by General Juan Samano. At the sight of this scene, Fernández’s
first thought was that a plot, similar to the one that took place on August 2, 1810, was being
devised.472
Throughout Quito, the belief that the incidents of August 2, 1810 could repeat
themselves produced anxiety, unrest, and sorrow. In a conversation between a Doña María
Azechna and a Don Manuel Larrea y Jijón, the latter claimed to be distraught with the
thought that they might experience another day similar to August 2 nd.473 However, others
viewed the imminent uprising with hope and expectation, wishing, nonetheless, that this
time the rebellion would not have such a tragic ending. For example, at a meeting at Doña
Margarita Peres’ home about a week before the 27th, a Don José Venegas ended up talking
about the forthcoming uprising with Friar José María Surita from the Mercedarian Order.
Surita told Venegas and Peres that in a few days royalists in Quito would suffer another
defeat and that none of the royalists were going to be able to escape. Surita claimed, with
apparent hope and anticipation, that Simón Bolívar and other rebel leaders were on their
way to Quito to finish with all of the city’s royalists. When summoned by the tribunal,
Surita denied he ever said any of this, but Margarita Peres confirmed that the friar had in
fact stated that all of Quito’s royalists were going to be killed. 474
Fromista’s list of suspicions ended with a series of warnings he had received from
Quito’s residents. A few days before the 27th, he received news that a woman in a
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confessional had declared that there would soon be an uprising and that royalists, such as
the Mercedarian priest that was listening to her confession, should avoid the Calle del
Correo. Other of his acquaintances, such as Priest Pedro José Peres and a Don Jose Antonio
Cevallos, contacted Fromista to inform him of rumors of an impending uprising. The word
on the street was that the rebels would first attack the army barracks and then move on to
control the rest of the Quito. Cevallos added that the Montufar House was probably
involved in the plot. Due these warnings and his intuition, Fromista doubled the number of
guards securing the barracks and advised his officers and soldiers to be vigilant. 475
As these rumors spread throughout the city, many Quiteños also began to take their
own precautions. Jose Antonio Cevallos, Fromista’s acquaintance, was cautioned by his
aunt for not doing so. A few days before the 27th, Doña María Álvarez passed by her
nephew’s house to visit his family. She was surprised to see their calmness and composure.
She could not avoid asking them why they had not hidden their valued objects or why they
were not preparing for the forthcoming disturbances. Álvarez warned them that the rumor
was that many soldiers were going to surrender once the uprising broke out. In those same
days, María Álvarez also cautioned her cousin, Ignacia Enriquez, about the news she had
been hearing. Álvarez suggested that both should leave Quito and head to her hacienda to
avoid any risk.476
Agustín Enríquez, an Augustinian friar, received a similar forewarning in the course
of those days. Enríquez’ father had moved to Cuenca some years ago and had left his house
in Quito in charge of María Peres, his domestic servant. Around June 23 or 24, Peres
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informed Agustín that she had received a letter from Enríquez senior, ordering her to leave
the city as soon as possible and to travel to the town of Cayambe taking with her the chests
he had left behind. Agustín did not understand his father’s orders nor what was happening.
By the 25th, before Agustín could question her further, Peres left the city with the muchtreasured chests.477
María Peres and Agustín Enríquez were not the only ones receiving information
from nearby cities and towns. Through letters and word of mouth, information
continuously circulated between Quito and its surroundings. For example, José Antonio
Cevallos, Fromista’s acquaintance and María Álvarez’s nephew, received news of an
imminent uprising through a series of letters coming from Riobamba, a city located
approximately 200 km south of Quito. One of those letters, sent on June 18 and signed by
‘El Astro’, alerted Cevallos that trouble was soon coming to Quito. ‘El Astro’ expressed
his concern over the rebels’ latest victories in the Province of Popayán and the possibility
that Quito’s insurgents, encouraged by these reports, would decide to attack the military
quarters based in El Panecillo hill. ‘El Astro’ urged Cevallos to discreetly warn Colonel
Fromista, commander of the troops stationed in Quito, that disorders were inevitably
coming to the city and that they would probably break out during the celebration of
bullfights and other festivities. ‘El Astro’ closed his note asking Cevallos to shred the letter
to pieces once he had read it and to avoid mentioning its existence to anyone, including
Fromista. ‘El Astro’ feared that the letter would get him into trouble. 478
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For one reason or another, Cevallos did not destroy the letter and it became a piece
of evidence in the tribunal’s investigation. The inquiry later found that ‘El Astro’ was a
Lieutenant Don Jose Luzero who, at the time, was living in Riobamba. When summoned
to explain his letter, Luzero said he had four reasons to warn Cevallos and exhort him to
talk to Fromista. First, because a widespread rumor of an imminent uprising and attack on
Quito’s military quarters had been circulating in Riobamba during the last days. Secondly,
because it was recently known in Riobamba that Don Carlos Montufar was now a fugitive
and had joined, with his own troops and weapons, the rebel armies in the Cauca Region.
The news that had reached Riobamba was that Montufar was planning to attack Popayán
and then move on to Pasto and Quito to continue “spreading the revolutionary system that
he so obstinately defended.” Luzero explained that the Montufar family had much support
in both Quito and Riobamba and that several of his relatives lived in Riobamba. Luzero
insisted that these facts were surely connected to the “general voice” that had been
propagating throughout Riobamba and surrounding towns. 479
In the third place, Luzero claimed that there was also news that Juan Pío Montufar,
father of Carlos and one of the main leaders of the 1809 Junta, was now living in his
hacienda of El Chillo and not in Loja where he was supposed to be detained. Luzero feared
that Juan Pío had moved closer to Quito and Riobamba in preparation for the uprising that
was going to take place. Luzero recalled that in 1814, when Juan Pío was still held in Loja
and Antonio Nariño’s troops were approaching Pasto, Juan Pío wrote a letter stating that
the time had come to take back what belonged to them. Luzero insisted: if last year Juan
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Pío had incited an attack on Quito’s royalists while being in Loja, this time, that he was
closer to Quito and his son was leading a rebel army in Cauca, he had an even greater
reason to actively take part in the forthcoming insurrection.
Luzero’s fourth reason dealt with a conversation he had had in recent days with a
Don Carlos Larrea, former army captain and nephew of Juan Pío Montufar. Luzero
explained he ran into Larrea while walking with two women. According to Luzero, people
remembered Larrea as one of the rebels who took part in the attack on the royalist army
barracks in Quito on August 2, 1810 and for detaining members of the Royal Audiencia
during the assault. Larrea told them that he was travelling to Quito in two days to attend
the bullfights that were going to be celebrated during Quito’s festivities during the first
weeks of July. After a short silence, one of the women responded that he was most certainly
going to encounter a “castle of fire.” Larrea claimed that “he would probably see some of
that” and added that he was planning on spending some days in Quito before travelling to
El Chillo hacienda, where Juan Pío Montufar was apparently hiding. Before parting, Larrea
exclaimed that in fifteen days they would all embrace in Quito. 480
In his closing remarks, Luzero explained that there were other signs that hinted the
imminence of disorders in Quito. In Riobamba, those known to be rebels had been acting
strangely during the last weeks. Loyalists had noticed that when they approached groups
of reputed rebel supporters, the latter would lower their voices or would simply break up
the meeting. For Luzero, there was no doubt that an uprising was going to break out in the
midst of bullfights when people from Quito and neighboring towns gathered to enjoy the
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festivities. Thus, he decided to warn Cevallos, urging him to advise the city’s authorities,
particularly Fromista, to take all necessary measures to prevent a new insurrection. 481
In Ambato, Latacunga, and other towns located between Quito and Riobamba, the
atmosphere was not much different. Among its inhabitants, the question was not if a new
uprising was going to break out in Quito, but when and how it was going to erupt. Many
claimed it would begin once the Santafereños took over Pasto. Once this happened,
Quiteños and peoples from contiguous cities and towns would stage an insurrection, expel
all royalists living in the Province of Quito with the help of the rebel armies coming from
Santafé, and then move on to conquer Riobamba, Cuenca, and Lima. 482
A Don Roque Martínez witnessed the propagation of rumors and feelings of hope
and uncertainty in Ambato, Latacunga, and their surroundings. Martínez, a native of San
Gil, a town approximately 325 km northeast of Santafé, ended up in Latacunga thanks to a
series of unfortunate events. Martínez was a military officer of the army belonging to the
recently founded State of Cundinamarca. When Antonio Nariño travelled south to conquer
Popayán and Pasto, Martínez was among the officers accompanying him. In May 1814,
Cundinamarca’s army was defeated in Pasto. Martínez, Nariño, and dozens of other rebels
were captured by royalist troops. The rebel prisoners were first sent to Quito and then
remitted to Guayaquil where they would be incarcerated or, as was Nariño’s case, shipped
to Cadiz. When the prisoners were about halfway through their journey to Guayaquil, in
the proximities of the village of Guaranda, Martínez fell seriously ill. Due to his critical
state, the officer in charge prisoners decided to leave Martínez in Guaranda under the care
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of a physician from Lima. Martínez’s health gradually improved and about two months
later, he left Guaranda and established in Latacunga. By mid-1815, he had been living in
Latacunga for over five months and had spent several weeks in Ambato and neighboring
towns and haciendas. After June 27th, he wandered around the region for a few days until
he travelled to Cuenca where he was captured by royal authorities and was interrogated by
the Audiencia on August 6, 1815.483
During the interrogation, Martínez seemed to be trapped in a difficult position,
incapable of denying his rebel past while also trying to demonstrate he had not been
involved in the disorders that had taken place in Quito. He claimed that the “revolutionary
spirit” was in full effervescence throughout the Ambato and Latacunga regions. Martínez
possibly over-embellished his testimony to conform to the magistrates’ animosity towards
criollo elites, particularly Quiteños and Santafereños. In Latacunga, he explained, there
were no more than four people manifestly loyal to the Spanish Monarchy. All over the
region, Antonio Nariño’s name generated admiration, hope, and expectation. Many viewed
Nariño as the redeemer who would free Quito from the tyrannical government of Toribio
Montes. Martínez himself was greeted with esteem and deference when he mentioned he
had fought alongside Nariño. Around Latacunga and Ambato, many asked Martínez about
Nariño’s whereabouts, claiming that the General had not been captured by royalist troops
and was gathering forces to stage another attack on Pasto. Even though Martínez told them
this was not true, that he himself had witnessed Nariño’s detention and seen how Nariño
was being driven to Guayaquil, few believed him. Such was their enthusiasm that many

483

AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 86-87.

242

rebel supporters mentioned they were making plans to join Nariño’s troops. During a
conversation a Don José Lamas had even commented that he was so eager to fight that “he
wished he could become a small bird or a witch” so he could fly all the way to Pasto and
join the Santefereños. In the meantime, the few royalists that still lived in the region
acknowledged that Quito was probably lost; however, they believed they could still
organize an army to stop Nariño’s advance towards Cuenca. 484
Similar to what had happened in Riobamba, in Latacunga and Ambato there were
also rumors that Juan Pio and Carlos Montufar were involved in this new insurrection.
However, by now, their leadership seemed to be fading in these districts. In Latacunga,
Martínez overheard people claim that they enthusiastically expected Carlos Montufar’s
arrival so they could join his troops and attack Quito. Nevertheless, these same people
argued that once they expelled the royalists from Quito, Carlos should be put in trail for
his treacherous conduct. As they explained, in 1812, when the rebel troops marched from
Quito to Cuenca, “they were not able to capture Cuenca because of Montufar’s fault,
despite being so close they could even see the city.”485 This time, many acclaimed, with
the help of the “courageous” Nariño and the Santafereños, things would be different.486
Martínez highlighted that the peoples living in these towns, villages, and the
countryside seemed inexplicably coordinated. In Latacunga and Ambato, as well as in the
smaller villages and haciendas he visited, people repeated similar rumors and news, and
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most shared the same opinions with regards to the incoming insurrection. Although
Martínez saw anonymous letters circulating throughout the region, he was unable to
discover where they came from or who had sent them. One of his closest acquaintances, a
Don Prospero Bascones, mentioned that some of those letters were sent by Santafereños
informing Ambato and Latacunga’s rebels how and when the new uprising was going to
take place.487
In Quito, rumors of an imminent uprising were complemented by hearsay of
widespread ransacking. Towards mid-June, clergymen, army officers, and royal
administrators heard inebriated soldiers exclaiming that in the following days there would
be extensive looting. Most of them ignored these remarks arguing that they were simply
the product of the soldiers’ drunkenness and arrogance. Don Gerónimo Andrade, a
lieutenant ascribed to the Cuenca militias, claimed that about fifteen days before the 27 th,
Colonel Fromista began to spread the word that there would soon be an uprising. According
to Andrade, once Quiteños saw that there were movements and preparations within the
quarters, they began to show signs of consternation. Apparently, some of Quito’s residents
feared not only a possible uprising, but also that soldiers could take advantage of the
situation to ransack shops and houses. 488
Thus, by late June 1815, the scene was set. Fear, confusion, anger, and hope had
been piling up, accumulating to a point in which a mere remark or gesture could spark an
outbreak of collective panic. For some, such as Martínez and Fromista – and possibly the
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tribunal carrying out the first interrogation – rebel leaders were covertly organizing and
coordinating people’s actions and thoughts towards an insurrection. Others, such as the
Cabildo’s members, argued that the growing atmosphere of discontent and turbulence was
the responsibility of a few agitators who were disturbing the city’s peace and loyal spirit.
Some believed that soldiers would soon ransack the city’s shops and residences. In the days
following the 27th, as Quito’s residents tried to understand what had actually happened on
that afternoon, other explanations came up. Joaquín Gutierrez, the Procurador General
Síndico (a sort of judicial advisor), argued that this kind of disorders were not uncommon
during the days previous to bullfights and festivities when people usually got overly
excited. In this occasion, he claimed, mayhem was sparked by the slaughter of dozens of
pigs that had been roaming the city’s streets for months.489 Gutiérrez’s claims will be
analyzed later on in the chapter.
Regardless of the different explanations that appeared during the interrogations,
most agreed that in the course of June 1815 a growing sense of unrest, turmoil, and fear
had been steadily expanding in Quito and its surroundings. The circulation of rumors,
letters, libels, and other written notes fed into this sense of collective confusion and panic.
Remembrances of past events, symbols, and atmospheres – particularly those related to
August 2, 1810 – stimulated these feelings of uncertainty and fear. Under these
circumstances, emotions piled up, shaping people’s understandings of what was
happening. As fear and confusion grew, many Quiteños began to conceive the possibility
that a violent outbreak could soon happen.
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An outburst of emotions
Quito’s residents experienced the disorders that broke out on June 27 in different
ways. Most accounts agree that confusion was widespread, people ran in different
directions, and an uproar traveled through the city’s streets. However, not all witnesses
concurred on what sparked the disorders and what actually happened during the half an
hour or so that the commotion lasted. While some claimed that it all began with people
screaming “bull, bull!”, others argued that the church bells or some other sign triggered the
upheaval. Some witnesses saw street brawls and traces of imminent violence. Some saw
soldiers capturing several of Quito’s notables and planning to ransack the city’s stores and
houses. Others only perceived a state of intense panic and agitation without clear signs of
hostilities against the army, royal authorities, or the city’s notables.
On June 27, 1815, since the crack of dawn, rumors of an impending uprising and
of widespread looting had begun to circulate with even more intensity than during previous
days. Many Quiteños started claiming that an insurrection was bound to happen that same
day or the following one. For example, Doña Dolores Cornejo, a nineteen-year-old woman,
woke up to a warning from Teresa Garzón, who had been her caretaker as a child. Teresa
Garzón urged the “Niña Dolores” to take shelter and hide her valued objects because an
uprising was going to break out that same day or the next one. According to Garzón, the
insurrection was going to begin once a bullock was set loose in Quito’s streets. Cornejo
was not sure what to make of this warning. However, later in the day, when she heard an
uproar and people screaming “bull, bull!”, she realized that her former babysitter’s
admonition was true.490
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When the tribunal asked Garzón about the message she sent to Cornejo on the
morning of the 27th, Garzón explained that, in previous days, a rumor had spread
throughout the San Roque neighborhood alleging that the soldiers and officers stationed in
the army quarters had been cautioned about an impending insurrection. On the morning of
the 27th, seeing that these rumors were gaining force, she decided to caution “Niña
Dolores.” By the early hours of the afternoon, Garzón and most her neighbors were certain
that the uprising was going to break out in a question of minutes or hours. The situation
became even more tense when an army patrol walked around the neighborhood’s streets
claiming to be safeguarding the city’s public tranquility. According to one of Garzón’s
neighbors, not long after the patrol had moved on, two men on horses passed by screaming
“bull, bull!”. Some minutes later, pandemonium broke out. 491 Cornejo and Garzón do not
explain what happened once they heard the uproar and people in the streets saying an
uprising had just erupted. Apparently, once the disorders began, both of them hid in their
homes.
Others, such as Colonel Fromista, were among the multitude running up and down
Quito’s streets once the disorders broke out. That day, fearing that an uprising could
explode at any moment, Fromista ordered almost all soldiers and officers stationed in the
army quarters in El Panecillo to stay inside the barracks until three in the afternoon.
Fromista, for his part, left the quarters in the early hours of the afternoon to attend a social
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meeting at a Doña Teresa Calisto’s home.492 Shortly after he arrived at Calisto’s residence,
people in the street started to scream that an uprising had just begun. Fromista went out to
the street with a pistol in his hand. He saw dozens of people screaming and running in all
directions. As he stood in the middle of the street, paralyzed by what was happening, some
of those running down the street approached him and hastily advised him to run and hide
before he got killed by a group of Indians that was tailing him. At that moment, Fromista
remembered that on his way to Calisto’s home, he had seen a group of Indians covertly
talking among themselves on the corner of Don Juan Ante’s house. At the sight of this
scene, Fromista could only imagine that these Indians were up to something. After all, Ante
was known to be an insurgent and the Indians arriving to Quito in previous days had been
acting suspiciously. Now, that he was standing in the street, in the midst of the commotion,
Fromista remembered this group of Indians and imagined they were going to ambush him.
He feared the worst and began running towards the army quarters. 493 It seems Fromista
believed the Indians coming into Quito were allied with his rivals or were perhaps part of
a larger scheme to attack the Spanish Monarchy.
Sergeant Jose Paredes was walking around the San Agustin Square when the
commotion broke out. Amidst growing turmoil, he recognized Colonel Fromista in the
middle of the rowdy crowd. According to Paredes, Fromista was running in distress, with
a saber in his hand, up a street leading to the army barracks. A group of youngsters wearing
capes and ponchos, and apparently unarmed, were running behind Fromista. The Colonel
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abruptly turned when he reached the corner of the square. The youngsters did the same and
continued their pursuit. Paredes felt the situation was getting out of control and that he
should return to the quarters as soon as possible. He took a shorter path than the one
followed by Fromista. When he reached the barracks, Paredes saw Fromista arriving safe
and sound along with two soldiers.494
One of those two soldiers was Manuel Tapia. When the disturbances broke out,
Tapia was visiting the house of Priest Teodoro Navarrete. While talking with Navarrete,
they heard people screaming that an uprising had begun. Tapia leaned out the balcony and
saw a large number of people down the street. Among the crowd, he noticed Colonel
Fromista dashing up the street with a naked saber on his hand. Behind him, following his
steps, was a group of six to seven men wearing capes and ponchos. Tapia quickly ran down
to the street to aid Fromista. He accompanied the Colonel all the way to the army quarters.
Fortunately for them, they arrived without a scratch.495
The commotion surprised other soldiers and officers while walking in the streets or
visiting acquaintances. Second Lieutenant Don Francisco Benito Camba, for instance, was
visiting a friend in the vicinities of the Santo Domingo Church when he heard the call to
arms being rallied. As he ran to the army quarters, he saw in the distance a mass of people
made up of nearly two hundred men. When interrogated on June 30, 1815, Camba claimed
that most of the multitude seemed to be advancing towards the barracks while others were
doing so towards the Santo Domingo Square. On the 27 th, people around him commented
that a new uprising had just exploded. A man he knew, Don Miguel Oramas, claimed that
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he had heard from an Indian woman that the President Toribio Montes had just been
assassinated. After hearing this news, Camba unsheathed his saber and continued his path
to the quarters.496 Another Second Lieutenant, Don Antonio Buendía, was walking to the
army quarters from his house when he heard the call to arms coming from the barracks.
Shortly after, he heard an uproar coming from down the street. In the distance, he saw a
crowd rowdily running around the streets. Buendía hurried his pace and reached the
barracks in time to join the formation that was going to march into the main square. 497
For his part, Sargent Manuel Andrade was in the Cruz de la Piedra neighborhood
when he heard the call to arms. People began running in different directions. Among the
crowd, a one-eyed man with a pistol caught his attention. Later on, as Andrade was headed
to the quarters, he saw an Indian renowned as ‘Capa Redonda’ (‘Round Cape’), standing
in the door of his house, with his face partially covered, and holding a stick and a rock in
one of his hands. Andrade overheard ‘Capa Redonda’ say to a woman: “comadre498, the
time has come to get rid of these deceitful men. Until when, until when!”. Andrade
continued his way to the quarters, without hearing the comadre’s response and without
seeing where ‘Capa Redonda’ was headed to.499
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Those inside quarters were as confused as those who were surprised outside the
barracks. Once the call to arms was rallied, soldiers and officers inside began to speculate
about what was happening in the city’s streets. From the watchtower, those on guard could
see crowds flowing around the city’s squares and dozens of people running up the city’s
streets, trying to find shelter in the hills and creeks. The word among the troops was that a
numerous mob was headed to the barracks. 500 As they deliberated over the size of the mob,
those outside – such as Fromista, Paredes, Tapia, Camba, Buendía, Andrade, and a few
others – began to arrive to the barracks. Fromista ordered soldiers and officials to form in
military formation and prepare to march into the city. Not long after the disorders had
begun, the troops marched from El Panecillo into the city’s main square. 501
As they passed the Cathedral, Second Lieutenant Buendía noticed that its doors
were open and that someone had just rushed inside. Buendía and other officers separated
from the troops, went into the Cathedral, and ordered the Cathedral’s sacristan to close its
doors. Once inside, Buendía saw two men hanging from the dormer next to the steps
leading to the tower. He ordered them to come down. One of them surrendered
immediately, while the other one tried to escape and hid beneath the main altar. During the
struggle to detain him, Buendía banged his forehead against the altar. The man was finally
captured and handed over to the city’s judges. 502
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The officers suspected these two men were the bell ringers who triggered the
commotion. According to an army official, they had been paid by the conspirators to toll
the bells. That same night, the two of them were taken to the tribunal for questioning.
Surprisingly, they do not come up in the records of the first interrogation. We know that
they were interrogated thanks to Francisco Cruz’s second testimony given on January 15,
1816. According to Cruz – with whose account we began this chapter –, during the inquiry,
the two men explained they were not bell ringers and that they knew nothing of the
commotion that had just taken place. One of them claimed to be a carpenter, while the other
one a button maker who worked in a shop next to the Cathedral. They told the tribunal that
once they saw that a disturbance had broken out, they decided to hide inside the Cathedral.
Cruz states that soldiers and army officers threatened the two men with a whipping if they
did not confess they were the bell ringers. Both men insisted they had not been involved in
the commotion. Regardless of their pleas, the two men were whipped. Seeing that they did
not relinquish, they were set free and the tribunal was unable to press any charges against
them.
Cruz’s remarks with regards to these two men seem somewhat problematic. On
January 16, 1816, Cruz claimed that on the night of the 27 th, the tribunal altered and
embellished several testimonies and statements in order to give the impression that a failed
insurrectionary plot had actually taken place. They did so by tricking the witnesses, asking
them to sign their declarations without reading their statements aloud. In at least one case,
they intimidated the witness into signing the declaration without him knowing what had
been written in the records. Yet, in the case of these two men who were allegedly whipped,
the tribunal did not add their testimonies, even distorted ones, to corroborate the existence
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of an insurrectionary plot.503 Perhaps, on his second interrogation, Cruz exaggerated the
tribunal’s arbitrariness and corruption to gain Montes’ favor. It is also possible that Cruz’s
claims are true, and that the two men were in fact interrogated and tortured, but the tribunal
then decided not to include them in the records for reasons that are unknown to us.
There are other accounts that seem to corroborate the troops’ suspicion that on the
afternoon of the 27th an insurrection broke out. For example, the daughters of a Jose
Ximenes, Mariana and Ignacia, claim to have seen from their window a group of Indians
walking towards the main square and one or two zambos – they could not agree on the
number – marching in front of them. The zambo or zambos were armed and held a knife
in their hands. In her first declaration given on June 30, 1815, Mariana explained that the
zambos incited the Indians, telling them to “advance, to die before long” and then moved
forward as if they were leading an attack. 504 On her second statement, given on February
15, 1816, Mariana claimed that the zambos did not make such remark, but that she did hear
a similar comment when a group of Indians passed by her house as they left the city after
the commotion broke out. Such was the anguish they suffered at the sight of these
seemingly dangerous men, that Ignacia stumbled and hurt herself. 505
The children of Doña Isabel Tovar witnessed a similar scene. Not long before the
commotion began, Tovar’s son, Miguel, saw four Indian men and an Indian nursing woman
arguing on the street. According to Miguel, one of the men was crying out, “everything
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should be finished, not a single one should be left.”506 The nursing woman, in her knees
and with a baby on her hands, implored the man not to get into trouble, telling him he
would surely get killed if he got involved in any sort of disturbance. Another of Tovar’s
children, Ignacia, saw one of the Indian men talking to another woman. Ignacia claims to
have heard the man explain to the woman that the Santafereños were on their way to Quito.
From the window, she saw the Indians continued their way towards the main square.
Shortly after, the disorders began. Sheltered in their home, located in the second floor of a
house, the Tovar family saw people running up and down the street. Among them was
Leandro, an Indian youngster whose family lived in the first floor of the Tovar’s residence.
Leandro walked up to the closed doors and begged his sister, Vicenta, to give him a knife.
Vicenta resisted and tried to convince his brother otherwise, advising him that he would
probably lose the knife and get into trouble. Leandro insisted so much that Vicenta was
forced to hand it over through a small window. With the knife in his hands, Leandro run
up the street in the same direction as the other Indians. Once the commotion had ceased,
Leandro and Vicenta’s parents went back to the streets, found Leandro, and recovered the
knife he had taken.507
Margarita Navarro, the shopkeeper who on the night of the 23rd had heard three
men talking about an attack on the army barracks, also saw Indians stimulating disorders
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on the 27th. That afternoon, Navarro was chatting with a soldier named Joaquín. They were
standing in the shop’s doorway when they saw two Indian men pass by. They heard the
Indians exclaim “they will all fall” as they beat their hands. 508 Both Navarro and Joaquín
knew these Indians were probably referring to the impending attack on the army quarters.
Navarro demanded the soldier to capture them and take them to one of his officers. Joaquín
claimed that he was alone and unarmed and would be unable to deal with the two of them.
Not much time elapsed after this scene when they heard an uproar coming from the end of
the street and saw people running in different directions. 509
Ardent comments alluding to the fall and destruction of Quito’s royalists continued
even after the commotion had come to an end. When the streets were mostly empty and
the troops were standing in the main square, María Josefa Salomé, a black woman, went
out to buy cigars. On her way to the store, Salomé claims to have heard a group of men
stating that, “since we’ve been unable to advance, we will throw the royalists out one by
one, all the way to the underworlds.”510
These accounts – such as those of several soldiers and officers, the Ximenes
daughters, the Tovar family, Navarro, and Salomé – suggest that the disorders were related
to an insurrectionary plot in which Indians apparently were going to play a central role.
Other accounts, nevertheless, offer a somewhat different picture. Some believed that
looting was taking place. Others, that troops were carrying out arbitrary detentions and
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committing all sorts of misdeeds. Several thought that some fortuitous event, unrelated to
political conflicts, had triggered the commotion. Their diverse testimonies hint that
disorders were perhaps produced by the growing unrest, mistrust, and fear that had been
circulating and piling up for weeks. Under such uncertainty and prevention, it seemed that
any minor incident could spark some sort of commotion.
For example, street vendors and shopkeepers encountered a tense environment in
Quito’s streets. It seemed that any gesture or action could lead to a violent outburst. On the
morning of the 27th, as he did several times a week, José Antonio Terán travelled to Quito
to sell wheat, fruits, and vegetables. As usual, he left some of his products at a store and
then wandered around Quito’s streets selling wheat. That morning, few people bought
wheat from Terán. Some told him they did not have any money, many claimed that this
was not a suitable day to be carrying out business. Towards one in the afternoon, Terán
went back to the store where he left his fruits and vegetables with the intention of collecting
his part of the share. The saleswoman, Mariana Losa, assured Terán that she had hid his
money out of precaution and urged him to leave immediately because general looting was
going to break out soon. Terán followed her advice and began his way back home. As he
was leaving Quito, he heard a loud uproar in the distance. 511
Mariana Losa, for her part, had been warned by another saleswoman. While doing
business in her store, a street vendor came in and asked Losa why she was so calm despite
warnings that disorders were going to take place soon. Losa glimpsed out the door and saw
dozens of women street vendors picking up their goods and hastily leaving the site. A Paula
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Ninsunta saw a similar scene. Shortly after midday, Ninsunta had gone out to the street
with her nursing boy. She was reaching the main square when an unknown woman
approached her and told her to leave immediately for an uprising was soon going to take
place. She then noticed that all stores were closings their doors and street vendors were
also picking up their products and stands. Ninsunta left the square with her baby and was
able to find shelter just before the mutiny began. 512
On the afternoon of the 27th, Jose Ximenes, the father of Mariana and Ignacia, was
doing business in a store when a small Indian woman went in. She seemed to be agitated
and inconsolable. The Indian woman told the shopkeeper that widespread looting was
about to take place and that some of her acquaintances were moving their merchandise and
valued objects into the Santo Domingo Convent. Just as the Indian woman had explained,
the disorders broke out shortly after she left the store. 513
Many believed that, similar to what had happened on August 2, 1810, the troops
would be the ones ransacking shops and residences. Most Quiteños were wary of foreign
troops and still remembered the viciousness with which the troops from Lima acted on
August 2nd. Once the commotion broke out on the 27th, Don Mauricio José de Echanique,
a royal accountant, hurried towards the army quarters with his son, an army officer. On
their way to join the troops, they saw people fleeing the city’s squares. The few residents
he saw standing on the streets were saying that it was all an artifice schemed by the army’s
officers and soldiers. These bystanders claimed that the officers had made up stories of an
uprising to discredit President Montes and to ruin the festivities the city was preparing to
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demonstrate its fidelity to the recently restituted Ferdinand VII. Minutes later, after
realizing that the uproar had been a false alarm, Echanique walked back to his house on
the main square. He found the troops standing in front of the Presidential Palace. When
they retired, he noticed the troops were taking a couple prisoners with them. Among them,
he identified the clergyman Francisco Rodríguez Soto. In his testimony, Echanique
explained that, at that precise moment, he felt President Montes was not the one calling the
shots.514
On the 27th, Toribio Montes was having lunch when one of his assistants informed
him that a commotion was soon going to break out. He was shocked to hear this news since
he had not felt any notorious sign of discontent among the city’s residents. When he heard
the uproar, he looked out the window and saw dozens of peoples running up and down the
streets. Nonetheless, he did not see anyone carrying weapons or any indication that they
were planning to attack the troops or royal authorities. As he watched what was happening,
Francisco Rodríguez Soto, Manuel Larrea y Jijón – one of the city’s main notables –, and
judge Don Antonio Aguirre entered his office. They came to inform him that, despite the
commotion, there was no reason to worry for there were no signs that an uprising was
taking place and the situation was calming down. According to Montes, as they discussed
the state of affairs, a group of soldiers stormed his office and detained the three men. They
held Rodríguez Soto prisoner in his house, let Aguirre free, and locked up Larrea in a cell
in the army quarters. As this happened, the troops patrolled the city’s streets and detained
another group of Quito’s notables. In letters sent to the Secretary of State in Madrid in
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November 1816, Montes explained that General Samano and Colonel Fromista defied his
authority and put people’s lives in danger. Montes argued that on that afternoon he decided
to be prudent and avoid further frictions with the army’s officers to prevent a tragedy as
had happened in previous years. He feared that if anyone, particularly him, responded to
these acts of insubordination, the troops would end up murdering dozens and even
hundreds of Quito’s residents.515
Some accounts suggest that Montes was not exaggerating when he said that a
tragedy almost took place on the 27th. Sometime after the commotion broke out, Captain
Agustín Galup was policing the streets with Lieutenant Ventura Llaguno. When they
reached the alcabala office, Llaguno insisted on opening fire and began to cry out that they
should move on to the San Roque neighborhood and “kill all the mischievous rebels.” 516
Galup was successful stopping him. Francisco Campos, the chief administrator of the
alcabala, saw the scene from his office. According to his testimony, without any apparent
reason, Llaguno began to point his rifle towards the bystanders at the end of the street.
When Galup stopped him from shooting, “all that could be heard were his allegations of
insurgents he wanted to kill.”517
That afternoon, Captain Galup witnessed the army carrying out other arbitrary
actions. Besides the detention of Rodríguez Soto and Larrea in the Presidential Palace,
other notables were captured for no apparent reason. Galup himself was ordered to visit the
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residences of the Montufars and arrest the family’s adult men. According to Galup, the
officers giving the order justified their detention claiming that the family had been involved
in previous uprisings and that there were rumors that Carlos Montufar had joined the rebels
in Popayán. Captain Ygnacio Valladares claims that these arbitrary detentions and the
army’s actions disallowing the President’s authority were part of a carefully premeditated
plot led by Fromista and other officers. Apparently, the plan was twofold: to incite Quito’s
notables to an energetic reaction that could be violently repressed and to place Fromista in
command of the city. In such state of uncertainty, in which it was not clear who was in
command of Quito, the rumor that General Samano’s troops were holding President
Montes in custody began to spread through the city. Many began to fear a repetition of
August 2nd.518
When the commotion broke out, people in the streets as well as those in their
residences and shops did not have a clear idea of what was happening: if an insurrection
had begun, if looting was taking place, if the army was harassing Quito’s residents, or if
the disorders had some other explanation. Among the latter, there is Clara Montenegro, a
shopkeeper, who first imagined that the uproar she heard was related to the killing of the
pigs that had been roaming the streets for the last weeks. Even though she had been warned
during the morning that looting was possibly going to take place, her first reaction was to
connect the boisterous screaming with the rowdiness she usually heard when pigs were
sacrificed on the streets.519
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Among those who questioned the idea that the events of the 27 th were related to an
organized rebellion or to widespread looting was the Procurador General Síndico Joaquín
Gutiérrez. During the first set of inquiries, Gutiérrez sent two petitions to Pereda de Saravia
and the tribunal offering his views on what had happened on the 27 th. In both appeals,
Gutiérrez insisted on Quito’s loyalty to Ferdinand VII and argued that that there are few
reasons to believe that the commotion was related to a revolutionary plot. In his first
petition, sent on June 30, Gutiérrez explained that the disorders were simply the product of
the uneasiness and nervousness that usually spread throughout Quito during the days
previous to the city’s festivities when it was not uncommon for disorders and unruly
behavior to happen. According to Gutiérrez, “that vulgar commotion was a momentaneous
sprout, a shock that people felt when they saw others run without any apparent reason. It
was mere confusion without malice nor hostility.”520 As the Procurador explained, people
in the streets simply ran and yelled as they tried to find shelter amidst the agitation and
confusion that broke out that afternoon. 521
For Gutiérrez, there were two reasons to believe that the disorders were not the
product of an insurrectionary scheme. First of all, during the disorders no one was
assaulted, people were not seen carrying weapons, and no one within the crowd was seen
leading the multitude. To some extent, other testimonies given to the tribunal portray a
different scenario in which Fromista was chased by a group of men, Indians and zambos
were seen with bladed weapons, several men were heard rallying others to attack royalists,
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and troops were seen harassing the city’s notables. Nonetheless, Gutiérrez is not mistaken
when he claims that no one was physically hurt during the commotion (the exceptions
might be Ximenes’ daughter who stumbled due to the fear she experienced and the soldier
who bumped his head against the altar), that firearms were not seen among the crowd, and
that there was no visible leader giving orders or running the scene among the multitude. 522
In the second place, the Procurador maintains that Quito’s plebeian women, instead
of the city’s notables, were the main instigators of the commotion. For Gutiérrez, the fact
that Quito’s nobles and “most respected residents” were not involved in the disorders
implied not only their innocence, but also that the commotion had no association with the
revolutionary plot others were talking about. As Gutiérrez claims, plebeian women were
responsible for spreading fear by announcing around the city that mayhem and looting were
soon going to take place. They were the first ones to pick up their goods, close their shops,
and rush out of the city’s squares. However, Gutiérrez clarifies, they did not act with
“sinister intentions” in mind. According to the Procurador, these women “lacked
judgement” and “the hesitance associated to their social condition and sex made them
susceptible” to easily falling into panic and confusion. Moreover, Gutiérrez claims that,
while most of the city’s inhabitants run up and down the streets, members of Quito’s
nobility could be found resting in their homes. Additionally, Gutiérrez explains that on the
morning of the 27th, Quito’s Cabildo – comprised of city notables – had prepared a letter
for President Toribio Montes warning him of the rumors and slander that had been
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circulating for weeks. All of this implied, according to Gutiérrez, that the commotion was
not the outcome of a failed insurrectionary plan. 523
In his first petition, Gutiérrez does not deny that people in Quito had been talking
for weeks of an impending uprising. However, the Procurador dismisses them as the work
of a few seditious criminals and adds that these messages had hardly transcended and had
been rejected by almost all Quiteños. Gutiérrez urges the tribunal to examine who was
behind the subversive rumors and texts instead of accusing the whole city, particularly
Quito’s most esteemed residents, of treachery. The Procurador concludes his petition
inviting the tribunal to abandon their animosity and mistrust towards Quito and
encouraging its members to promote gratitude and confidence among all Spaniards,
American and Peninsular, so that peace could reign over the city. 524
Gutiérrez sent a second petition on the 3rd of July. In the appeal, he continues
insisting that the commotion was not related to an insurrectionary plot and that Quito’s
loyalty was indisputable. He asks the tribunal to continue its investigation to capture those
who had been disturbing public peace through rumors and pamphlets and to vindicate the
city’s honor by ratifying its fidelity to the Spanish Crown. What stands out in this second
petition, however, is an alternative explanation regarding the events of the 27 th. In his
petition, the Procurador requests the tribunal to take into account that, “to a certain extent,
what motivated the sudden turbulence of the mob, widespread bewilderment, and people
rushing to find shelter was Judge Don Camilo Caldas’ decision to slaughter the dozens of
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the pigs” that had been roaming the city’s streets. 525 In early nineteenth-century Quito, as
well as many other American and European cities and towns, it was not uncommon to find
swine and cattle in urban streets. Every once in a while, to ensure hygiene and public order
– the term used at the time was policía –, authorities would issue the order to slaughter
stray livestock. Such measures were not welcomed by many residents. Some of them
owned these animals and actually lived with them inside their households. When the
animals were not inside a residence due to lack of space or any other reason, city dwellers
would simply let their pigs and cattle loose in the streets. 526 By mid-1815, Gutiérrez
explains, Quito had not slaughtered stray swine for a long time. By then, entire herds of
pigs were wandering the streets, filling them with rubbish and even damaging the street’s
stone pavement.527
According to Gutiérrez, on the 27th, around 2 p.m., news that Judge Caldas was
going to slaughter pigs that same afternoon began to spread. Word of the forthcoming
slaughter stirred people’s emotions to such extent that many “began running like sheep,
one after the other. Meanwhile, others began closing their stands and shops. And in doing
so exacerbated fright in the streets.”528 Rodríguez compared those running for their pigs
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with sheep perhaps to illustrate their hectic manners, but also possibly to highlight what he
believed to be the mob’s foolishness. As Rodríguez explained, many ran to find their swine
and hide them from Caldas and his band of guards. For some of Quito’s plebeians, their
swine were their sole possession and material patrimony. Wherever packs of pigs were
seen, dozens of people arrived to conceal the pigs from the officials. According to the
Procurador, there was a swift contagion of panic in the streets and many began to run out
of fear and despair. From his balcony, Gutiérrez saw people running in all directions. He
was able to ask some of them what was going on. In almost all cases, they answered that
disorders had erupted because Judge Caldas was about to slaughter stray pigs. 529
For the Procurador, all clues supported the idea that the commotion was not the
manifestation of an insurrectionary plot. The disorders were merely an explosion of
emotions that had been agitated by either the forthcoming festivities, plebeian women’s
propensity to panic, or news that stray pigs were going to be slaughtered. Additionally,
Gutiérrez considered there were other clues aiming in the same direction. In his second
petition, he explained that it was worth drawing attention on the fact that, when the call to
arms went out, a small contingent of soldiers carrying a few drums and a small sword left
the army quarters to go into the city for a short period of time. None of the soldiers were
attacked even though not all of them were armed nor prepared for battle. Likewise, the
several soldiers who were dispersed throughout the city when the commotion broke out
made it back to the army barracks without being attacked or suffering any serious menace.
Not even a rock was thrown at them. Moreover, Gutiérrez argued that if rebels were
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actually thinking of carrying out an insurrection, they would have not planned it for the
27th, but would have waited for the festivities to begin. On 1815, Quito’s festivities had
been scheduled to begin on July 10. During these days, Quito’s residents as well as those
living in its proximities gathered in the city’s main squares and streets. Usually, many wore
costumes and masks that concealed their identity. Such days, Gutiérrez maintained, offered
an ideal venue for a revolutionary scheme to be carried out. On the contrary, the 27 th posed
no strategical advantages.530
As in his first plea, the Procurador closed his second petition urging the tribunal to
acknowledge that the events of the 27th were not a failed uprising or the materialization of
a rebel plot. Rather, Gutiérrez demanded the tribunal recognize Quito as a loyal city where
only a few individuals were responsible for spreading “ridiculous rumors resulting from
their bitterness and resentment.”531 Such a faithful city, Gutiérrez concluded, did not
deserve to be dishonored by being labeled an insurrectional city. Pereda de Saravia and the
tribunal, for the most part, dismissed Gutiérrez’s arguments. Despite the Procurador’s
claims, they withstood the decision to incarcerate several of Quito’s notable such as
Manuel Larrea y Jijón, Manuel Matheu, José Barba, Joaquin Sanchez, Guillermo
Valdivieso, and a few others. 532
Thanks to the testimony of Roque Martínez, the native of San Gil who ended up in
Ambato and Latacunga, we know that news of the commotion and the subsequent arrests
of several of Quito’s most esteemed notables quickly spread throughout the region. The
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days previous to the commotion, Martínez had been travelling. On the 27 th, he arrived at
the house of Don Próspero Bascones in the vicinities of Ambato. Martínez’s original idea
was to stay there for a few nights before going back to Latacunga. However, on the night
of the 28th, towards 8 p.m., Próspero’s brother, Don Francisco arrived from Quito with
pressing news. Francisco showed up barefoot and claiming to have walked a considerable
part of the way. He had left Quito at around four in the morning, fleeing the city because
soldiers were storming into the residences of notables to capture them and sent them to
prison without any apparent reason. When Próspero and two of his other brothers heard
Francisco’s account, they decided to hide before they were also arrested. Francisco and the
other two brothers left shortly after. Martínez and Próspero left around 9 p.m. That night,
the two of them slept in the house of an acquaintance in Huachi, a few kilometers south of
Ambato. The following morning, when they returned to Próspero’s household, the
Bascones women told them that all the men in Ambato and vicinities had left, and they
should do the same—they were in imminent danger. During the two following days,
Martínez and Próspero moved between haciendas, hiding from royal authorities. On the
30th, Martínez visited Latacunga by himself to speak with the priest and some of his
neighbors. But when he reached the town, none of them were there. He was only able to
talk to his landlady who told him that all of Latacunga’s men had fled and that he should
do the same and hide in a hacienda. Martínez thought about going back where he had left
Próspero but changed his mind and decided to head south, towards Cuenca. Martínez
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reached Cuenca some days later. On his third day in the city, he was arrested under charges
of sedition and was interrogated by the Royal Audiencia a few weeks later. 533
A finale to chaos
Besides ordering the detention of Larrea, Valvivieso, Barba, and other of Quito’s
most reputable notables, the Asesor Pereda de Saravia, President Toribio Montes, and other
officials took additional measures to assure public tranquility and capture those responsible
for the commotion. On June 28, authorities issued a bando informing Quito’s inhabitants
that those who had left the city or had changed their place of residence as of the 27 th had
eight days to return to their homes. If they did not do so, they would be considered
suspicious of disturbing public peace. Those who returned and were not found guilty of
any crime, would be pardoned. Secondly, the bando stated that those who owned firearms,
blades, and knives should present them to the authorities. Those who did not do so, and
were later found in possession of a weapon, would be condemned accordingly. In the case
of those concealing pointed knives, the sentence could be up to six years in prison, as
established by a Royal Pragmatic. Lastly, the proclamation declared that curfew was in
place, that no one was to go out to the streets after curfew began (starting hours would be
announced each night), and that no one could walk in the streets after 7 p.m. without a
torch in their hands that would allow others to identify them. The bando was signed by
Montes, but, given the circumstances, it is unclear if he authored it. As usual, the bando
was posted on the city’s most visible walls and announced through a public crier. 534
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There are two possible reasons for the bando’s insistence on identifying those in
possession of pointed knives and other weapons. One has to do with the news that had
spread through the city of Antonio Ante’s purchase of sixteen razors during the first days
of June. On the 27th, when army officers visited Ante’s residence to interrogate him, they
found an empty house with traces that he had recently fled the city. As of that moment,
Pereda and several officers considered Ante a serious suspect. The second reason has to do
with an unresolved theft of weapons and ammunition. During the first weeks of 1815,
gunpowder, hundreds of cartridges, and several knives were stolen from a warehouse
within the army quarters. Several people were captured in relation to this theft, but most of
them ended up fleeing from prison and the weapons and ammunition were never found.
According to the authority’s investigation, the stolen ammunition was sold to the notables
Guillermo Valdivieso and Manuel Larrea. Apparently, the stolen ammunition was meant
to supply a new insurgent army in the vicinities of Quito as well as the rebel troops from
Cauca.535
The bando’s note regarding those who had left the city underlines the authority’s
concern over the continuous flow of people coming in and out of Quito. Fromista, Pereda
de Saravia, and other officials believed that rebels and renegades were creating unrest
within the city and then hiding in the haciendas and villages found in its proximities. They
supposed that rebels were using these networks between Quito and its vicinities to move
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people, information, and weapons. Yet, it seems that most of those who left the city on the
afternoon of the 27th and early hours of the 28th were fleeing imminent detentions or an
impending outbreak of extreme violence. Among the former, there were several of Quito’s
notables. Such was the case of Francisco Bascones, the man who Roque Martínez saw
arriving barefoot with news that a commotion had taken place in Quito and notables were
being detained.536 Many others believed that the short-lived commotion that broke out
around 3 p.m. was but a warning of impending violence. On the night of the 27 th, Isabel
Tovar, who lived just outside the city, saw dozens of people leaving the city. She offered
shelter to a few of them who said they were hiding out of fear that the troops would
vandalize the city.537
During the following days and weeks, Quito lived a tense peace. Rumors of a
forthcoming uprising, of widespread looting, and of violent repression continued to spread
throughout the city. On July 19, a small commotion broke out. Apparently, the disorders
were caused by rumors that that the troops were planning to ransack shops and residences.
A group of people were seen running in the streets. Shortly after, the city’s streets went
back to tranquility. In the meantime, the troops stayed inside the barracks. 538
In the midst of this tense atmosphere, Pereda de Saravia’s tribunal continued
interrogating people and prosecuting those who had been detained. Finally, towards the
second week of July, the tribunal led by Pereda reached a verdict and decided to opt for an
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intermediate resolution. Many of the imprisoned notables were transferred to their homes
and most of them were granted limited mobility within the city. The tribunal established
that some of the detainees could only go out to the streets escorted by soldiers or guards.
Those who were considered the leaders of the failed uprising – Manuel Larrea, Manuel
Matheu, José Barba, Joaquin Sanchez, and Guillermo Valdivieso – were sentenced to exile.
The tribunal explained that their continuous meetings, questionable loyalty, and
considerable influence over Quito’s residents made them highly suspicious as well as a
threat to the city’s public peace. The five notables were given three days to choose a destiny
outside of the Province of Quito where they would spend an undetermined amount of time
while things settled down. The Procurador General Síndico, Joaquín Gutiérrez, tried to
mediate, but was unsuccessful convincing the tribunal otherwise. 539
The tribunal also passed judgement on Juan Pío Montufar and his brother Carlos
Montufar. Both of them were charged of relapsing into criminal activity and of generating
restlessness within the city. Even though the Montufar were not in Quito on the 27 th or on
previous days, the tribunal’s members argued that it was highly likely that they had been
involved in the propagation of seditious rumors such as those claiming that rebels from
Cauca and Santafé were about to take over Pasto and would soon invade Quito. Some of
these rumors stated that the Montufar had joined rebel troops in Popayán or that they were
organizing an army close to Quito to carry out a coordinated attack on the city. This hearsay
caused extensive agitation throughout the city. Yet, the tribunal’s reasoning was somewhat
paradoxical. At the same time that they claimed that the rumors were not true, the tribunal
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gave them credibility when accusing Carlos and Juan Pío of plotting, in coordination with
the Santafereños, against Quito’s royalist authorities.540
The tribunal’s final discussions with regards to this issue acknowledges its
incapacity to identify those who actually instigated the commotion. One of its members
claimed that the disorders “had not been clarified, nor who had been their authors, because
such sort of crimes are difficult to prove, and only in rare occasions can they be confirmed.
And because those who could offer information concerning this matter had fled.” Thus, the
judge declared that this affair had reached a state in which it was “completely unverifiable,
impossible to find the individuals who had actually fomented the sedition and agitated
people to commit a crime that had been previously announced.” 541 The judge admitted that
there was no evidence against the notables who had been detained but noted that the
tribunal had the authority to sentence them merely based on their suspicious activities. As
a matter of fact, he recognized that their detention and exile could help bring peace and
tranquility to Quito.542
A few days after a verdict was reached, Pereda de Saravia’s comments regarding
the trial reveal a combination of frustration, perplexity, and relief. In a report sent to
Montes, Pereda de Saravia explains that the disorders did not end up in a full-scale
revolution thanks to the troops’ vigilance and wise measures. His report also claims that

540

AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 54, 84.
“…resulto de lo actuado indudable, y solo no aparece esclarecido quienes hayan sido sus autores, o por
que estos crimenes son de muy dificil provansa, y raras veces pueden justificarse; o por que haviendo
profugado aquellos que podian ministrar algun conocimiento sobre este punto, se halla el negocio en un
estado de ser enteramente inaveriguable quales fueron las personas que realmente fomentaron la cedicion y
alarmaron al pueblo para cometer un crimen que ya anteriormente se anunciaba...” (AGI, QUITO,269,
‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 49.)
542
AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 49-50.
541

272

there were more than enough reasons to believe that the commotion had been incited by
Quito’s notables. Nevertheless, the advisor admitted that his conclusions were merely
based on his own suspicions. Although he acknowledged that the culprits had not been
identified, he argued that everyone suspected of Valdivieso, Larrea, and others because of
their questionable attitude in past episodes. Thus, the Asesor concluded that the tribunal’s
decision to exile these notables and detain others in their residences was a prudent and fair
ruling that would ensure Quito’s peace.543
Another report written from Cuenca on August 3 by the Audiencia’s Fiscal
Interino reached a similar conclusion. In this document, the Fiscal claimed that it was
undoubtable that the events of the 27th were incited by Quito’s insurgents but explained
that the instigators were still unknown and further investigation was needed to identify the
culprits. So far, he argued, the authorities’ only piece of evidence was that many of these
notables had been involved in previous subversive episodes. However, the Fiscal Interino
did not dismiss these suspicions as gratuitous and even suggested that the tribunal use the
notables’ reputation and criminal records as a parameter from which to decide the sentence
that would be imposed on each suspect. Individuals such as Valdivieso and Larrea, the
Fiscal implies, deserved the harshest punishments for their alleged participation in past
seditious actions.544
Those who were detained on the 27th and 28th insisted on their innocence and their
loyalty to Ferdinand VII. They requested the tribunal and President to reconsider the
verdict and pled for house arrest while a definite decision was made. In the meantime, their
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families did the same. Wives, mothers, sisters, and brothers sent dozens of letters asking
for mercy. The letters claimed that it was not true that a failed uprising had taken place on
the 27th and, thus, argued that it made no sense to accuse their relatives of disloyalty,
insurgency, or any other wrongdoing. Likewise, the letters portrayed their loved ones as
loyal vassals who had served the Spanish Crown in many ways. Some highlighted the
military services they had performed, others the bureaucratic positions they had held.
Several letters also discussed their relatives’ health issues in an effort to convince Pereda
and Montes to grant their loved ones their freedom or, at least, house arrest. Medical notes
explaining their relatives’ conditions – from abscesses to chest pains – were attached to the
letters. During the first two weeks of July, even before the tribunal reached a final verdict,
several suspects were let free or granted house arrest. Once the tribunal reached a decision,
several prisoners were declared innocent but warned that if the tribunal received any
incriminating evidence, they would be detained once again. 545
However, with regards to the main suspects, Pereda and the tribunal did not yield.
Towards mid-July, Larrea, Matheu, and other of the prisoners sentenced to banishment
were informed that they had three days to indicate where they would be spending their time
in exile. Manuel Larrea and Manuel Matheu answered in written letters that they wanted
to be exiled in Madrid. In his letter, Larrea explained that for a long time he had wanted
“to go to the Peninsula, cradle of our elder, and seat of our King and Father. Following this
proclivity, I choose the kingdoms of Spain, specifically the city of Madrid, as my place of
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residence.” Montes agreed with their decision and granted them passports to travel to
Spain.546
Yet, Larrea and Matheu were not able to travel to Madrid. Before they left Quito,
the tribunal changed its ruling and decreed that those sentenced to exile should be put back
into prison. Larrea and Matheu fled the city before being detained once again. During the
following months, they hid in haciendas in the outskirts of Quito. While they were hiding
from the army, their names came up, for different reasons, in the Councils in Madrid. On
August 6, 1815, the Spanish Crown conferred Manuel Larrea the title of Marquis of San
José.547 Some months later, when news of the commotion and the subsequent detentions
reached Madrid, Juan José Matheu – Count of Puñonrostro and former deputy at the Cortes
of Cádiz – brought up his brother’s case to the Council of Indies. The Count insisted on his
brother’s innocence as well as on that of most Quiteños. He argued that the commotion of
the 27th had been a plot led by General Samano and other army officers who wanted to
repress Quito’s nobility. The Count explained that his brother, Manuel, had been put in
charge of that year’s celebration of the Quito’s annual festivities in which the city was
going to acclaim Ferdinand VII’s restitution to the throne. Due to this commission, Manuel
had been in contact with all sorts of people and had gained the admiration of Quito’s
populace. Pereda and Samano used Manuel’s approval as proof of his alleged intrigues.
Yet, the Count explained, this in no way meant that Manuel was planning an uprising.
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Despite the Count’s pleas, the Council did not decide on Manuel Matheus’ fate and insisted
that Quito’s Audiencia resolve the issue.548
It seems that towards late August and early September of 1815, the emotions the
commotion of the 27th stirred were by then waning. However, the tensions among Quito’s
main authorities persisted during the following months. On one side, there was President
Toribio Montes, royal administrators, mid-level bureaucrats, and several army officers and
soldiers, mostly from Quito. On the other, there was the Asesor Pereda de Saravia, General
Samano, Colonel Fromista, and dozens of army officers, particularly those from Lima,
Guayaquil, and the Iberian Peninsula. Many of the members of the Royal Audiencia
stationed in Cuenca sided with the latter group, while most of the Quito’s notables and
commoners did so with Montes.549
The commotion of the 27th was at the heart of these tensions. Montes accused
Samano and Fromista of instigating a commotion to imprison Quito’s notables and depose
him from the presidency. In letters sent to the Secretary of State, Montes explained that the
officer’s insubordination was manifest. First of all, the army rallied the generala (call to
arms) without his consent. Then, they stormed his office and captured Rodríguez Soto and
Larrea without even asking him for his approval. Their arbitrary and defiant actions
continued, Montes argued, with the Asesor Pereda’s tribunal. According to Montes,
Pereda’s trial was biased and inaccurate. Montes claimed that during the night of the 27 th,
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army officers intimidated and deceived several witnesses, forcing them to submit
untruthful testimonies that gave the impression that Quito’s notables had planned an
insurrection. From there on, he maintained, Pereda had continued a trial full of
imprecisions that unjustly ended in the detention and conviction of several innocent
Quiteños. To make his case, Montes ordered new interrogations that could disprove the
allegations made by Pereda’s tribunal. These inquiries were carried out on November 1815
and during the first months of 1816.550
Montes’ allegations were perceived as an affront by Pereda, Samano, and
Fromista. In a letter sent to the Spanish King on January 7, 1816, Pereda accused Montes
of being the “commander of the treacherous insurgents.” Pereda questioned why Montes’
crimes were tolerated and what special privileges allowed him to contravene judicial
sentences imposed on criminals. He demanded that Montes be deposed and ordered to
leave Quito immediately, for such as an “outrageous” servant, with “his despotic and
abusive government should not be allowed to pass such a pernicious example on to
posterity.” Both Samano and Fromista censured Montes for his close ties to those who took
part in previous insurrectionary plots and accused him of trying to form a despotic
government that would persecute his personal enemies. 551
In Cuenca, Lima, and Madrid, judges and other officials went over the judicial
records as well as the accusations made by both factions. Most resolved that Pereda’s
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conclusions were accurate, dismissed several of Montes’ allegations, and concluded that a
failed uprising had in fact taken place in Quito on June 27th. For example, the Audiencia’s
Fiscal in Cuenca argued that, even though Samano and Fromista did not act accordingly,
their poor behavior did not disprove that on the 27 th a failed insurrectionary plot had
actually broken out. The Fiscal maintained that similar to what had happened in previous
uprisings, on this occasion, there had been too many rumors and voices talking of an
impending insurrection. The Fiscal jumped to the conclusion that the existence of rumors
proved that there was in fact an insurrection. “This has always been Quito’s way,” he
explained. “There has never been a movement without preceding voices or other precursory
signs announcing that there will soon be a novelty.” 552
Nonetheless, most officials who reviewed the case also found fault in Samano and
Fromista’s acts. Some, such as the Fiscal, believed their actions had been inappropriate,
but did not push for an inquiry to examine their conduct. Others, such as the members of
the Council of Indies in Madrid, thought otherwise. On February 1817, the Council ordered
Quito’s Audiencia to investigate Samano and Fromista for their insubordinate actions and
for inappropriately intervening in Pereda’s trial. 553 A formal and thorough investigation
was never carried out, probably out of fear that it could lead to further frictions and violence
among the two factions. Towards November 1817, Juan Ramírez – who replaced Montes
as president of Quito’s Audiencia on July 26, 1817 – closed the case arguing that a royal
decree of January 24, 1817 declared general pardon for the crime of insurrection. Ramírez
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made use of this decree to put an end to all judicial trials related to the commotion of the
June 27th. In spite of this decision, Ramírez’s closing remarks also reveal that he believed
that an unsuccessful insurrection had taken place and that several army officials, in an act
of insubordination, had defied the President’s authority.554
The frictions between the two factions were left unresolved. Despite the
accusations of treason and disloyalty that both sides hurled at each other, it seems that these
were merely disagreements among royalist ranks that went back to August 10, 1809 and
August 2, 1810. At least among these two groups, the Spanish Crown and Ferdinand VII’s
sovereignty over the American territories was not at stake. It was a matter of how to
confront and deal with the monarchical crisis that erupted on 1808. The frictions that arouse
in 1809 over the recognition of the Consejo de Regencia and over the establishment of a
government junta left a stamp in the memory of most Quiteños. Despite Montes’ efforts to
put behind these events and erase them from Quito’s memory, remembrances of these past
events – with the atmospheres, feelings, and codes they reminisced – were at the core of
Quito’s collective memory.555 Anger, mistrust, and fear arouse among most Quiteños when
they recalled August 10th and, particularly, August 2nd. On June 27th, these memories
shaped the ways they experienced the emotional outburst that broke out that afternoon as
well as their grasp of what was happening and of what to expect from the future. The
commotion of the 27th, with the panic and repression it produced, fed the growing tensions
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between these royalist factions. On both sides there were individuals trying to prove their
fidelity to the Spanish Crown at the same time that they attempted to portray their rivals as
disloyal insurgents. In the years to come, these frictions would open the doors for the
expansion of pro-independence and republican projects.
Conclusions: reflections on memory and emotions
The commotion that broke out on June 27, 1815 may be considered a rather
irrelevant historical event. Nonetheless, the hundreds of written pages of judicial records
and letters it prompted offer a unique glimpse into the emotions and memories of Quito’s
residents and those from its vicinities. Contradictions and inconsistencies arise throughout
the trial, and many witnesses are unable to remember certain details of what they saw or
heard. Through the types of questions asked, the open or implicit intimidation inflicted on
the witnesses, and the statements that were included, altered, or omitted, ambiguity and
bias stand out in the historical record. To a certain extent, the accounts that ended up in the
documents are a combination of what the witnesses recall having seen and heard, their own
preconceived notions, and the tribunals’ prejudices.
In that sense, each testimony is both a recollection of individual and collective
memories and understandings. When the witnesses were summoned by the tribunal, the
testimonies they offered were based on the scenes, conversations, and other details they
remember to have seen and heard on June 27th and the days before and after the commotion.
However, there are gaps in their narratives, either because their memory fails them, because
certain details do not sum up in their reasoning, or because there are certain issues that they
prefer to adapt to gain the tribunals’ favor. It seems that to fill in these gaps, some resorted
to a common domain composed of recollections of events, atmospheres, codes, and
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symbols. From this repertoire or inventory, some picked out the memories that best suit
their grasp of the present or that best fit the explanation they wanted to reach. Yet, it appears
that this selection of memories is not a completely conscious and intentional process. It
seems that part of it responds to each individual’s unconscious biases and prejudices as
well as that of their more intimate social group.
At this point, Paul Ricœur’s discussion on memory and recollection is worth
bringing up. Ricœur explains that the act of remembering comes about in two distinct ways.
For the one part, there is the notion that some memories appear passively and pop into the
mind without any conscious effort. He designates this act of remembering with the Greek
term mnémé. On the other hand, there is anamnésis or the act of consciously searching for
an object in our memory.556 Halbwachs, whose reflections on memory came before
Ricœur’s, argues that the elements found in the common domain can be recollected
whenever one wants to and that these remembrances are easier to recall than individual
ones. Halbwachs does not explicitly divide the process of remembering between the
spontaneous and the deliberate. Nonetheless, he argues that recollections from the
collective memory do not require much effort.557 At least with what regards to what was
going on in people’s minds on the 27th as they ran up the streets or hid in their homes, this
seems to be the case. It appears that when rumors began to circulate and when the disorders
broke out, shared memories popped into people’s mind without any deliberate effort.
However, when they were interrogated by the tribunals, it appears that certain memories
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appeared spontaneously while others did require a deliberate effort, particularly when
witnesses wanted to underscore or disregard certain elements.
In as much as a society’s collective memory offers tools that allow individuals to
understand and give meaning to what was happening during a certain event, collective
memory also incites and shapes particular emotions. That is, recollections from the
common domain shape people’s experiences and the emotions they feel at a given moment.
The emotions that memory motivates usually correspond to those a person or society
experienced during similar incidents in the past. For example, we have seen that rumors
played a central role engendering unrest, fear, and mistrust. In Quito’s collective memory
there were remembrances of the widespread uneasiness and suspicion that rumors had
generated in the past. Many recalled that disorders usually erupted in the midst of such
overwrought environments as happened in 1809 and 1810. As the Fiscal from Cuenca
explained in his assessment of the commotion of the 27 th, in Quito “there has never been a
movement without preceding voices or other precursory signs announcing that there will
soon be a novelty.”558 Those remembrances not only influenced their understanding of their
present, but also shaped their emotions. For instance, a few days before the 27 th, Manuel
Larrea y Jijón – the notable who was imprisoned and ended up fleeing the city – claimed
to have felt grief-stricken at the thought that August 2nd could repeat itself.559 As Larrea,
several other witnesses associated memories of the past, such as rumors and the tense
atmosphere they generated, with imminent disorders and, thus, these recollections
produced fear and distress among them.

558
559

AGI, QUITO,269. ‘Quaderno Tercero sobre lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Noviembre 1815.’, 22.
AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 4.

282

This relationship between memory and emotions comes up in dozens of accounts.
When the witnesses offered details of what happened on the 27 th, they constantly alluded
to recollections from the common domain to explain what they saw and heard as well as
the emotions associated to these collective remembrances. An interesting example is that
of the children interrogated by the tribunal: Miguel Tovar who was eleven years old at the
time of the events, Ignacia Ximenes who was fourteen, and Vicenta Rojas who was eleven
years old. The sisters of the first two were also interrogated but were fairly older: Ignacia
Tovar was eighteen and Mariana Ximenes nineteen. Due to their young age, Ignacia
Ximenes, Vicenta, and Miguel probably did not have personal recollections of previous
disorders in Quito. Nonetheless, it seems that their understanding of what was happening
and the emotions they felt when the commotion broke out were shaped by a common
domain of remembrances. Their familiarity with this collective memory was perhaps
partial and limited if compared to that of an older person, but it seems that through
conversations with their elders, relatives, and other members of their community, they
grasped certain memories of past events. When Ignacia and Miguel saw groups of Indians
in the streets, they seem to have immediately associated the scene with trouble and
impending disorders. The sight of four Indian men and an Indian woman crying in her
knees instantly made Miguel fear that riots were soon going to break out. 560 In the case of
Ignacia, the sight of zambo men holding knives and leading and rallying the Indians caused
such intense fear and anguish in her that she stumbled and hurt herself. It is as if at that
precise moment, recollections from August 2nd – particularly the remembrance of zambo
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and black soldiers from Lima opening fire at the multitude on the streets – sprung into her
mind and made her panic and stumble.561
Vicenta’s case is somewhat different. The records refer to Ignacia Ximenes as Doña
and Miguel Tovar as Niño, implying that both of their families were of a relatively high
social standing. Likewise, the documents do not refer to their race, which leads us to
suppose they were probably white or mixed-race. We know that Vicenta’s mother was a
covachera (small shopkeeper)562 and that her brother, Leandro, is referred to in the records
as a cholo or Indian. Thus, contrary to Ignacia and Miguel, Vicenta was apparently a
commoner and an Indian. Vicenta’s account focuses on the moment in which Leandro
showed up and asked her through the closed door to give him a knife. After his constant
pleading, she was forced to give it to him. In her statement, Vicenta explains that her
concern at that instant was that Leandro would probably lose the knife and get into trouble.
Vicenta implies that she was worried at the sight of her brother pleading for the knife and
people running in the streets.563 Yet, she does not talk about potential violence, looting, or
turmoil. It seems that her worries and fears were not the same as Ignacia and Miguel’s,
neither in intensity nor in subject matter. Perhaps, this is due to fact that the remembrances
she received through her parents and relatives were not the same as those that Ignacia and
Miguel held.
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AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, pp. 13-14.
Covachas were small shops located in the first story or the main hall of a house or building. Towards the
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Two issues arise from these three testimonies. One has to do with the racial
predispositions that were at play in this relationship between memory and emotions.
Several testimonies claim that Indians were seen in covert meetings, harassing royalists,
chasing General Fromista, preparing for battle, and rallying people to attack the troops.
The few zambos that come up in the records are also accused of inciting violence. Yet, not
a single Indian or zambo was sentenced or even captured in relation to the commotion of
the 27th. Apparently, racial prejudice was involved in these testimonies. Yet, it seems that
memories of the past also help explain why white and mixed-race residents so insistently
associated the presence of Indians and people of African descent with an impending
uprising. Previous riots and disorders in Quito, such as those of the Rebellion of the Barrios
and August 2nd, coincided with the arrival of numerous Indians into the city. Moreover,
stories of distant events, such as the Tupac Amaru Rebellion and the Haitian Revolution,
were possibly also incorporated into the city’s collective memory. In the end, recollections
of Indians and people of African descent involved in riots and extreme violence ended up
being part of Quito’s common domain. Thus, many Quiteños ended up feeling fear and
unrest at the sight of groups of Indians and zambos in the streets partly due to recollections
of previous disorders popping to their mind.
These three testimonies also bring up questions with regards to the relation between
individual and collective memory and the diversity of ways in which different members of
a society relate to the common domain. Apparently, Vicenta Rojas did not have the same
recollections as Ignacia Ximenes and Miguel Tovar despite the fact that they had almost
the same age and lived in the same city. As a matter of fact, Ignacia and Vicenta lived in
the same house: Vicenta’s family on the ground floor and Ignacia’s on the second story.
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However, there were deep social divisions that set them apart. It seems that these social
differences shaped the memories each one recollected from the past and, thus, the emotions
they felt at the sight of certain scenes. While most white and mixed-race Quiteños felt fear
at the sight of a congregation of Indians, for the Rojas family such a scene did not bring up
memories of violence and disorders nor did it produce feelings of fear. It is as if there were
more than one collective memory and Vicenta did not have access to the same collective
memory as Ignacia and Miguel. Or, as Halbwachs would explain, there is only one
collective memory, but the remembrances each one calls to mind were not the same due to
each person’s place in society. Memory and the act of remembering are social and take
place in a given social context.564
Halbwachs claims that the collective memory obtains its force and continuity from
an ensemble of people who are constantly feeding the shared repertoire with memories.
Although it is a collective act, remembering is an individual action. In this act of
recollecting from a shared pool of memories, not all remembrances have the same effect
on all individuals. Some memories might leave a significant imprint on certain individuals
while they might barely reach others. As Halbwachs argues, each individual memory is
merely a point of view from the totality of the collective memory. Such point of view
changes depending on the individual’s social standing and her or his relations with the rest
of society. Thus, Halbwachs maintains, it is not surprising that not everyone makes use of
this shared instrument in the same manner. 565
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To sum up, the commotion of the 27th offers a glimpse into the ways in which
people in Quito experienced fear, panic, unrest, and other emotions during a particular
incident. Likewise, it shows the ways in which these emotions travelled and reproduced
through rumors and memories. The disorders that broke out that day also highlight the
persistent frictions among royalist fractions. Moreover, the events of June 27 th bring to
light a connection between collective memory and emotions. Previous cases of repression
and violence left an imprint in the collective memory of Quiteños. Remembrances of these
past events helped Quito’s residents give meaning to what was happening at the same time
that these recollections shaped the emotions they were feeling. Yet, not everyone accessed
the collective memory in the same way. An individual’s place in society influenced that
person’s remembrances and, thus, the emotions she or he felt. In that sense, memory could
be considered an additional element to add when studying Barbara Rosenwein’s
“emotional communities”, which was explored in the previous chapter. 566
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Barbara Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History”, The American Historical Review 107, no. 3
(2002): 842-843.

287

Chapter 4: Emotions, Strategies, and Practices Amidst the Monarchical Restoration
in New Granada.
On June 7, 1816, Friar Juan José Merchán, a member of the Order of the Hospital
of Saint John in Santafé de Bogotá, was put on trial accused of betraying the Spanish
Crown. Several witnesses claimed they saw Merchán publicly swearing allegiance to
Cundinamarca’s constitution and its declaration of independence. Moreover, the witnessed
maintained that the friar was even elected to Cundinamarca’s Assembly as a delegate of
Chocontá, a town 75 km northeast of Santafé. A few of them recalled that when news of
royalist victories reached Santafé, Merchán was seen upset and disappointed. In his
defense, the friar stated that he had sworn in favor of the constitution and declaration of
independence because he was left with no other option. He justified his involvement in the
Assembly by claiming it had been simply a way to prevent the rebels from making radical
decisions that would have led to a definite break from Spain. 567
Furthermore, Merchán explained that he joined the Assembly because he believed
he could aid and care for even more Spaniards and royalists than those he had already been
helping as a member of a hospitaller order. All through his defense, the friar constantly
claimed that after the formation of Santafé’s Junta, he protected dozens of Spaniards and
royalists. He insisted that, thanks to his aid, many were able to hide in the Convento
Hospital de San Juan to escape from the republicans’ harassment and incarcerations.
Several of these royalists offered their testimonies in court or sent notes corroborating
Merchán’s help and protection. Throughout the trial, the friar also emphasized the
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sufferings and persecutions he had endured at the hands of rebel forces. According to the
clergyman, in December 1814, amidst the final stage of the war between Cundinamarca
and the Provincias Unidas de la Nueva Granada, 568 he suffered General Bolívar’s siege and
an assault on his hospital. After being captured, Bolívar’s troops insulted and humiliated
him. Despite the ample evidence in his favor, royalist officials found Merchán guilty of
treason and sentenced him to solitary confinement in the Saint John’s Convent Hospital. 569
The friar’s case was not unique in anyway. Throughout the monarchical restoration
in New Granada, between 1815 and 1819, hundreds of people were brought to court to
explain their conduct following the formation of local government juntas and their
association with rebel leaders. Some years earlier, between 1811 and 1813, most provinces
in New Granada had declared their independence from Spain and formed new republican
states. Throughout the region, hundreds of cities, towns, and villages held ceremonies to
swear allegiance to the new republics, their leaders, and their newfound constitutions. The
swear-ins were attended by multitudes. Some people genuinely joined the celebrations
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In November 1811, after most of New Granada’s provinces had established government juntas and some
of them had even declared their independence from Spain and formed republican governments, New
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de Nueva Granada. From the beginning, Cundinamarca was unwilling to join the federation and many of the
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convinced that independence and republicanism would bring better times. Others showed
up out of curiosity or even out of fear that republicans would reproach them and condemn
their absence.570 Around 1815, as the tides of revolution began to change, most of New
Granada’s residents, such as Friar Merchán, were left in an odd position. Even though many
of them had recently sworn allegiance to the Free State of Cartagena, the Republic of
Cundinamarca, or other independent states, by 1815 and 1816, they were now, once again,
vowing loyalty to the Spanish Crown. Those who had taken a part in republican loyalty
oaths were left with a stain on their reputation, regardless of their alleged reluctance to
attend the ceremonies.571 Amidst these trouble times, expressions and manifestations of
emotions became strategies to navigate the period’s frictions and tensions.
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At the time, there were hundreds of testimonies throughout New Granada claiming that rebels intimidated
them and coerced them into swearing republican constitutions and declarations of independence from Spain.
It is possible that some exaggerated such acts of intimidation to justify any wrongdoing they could have
committed during previous years. Others may have portrayed the rebels in the worst possible terms to go
along with the rhetoric that came with the monarchical restoration. Yet, it is undeniable that republicans did
force many into pledging constitutions and declarations of independence. Some of the harshest testimonies
concern the ceremonies that took place in Santafé de Bogotá in July 1813. On July 16, Cundinamarca declared
its independence from Spain and formed a new state with Antonio Nariño as its dictator. As part of the
ceremony, Nariño planted a “tree of liberty” in the city’s main square and then executed, without trial, a slave
accused of having killed his master. The following day, a desk and a dock were placed next to the tree. During
the ensuing days, all residents were expected to attend the main square to swear the declaration of
independence. A secretary sitting on the desk took note of every person who swore the declaration. The dock
was placed next to the tree so that republican soldiers could, without any delay, execute anyone who refused
to pledge Cundinamarca’s independence. Apparently, no one was put to death, but one can imagine the dock’s
presence – and the memory of the executed slave – compelled many into swearing the declaration of
independence. (Archivo General de Indias (AGI), SANTAFE,747, ‘Carta de Gerónimo Fernández
aparentemente a Fr. Andres de Aras, monge capuchino residente en la Havana. Kingston. 20 de noviembre
de 1813.’, 1-3.)
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This chapter pays attention to New Granadian clergymen who were put in trial for having publicly sworn
republican constitutions and declarations of independence. The records of dozens of these judicial cases are
found in the Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia. But it was not only clergymen who were put in such
a situation. Even high-level bureaucrats with credentials attesting their loyalty and services to the Spanish
Crown faced repudiation and condemnation for having pledged constitutions and declarations of
independence. An intriguing case is that of Juan Jurado de Laínez. Jurado arrived at Santafé a few days before
July 20, 1810, when Santafé formed its government junta. Jurado had been recently appointed as the Royal
Audiencia’s new oidor (magistrate). He remained in Santafé until January 1815. During that time, he held a
variety of posts for the different governments that ruled the province. Apparently, in more than one occasion,
he tried to leave Santafé but the city’s officials did not give him permission to do so. Moreover, the fact that
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This chapter studies two cases in which individuals and collectivities strategically
expressed fear, elation, and anger while they also tried to incite similar manifestations
among others. Clergymen are the main protagonists throughout the chapter. In early
nineteenth-century New Granada, the clergy played a leading role spreading information
and advocating for what they considered to be proper values and forms of conduct. 572 Their
symbolic capital came not only from being religious men, but also from their position as
social and political mediators. The first case revolves around priest José María Morcillo’s

he had eleven daughters and one son living with him and his wife made him dismiss the option of fleeing.
He claimed that during these years he used his position to aid and protect Spaniards from any sort of
repression and that he did what he could to maintain Cundinamarca as a province loyal to Ferdinand VII. He
explained that he only swore the republican constitutions and declarations of independence because he was
left with no other option. It was only until January 1815, after being harassed by Simón Bolívar and his
troops, that he was given permission to leave. On his way to Santa Marta, Bolívar’s troops abducted his 14year-old son. The son was later released shortly after Jurado departed to Panamá around mid-1815. In Santa
Marta, Cartagena, and Panamá, royalist officials rejected him and accused him of treason. In Panamá, where
Santafé’s Audiencia was convening at the time, magistrates rejected his requests to join the Audiencia. It was
only after over a year of requests to Spain’s courts and councils that Jurado was absolved of any crime and
was given a post in Cuba. However, it seems that in the following years, other magistrates and bureaucrats
did not completely pardon him for his alleged treachery. (AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Expediente caso Juan Jurado
de Lainez. Panamá. 3 de agosto de 1815.’, 1-38; AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Oficio Fiscal del Consejo de Gracia
y Justicia sobre restitución de Jurado. 18 de mayo de 1816.’, 1-4.)
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Both monarchist and republicans acknowledged the clergy’s importance as social and political mediators.
An example of this is seen with the hundreds of sermons that were pronounced in favor, or against,
independence and republicanism between 1808 and the early 1820s. In 1819, shortly after republican troops
regained control of Santafé de Bogotá, Francisco de Paula Santander issued a decree that ordered clergymen
all through New Granada to offer sermons in favor of independence. In the sermons, the clergymen were
expected to explain that independence did not go against Christ’s doctrine and the supporting independence
was not sinful. Republican officials demanded priests to send copies of their sermons to prove they had
obeyed with the decree. Over two hundred of these sermons are found in the Archivo General de la Nación
de Colombia. Many of them were recently compiled in a book published by the Colombian National
Archives. To an extent, Santander was simply following the example set by royalist authorities who, during
the monarchical restoration as well as during the first years of the monarchical crisis, demanded clergymen
to praise Ferdinand VII, the Spanish Crown, and the monarchical system in their sermons and treatises.
(Viviana Arce Escobar, “El púlpito entre el temor y la esperanza: ideas de castigo divino y misericordia de
Dios en la oratoria sagrada neogranadina, 1808-1820”, Anuario de Historia Regional y de las Fronteras 17
(2012): 83, 85; José David Cortés Guerrero, “La lealtad al monarca español en el discurso político religioso
en el Nuevo Reino de Granada”, Anuario colombiano de historia social y de la cultura 37, no. 1 (2010): 4548; Margarita Garrido Otoya, “Los sermones patrióticos y el nuevo orden en Colombia, 1819-1820”, Boletín
de Historia y Antigüedades 41, no. 826 (2004): 462; Armando Martínez Garnica (comp.), Sermones
patrióticos en el comienzo de la República de Colombia, 1819-1820 (Bogotá: Academia Colombiana de
Historia-Archivo General de la Nación, 2019).)
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funeral rites in Popayán in 1817. The second case studies a series of interrogations
revolving around a priest, José Ángel Manrique, and his involvement in the rise of a
guerrilla group north of Santafé in late 1817. The questioning is one of hundreds of trials
that took place between 1816 and 1818 when royalist authorities interrogated clergymen
who were accused of supporting the rebellion and of swearing republican constitutions and
oaths of independence.573
This chapter poses a premise and an argument. In the first place, this chapter
presents the premise that public expressions and manifestations of emotions help shape the
meanings given to people’s actions and conduct. That is to say, our understandings of what
others say and do is shaped by their displays of emotions. This claim has several
implications. On the one hand, it implies that emotions and strategy, following Bourdieu’s
understanding of the term, are inseparable. Emotional expressions, due to their capacity to
affect meaning, may be marshalled and guided in certain directions as part of a person’s
efforts to improve their standing and reputation. During the monarchical restoration in New
Granada, people from different social status and political positions turned to expressions
of fear, elation, and anger as means to convey their faithfulness to Ferdinand VII. Many of
them, in as much as they could, strategically sought to conceal, exaggerate, or twist their
emotional manifestations to persuade others of their indisputable loyalty to the Crown. By
doing so, they were also inciting those around them to follow their lead, tacitly persuading
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The Archivo General de la Nación in Bogotá holds several boxes filled with interrogatories carried out by
royalist authorities against clergymen suspected of having betrayed the Spanish Crown and of having
supported the formation of local juntas and republican governments. These interrogatories were carried out
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Eclesiásticos.)
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them to employ similar emotional expressions. Another implication that arises from this
premise is that emotions are not separated from rationality but are constitutive of rational
thought. Emotions do not blur or distort rationality. On the contrary, emotions are part of
people’s cognition as they inform and guide a person’s thought processes and shape the
ways in which ensuing actions and behaviors emerge. Emotions help people give meaning
to the world they live in at the same time that emotional expressions bestow meaning on
people’s actions and behavior.
Secondly, the chapter argues that the widespread atmosphere of fear and confusion
that took over New Granada during the 1810s partly explains why the monarchical
restoration was so swift and why the political tides of the time changed so abruptly. Even
though most political and military leaders were convinced of the causes they defended, it
seems that for many members of society, the discussions between monarchy and republic
or between independence and belonging to the Spanish Crown were secondary issues. For
many, these political discussions lost their relevance when personal or family survival was
at stake, or when safeguarding property required unusual measures. Although there are
numerous cases of people willing to die for their political cause, it appears they were a
minority. Many denied and rejected their past allegiances without posing much resistance.
The uncertainty they experienced and the fear they felt when faced with the possibility of
being imprisoned or executed led many to publicly repudiate past actions. Although it is
possible that some were simply performing and hiding their true feelings and thoughts, the
fact remains that they publicly rejected their previous loyalties. In that sense, despite the
growing political tensions of the time, the prevalent milieu of fear and confusion that spread
throughout the region hindered the spread of fervent political allegiances.
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In New Granada, the monarchical restoration was swift. In a matter of a few
months, almost all republican territories fell into the hands of royalist forces. Hundreds of
rebel leaders were captured and executed while many others fled to the Llanos 574, Jamaica,
and other Caribbean islands.575 As royalist forces took over cities and towns, countless
bureaucrats, clergymen, and civilians who had hardly taken an active role in the rebellion
ended up becoming suspects. Although many of them had collaborated some way or
another with the republican governments – either working for them, doing business with
them, or simply attending their ceremonies – only a few of these New Granadians could
actually be considered fervent pro-independence republicans. In spite of this, royalist
officials in regions such as Cartagena, Santafé, Tunja, and Popayán decided to go after
almost anyone suspected of aiding or supporting the rebels. 576 Officials basically distrusted
anybody who had attended the rebel loyalty ceremonies or who had publicly pledged
loyalty to a republican constitution. Many suspects were accused of treason and put on
trial. Those facing charges of treachery tried to demonstrate their innocence by
emphasizing their loyalty to the Crown while also claiming that their alleged acts of
infidelity had been done against their will.
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Externado de Colombia, 2016), 172-193.
576
Gutiérrez Ardila, La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819), 135-145; Biblioteca Nacional de
España (BNE), ‘Con motivo de la reconquista de la plaza de Cartagena de Indias el 7 de Febrero de 1816 por
las tropas Reales fueron arrestados en ella varios individuos que influyeron en la substraccion de dicha ciudad
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Amidst the monarchical restoration, it was not only those facing charges in court
who found themselves in a situation in which they had to prove their innocence and
demonstrate their loyalty to the Spanish Crown. Whole towns and cities came under
suspicion for having hosted republican governments with their numerous celebrations and
ceremonies. To repair past harms, royalist officials promoted collective rites in which
populations as a whole could publicly demonstrate their repentance and their renewed
loyalty to the Crown. These were communal acts through which provinces, cities, and
towns could cleanse their offences and restore their lost reputation. The public ceremonies
became means for improving a city’s standing in the eyes of authorities in both the Iberian
Peninsula and the Americas, as well as in the view of all those living in nearby provinces. 577
Nonetheless, it was not only a city’s standing that was at stake but also that of its residents.
For those living in these cities and towns, such public rituals were opportunities to
demonstrate to royalist officials and to their monarchist neighbors that there was no doubt
about their longstanding support in favor of the Spanish Crown.
During judicial trials as well as public ceremonies, facial expressions, gestures, and
even bodily postures conveyed messages of repentance and of loyalty to the Crown.
Because the context was a struggle for standing and reputation, emotional manifestations
were one of several means people used to persuade others. Those sent to trial or attending
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the ceremonies manifested fear, awe, and elation following the social norms and habits of
the time. Yet, their expressions were not completely mechanical. Individuals navigated the
times the times they were living the best they could. Their emotions and expressions were
but tools at their disposal. Amidst the atmosphere of repression that prevailed during the
monarchical restoration, many tried to conceal their emotions, exaggerate them, or give
them some sort of twist to persuade others as to the standing they deserved. In rituals and
trials, many employed their emotional expressions strategically so that they could position
themselves as loyal vassals who did not have a single stain on their reputation, regardless
of any alleged wrongdoing they might have committed in the past.
In that sense, this chapter pushes back against the way traditional historians have
portrayed the monarchic restoration or the Reconquest578 (as this period is generally
referred to). Nineteenth century historians, such as José Manuel Restrepo and José Manuel
Groot, depicted the Reconquest as a period of intense repression in which dozens of martyrs
sacrificed their lives for Colombian independence. Many school textbooks and public
intellectuals continued this narrative. 579 Even some recent scholarly work follows this
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Daniel Gutiérrez argues in favor of using the term “monarchical restoration” to refer to this period rather
than other terms such as the “Reconquest” or the “Pacification.” He argues that the terms “Reconquest” and
“Pacification”, contrary to what happens with the term “monarchical restoration”, tend to highlight the
violence committed by royalist forces while obscuring that performed by rebels. Likewise, the “Reconquista”
tends to homogenize experiences of violence. That is to say, it ignores that levels of violence varied according
to the region. Provinces such as Antioquia, Pasto, and parts of the Caribbean did not suffer violence with the
same intensity as Santafé, Popayán, Cali, and Tunja. Moreover, the term “monarchical restoration” offers a
more global depiction of what was happening at the time. While the “Reconquest” simply alludes to
happenings that were taking place in northern South America, the term “monarchical restoration” considers
events that were unfolding both in the Americas and the Iberian Peninsula, such as Ferdinand VII return to
the Spanish Crown. (Gutiérrez Ardila, La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819), 37-45.)
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storyline.580 And dozens of plaques and monuments dot the colonial districts of cities such
as Bogotá, Cartagena, Popayán, and Tunja, honoring those executed during the
Reconquest. This chapter presents a different picture. It pays attention on those who
publicly gave up their political preferences and used the multiple strategies at their
disposal, including their emotional expressions, to survive.
This does not imply that people were indifferent to New Granada’s destiny or to
the different paths that society might take. Rather, it appears that for many New Granadians
there were many different issues at stake, besides the disjunctions between monarchy and
republicanism and between independence and subordination to Spain. This point raises
questions with regards to some of Isidro Vanegas’ reflections regarding people’s level of
involvement in the major political discussions of the time. 581 It is true that people from all
social stratum participated in debates concerning New Granada’s independence and the
forms of government the new nations should adopt. Yet, there were many who quickly
evaded these discussions once hints of repression appeared. As Daniel Gutiérrez’s work
shows, such was the case of the historian and bureaucrat José Manuel Restrepo, who
abruptly abandoned his participation in the revolution when facing the monarchical
restoration.582 Likewise, there were countless communities in which actions and decisions
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were framed outside of direct struggles over independence and republicanism. As Marcela
Echeverri has argued, many groups assessed the situation of the time to advance their own
interests. Some Indian communities sought protection of their communal landholdings and
lower tribute payments. In the meantime, slaves of African descent in the Pacific pursued
emancipation.583 In these cases, as was for many, it seems that concerns over a variety of
social, economic, and cultural issues overshadowed any misgivings about reinstituting the
Spanish Monarchy or over the formation of new, independent republics.
In addition to these historiographical reflections, the chapter offers a series of
reflections on emotions. Previous chapters have explored how rumors, information,
recollections, and certain events – and the interpretations given to them – incited and
produced particular emotions and how such emotions shaped people’s understandings of
the past, present, and future. In the first chapters I have tried to avoid a mechanical
explanation of how emotions emerge and materialize. It is not simply that an event, the
uttering of a word, or the reminiscence of a past incident automatically sparks certain
emotions and forms of experiencing and expressing them. Emotions are present and take
shape in particular contexts, under specific social relations, conditions of symbolic power,
and political settings. Additionally, past experiences also explain why certain feelings and
expressions emerge in the ways they do. To use Pierre Bourdieu’s words, the habitus – a
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product of history and of past experiences – shapes society’s schemes of perception,
thought, and action.584
Following some of these reflections, Monique Scheer has proposed understanding
emotions as practices. Such approach helps explain the first premise posed in this chapter.
Resorting to Bourdieu’s practice theory allows us to reflect on the reasons why individuals
and collectivities express certain emotions during specific circumstances and why they
experience and perform them in the way they do.585 Moreover, it helps us think of the
interaction between emotions and strategies. In Bourdieu’s practice theory, strategies do
not necessarily follow an intentional, goal-oriented logic; rather, strategies are guided by
the habitus that embodies and enacts past coping strategies. 586 One might be somewhat
tempted to think that the planned and oriented actions that constitute objective strategies
are guided by people’s motivations to shape the upcoming future. Yet, as Bourdieu argues,
this partly an illusion. Strategies are generated by the habitus and are, thus, governed by
the past conditions of production. As Bourdieu explains, the generative principles of
practices and strategies are “adapted in advance to the objective conditions whenever the
conditions in which the habitus functions have remained identical, or similar, to the
conditions in which it was constituted. Perfectly and immediately successful adjustment to
the objective conditions provides the most complete illusion of finality, or – which amounts
to the same thing – of self-regulating mechanism.”587 In other words, strategies inform
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individuals and collectivities of the predominant ways in which society experiences,
expresses, displays, and interprets emotions. Thus, strategies confer individuals and
collectivities with the awareness to conform to the prevailing norms and conventions.
Bourdieu’s practice theory implies that strategies are mostly determined by past
experiences and by the conditions enacted by the habitus. Moreover, Bourdieu explains
that strategies do not always follow an intentional, goal-oriented logic. In some cases,
people’s actions are strategic simply in the sense that they align with the goals presented
by the social script and the standing conditions of symbolic power. 588 To an extent,
Bourdieu seems to not leave much room for people’s subjective strategies. Yet, he explains
that the habitus sets the limits to what is possible but leaves the possibility for individuals
to have goals and intentions within the boundaries and conditions imposed by the
habitus.589 In that sense, emotions and emotional practices – such as gestures, body
postures, and verbal and nonverbal expressions – are also strategic when individuals and
collectivities, within the limits and conditions imposed by the habitus, attempt to suggest
specific meanings by marshalling and guiding emotional expressions in certain directions.
In that sense, this chapter focuses on these breaches in which people’s subjective strategies
come about in the form of manifestations of emotions. 590
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Amidst the context of repression and violence that spread during the monarchical
restoration, those involved in the ceremonies and trials strategically moved their emotions,
particularly their expressions, to improve their reputation and standing. Through sermons,
rituals, printed texts, and the subtle and not so subtle answers given during interrogation,
clergymen and other individuals deliberately sought to prove their loyalty to the Spanish
Crown and avoid prison and capital punishment. Those involved in interrogatories and
funeral rites attempted, through all sorts of strategies – including emotional gestures,
expressions, and rhetoric that were characteristic to this specific period of time and region
–, to portray themselves as loyal vassals. In this interplay, emotional manifestations worked
as social markers that bestowed symbolic capital on those seeking recognition as passionate
loyal subjects.
Emotions to prove one’s loyalty: the case of Morcillo’s funeral rites in Popayán
On May 9 and 10, 1817, civil and religious authorities held funeral rites in
Popayán’s cathedral to bury the remains of José María Morcillo, a clergyman murdered
five years earlier in the town of El Tambo. Morcillo had been the priest of La Cruz, a small
town located about 40 kilometers northwest of Popayán. Sometime around late 1811 and
early 1812, as political violence swept the region, Morcillo left his parish in La Cruz and
joined the royalist army as one of its chaplains. In early May 1812, republican troops
captured Morcillo in the outskirts of El Tambo, about 35 kilometers west of Popayán. 591
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After detaining the priest, rebel soldiers dragged him into El Tambo, held him prisoner in
a damp room inside the town’s chapel, placed him in stocks, verbally harassed him, and
then executed him on May 9th.592 According to Julián Anchinte, a resident of El Tambo
who witnessed the execution, the priest was killed “due to his faithfulness to the Sovereign,
without there being any other cause for the rebel troops to have committed such an act.” 593
Simón Rojas, another inhabitant of the town, declared that he did not witness the killing
but that he helped bury the clergyman’s body. 594 Anchinte and Rojas’ familiarity with
Morcillo’s murder would come in handy five years later when the priest’s body was
exhumed and transferred to Popayán’s cathedral.
The rites and ceremonies honoring Morcillo shed light on the inner workings of
emotions in the period. In 1817, royalists were attempting to avenge the rebels’
wrongdoings and trying to erase any trace of support in favor of the republican faction. In
such a context, the funeral rites were meant to give the impression that Popayán was a
faithful city while also attempting to compel rebels and disloyal subjects to publicly
embrace the Spanish Crown. To an extent, the rites’ ardent rhetoric and magnificent
ceremonies were a form of absolution. They were a way to demonstrate that despite falling
to rebel armies, and despite some residents’ embrace of the republican cause, infidelity had
been wiped out from the city’s memory and the province was once again loyal to the
Spanish Crown. In that sense, the ceremonies served as a channel through which city

592

CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, folios 82-96, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias de José
María Morcillo. Popayán. 1817.’, 21.
593
“… fue baleado en este Pueblo por su fidelidad al Soberano, sin haber habido otra causa para semejante
atentado cometido por las tropas rebeldes al Rey.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación
de exequias…’, 11.)
594
CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias…’, 10-11.

302

officials could gain symbolic capital in the eyes of its residents, authorities in Santafé, other
neighboring provinces, and the Iberian Peninsula. Likewise, the funeral offered Popayán’s
residents a means with which to contend for symbolic capital through their gestures and
other emotional expressions.
The funeral rites, from their conception to their execution, sought to manifest and
induce certain emotions, such as elation, anger, and grief, as well as particular ways to
experience and perform them. The officials’ rhetoric, full of metaphors and allegories
stressing the rebel’s cruelty and emphasizing Morcillo’s martyrdom, helped craft a milieu
in which the city’s residents were inclined to publicly praise the priest’s death. This does
not imply that language and symbols unequivocally define emotional practices and
strategies, but simply that they may instigate an atmosphere in which certain manifestations
prevail over others.
In that sense, Morcillo’s funeral also offers a glimpse of the emotional expressions
and ways of feeling that prevailed at the time. Every part of the rites – from the exhumation
of the body to the sermon – is illustrative of some of the ways in which Popayán’s residents
might have experienced and expressed emotions such as grief, rage, and jubilation. For
instance, during the ceremonies, grief was overshadowed by a hue of gratitude and
admiration for Morcillo’s martyrdom. Consequently, grief for the priest’s death was
eclipsed by expressions of awe and elation towards Morcillo’s sacrifices. The implicit
message throughout the rites was that if tears were going to be shed during the funeral, they
were generated by the exaltation produced by the priest’s life rather than the melancholy
his death produced.
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Some ramifications that arise from these assertions merit further discussion. The
officials’ accounts undeniably show us a partial and biased picture of the range of plausible
emotional expressions and understandings that existed in early nineteenth-century
Popayán. Even though there existed a shared repertoire of expressions, terms, and
understandings, emotional practices were not homogenous among all members of society.
This was particularly true in the case of Popayán’s diverse and complex society. Amidst a
context of political and social strife, dominating groups, such as Popayán’s civil and
ecclesiastic authorities, were inclined to keep emotional expressions and manifestations
within a delimited domain. They did so by favoring certain emotional expressions and
disallowing others. By doing so, they sought to convey the image that Popayán was loyal
to the Crown in spite of tacit acts of defiance that could have appeared.
A limited number of sources allow us to explore the emotions and expressions that
emerged during Morcillo’s funeral. Written traces of the rites are found in a few manuscript
documents and, primarily, in the two printed texts that Popayán’s authorities published in
the city’s only printing press. The first text, “Relación de las exequias consagradas por el
Excelentísimo Cabildo de Popayán,” is a nineteen-page document that includes Popayán’s
procurador’s plea to transfer Morcillo’s body, Cabildo debates about the transfer,
correspondence with army and ecclesiastic officials concerning the ceremonies that were
to take place, and a brief summary of the funeral rites.595 The second text, “Oración
funebre. Pronunciada por el D.D. José María Gruesso Rodríguez, provisor y vicario
capitular, en sede vacante,” is a twenty-eight-page document with the sermon that was
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proclaimed on May 9th during Morcillo’s funeral rites.596 Since the bishop’s position had
been vacant for some time, the cathedral’s vicar, Gruesso Rodríguez 597, was charged with
sermon. An indeterminate number of copies of each one of these two documents were
printed in Francisco de Paula Castellano’s printing press.
Although we do not know the exact number of facsimiles that were produced, the
decision to publish the vicar’s sermon as well as records belonging to the Cabildo’s private
realm – such as its minutes, correspondence, and instructions concerning the funeral rites
– was a strategic act carried out by Popayán’s civil and religious authorities. Their aims
were twofold. First, officials sought to register their own loyalty and zeal for the Spanish
Crown. These texts were means through which Popayán’s civil and ecclesiastic authorities
could gain symbolic capital by proving their emotional fervor for the Monarchy while also
inducing others into such interplay of emotional practices. Likewise, with its publication,
authorities meant to spread their accounts of the rebels’ brutality and of Morcillo’s courage.
It was an overt attempt to take control over the many possible interpretations, experiences,
and expressions that could arise from the funeral rites. The sermon and the Cabildo’s
discussions described Morcillo’s heroism and his many sacrifices at the same time that they
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conveyed a series of morals in which loyalty to the Crown ultimately prevailed over the
rebel’s principles. These were lessons that Popayán’s officials were trying to make known
among anyone within their reach. The fact that these texts ended up in the printing press
indicates that civil and ecclesiastic officials were trying to reach those who could not attend
the ceremonies at the same time that they were attempting to reinforce particular
understandings of Morcillo’s death among those who witnessed the funeral rites and
sermon.
Discussions concerning the transfer of Morcillo’s body from El Tambo to
Popayán’s cathedral began months before the exhumation. On February 14, 1817, Mathias
Cagiao, the city’s síndico procurador general (a sort of judicial advisor), presented a plea
to transfer the clergyman’s remains from El Tambo to the cathedral. According to Cagiao,
he was merely presenting a request endorsed by all of Popayán’s clergy as well as many of
the city’s loyal subjects. The procurador explained that faithful Payaneses had always
looked upon Morcillo’s execution with the greatest pain and consternation. They believed,
he added, that the priest’s assassination would forever mark the rebels’ infamy. In his
address to the Cabildo, Cagiao argued that Morcillo’s assassination “had established for
eternity the bloodthirsty, ferocious, irreligious, and cruel character of the rebellion.” 598
Such viciousness, the procurador continued, would prove to future generations that the
rebels knew no limits as they went so far as to destroy that which was most holy and worthy
of esteem to society. Cagiao claimed that “those men who, to their misfortune, opened their
hearts to the rebel’s depraved principles ceased to be men. Their sensibility, tenderness,
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and compassion disappeared the exact instant the fatal echo awakened them and armed
them with the dagger which knows how to tear apart the insides of their own brothers.” 599
Throughout his exposition to the Cabildo, Cagiao argued that the killing of a priest
was one of the worst crimes anyone could commit and that only those men who had fallen
to extreme depravity could dare do such a thing. The procurador contrasted the rebels’
brutality with the royalists’ respect for the clergy, including towards those believed to have
betrayed the Spanish Crown and committed numerous abominable crimes. Cagiao
explained that royalist troops captured dozens of clergymen accused of the most
horrendous offences. Yet, they never dared think of executing them. On the contrary, the
procurador maintained that the sinful clergymen who refused to repent were treated with
respect and sent to Spain to be put on trial and, only then, punished for their crimes. Cagiao
claimed that contrary to what happened with Morcillo, who was executed without a trial,
rebel clergymen found guilty after trial were merely sent to confinement. The procurador
continued his exposition insisting that such a crime could not go unpunished. In the
Catholic world, he added, when clergymen were murdered the perpetrators were punished,
at least, with excommunication.600 It is worth noting that the procurador’s claims were not
fully accurate. Although it seems to be true that royalist troops did not execute any
clergymen during the monarchical restoration in New Granada, the truth is that dozens of
priests were imprisoned and coerced. Many ended up confessing crimes they had not
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committed or pointing the finger at innocent men and women. 601 Moreover, as Daniel
Gutiérrez has explained, the monarchical restoration in New Granada brought about a
significant rise in violence and oppression in comparison to that of previous years. 602
Cagiao finished his presentation claiming that Morcillo was nothing less than a
martyr who deserved the highest honors. As the procurador argued, the body of a man who
had given his life in the name of the Spanish Monarchy and the Catholic Church should
not be left to rot in a deserted chapel but buried in Popayán’s cathedral. Cagiao suggested
that transferring the priest’s remains would bring justice to his life and memory at the same
time that it would also help raise Popayán’s residents’ sense of loyalty and religiosity. The
procurador’s plea did not merit much discussion and the Cabildo approved it promptly.603
The procurador’s intervention was successful not only gaining the Cabildo’s
support to his request but also putting into motion a series of interactions through which
officials and other individuals could demonstrate their loyalty to the Crown. The
explanations, letters, and rites that would follow from there on – and the printed texts that
resulted from them – picked up on Cagiao’s words and expressions. They did so to spread
his message and to demonstrate, as the procurador had done in his intervention, their zeal
for the Spanish Crown. Several officials and clergymen reinforced and spread Cagiao’s
arguments and expressions, but more importantly, they helped bolster a collective mood
and ambience among the city’s residents. In this atmosphere, the procurador’s rhetoric
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ended up guiding others as to how they should understand Morcillo’s death and exhumation
as well as how they should express their feelings in order to be recognized as faithful
subjects. Cagiao’s strategy highlighted the insurgents’ cruelty while also emphasizing the
clergyman’s courage and loyalty. In the months following his intervention, officials,
clergymen, and other of Popayán’s residents would come up with their own strategies,
mostly to go along with the procurador’s insinuations and emotional expressions, as they
joined this interplay of recognition and symbolic capital.
In the following weeks, the Cabildo issued orders to transfer the body to Popayán
and delivered instructions to prepare funeral rites worthy of the clergyman’s
honorability.604 Throughout its proceedings, the Cabildo’s members referred to the act of
honoring Morcillo’s life and martyrdom as one of recollection. As the Cabildo’s minutes
explain, the burial was to be carried out with the highest magnificence and “should produce
a memory, although a sad one, one that is highly commendable to the Spanish Monarchy’s
right cause as well as to the martyr’s family and the royalist armed forces.” 605 Furthermore,
the Cabildo instructed its scribes to add an account of the ceremonies into the council’s
minutes so that such register serve as a “monument to honor the victims of this crime as
well as to point out, as an indelible public note of infamy, the execrable authors of such an
abominable event.”606 Ultimately, the Cabildo expressed a combination of awe and rage
with glints of sadness. Popayán’s councilmen were, as the procurador before them,
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demonstrating their loyalty to the Crown and inviting others into this interplay of emotions,
practices, and expressions.
The first steps to celebrate Morcillo’s funeral rites began in early May of 1817.
Manuel María Rodríguez, El Tambo’s priest, following a request from Popayán’s Cabildo,
asked Rojas and Anchinte for their assistance to find and identify Morcillo’s remains. Rojas
recalled the tomb was behind the pulpit, about a meter from the wall, between the altars of
Our Lady of Sorrows and Saint Barbara. Anchinte corroborated Rojas’ indications and
explained that one year earlier, when burying another corpse in the chapel, he found bones,
shoes, clothes, and a biretta close to the spot signaled by Rojas. Anchinte was quite
confident that they were Morcillo’s remains. On May 6, 1817, after hearing these
testimonies, El Tambo’s priest had the tomb opened. In it, Rodríguez and those aiding him
found bones, shoes, and what was left of a rotting biretta. According to El Tambo’s priest,
Morcillo’s bones were apparently mixed with those of a royalist man who had been buried
next to him. Due to the difficulty to identify which bones were Morcillo’s, Rodríguez
ordered that all the remains be put into the same urn and sent to Popayán. On May 7 th, the
Cabildo received the sealed urn along with a report written by Rodríguez in which he
described the exhumation and informed the Cabildo of the testimonies that allowed him to
locate the priest’s remains.607
Two days later, on May 9th, ceremonies took place in Popayán to honor Morcillo’s
loyalty and sacrifice. The organizers invited civil, ecclesiastic, and military officials to join
the funeral rites. Regular and secular clergy were asked to take part of the processions and
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to pray for the priest’s soul from their churches, convents, and monasteries. Army officials
and their troops lined up in the city’s streets to accompany the chaplain’s body as it was
transferred to the cathedral. General Ruperto Delgado, commander of the troops stationed
in Popayán, willingly backed the army’s partaking in the funeral rites. 608 Delgado
explained that the army was always ready to aid Popayán in its efforts “to exalt the heroism
of their brothers who have gone so far as to seal their love to the Sovereign with their own
blood and who have opened, with their example, a path towards loyalty and justice.” 609
On the 9th, the ceremony began at three in the afternoon when the cathedral’s bells
and those of the other churches began to toll. Top military, civil, and religious authorities
gathered in the temple of the Monastery of the Incarnation, about two blocks from the
cathedral. The urn with Morcillo’s remains had been placed in this temple upon its arrival
at the city. That afternoon, Popayán’s priests, properly dressed for the occasion, placed the
urn on a platform, took the platform on their shoulders, and began their way to the
cathedral. During the short procession, the battalion’s band played martial notes to confer
the funeral rites with the solemnity they deserved. In the backdrop, the city’s churches and
convents incessantly tolled their bells. Once in the cathedral, the urn was placed on a high
pedestal decorated with black silk and supported by four Tuscan columns. As the Cabildo’s
minutes explain, the monument was “striking and admirable to the observer, who is filled
by the magnificence that inseparably accompanies the consecration of everything related
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to the celebration of the triumphs of death.” 610 That night, the vigil was celebrated with
music and singing. On the 10th, a requiem was held for the soul of Morcillo. José María
Gruesso, the cathedral’s vicar, read a sermon and, thereafter, Morcillo’s remains were
buried in the cathedral’s presbytery. A plaque with an inscription in Latin was placed on
the tomb. The word “Fidelitatis” (fidelity in English) stood out on top of the inscription. 611
The sources only offer limited information concerning the ways in which Popayán’s
residents understood and reacted to the ceremonies they were observing. There are some
indirect references to the sense of solemnity and magnificence that the music and the bells
tolling produced among the audience. There is also an allusion to the feelings of awe the
pedestal allegedly produced among the spectators. However, these may be intimations of
the emotions and expressions that authorities displayed and hoped to incite rather than close
depictions of people’s reactions during the ceremonies. In that sense, the printed texts
regarding Morcillo’s funeral served as proof that Popayán’s officials and residents had
publicly demonstrated their ardent loyalty to the Crown. Likewise, the texts acted as a sort
of manual or guidebook suggesting the emotional expressions and understandings that were
expected and considered appropriate under such circumstances. These efforts to publicly
display certain emotions and expressions while also attempting to incite them among a
wide audience are even more manifest in the sermon’s rhetoric, with the vicar’s harsh
descriptions and constant analogies and metaphors.

610

“… lo hacían vistoso y respectable al observador que se penetra de magestad, que acompaña
inseparablemente a todo lo que se consagra, para celebrar los triunfos de la muerte.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo
de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias.’, 18.)
611
The text on the plaque was the following: “Fidelitatis Monumentum in Ossibus. D Joseph Marie Morcillo.
Juxta, Exmi, Coetus Acta. Translatis et Sepultis. Anno. 1817” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo
58, ‘Relación de exequias…’, 18-19.)
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Gruesso’s sermon was heard by hundreds of attendees and was read or heard by an
indeterminate number of people who were in contact with the sermon’s printed copies. The
homily reinforced claims and accusations that came up in the procurador’s plea and the
Cabildo’s discussions. Throughout the sermon, Popayán’s vicar argued that Morcillo’s
murder exemplified the rebellion’s cruel spirit. “So come with me,” he stated, “and I will
explain to you what the rebellion is all about. Do you see this monument? This lugubrious
apparatus that is decorated with all the splendor and majesty of religious ceremonies? It is
dedicated to the memory of a distinguished son of Popayán who was faithful to the
sovereign up to his death…”612 The sermon emphasized the rebels’ cruelty and unrestraint
as well as Morcillo’s martyrdom. Gruesso exclaimed that the chaplain “was an
irreprehensible man, one of the victims to the rebellion’s fury, a priest of the Almighty…
A priest! A minister of the Lord! Such a holy person! Is it possible? Can one believe such
atrocious act?”613
As Gruesso continued his accusations against the rebels’ brutality, he underlined
the nexus between the republicans’ disloyalty and their ruthlessness. “Infidelity manifests
itself with such bloodthirsty expressions!”, he called out, “and in what ways does it defy
that which is most sacred merely to obtain its ends! Will posterity be able to believe such

612

“Venid pues conmigo que yo voy a manifestaros lo que es la rebelión. ¿Veis ese monument? ¿Ese aparato
lugubre que está nimado con toda la pompa, y la magestad de las ceremonias religiosas? Pues el está
consagrado a la memoria de un hijo benemérito de Popayán, que fue fiel a su soberano hasta la muerte;”
(CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 5)
613
“de un hombre irreprehensibe, que sirvio de víctima al furor de la rebelión; de un sacerdote de el
Altísimo… ¡Un sacerdote! ¡Un ministro de el señor! ¡Una persona tan sagrada! ¿Es posible? ¿y podrá creerse
un atentado tan atroz?” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’,
5)
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an event as that of May 9…?”614 For Gruesso, Morcillo’s assassination was the
consummation of numerous misdeeds condensed into one crime: “irreligion, sacrilege,
impiety, profanation, hate, revenge, defamation, homicide, cruelty… all of them, all of
them got together to make the fatal blow that fell upon that gentle, innocent man, who did
nothing to deserve such a disastrous death, even more dreadful…” 615 The vicar strongly
believed that the maxims that republicans endorsed produced numerous crimes such as
Morcillo’s murder. The clergyman maintained that the republican system created much
confusion and contempt and that such state of affairs led its supporters to commit all sorts
of vicious offences such as this “clericide.” 616
Yet, Gruesso also argued that in such circumstances in which so many had fallen
prey to the rebels’ principles, Morcillo’s loyalty and martyrdom was an example to be
praised and honored. Popayán’s vicar exclaimed that the priest’s death was “too glorious
for it to not to be celebrated with all the enthusiasm” and admiration it deserved. 617
Gruesso’s sermon placed Morcillo at the same level as royalist generals who reconquered

614

““¡Con que expresiones tan sangrientas se sabe explicar la infidelidad! ¡Y como atropella por lo más
sagrado, con tal de que sus fines se realicen! ¿La posteridad podrá creer el suceso de el nueve de Mayo, y
hallará palabras enérgicas, para encarecer su deformidad?” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58,
‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 7)
615
“Por que ¡quantos delitos, en un solo crimen! Irreligion, sacrilegio, impiedad, profanación, odio, venganza,
calumnia, homicidio, crueldad… todo, todo se reunió, para hacer mas horroroso el golpe fatal, que se
descargó sobre aquel amable inocente, que por ninguna de sus acciones había merecido un fin tan desastroso.”
(CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 7)
616
“Todo se reunió, para hacer más odioso, y mas detestable el sistema, que supo inspirar máximas tan
depravadas, para que se holláse el Santuario, sin ningún extremecimiento, y sin un solo temor. Todo se reunió,
para que se descubriese la hipocresía de la rebelión, y para que se desconfiase de una causa, que con tanta
sangre fría era capaza de cometer semejantes excesos. Y todo se reunió en fin, para llenar de oprobio, de
confusión, y de vergüenza a los autores de el espantoso sacricidio, mientras que el martir de la fidelidad se
llenó de gloria por su heroico sacrificio.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre
en las exequias’, 8.)
617
“Su muerte es demasiado gloriosa, para que dexe de celebrarse con todo el entusiasmo de la admiración.”
(CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 8)
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vast rebel territories, such as Calzada, Samano, and Morillo. “But allow me to place among
such immortal men,” the vicar declared, “a humble priest who has also triumphed against
the rebellion, who died for refusing to consecrate their deplorable maxims.” The vicar then
asked, “could there be a more glorious death?... Is this not also a triumph? Is it not also
worthy of the praise offered to the heroes of the century?” 618 His answer to these questions
was unambiguous. “He deserves them, certainly,” Gruesso argued, “for his death was so
glorious as it fulfilled the duties imposed by religion and vassalage…” Moreover, the vicar
insisted, “the priest of La Cruz, in his efforts to obey such duties, voluntarily headed
towards torture, preferring a glorious death rather than the dishonorable life that he would
have faced had he decided to emmesh himself with the atrocious crime that the rebellion
represented.”619
Gruesso praised Morcillo not only for his martyrdom but also for his courage when
he organized his flock and incited it to put an end to the rebel’s advance. According to the
vicar, the priest prevented his congregation from being seduced by the republican’s
promises and convinced many to take up arms against the rebels. Morcillo “ran, flew, from
one side of his parish to the other,” Gruesso exclaimed, “and succeeded inflaming his flock
with the holy and beautiful fire of fidelity. He stirred some, exhorted the others, arouse

618

“…pero que se me permita colocar al lado de estos hombres inmortales, a un humilde sacerdote, que
también ha triunfado de la rebelión, muriendo, por no consagrar con sus máximas detestables, ¿puedo haber
una muerte más gloriosa? Y este, ¿no es también un triunfo? ¿y no será digno de las alabanzas que se tributan
a los héroes de el siglo?... (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las
exequias.’, 9.)
619
“Él las merece, ciertamente, y para consagrárselas diremos, que su muerte fue gloriosa, por que con ella
cumplió con los deberes que impone la religión, al vasallage, o más claro… con estos tantos deberes el cura
de la Cruz, voluntariamente, se encamino al suplicio, prefiriendo una muerte gloriosa, a una vida que le
hubiera sido infame si se hubiera mezclado en el crimen espantoso de la rebelión.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo
de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 9.)
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some others, and did not lose heart with the rest.”620 According to the vicar, the priest
persuaded his congregation, showing them that it was their obligation as loyal vassals to
defend the Crown and convinced them that an attack on the King was in fact an affront on
the Catholic religion. Amidst his efforts to mobilize his flock, Morcillo allegedly claimed
that giving one’s life for the Sovereign was in reality a sweet death. In the end, “sixty
victims accepted the compromise to sacrifice themselves in the altars of fidelity” and left
the town of La Cruz to join the Patíanos621 and the diminished royalist army.622
In the same manner that Morcillo had insisted to his congregation that dying for the
Sovereign was a “sweet death”, Gruesso claimed that Morcillo’s death had been the utmost
magnificent episode of the priest’s lifetime. As the vicar explained in his sermon, “the most
glorious time in Morcillo’s life” began the minute rebel troops captured him and displayed
him as if he were a valuable prey. “With what modesty! With what humility!”, Gruesso
exclaimed, “With what presence of the soul did he sustain the enraged glares, the offensive
insults, the arrogant ways of his irreconcilable foes.” 623 The vicar continued, “with what

620

“… corrió, voló de un extremo a otro de su curato, y logró inflamar a sus feligreses, con el santo, y hermoso
fuego de la fidelidad. El animaba a los unos, exortaba a los otros, levantaba a estos, y no desmayaba con
aquellos. (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias’, 13.)
621
In the early 1810s, the Patíanos, black communities made up of several generations of runaway slaves
living in the riverbanks of the Patía River and the shorelines of the Pacific Ocean, were among the most
important royalist forces in the Province of Popayán. Marcela Echeverri and Jairo Gutiérrez Ramos have
argued that during the 1810s and early 1820s, the Patianos opposed republicanism and independence from
Spain in the hopes of obtaining land privileges, social and political status, and other benefits from the Spanish
Crown. Moreover, many Patianos disdained and mistrusted the slave-owning families who actively took part
in the rebellion. (Echeverri, Indian and Slave Royalists in the Age of Revolution, pp. 157-190; Jairo Gutiérrez
Ramos, Los indios de Pasto contra la República (1809-1824) (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología
e Historia, 2007), 176-181.)
622
“… sesenta victimas se comprometieron a sacrificarse en los altares de la fidelidad…” (CIH-UC, Fondo
Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 13.)
623
“Aqui señores comienza la época más gloriosa de la vida de D. Jose Maria Morcillo. ¡Con que modestia!
¡con que humildad! ¡con que presencia de Alma sostuvo las miradas furibundas, las expresiones insultantes,
los modos altaneros de sus irreconciliables enemigos!” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58,
‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 19.)
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coolness did he face the approaches of furor!... With what composure did he confess that,
if the republicans believed that being loyal to the King was a crime, he loved his crime and
would commit it thousands and thousands of times again, even if it would result in him
enduring all of life’s miseries and all sorts of anguishes.” 624 Gruesso made it clear that the
priest defied the rebels with wit and courage. According to the vicar, Morcillo enraged his
captors by telling them that he had inflamed his flock’s hearts with passion for their
Sovereign when he warned his congregation that they had “the obligation to defend His
cause and to die for it.” To infuriate his captors even further, Morcillo presumedly said: “I
have promised them [his flock] that I will endorse such doctrine with my death. I will soon
receive it. Do with me whatever you like.” 625
For Gruesso, the moral of the story was unambiguous. “Royalists of the Province
of Popayán!” he proclaimed in his sermon, “Privileged men who thanks to heaven’s mercy
have not been dragged by the torrential rebellion that has embroiled New Granada’s first
and best men! There you have it, a model that you should imitate in order to maintain, at
all costs, the purity of the beautiful fire of fidelity that divine religion has deposited in the
best corner of your heart.”626 Yet, the vicar’s message was also meant for those who had

624

“¡Con que indiferencia vio aquel aparato de furor… ¡Con que serenidad confesó, que si para los
republicanos era un crimen ser fiel a su rey, el amaba su crimen y que lo cometeria mil y mil veces, aunque
para ello fuera necesario sufrir todas las miserias de la vida y toda suerte de tormentos!” (CIH-UC, Fondo
Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias’, 19.)
625
“… he inflamado en el amor a su Soberano. Les he dicho que tienen obligación para defender su causa, y
morir por ella. Les he prometido, que confirmare esta doctrina con mi muerte. Yo estoy pronto a recibirla.
Que se haga de mi lo que se quiera.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en
las exequias.’, 21.)
626
“¡Realistas de la Provincia de Popayán! ¡Hombres privilegiados, que por pura merced de el cielo no habéis
sido arrastrados por el torrente de la rebelión, en que han sido embueltos los primeros y mejores hombres de
la nueva Granada! Alli tenéis el modelo que debéis imitar, para mantener puro, hasta el ultimo trance, el
fuego hermoso de la fidelidad que la religión divina, depositó, en el mejor lugar de vuestro corazón.” (CIHUC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 28)
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betrayed the Spanish Crown. As Gruesso exclaimed, “deplorable and dear revolutionaries
(because despite your delusions and our differences, you will always be my cherished and
sweet brothers…), there you have a model to emulate. Condemn your previous conduct
and craft for yourselves a new heart, one that serves as refuge for the fidelity you betrayed
in the excess of your frenzy.” For the vicar it was clear that Morcillo’s death and sacrifice
set an example for both royalists and rebels to pursue. “Let us ask heaven that such glory
[Morcillo’s martyrdom] be conceded to all of us”, he pungently said in his closing
remarks.627
Gruesso’s sermon, with its passionate praise for Morcillo’s life and his fervent
condemnation of the rebels’ principles, was but the prolongation of a series of strategic
actions the procurador had set in motion a few months earlier. The vicar’s insistence on
the rebels’ cruelty and his exaggerated depiction of the priest’s sacrifices were ways to
manifest his outrage and ire at the insurgents’ alleged crimes against the Catholic Church
and the Spanish Crown. Gruesso’s sermon was not only aimed at gaining personal
recognition as a fervent loyal vassal. It also sought to bestow symbolic capital on Popayán’s
bishopric and its grey. As one of the heads of the diocese and one the city’s main spiritual
guides, the vicar’s claims and expressions were meant to demonstrate that Payaneses had
overcome their previous misdemeanors and had erased any trace of republicanism from
their province.

627

“Deplorables y queridos revolucionarios! (porque a pesar de vuestros delirios, y de nuestra desemejanza
de opinión, series siempre mis queridos y mis dulcísimos hermanos…), allí tenéis el modelo que debéis
imitar, detestando vuestra conducta pasada y creando un nuevo corazón, para que sirva de asilo a la fidelidad,
que ultrajasteis en el exceso de vuestro frenesi… ¡Ah! Pidamos al cielo que nos la conceda a todos, en su
misericordia.!” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias…’, 2829.
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By doing so, the vicar was also offering those hearing and reading the sermon an
opportunity to join him in this interplay of emotional practices to publicly display their
feelings of elation and indignation. All through Morcillo’s funeral rites, authorities
expressed, in a variety of ways and through different means, a sense of admiration and
jubilation for Morcillo’s life while also conveying feelings of rage for the rebel’s crimes
and resentment for the priest’s violent death. The officials’ rhetoric, such as Gruesso’s
usage of certain terms and metaphors, as well as the adornments, music, and other symbolic
language that accompanied the funeral hinted at the expressions and manifestations that
were expected under such circumstances.
The terms, symbols, strategies, and emotional practices that come up throughout
the rites were a product of their time and of Popayán’s particular social and political
context. Each feeling that came to light was conceived, experienced, and expressed
following the period’s conventions and overall attitudes. According to Philippe Ariès,
around the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, attitudes towards death in the
West underwent a series of transformations. People became less concerned with their own
death and more worried with the decease of others. Likewise, death ceased to be a banal
affair and was exalted and dramatized beyond what had been usual for more than half a
millennium. A new passion stirred attitudes towards death. Ariès maintains that actions
and behaviors revolving around death “were described as if they had been invented for the
first time, spontaneously, inspired by a passionate sorrow which is unique among
sorrows.”628 Death began to be understood as something insurmountable, as a very grave

628

Philippe Ariès, Western Attitudes toward Death: from the Middle Ages to the Present (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1974), 59-60.
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wound that led people to cry, faint, languish, and fast. As Ariès explains, “it was a sort of
return to the excessive and spontaneous demonstrations – or apparently spontaneous
demonstrations – of the Early Middle Ages… The nineteenth century is the era of mourning
which the psychologist of today calls hysterical mourning.”629
Adriana Alzate, for her part, underlines how death in New Granada during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries began to be viewed as an event that was not
inevitable thanks to recent developments in scientific knowledge as well as to the
expansion of hospices and shelters where the sick and the deprived could seek assistance.
In that sense, Alzate explains that death was conceived as contrary to the happiness that
life implied. That is, under normal circumstances, death was not an episode that was
celebrated but rather mourned.630 Pablo Rodríguez reaches a similar conclusion in his
analysis of eighteenth-century wills in New Granada. He argues that death was shocking
and distressing for the deceased as well as for the family members, friends, and servants
who aided the defunct during his or her last moments of life. Many eighteenth-century wills
revealed the anxieties and agonies that came with widowhood and old age, especially if
they were combined with poverty.631

629

Ariès, Western Attitudes toward Death, 67-68.
Adriana María Alzate Echeverri, Geografía de la lamentación: Institución hopitalaria y sociedad. Nueva
Granada 1760-1810 (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2012), 22-25. (Alzate also claims that in
New Granada during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a gradual change in the ways in which
suicide was perceived. In the first decades of the eighteenth century, suicide was severely condemned by
both religious and legal authorities. The suicide victim, Alzate explains, was viewed as a social monster. By
the mid-nineteenth century, suicide was no longer found in New Granada’s Penal Code. It was still rejected
and anyone who attempted to commit suicide could be socially chastised and legally penalized. Yet, Alzate
maintains that in the course of these hundred years, there was a slow process of humanization and
understanding towards suicide. By the mid-nineteenth century, the suicide victim was no longer perceived as
a monster. (Adriana María Alzate Echeverri, Repertorio de la desesperación. La muerte voluntaria en la
Nueva Granada, 1727-1848 (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2020), 241-242.))
631
Pablo Rodríguez Jiménez, “Testamento y vida familiar en el Nuevo Reino de Granada (siglo XVIII)”,
Boletín Cultural y Bibliográfico 31, no. 37, (1994): 17-18.
630
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Only some of the attitudes that Ariès, Alzate, and Rodríguez draw attention to are
found in Morcillo’s funeral. The grandiose displays of passion that Ariès speaks about are
clearly present. Yet, manifestations of intense sorrow and mourning do not stand out from
the records. Terms such as “pena”, “desazón”, “congojo”, “tristeza”, “dolor”, and others
used to describe feelings of sadness and grief are mostly absent from the sermon and the
Cabildo’s minutes. Other of the funeral’s components, such as the church bells tolling and
the ornamented pavilion, apparently sought to induce a sense of magnificence rather than
of sorrow. Such an attitude towards death, deprived of manifest demonstrations of sadness,
was probably not widespread among Payaneses in the 1810s. It seems that Morcillo’s
funeral was somewhat exceptional in that sense.
Amidst the consolidation of the monarchical restoration, certain royalist authorities
strategically tried to give Morcillo’s death a particular meaning. By emptying the funeral
of demonstrations of sadness and mourning, the city’s officials reworked and adapted
existing notions of death in order to produce a milieu of jubilation in which they could
acclaim the priest’s martyrdom and his loyalty to the Crown. Such a twist consisted of
praising Morcillo’s life and sacrifices on top of the rebels’ alleged cruelty or the sadness a
clergyman’s death should produce. As a matter of fact, officials insisted on Morcillo’s
purported glories even more than on the insurgents’ ruthlessness. Gruesso went so far as to
claim that the priest’s death was the most glorious moment in the clergyman’s life and that
his demise was so glorious that it should be celebrated. 632
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CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 8, 19.
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Cagiao and other members of the Cabildo expressed admiration for the priest and
his martyrdom, but it was Gruesso who took such praise a step further by insisting that
Morcillo’s death should be considered a glorious and even jubilant event. The 1734
Diccionario de Autoridades offers two definitions for the term “glorioso” (glorious) which
the vicar consistently used throughout the sermon. The first entry defines it as someone or
something “illustrious, famous, worthy of honor, praise, and recommendation.” 633 The
second acceptation defines the term as “he who is enjoying the glory of the blessed.” 634 To
an extent, Gruesso’s usage of the term follows both definitions. The vicar not only praised
Morcillo and his honorable death, but even suggested that the priest’s providential life
placed him among Spain’s greatest heroes.
Popayán’s officials – with their strategic understanding of the priest’s death – seem
to have been successful crafting a milieu within which they could set the sorts of emotions
and expressions that were to abound during the rites. In such an atmosphere, manifestations
of extreme sadness and sorrow during the funeral were not encouraged and, thus, were
somewhat uncommon to see. On the contrary, such milieu favored demonstrations of
elation to celebrate Morcillo’s martyrdom at the same time that it fostered sparks of rage
to condemn the rebels’ wrongdoings as well as hopefulness for better times to come, thanks
to the priest’s example. One can imagine that if tears were shed during the rites, they owed
not to sadness, but to admiration for the priest’s sacrifices and profound love for the

633

“Glorioso, adj. Ilustre, famoso, digno de honor, alabanza y recomendación.” (Diccionario de
Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1734.)
634
“Glorioso. Significa también el que está gozando la gloria de los bienaventurados.” (Diccionario de
Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1734.)
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Spanish Crown. Other manifestations of emotions, such as passionate cries and gestures of
anguish, were also meant to celebrate rather than grieve Morcillo’s death.
Within such a milieu, many in Popayán expressed feelings of jubilation as part of
their efforts to improve their standing in the eyes of authorities and fellow residents. They
did so by following the path officials set out through processions, adornments, and
sermons. It is possible that some Payaneses genuinely felt elation and that their gestures of
excitement were sincere. However, some of them might have embellished their emotional
demonstrations to leave no doubt with regards to their loyalty to the Crown. Others who
attended the ceremonies and who heard or read Gruesso’s sermon might have not felt such
strong feelings, but they participated in the overall atmosphere and replicated some of the
practices and manifestations they saw among officials and other residents. Either way,
authorities’ efforts to produce a specific milieu simply set the stage so that people of
different social stratum and political positions could enter this interplay of strategies and
emotional expressions to portray themselves as loyal vassals.
Procurador Cagiao triggered this struggle for symbolic capital when he demanded
the exhumation of Morcillo’s body and its transfer to Popayán’s cathedral. His intervention
to the Cabildo set the stage for the interplay that followed. Cagiao’s request to honor the
clergyman, as well as his fervent condemnation of the rebels’ alleged cruelty, shaped
practices and strategies during the ceremonies. Others replicated his insinuations and
reinforced his intimations. Gruesso’s sermon celebrated Morcillo’s death as a glorious
event rather than a tragic one. Popayán’s authorities furthered these notions and attitudes
by printing the sermon as well as the council’s records and correspondence. In the end,
they crafted a milieu in which expressions, gestures, and words of elation and jubilation
323

concerning the clergyman’s death became a token through which the city’s residents could
compete for symbolic capital. The re-consecration of Morcillo’s remains became a struggle
for good standing and reputation, to prove Popayán’s indisputable loyalty to the Spanish
Crown.
Emotions and cover-up strategies: José Ángel Manrique and the Almeyda Guerrilla
During the first half of 1816, most republican territories in New Granada fell into
royalist control. Following the siege of Cartagena de Indias from August 1815 to the
subsequent occupation of the city in December 1815, royalist troops gained control of vast
territories in a matter of a few months. By May 1816, the Expeditionary Army had
conquered Santafé de Bogotá. Amidst the royalists’ quick advance, hundreds of rebels and
republicans were forced to flee, dozens were executed and imprisoned, and many decided
to hide and deny their former allegiance to republican governments. Many who had
previously supported pro-independence and republican regimes ended up publicly
expressing their loyalty to the Spanish Crown. That is to say, the restoration was
expeditious not only in military and political terms, but also in the way a tide of public
support in favor of republicanism and independence quickly dissipated. In New Granada,
Quito, and Venezuela, foci of insurgence quickly moved from the region’s main urban
centers to frontier territories. Among the hundreds who escaped the Expeditionary Army’s
rapid advance, many ended up in the Llanos – where rebels tried to reorganize after their
many military setbacks. Others fled to Jamaica and other islands in the Caribbean. 635
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Gutiérrez Ardila, La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819), 172-193.
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Despite the monarchical restoration’s success putting the rebels on the run and
wiping out public support in favor of republicanism, by 1816 and 1817 there were minor
cases of rebel resistance to the monarchical restoration in the vicinities of New Granada’s
main cities. Guerilla groups emerged in the proximities of Socorro, Honda, and Popayán.
Although eradicating these rebel groups proved to be arduous and time-consuming, and
even though royalist troops were never able to wipe out the Socorro guerilla, none of these
groups resulted in a serious threat to the Expeditionary Army or to the Crown’s authority. 636
It was only the so-called Almeyda Guerrilla that really set off alarm among royalist
officials in Santafé and its vicinity. In November 1817, a guerrilla group emerged in
Machetá and Tibiritá, two towns located halfway in-between Santafé and Tunja. The group
was led by Ambrosio Almeyda and his brother Vicente. The guerrilla’s quick advance
towards the viceregal capital and the support they summoned in towns along the way forced
royalist officials to reassess the authority they genuinely had over these territories. In a
matter of days, the Almeyda Guerrilla grew to have over 300 hundred mounted men – most
armed with lances – and amassed more than thirty firearms. The guerrilla was successful
taking control over the towns of Chocontá and Suesca as well as several villages in the
valleys of Tenza, Turmequé, and Ubaté. Authorities sought to avenge this affront in the
strongest terms possible. In less than two months, the guerrilla was defeated; however,
none of its main leaders were captured. Most of them made it to the Llanos, where they
joined other rebel groups. Authorities detained, interrogated, and sentenced to prison
dozens of people accused of being members or collaborators of the guerrilla group. Several
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of them were even executed. Officials confiscated almost all horses found in the region out
of fear that the animals would end up in the hands of rebel groups. Additionally, as a way
of symbolic chastisement, royalist authorities organized the execution of effigies of the
guerrilla’s leaders in Santafé’s main square.637
Among those accused of aiding the Almeyda Guerilla was José Ángel Manrique,
the priest of Manta, a town located about 25 km southeast of Machetá and 15 km south of
Tibiritá. Manrique allegedly summoned his flock to aid the rebels with horses, provisions,
and iron to manufacture lances. It was said that Manrique traveled twice to Tibiritá and
Machetá to meet with the Almeydas and that from Manta the clergyman continuously sent
letters to the rebels. Manrique was captured in December 1817 and was interrogated during
the following months. Several of Manta’s residents and those of its vicinities were also
questioned as part of this trial. The priest was eventually sentenced to prison, first in
Santafé and then in Santa Marta. He did not spend too many years in captivity thanks to
the republican takeover of Santa Marta in late 1820.638
In a petition written in December 1820, in which Manrique requested he be
appointed as the dean of Santa Marta’s Cathedral, the clergyman described all the miseries
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and torments he underwent after being detained. Manrique claimed that when royalist
troops captured him, they seized his possessions and books. While in prison in Santafé, the
priest explained, he was treated without consideration for his sacred rank and was dealt
with as if he were the most villainous criminal. During the long journey to Santa Marta,
the affronts and humiliations continued and was left barely naked and almost starving.
Manrique claims that during the unending marches there were countless occasions in which
he felt he was about to die. When he reached Santa Marta, he was confined to a cell in the
island of El Morro, just off the city’s shore. He was lucky enough that his captivity in Santa
Marta did not last long. In November 1820, a few months after Manrique’s arrival, rebel
troops occupied the city and set him free. After his release, Manrique wrote a petition to
Simón Bolívar. General Francisco de Paula Santander first received the request and
endorsed it arguing that he was well aware of Manrique’s many pains and sacrifices.
Bolívar, for his part, sent the request to Bogotá’s ecclesiastic authorities asking them if he
was authorized to make such sort of appointments.639 It is unclear what happened to
Manrique and his request. It appears that his petition was among dozens of others that put
the newly formed government in a quandary over their authority to appoint clergymen
without the Vatican’s official approval. 640
Throughout Manrique’s trial, emotions such as fear and distress were strategically
used by all sides. Some, such as the clergyman, claimed they were coerced into supporting
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the Almeydas. Manrique justified his apparent infidelity and alleged wrongdoings by
appealing to the rebels’ acts of intimidations and pressing demands. Others also drew on
their purported fear to the Almeydas to explain their actions, or inaction, as the guerrillas
expanded throughout the region. In that sense, those interrogated tended to highlight, and
perhaps exaggerate, the dread they experienced during these times. Similar to what
happened during Morcillo’s funeral when officials and city residents recurred to emotions
to prove their loyalty, those interrogated employed them to demonstrate their innocence
and allegiance to the Spanish Monarchy.
Such feelings of distress and fear not only emerged in the testimonies the witnesses
put forward but also in the interrogations themselves. The trial and the corresponding
inquiries took place in Manta and Santafé during December 1817 and March 1818. They
were ordered by Viceroy Juan Samano and led by Simón Muñoz, Lieutenant Colonel of
the Royal Army.641 The records do not offer much information concerning the gestures or
the tone of voice of those being interrogated nor of those carrying out the interrogations.
We cannot fully grasp if those called to testify felt confident or if they felt intimidated by
the officials’ questions nor do we know if the authorities in charge of the interrogations
attempted to daunt the witnesses with bodily movements, tone of voice, or with the way
arranged the room in which the inquiries were taking place. Nonetheless, we can picture
the interrogations as a sort of interplay of emotions, practices, and strategies amidst a
context of repression and violence. The witnesses’ descriptions, their apparent
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contradictions, and their emphasis on certain details hint at some of the emotions they
might have experienced while testifying.
Fear and distress surface throughout the records. In the case of some witnesses,
glints of rage and spitefulness blend with a sense of fright. Among the officials carrying
out the interrogations, there seem to be traces of mistrust and ire. The witnesses’ responses
are illustrative of their struggles to express and internalize the dread they were possibly
experiencing. Under a context of repression such as the one New Granada had been living
for the past few years, one can imagine that those called to testify attempted to suppress
their fear to avoid creating the impression that they were guilty of any charge. At the same
time, many strove to show that they were fully cooperating with royal authorities and ended
up offering somewhat credible responses that would not incriminate themselves, their kin,
or close friends. In the meantime, one can presume that the interrogators were following
orders to repress the rebels and their collaborators at any cost, be it through intimidation or
persuasion. Inflicting some fear among the witnesses was something the interrogators were
possibly looking for, regardless of the interviewee’s rank. As Carlo Ginzburg explains
when talking about what he calls “archives of repression” – that is, records produced by
inquisitorial trials and other sorts of harsh and menacing hearings – those being questioned
were not on equal footing as those carrying out the interrogation. 642 Yet, Ginzburg claims
that from these unbalanced interrelationships, historians can attempt to grasp the “subtle
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interplay of threats and fears, of attacks and withdrawals.” 643 Or, to put it in other words,
one can explore the emotional practices and strategies that were at play.
Almost all testimonies claimed that Manrique left Manta just after the Almeydas
rose up and took arms. Most witnesses argued that, at some moment, the priest met with
the rebel brothers in Tibiritá and Machetá. Some of them added that they had seen
Manrique on the trail leading to these towns while a few others claimed to have seen him
coming back from them. The majority of testimonies maintained that they personally did
not see Manrique inviting his flock to take up arms and join the Almeydas. Yet, many
witnesses claimed that they overheard others saying that Manrique had been seen
requesting iron, horses, and provisions for the Almeydas. Other witnesses even stated that
they heard some say that Manrique told Manta’s residents they should meet with the
guerrilla leaders as a way to show their tacit support and save the town from their wrath.
As more witnesses were called upon to testify, the details of what Manrique said and did
after returning to Manta become blurrier and somewhat contradictory. 644 It seems that most
witnesses, with a few exceptions, were trying to avoid incriminating themselves, the town’s
priest, or any of their fellow neighbors. This was possibly done not only out of
consideration for existing relations of friendship and kinship but also out fear that political
tides could once again turn back and that anything they said or did could eventually be used
against them.
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The controversial and conflicting claims concerning Manrique’s conduct revolved
around his statements about the Almeyda Guerrilla and his alleged efforts to aid the
guerrilla group with horses, iron, and other provisions. The discrepancies appeared early
in the trial. The first witness called to testify, Pedro José Piñeres, opened his testimony
claiming that “Doctor Manrique has not preached in favor of the bandits, but that he
[Piñeres] knew that he [Manrique] had traveled to the town of Tibiritá and from this one to
that of Machetá where the offenders of the Sovereign’s rights” were found. 645 Despite
stating that the clergyman had not spoken in favor of the bandits, Piñeres closed his
testimony declaring that once Manrique returned to Manta, he gathered his flock and told
them to “try to make some lances to aid the vandals.”646 Another witness, Tomás Cárdenas,
asserted “that he had not heard Manrique preach in favor of the rebels” but that he did hear
others say that the priest had “requested they make lances” and that “he told his flock that
they should head out and serve the traitors.” 647 Yet, in his final remarks, Cárdenas added
that some of the town’s residents also claimed that Manrique had met with the rebels and
had made those public comments to prevent the guerrilla from destroying Manta. 648
Another witness, Pedro Ignacio Méndez, also offered rather inconclusive
testimonies both times he was questioned. During his first statement given on December
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27, 1817, Méndez claimed that he did not know if Manrique had provided horses to the
Almeydas nor if the rebels had forced him to do so. Yet, he maintained that when Méndez
returned to Manta, the priest “made a formal appeal that said: ‘Machetá is full of people in
favor of the patria, you should encourage a meeting, for if you do not, these leaders will
burn your rooms and destroy all your possessions.’” 649 Méndez was quite certain that
Manrique had asked his flock to produce lances for the Almeydas and added that one day
he even came across a poor farmer who was taking his shovel to the priest so that they
could use its iron to build lances. 650
A month later, on January 29, 1818, Méndez was interrogated for the second time.
On this occasion, Méndez claimed that he did not know if Manrique had provided horses
to the rebels, but that he did know that the priest’s two horses had been with him until José
Jaramillo, a royalist official, captured the clergyman and took the horses along with the
apprehended priest. Moreover, Méndez argued that he was unaware that Manrique
exhorted his flock to support the rebels or that the priest ordered the town’s residents to
provide lances to the rebels. In Méndez’s second testimony, the story about the poor farmer
and his shovel comes up again. However, this time, Méndez stated that the farmer simply
said that Manrique had requested iron but that the man never commented on the priest’s
reasons or alleged intentions to produce lances. 651 In this second declaration, Méndez
mentions a short dialogue he had with Manrique and Juan Nepomuceno Guerrero, the
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town’s mayor. According to Méndez, he was talking to Guerrero when the priest came up
to them and urged them to meet with the rebels for if they did not “they would motivate
the patriots to come in, burn the town, and take away all your stakes.” 652
Pedro Miguel Medellín, the farmer Méndez claimed he saw with a shovel, was also
called upon to testify. Medellín explained he did not really own a shovel, but merely three
pounds of iron with which he planned to have a shovel made. When he was taking the iron
to the blacksmith’s, he came across Manrique, “who asked him to show him the iron and
told him to hand it over because he needed it for something and paid him at a rate of three
and half reales per pound, but that he who testifies did not know why he [Manrique] needed
it.”653 Medellín’s following answers are relatively ambiguous and vague as his other
responses and those of other witnesses. In one of his answers, the farmer explained that
during those days he had hardly been in town due to his work in the ranch and that for that
reason he was unaware of what Manrique had been saying or if the priest had handed over
his horses to the rebels. Yet, other of his responses imply that Medellín was quite informed
of what was being said in Manta. About the same time that the rebellion began, the farmer’s
wife attended Sunday mass. According to what she told Medellín, that day the priest told
all his flock that he required them to attend an offering of gratitude to take place the
following Thursday. During Thursday’s service, Medellín’s wife heard the clergyman
exclaim to all the audience “that if they did not go along with him, he would soon leave.”
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Neither Medellín nor his wife understood what the priest meant by this. A few days later,
the word in town was that Manrique had gone to Tibiritá and Machetá to meet with the
insurgents.654
The first testimonies, with their apparent contradictions and ambiguities, point at
some of the strategies and practices that were at play. The witnesses drew attention on the
growing atmosphere of distress that spread through Manta once claims of a rebel invasion
began to take force. By alluding to such milieu, witnesses offered a seemingly truthful fact
as well as a justification to any improper behavior they or other of Manta’s residents may
have committed. These testimonies also hint at some traces of the fear and mistrust that
surged during the interrogations. It is likely that during the questioning royalist officials
attempted to pressure and intimidate the witness into giving valuable information or even
incriminating someone else. In the meantime, it is possible that those being questioned
believed that they could end up among the hundreds of people who had been imprisoned,
tortured, and even executed in the past few years. In that sense, the seeming contradictions
and vague remarks were merely a reaction to the intimidating atmosphere some faced
during the interrogations. The witnesses offered any sort of information to confront and
appease the interrogator’s growing pressure. By doing so, they could demonstrate their
willingness to collaborate without incriminating themselves or any of their friends,
relatives, and neighbors.
Yet, the persuasiveness of their answers depended not only on the faithfulness of
their accounts. Other emotional practices were also at play. Their facial and body gestures,
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their tone of voice, and other expressions – of which we have no record but can imagine
given the circumstances of the time – could substantiate the witnesses’ answers and, thus,
their standing in the eyes of the tribunal. Yet, these emotional practices, if not played
correctly, could lead to their doom. A trembling voice or an expression of fright could
produce further mistrust and hostility on behalf of the officials leading the questioning. In
the end, the witnesses’ strategy to avoid their incrimination or that of their acquaintances
was one in which emotional practices were not separated from the rational but acted as an
essential part of it.
Contrary to what was seen with the first witnesses, there were others who, perhaps
owing to personal enmities or political reasons, sought to move emotions in other directions
other than to avert repression on any of the town’s residents. Such was the case of Manta’s
mayor, Juan Nepomuceno Guerrero. His responses seem to have been guided by feelings
of fear and resentment as well as by his efforts to produce a certain sense of compassion
and comradery among royalist officials. During the interrogation, Guerrero declared that
once news of the Almeydas’ uprising reached Manta, Manrique asked the town’s residents
for alms so he could offer mass to implore for the Virgin Mary’s protection of Manta. The
mayor himself supported the priest with six pesos. The following Thursday, while most of
Manta’s inhabitants were working the fields and occupied in their trades, Manrique gave
mass to a few parishioners.655 Guerrero, who was among the few attendees, recalled that
when the clergyman finished preaching the Gospel, “he turned his face to the people, and
the doctor said: ‘men, you might as well get together, for the time of our liberty has arrived.’
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And he said various other things which, when brought together, [implied] that we aid the
insurgents that were found in the town of Machetá. But the people stayed silent, and the
mass ended, and each one went their own way, without paying attention to anything.” 656
In contrast to the first testimonies, Guerrero was quite unambiguous when talking
about Manrique’s behavior. According to the mayor, following the priest’s homily,
Manrique left town and went to Machetá and Tibiritá. Once the clergyman came back, he
went around Manta talking to its residents. At one point, while the mayor was talking to
Ignacio Méndez, the priest came up to them and said: “sirs, why don’t you try to present
yourself to the patriots that are in the town of Machetá. For if you do not, you will incite
them to come and burn the town and your estates.” 657 Guerrero alleged that the clergyman
made many other contentious claims such as that “Manta was the only town that did not
belong to their [rebel] party for all the towns in the territory’s jurisdiction were following
the faction of the patriots.”658 While Méndez’ testimony with regards to this conversation
were quite ambiguous, Guerrero’s statement was conclusive.
According to Guerrero, while talking to Méndez and the priest, the mayor tried to
ignore Manrique’s comments. Yet, at some point during the priest’s jabber, Guerrero
intervened saying that he was a loyal vassal and would not meet with the rebels and added
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that his impression was that Manta’s residents felt no sympathy for the insurgents. The
clergyman allegedly left them after the mayor’s intervention. Guerrero thought the priest
had gone home and had stopped making allegations in favor of the Almeydas. However,
two or three days after such incident, the mayor received a letter coming from Machetá
written by the priest. According to Guerrero, along with Manrique’s note came a message
from one of the rebel commanders stating that if Manta “did not put itself under the
obedience of the intrusive government, they would burn the town and tie all of the town’s
vecinos659 and take them to Machetá…”660 Guerrero kept the letter and handed it over to
José Jaramillo, the royalist official who eventually captured Manrique. The priest’s
dispatch and the rebel leader’s note were later appended to the trial’s records along with a
letter from Guerrero to Lieutenant Colonel Simón Muñoz.661
Manrique’s letter left few doubts of his apparent backing of the Almeydas. In the
dispatch, dated November 13, 1817, the priest stated that he “found himself ashamed of
the apathy and lack of interest that Manta’s vecinos had shown for the common cause and
the little interest they showed for the happiness of their patria even as all the towns in the
canton obstinately came together and pled, as a favor, to be admitted into the Liberators’
troops.”662 Manrique’s request to Guerrero was straightforward: “I beg of you, in the name
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of the patria and of humanity, to do whatever is at your disposal to invigorate these peoples,
to send us weapons, mounts, and money to pay for our expenses.” 663 Manrique even asked
the mayor to send them the many shotguns and pistols that the rebel commander claimed
were found in Manta, “regardless of who they belong to, for the commander and I will
answer for them to their owners.” 664 In another fragment, the clergyman encouraged
Guerrero to “not be afraid of the enemies, for they have too many places to deal with and
they are hated by all the towns that are urging us and inviting us.” 665 Manrique finally
concluded saying, “let us not be this region’s stain. You must look out for the wellbeing of
your country of birth. You must not allow for it to be buried in opprobrium.” 666
A few days later, Guerrero received another letter from Machetá. This time it was
dated November 18 and signed by Vicente Almeyda. The rebel leader began his dispatch
claiming that the cause he defended was “for the common good and for the benefit of all
the Kingdom, and in revenge for the affronted humanity and the blood of American victims
dreadfully shed by Godo667 bandits…”668 Almeyda claimed to be shocked to see how

concurren a porfia, y piden como por favor, ser admitidos en la tropa de los Livertadores…” (AGN,
CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 574.)
663
“le exorto a usted en nombre de la patria y de la humanidad haga quanto este de su parte, para dar vigor
en a esas gentes, remitirnos armas cabalgaduras, y dinero para la ayuda de los gastos…” (AGN,
CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 574.)
664
“remitamela sea de quien se fuere, que el comandante y yo respondemos de ellas para con sus dueños.”
(AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 574.)
665
“no hay que temer los enemigos tienen muchos puntos a que atender, se hallan odiados de todos los
pueblos que nos llaman y conbidan.” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra
el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 574.)
666
“no seamos pues el borroso de estos lugares, y usted deve de mirar por el bien del pais de su nacimiento,
y no permitir que cuanta quede sepultado en el oprovio.” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos,
‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 574.)
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In the 1810s, the term godo was used pejoratively to refer to royalists.
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de las victimas Americanas, tan vilmente derramada por los Bandidos Godos.” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAAI.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818’, 573.)
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Manta’s residents refused to support their endeavor while many others throughout the
region backed them and even sent men and provisions. “I am well persuaded,” he
explained, “that this is not on the priest’s side, for I know that he has done what is at his
disposal to help us and he has obtained nothing. And I now see that the methods of
benignity and condescendence that we have used to the present, which have been so
successful in other towns, are futile in this parish.”669 Almeyda announced that he would
send “a carabineer and four lancers, for them to round up and remit all the useful horses
[found in Manta], even if they belonged to the Roman Pope himself, as well as saddles,
ammunitions, and provisions.”670 Additionally, the rebel commander requested lances and
iron as well as cash from the royal revenues and tithes. If these five men were not sufficient,
the rebel commander made clear, he would send “enough men to take by force that which
will has denied, and we will carry it out even if we must set the parish on fire. We must
follow the example of the Godos…”671
Almeyda’s threats and Manrique’s insistence seems to have been somewhat
successful. According to Guerrero, in a couple of days the town’s frightened residents
collected 77 pesos, one cow valued at 17 pesos, and around 50 pesos worth of silver. Yet,
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“… yo estoy bien persuadido que en esto no es parte el cura, pues se que ha hecho quanto está de su parte
para ayudarnos, y nada ha podido conseguir y asi veo que el partido de la venignidad, y condescendencia que
hemos usado hasta la presente, y que ha tenido tan buen suceso con todo los demas pueblos es infructuoso
en esa parroquia. (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta.
1817-1818.’, 573.)
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“… remito a ella un carabinero y quatro lanzeros, para que haga recogida, y me remitan todos los caballos
que hubiese utiles aunque sean del mismo Papa de Roma, monturas pertrechos y viveres hagan hacer quantas
lanzas se puedan recogiendo el fierro a un que sea labrado, remitan todos los dineros pertenecientes a rentas
reales y los que se puedan juntar del ramo de diezmos que con mi recivo satisfacer todo a la patria…” (AGN,
CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 573-574.)
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“…con gente suficiente para quitar por fuerza, lo que de voluntad se niega, y esta se executará aunque sea
necesario ponerle fuego a la parroquia. Es necesario tomar el exemplo de los Godos…” (AGN,
CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 574.)
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despite these efforts, rumors took hold claiming the town’s aid had been insufficient. 672
The word was that the rebel troops would soon unleash all their fury against Manta due to
the town’s refusal to fully support the insurgents. While some residents feared looting,
others dreaded abduction and even murder. Amidst these frightening perspectives, dozens
of Manta’s dwellers decided to leave town and hide in the forest. Both Guerrero and
Manrique, one posing as the town’s most royalist subject and the other accused of backing
the rebels, were among those who hid in the forest out fear that a bloodshed was soon going
to happen. José Cecilio Castañeda, a peasant who also fled into the forest, explained that
“he, as well as all of the vecinos, went into the forest because they had heard that they [the
rebels] were coming to burn the town and capture the mayor, Juan Nepomuceno Guerrero,
and take him to the town of Machetá.”673
Guerrero, for his part, declared that the arrival of a carabineer, his assistant, and
three lancers on November 18th was what prompted many to leave their homes. The town’s
residents, the mayor explained, were already fearful due to the priest’s many threats and
his claims that if Manta did not recruit enough men or collect sufficient provisions the
rebels would destroy the town. Once the five rebels arrived at Manta, they apparently stole
horses and were seen plotting and saying they would return with more men. “I could only
suspect,” Guerrero explained, “that they were going to bring more thieves to take my life
away and to destroy this locality, and thus I found no other option than to run into the forest
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AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 575.
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quemar el Pueblo, y a llevarse al Señor Alcalde Don Juan Nepomuceno Guerrero preso para el pueblo de
Machetá.” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 18171818.’, 571.)
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with my family, which is composed of my woman, four daughters, two male offspring, one
married and the other a seven-year-old minor…” 674 Guerrero remained hidden in the forest
for about five days until November 23 rd when he received news informing him that
“royalist troops had exterminated the mob of thieves” and “that commander Don Simón
Muñoz had arrived at the town of Tibiritá.” 675 Finding himself safe and sound, he wrote a
letter to Muñoz putting himself at his service. According to the mayor, following the
Lieutenant Colonel’s requests, he eventually sent sixteen horses and four saddles to the
royalist troops stationed in Guateque. 676
The mayor’s testimony, like those that took place before his, was an interplay of
emotions. Even though Guerrero’s resentment and insinuations against Manrique stood out
from other testimonies, his strategy was not far removed from that of others witnesses. For
instance, the mayor also highlighted the milieu of fear that spread through the town and
explained that under such circumstances he even offered alms to the priest to implore for
the Virgin Mary’s protection. Likewise, Guerrero tried to employ emotional practices to
his benefit. It is likely that due to his position and the evidence he had presented
beforehand, such as Manrique’s compromising correspondence and the letter he sent to
Lieutenant Muñoz, the interrogators were much more lenient with him. Even if the royalist
officials were more indulgent and believed in his innocence even before beginning the
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“… no puedo yo menos que sospechar que hivan a traer mas ladrones para quitarme la vida y acabar con
este vecindario, y luego no hallé otor adbitrio que fue el meterme a los montes con mi familia que se compone
de mi muger, quatro niñas, dos hijos varones, uno casado y otro menor de siete de años…” (AGN,
CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 575.)
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“ya havian exterminado a la turba de ladrones… que el comandante Don Simon Muñoz se hallava en el
Pueblo de Tibirita…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de
Manta. 1817-1818.’, 575.)
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questioning, Guerrero had reasons to feel some distress during the interrogation. It was not
his life or liberty that was at stake, but his social and political standing. The questioning
was an opportunity for the mayor to prove his fervent loyalty to the Spanish Crown to
improve his political position. That is to say, his decision to offer incriminating information
might have been due to some sort of animosity towards the priest, but also from his efforts
to portray himself as someone who was supportive of the Crown’s interests and, thus,
worthy of recognition. As happened with previous testimonies, his persuasiveness not only
depended on what he said, but on how he said it. We can imagine that in this interplay of
emotions, his gestures and expressions were part of his efforts to render himself as a loyal
vassal.
Manrique was interrogated following the testimonies of dozens of witnesses who
dubiously pointed at the priest’s purported improper conduct and a few other declarations,
such as Guerrero’s, who unambiguously highlighted the clergyman’s allegiance with the
Almeydas. Before starting the inquiry, the clergyman was told to put one hand on his heart
and another on his head and to swear that he would answer truthfully to every question
asked to him. It is unclear if it was common for investigators justice tribunals to have
suspects place their hands to their head and heart. However, such symbolic practice is
illustrative of one of the claims put forward in this chapter regarding the indissoluble
connection between emotions and rationality. It is as if by placing his hands in his head
and heart, Manrique was representing through his body the notion that emotions are
constitutive of the rational.
During Manrique’s interrogations, emotional strategies and practices similar to
those seen among other witnesses also come up. It is clear the priest was trying to save his
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own skin by trying to convince the interrogators of his innocence and of his loyalty to the
Spanish Crown. All through the interrogation, the priest highlighted his loyalty to the
Crown, downplayed others’ fidelity, and blamed the rebels’ incessant coercion for his
purported misconduct. Moreover, he probably did this attempting to conceal any sign of
fear or wariness that could make the investigators even more suspicious. At certain
moments during the inquiry, the clergyman was confronted with other witnesses and their
testimonies, making the situation even more tense. The interrogators, for their part, seemed
to be convinced of Manrique’s culpability and attempted to induce him, with certain
harshness and insistence, to confess his alleged wrongdoings. 677
Throughout the inquiry, Manrique constantly tried to argue that his actions only
sought to save Manta from the fury of the rebels. From the beginning, the clergyman
confessed he had visited Machetá and Chocontá and had met with the Almeydas. However,
he clarified that he only did such things because he was convinced the rebels “were going
to send people to Manta for them to proceed against this town for not taking part in their
complot.” The priest claimed that when he met with Vicente Almeyda, he tried to convince
“him to not do such a thing such as to send men to exterminate the place, that instead he
should commission the mayor to give them aid and send supplies.” 678 With regards to the
aid given to the rebels, Manrique first argued that he had not given them supplies of any
kind. Nonetheless, when asked about the iron he bought from Medellín and about his
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AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 575576.
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“hivan amandar a la parroquia de Manta gentes para que prosedieran contra este Pueblo, por que no había
entrado en su compló… le dixo que no hiziere tal cosa de mandar hombres a esterminar el lugar que en tal
caso comisionase a el Alcalde y le diera auxilios para sacar recursos…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 –
Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 576.)
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requests asking Manta’s residents to send provisions to the insurgents, the priest was forced
to admit that he had in fact sent iron and had asked several of the town’s inhabitants to do
the same. However, the clergyman quickly asserted that he had done this against his will
and only because “the Almeydas had agreed that they would not harm the locality under
the condition that they [Manta’s residents] give them some provisions.” What is more, the
priest argued that it was the mayor, “who encouraged the people to do so and to gather
weapons, and the vecinos did as they were told.”679 Under such circumstances, Manrique
explained, when the town’s residents were gathering supplies, some commented that the
priest was not making any contribution of any sort. To avoid further recriminations, the
priest bought three to four pounds of iron from Medellín and gave them as his offering. 680
With respect to the most compromising evidence against him, such as the letter and
the controversial homily, the priest simply argued that the rebels forced him to carry out
numerous actions against his will. The clergyman admitted that he wrote and signed the
damning letter; however, he declared that it was written in such bellicose terms because
the rebels pressed him to do so, telling him that they would attack Manta if he did not
comply with their request. Manrique claimed he repeatedly told the Almeydas that the
epistle would be futile due to the town’s faithfulness to the Crown, but the insurgents
allegedly forced him to write the hostile note. 681
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“Almeidas solo assendieron a no perjudicar el lugar con la condicion de que se le diesen algunos auxilios…
el Alcalde, de quien fusitó la gente, y la hizo manifestar la comicion de juntar armas por lo que los vecinos
contribuyeron...” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta.
1817-1818.’, 576.)
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The priest also declared that he offered an eucharist to implore for the Virgin
Mary’s protection simply to fulfill the rebel’s demands. During the interrogation, the
clergyman was asked once and again who had come up with the idea to host the mass.
Manrique first pointed at the mayor, claiming Guerrero was the one who proposed the idea
and asked Manta’s residents for contributions to pay for the service. The interrogators
refuted the clergyman twice and showed him testimonies that claimed that it was he who
invited his flock to the eucharist and he who had been seen asking townspeople for
contributions. The records do not describe Manrique’s reactions once he was controverted.
It is possible that his voice began shaking and his face quivered out of dread once he heard
the incriminating testimonies. Or perhaps the clergyman maintained his composure despite
being put against the wall. Nevertheless, we know that after two rebuttals and incessant
questioning of his remarks during the sermon, Manrique accepted he was the one who had
summoned Manta’s residents to mass. Instantly after, he confessed that during mass he
pronounced a rather ambiguous homily with some seditious remarks. As Manrique
explained, “and although it is true that after the Gospel I said some words, they were not
in the terms I have been reproached for, but rather in amphibolic682 terms which each one
can interpret according to their apprehension.” The priest then continued, “it is true that
something was said about this issue [of aiding the rebels], but I did so because it was one
of the conditions the Almeydas imposed for them to not proceed against Manta. And that
I suspected they had spies to verify this.”683
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The term amphibological (anfibológico) refers to terms and phrases that are ambiguous, equivocal, and
can be interpreted in more than one way.
683
“… y que aunque es cierto que despues del Evangelio dixo algunas expresiones no fue en los terminos
que se le recombiene si no en los terminos anfiboloxicos que cada uno interpetaria segun su malicia, pero
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In the end, Manrique tried to portray himself as a loyal vassal whose mediation
saved Manta from the Almeydas’ wrath. In his final remarks, the priest explained that he
had never been unfaithful to the Crown nor tried to persuade his flock to join the rebel side.
The clergyman insisted that he traveled to Machetá to prevent the Almeydas from raiding
Manta and added that the reason why he visited the rebels from the very beginning was
due to his efforts to save the life of Francisco Pérez, a Spaniard sentenced to death by the
rebels. Manrique claimed he was unsuccessful in this endeavor as Pérez was executed
before he reached the town. Yet, the clergyman clarified that upon his arrival, he “publicly
reproached Vicente Almeyda, mainly for having killed him without sacraments.” 684
Manrique then picked up on the mayor’s claims about his flight into the forest when the
rebels’ attack seemed imminent. As part of his strategy, Manrique downplayed others’
efforts to protect Manta’s population. The priest dismissed Guerrero’s retreat claiming it
held little significance as several of the town’s residents, including himself, had done so
even before the mayor’s withdrawal.685 Through his recurrent remarks against the mayor,
Manrique not only unveiled his animosity towards Guerrero, but also drew attention on his
efforts to protect his flock from harms’ way. Ultimately, the priest was attempting to stir
the tribunal’s sympathies, instigating aversion towards the mayor while trying to gain its
favor by portraying himself as Manta’s most loyal vassal who, thanks to his shrewd actions,
saved Manta from the rebels’ mayhem.

que es cierto que algo dixo sobre el particular y le hizo por ser una de las condiciones que le pusieron los
Almeydas para no proseder contra Manta y sospechava tenian espias para ello…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAAI.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 577.)
684
“… el reprendio publicamente a Vicente Almeyda principalmente por haverlo matado sin sacramentos.”
(AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 577.)
685
AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 577.
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In the long run, Manrique’s efforts were futile. The priest was unable to persuade
the interrogators of his innocence. Perhaps, royalist officials considered the evidence
against him to be too ample and too damning. We can only conjecture whether Manrique’s
interrogations made matters worse or not. Perhaps, his continuous allusions to the
Almeydas’ coercion to explain almost all of his actions might have raised more questions
than they answered. It is also possible that his emotional expressions and gestures
complicated matters even further. When the interrogators refuted him, Manrique almost
instantly accepted his inaccuracies and provided different and sometimes contradictory
answers. It is as if the intimidation and distress he was undergoing led him to change his
narrative in more than one occasion. As his answers became even more unpersuasive, the
interrogators’ hostility grew, and one can imagine that the priest’s expressions of fright
became even more palpable. This, in turn, possibly raised further misgivings among the
tribunal’s members.
Amidst this interplay, emotions and emotional expressions were part of the
strategies employed throughout the interrogation. That is to say, the fear and intimidation
Manrique experienced all through the questioning, and his gestures and expressions
throughout, gave form and meaning to his answers. These feelings of dread did not
necessarily blur his thoughts. Rather, they were an input that guided the clergyman toward
displaying compelling behavior during the trial, not only offering convincing answers but
also displaying persuasive gestures and expressions. As Joanna Bourke would put it,
emotions, such as fear, do not necessarily disrupt processes of rationality, but rather
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animate rationality.686 Or, as was discussed in the chapter’s introduction, Bourdieu’s
practice theory implies that thoughts and feelings are inseparable and both emerge, hand
in hand, from “inductive states of the body.” 687
In the end, the committee led by Lieutenant Muñoz finished its work in March of
1818. The testimonies and evidence collected reached the viceroy’s office in the following
weeks. The Viceroy Juan de Samano and the tribunal did not reach a verdict. Rather, on
late May they decided to pass on the case to the ecclesiastical authorities claiming that
Manrique, as a clergyman, had been granted immunity and could not be condemned by a
civil tribunal. Yet, despite not reaching a ruling, the viceroy’s decree demanded “the strict
and prompt administration of justice… for the fulfillment of the public’s reprisal.” 688 In the
following weeks, an ecclesiastic tribunal sentenced Manrique on charges of infidelity. He
was reproached for betraying not only the King and the Spanish Crown, but also the
Catholic Church and God himself.
Manrique’s efforts to prove his innocence and his indisputable loyalty to the Crown
proved to be somewhat futile. Yet, his case underscores the ways in which emotions and
emotional expressions helped give meaning to actions and conducts. The testimonies given
throughout the interrogations, and the interpretations that arose from them, were shaped by
fear. Many continuously referred to situations of distress in which they claimed to have
been forced to carry out acts that were contrary to Crown. At the same time, the fright and
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anxiety many faced during the interrogations shaped the sorts of answers they gave and the
ways in which they expressed these answers. The thought of ending up in prison or among
the hundreds who had been executed, led to contradictory answers and fairly incomplete
responses. Possibly owing to the growing intimidation and fear they were facing, all those
who were questioned were quick to deny any sympathy or assistance towards the Almeydas
or any rebel groups before them. In the blink of an eye, traces of support for republicanism
and independence vanished once the inquiries began. Manrique was lucky enough that his
hardships and confinement did not last long. In late 1820, almost two years after being
sentenced and after being sent from Santafé to Santa Marta, rebel troops freed Manrique.
He was once again seen speaking in favor of republicanism and the rebel faction. 689
Conclusions
During the monarchical restoration, in regions such as Cartagena, Santafé,
Popayán, and Tunja, royalist officials ended up viewing almost everyone as a suspect.
Their intense distrust was particularly manifest during the beginning of the restoration
when the Expeditionary Army began to take control of former rebel territories. In some
cases, somewhat minor details raised royalists’ hesitations. Such was the case of Andrés
Suárez, the priest of Aguada de Pablo, a town about 70 km east of Cartagena de Indias. In
November 1815, while royalist troops laid siege of Cartagena for the third consecutive
month, army officials began an investigation against Suárez. Royalist authorities had
received complains from soldiers and town residents accusing the priest of behaving
improperly and of refusing to aid royalist troops. Some rumors claimed the clergyman
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AGN, CO.AGN. SR.35,24 – Curas-Párrocos, ‘Postulación de José Ángel Manrique. 17 de noviembre de
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dressed inappropriately, wearing short, loose white pants that exposed his legs. Other
claims maintained that he lived with a mulatta woman and that he harassed dozens of the
town’s women. Furthermore, officials were informed that the priest had advised the town’s
residents to turn down any of the Expeditionary Army’s requests for food or lodging.
Apparently, he went so far as to incite Aguada de Pablo’s inhabitants to take down or burn
any abandoned house so that royalist troops could not use them for shelter or to treat their
ill. Some of the allegations that reached monarchist officials even accused Suárez of killing
a convalescent army officer. The word was that Suárez visited the ill and wounded to offer
them spiritual comfort. Amidst his acts of religious relief, he gave an officer some sort of
medication that quickly deteriorated the officer’s health and eventually killed him. 690
Those called upon to testify corroborated some of these rumors. Two of the
witnesses claimed that Suárez mostly wore his habits, but that due to his “philosophical
character”, he sometimes dressed somewhat peculiarly. They explained that he was often
seen wearing white pants and a worn out, light blue, linen frock coat. Several witnesses
confirmed that the word around town was that Suárez lived with a mulatta woman, but
most of them stated that it was not true that he mistreated the town’s women. The witnesses
were even more unequivocal when explaining that Suárez had always been a faithful
royalist. Moreover, they maintained that the priest offered all sorts of assistance and
support to the Expeditionary Army once it reached Aguada de Pablo. They all denied that
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Suárez held any responsibility with regards to the officer’s death or concerning any other
inconvenience the royalist troops might have had when passing the town. 691
The interrogation was sent to the Viceroy Francisco José de Montalvo. The Viceroy
absolved Suárez of any crime. It seems Montalvo was not pleased with the way the
investigation and interrogations were carried out. In a letter written on December 9, 1815,
Josef Barcenas, the army officer who led the inquiry and who was in charge of some of the
troops stationed in Aguada de Pablo, apologized to Montalvo for any wrongdoing he and
his men might have committed. At some point, Barcenas explained that he had always tried
to treat the town’s residents with the upmost respect and that he had only threatened to
death those few who had been captured under charges of treason. The officer also clarified
that his soldiers did take wine from one of the town’s residences but that they did so with
the owner’s permission and blessing. Additionally, Barcenas accepted his mistake for
having allowed his men to drink and dance the same night that another one of his
subordinates was dying.692
To an extent, Andrés Suárez was lucky that his case reached Montalvo and not one
of the tribunals set up by the Expeditionary Army. Montalvo did not pay much attention to
Suárez’s idiosyncratic behavior and preferred to absolve the priest and ignore the
accusations made against the clergyman. 693 Daniel Gutiérrez has argued that during the
first years of monarchical restoration, there were continuous tensions between Viceroy
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Montalvo and the generals leading the Expeditionary Army. Montalvo as well as his
advisors and some of Royal Audiencia’s magistrates were in favor of a conciliatory
approach to the restoration. They favored general pardons and believed they could gain
authority through peaceful means. General Pablo Morillo, commander of the Expeditionary
Army, and his closest circle preferred other, more violent and pugnacious methods. In the
regions where Montalvo was able to impose his authority, executions and imprisonments
were somewhat limited. In those in which Morillo and his generals enforced their methods,
violence and repression were rife. 694
There are several possible reasons why the Expeditionary Army and so many
royalist commanders decided to impose their authority through violent means. Perhaps
some were simply replicating the intense violence they experienced in the Iberian
Peninsula during the war against France or in Venezuela during ‘War to Death.’ It is also
possible that the rhetoric coming from the French Revolution as well as from other previous
episodes of terror also influenced their conduct. In any case, emotions such as rage and
resentment shaped the strategies they used to navigate through the monarchical restoration.
These emotions helped built a milieu in which repression and brutality became means to
demonstrate their commitment and loyalty to the Spanish Crown. In the end, Morillo’s
approach proved to be counterproductive. By 1819, many New Granadians were fed up
with the royalists’ terror and persecution and embraced the rebels’ efforts to put an end to
Spanish rule. For many, it was not necessarily republicanism and independence guiding
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them into the battlefields, but their hope to put an end to the unending violence and
oppression.
Manifestations of fear, rage, elation, and resentment, along with other emotional
expressions, were part of people’s strategies during the monarchical restoration. The ways
in which emotions were expressed and displayed gave meaning to particular actions and
statements. Exaggerating, concealing, or twisting certain emotional expressions could
demonstrate a person’s good standing and their loyalty to the Spanish Crown. In certain
circumstances, playing the correct keys and displaying certain emotions in particular ways
could save a person from imprisonment and even from capital punishment. That is to say,
emotions not only shape society’s understandings of the times being lived, emotions – in
their different manifestations – also bestow meaning on certain conducts and acts. This
premise reinforces the idea put forward throughout the dissertation that emotions are part
of people’s cognition. They are intrinsically linked to the act of giving meaning, both
helping people understand the world around them and bestowing meaning on their actions
and behavior.
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Chapter 5: The Constitution on the Throne: Emotions and Archetypes in the First
Republic of Colombia
On the morning of December 2, 1821, Bogotá’s residents gathered in the city’s
main square to acclaim the recently enacted Cúcuta Constitution.695 At around 9 a.m, the
city’s councilmen marched towards a throne resting on a platform that had been placed in
the middle of the main plaza. Those leading the procession carried the standard of Bogotá
with a constitution hanging from its rod.696 When they reached the platform, two of them,
Bernardo Pardo and José León Licht, carefully set the standard and the constitution on the
throne. They then picked up the constitution and began reading it aloud. When they
finished reading the text, the crowd cheered “long live the sacred constitution of the
Republic of Colombia” and exclaimed promises to uphold, obey, and respect the
constitution and the Republic’s magistrates and officials. Amidst the cheers, some yelled
that that they would defend the constitution “with their interests, with their blood, and with
their own lives.”697 Once the praises and acclamations came to end, councilman Pardo
grabbed the standard with the constitution affixed to it and walked back to the building. He
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then mounted a horse and began his way towards the city’s main street while displaying
the standard and the constitution. All the other councilmen as well as Bogotá’s top civil
and military authorities and several city notables followed Pardo’s lead. According to the
scribe’s account, onlookers cheered and expressed their happiness as they watched the
constitution and the procession pass by. The scribe explained that the Indians standing on
the sides of the streets were “particularly satisfied as they saw their holy desires fulfilled
with the Republic’s reestablishment along with the publication 698 of the constitution that
would govern them.”699
Even though Bogotá’s residents were celebrating a republican constitution, the
festivity built upon colonial and monarchic notions of symbolic power. During the
celebration, the throne placed in the city’s square stood out as a visible symbol of power.
In Bogotá in 1821 a throne entailed authority and legitimacy for a variety of reasons. It not
only represented the seat from which monarchs imparted commands and enforced their
authority but also denoted religious authority. Catholics believed there was only one throne
in heaven and that that throne belonged to God. Moreover, kings and queens who sat in the
throne were usually regarded as blessed and consecrated beings. 700 In this case, however,
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the throne was not meant for a monarch or for God but for a constitution. Similar to the
meanings it brought about in monarchical regimes, the throne sought to bestow the
constitution with a certain sense of legitimacy, authority, and sacredness. Those who
attended the public ceremony referred to the charter as “the sacred constitution of the
Republic of Colombia.”701 The scribe even explained that the Indians viewing the
procession and praising the constitution held a “holy desire” to see its publication. In that
sense, in spite of replacing the monarch with a republican charter, the ceremony could
hardly be considered a disruption from colonial and monarchic conceptions of symbolic
power.
Similarly, the celebration built on colonial social hierarchies and relations of power.
During the rite, direct contact and access to the constitution was unequal. The constitution
was carried, displayed, and read aloud by the city’s councilmen. Those who were closest
to the charter, both when it was read and when it was displayed during the procession, were
top authorities and city notables. Plebeians and Indians were expected to see the
constitution from a distance and to hear its content through the mediation of Bogotá’s
patricians. Their part in the festivity was a somewhat passive and ornamental one. They
cheered and celebrated the charter as Bogotá’s patricians presented it to them.
The celebration of the 1821 Constitution is an example of the persistence of
monarchical and colonial archetypes after the onset of republicanism. This chapter argues
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that during the first years of republican life, people’s notions of power – and their
conceptions of how power was supposed to be represented – were still shaped by models
and mental images of monarchical symbols and colonial social relations. The political
changes that were taking place in the 1820s did not bring about immediate transformations
in society’s conditions of symbolic power nor in people’s notions of social organization.
Such conceptions could not be easily erased or altered in people’s minds. At the time, the
new republic’s citizens as well as those denied complete citizenship were still coming to
terms with what independence and republicanism meant and how power and social order
were to be understood and represented under these new political circumstances. The
language of rights, equality, and citizenship imbedded in the new constitutions was given
different meanings across society. However, this new language did not produce an abrupt
transformation in society’s different understandings of power.
The chapter draws on William Reddy’s concept of ‘emotives’ to discuss the ways
in which archetypes from the past shaped people’s emotions and their understandings of
what was happening around them. The chapter claims that models and mental images from
the past shaped not only rituals, such as the celebration of the 1821 Constitution, but also
people’s emotions and their notions of reality. In the 1820s, the inhabitants of the newly
formed republic strategically looked back to monarchical representations of power, to
colonial social hierarchies, and to past events to give meaning to the world they were living
in. Archetypes from the colonial period informed discussions and public debates and
guided people’s emotions. A mental image of prior symbols of power or of bygone notions
of society brought about emotions and emotional expressions associated with those
particular archetypes. For instance, patricians, slaveowners and even middle sectors
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alluded to an ideal and bygone social order to justify their dread of slave manumission and
of any reform leading to racial equality. At times, debates over the republic’s political
stability ended in insinuations in favor of powerful absolutist leaders. Some did not hesitate
to suggest that stability could only be achieved by returning to a monarchical form of
government. They waved the threat of anarchy, as monarchists had done some years earlier,
to justify absolutist projects. In the end, such allusions to ideal models of society and to
past notions of political stability shaped the emotions that emerged and the ways in which
such feelings were understood, experienced, and expressed.
Reddy’s notion of ‘emotives’ helps us understand how the act of labeling a feeling
– or, in the case being made in this chapter, the act of opting for a particular reference or
model – ends up guiding and shaping emotions. For Reddy, ‘emotives’ are utterances or
speech acts through which individuals define and characterize emotions. When a person is
feeling a series of sensations, ‘emotives’ come into play in the moment in which the
individual decides to identify those feelings and label them under a particular category or
term. In that sense, an ‘emotive’ is the act in which a person names an emotion in
accordance with society’s terminology and understandings of what such emotion
implies.702 Thus, Reddy claims that ‘emotives’ can be “considered as utterances aimed at
briefly characterizing the current state of activated thought material that exceeds the current
capacity of attention. Such expression, by analogy with speech acts, can be said to have (1)
descriptive appearance, (2) relational intent, and (3) self-exploring and self-altering
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effects.”703 One of the main implications that comes with Reddy’s definition is that the act
of naming and labeling a feeling realigns an individual’s emotions. When a person
experiences a feeling and labels such sensation under a particular term, that person’s
feelings are readjusted to fit that term. For instance, when the attendees at the acclamation
of the 1821 Constitution began to acclaim the charter, it is possible that some identified
and labeled what they were feeling as happiness and joyfulness. Following Reddy’s line of
thought, this act of labeling would have brought about a realignment in their emotional
experiences and expressions in order to match the meanings and implications that
happiness had in such a context.
Reddy argues that ‘emotives’ are both managerial and exploratory. 704 They are
managerial in the sense that people’s decision to label a feeling is not only determined by
practice and structure. People’s strategies and interests, even if marginally, also come in
play. The fact a person can partially decide how they want to name a sensation gives them
some relative control over the types of emotions and expressions they and those around
them may experience. One could add to Reddy’s argument that some individuals and
collectivities, depending on their standing and power, have a larger capacity to act
managerially with regards to their emotions. Reddy argues that emotions are also
exploratory because they may guide people into unexplored territory. As Reddy explains,
an ‘emotive’ can be understood as an attempt “to feel what one says one feels. These
attempts usually work, but they can and do fail. When they fail, the emotive expression is
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‘exploratory’ in the sense that one discovers something unexpected about one’s own
feelings.”705
The archetypes and models that pop up into people’s minds shape emotions in an
analogous way as Reddy’s ‘emotives’ do. When an individual labels a particular situation
with a mental image, such as a shared remembrance or a prevailing notion of social order,
that action ends up guiding emotions and shaping the ways in which they are experienced
and expressed. In 1821 in Bogotá, the throne brought up mental images associated to the
reverence and awe that kings and queens produced. These archetypes steered people’s
emotions into feeling some sort of happiness and joy at the sight of the Cúcuta Constitution
resting on the throne. As people struggled to understand and give meaning to the world
they were living in, the archetypes that came up in their minds ended up managing and
directing their emotions and forms of expressions.
Recurring to William Reddy’s ‘emotives’ to analyze the ways in which archetypes
from the past shape emotions comes with its limitations. In the cases studied in this chapter,
part of the problem comes from the source base. Historical sources leave many unanswered
questions and may be vague with certain details. Thus, there is usually not enough
information to closely go over Reddy’s cycle: first seeing how an emotion is labeled and
then studying how those feelings adjust to what that particular emotion is supposed to mean
in a given context. These limitations are particularly true when trying to analyze the
perspectives of women, plebeians, and slaves, among other social sectors, who had limited
access to literacy and whose testimonies come up less often in the archival records. Despite
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the many constraints this approach might have, Reddy’s ‘emotives’ allow us to think about
how archetypes and mental images from the past shape people’s emotions and their notions
of reality. In that sense, this relationship between mental images, emotions, and
understandings of the world supports the claim that emotions are part of cognition and that
emotions help society give meaning to the past, present, and future.
In the 1820s, archetypes and models of stability, order, and security hailing from
the colonial and monarchic past continually popped up into people’s minds. In Bogotá and
other parts of northern South America, feelings of uncertainty and insecurity had become
prevalent among many of the region’s residents. Despite the hopes and dreams that
emerged with the advent of new republican nations, years of violence and unrest had left
many feeling doubtful and hesitant of the future ahead of them. Independence and the
adoption of a republican form of government furthered peoples’ misgivings. For many of
them, symbols such as the throne, a painting, or a school’s reputation not only inspired
authority and sacredness, but also a sense of certainty and security amidst the turmoil they
were living. Aspirations for social and political stability became recurrent among people
of different social stratum and political inclinations. They actively sought references of
what order and security were supposed to look like in times in which Colombian society
debated central issues such as the expropriation of Church properties, racial equality, slave
manumission, and the government system the country should adopt.
The Ecce Homo: religion and education
For instance, in the town of Villa de Leyva, about 150 km northeast of Bogotá, the
persistence of archetypes from the colonial past gave shape to religious and political
tensions and people’s ensuing emotions. In 1828, Villa de Leyva’s residents and those of
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neighboring villages rioted against national officials over a sacred painting. 706 During the
first years of republican life, the new government sought to establish new schools and
universities. Funding for these institutions partly came from the expropriation of properties
belonging to the Catholic Church, including religious objects and images. 707 One such
object was the Ecce Homo, a painting taken by Spanish troops during the 1527 sack of
Rome and brought to the Americas in the early seventeenth century. Juan de Mayorga
Casallas donated it to the Dominicans as part of his contributions for the foundation of a
convent in the vicinities of Villa de Leyva. The convent eventually took the name of the
Ecce Homo.708 In 1825, as republican officials sought funds to finance the newly
established Universidad de Boyacá, a rumor spread throughout the region claiming that the
University was going to sell the painting. Residents in Villa de Leyva and nearby villages
protested against such prospect. They ended up assaulting the convent, seizing the painting,
and hiding it in Villa de Leyva. Local authorities explained that the situation became so
tense that they feared a continued outbreak of violence throughout the region. 709
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In April and May of 1825, Villa de Leyva’s officials, the Intendant of Boyacá, and
the president of the University of Boyacá exchanged a series of letters seeking a solution
to this problem. Despite some frictions among them, they all agreed that it would be unwise
to sell the painting or to remove it from the region. Throughout their dispatches, officials
claimed to echo local residents’ feelings and thoughts about the issue. They explained that
many of the region’s inhabitants believed the painting and convent gave them protection,
status, and wellbeing. Locals referred to the convent as a place of pilgrimage and to the
painting as a sacred object. For many, losing the painting meant they would be deprived of
a sacred tradition. The Intendant claimed that people from the region were “accustomed to
worship God in such adorned temples, and it would be very painful for them to see their
temples naked and ruined.”710 The University’s president, Bernardo María de la Motta,
argued that the institution’s administrators would not want to see local residents “deprived
of an ornament to which they professed unlimited devotion.” 711
The officials agreed that under these circumstances, they should act with the highest
prudence and caution. They hoped to avoid an outbreak of violence at the same time that
they aspired to gain local residents’ esteem. As de la Motta explained, “taking these
ornaments from their corresponding places would cause discontent among locals and
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would raise certain apprehension against this scholarly institution.”712 Thus, Villa de
Leyva’s officials, Boyacá’s Intendent, and the University’s president, after considering the
views of the Ecce Homo’s devotees, decided to transfer the painting to the region’s
clergymen for their protection and veneration. The residents of Villa de Leyva and
surrounding towns, the officials argued, would see such a decision as an act of generosity
and fraternity on behalf of the University and the national and provincial governments. 713
In Villa de Leyva, archetypes from the colonial past moved and shaped people’s
emotions as well as their understandings of what was happening. According to local
officials, protesters demonstrated feelings of despair and fear while those who stormed the
convent seized the painting with fury, enraged at the authority’s alleged arbitrariness.
Although we do not have accounts of what was going on in the minds and hearts of those
protesting and seizing the painting, we do have some hints that help us understand their
feelings of fear and rage. In 1828 many in Villa de Leyva still associated their security and
wellbeing with the protection and status a religious image, such as the Ecce Homo,
conferred on their community. This sense of stability and safety was based on archetypes
from preceding decades and centuries. When they saw that the painting’s permanence was
in danger, they felt that their security and stability were also at stake. In the 1820s,
following many years of war and political strife, uncertainty held all sorts of negative
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implications as it was associated to violence and disarray. Thus, among most of the region’s
dwellers, the prospect of a rupture did not produce expectation and hope at the possibility
of better times to come but rather fear, apprehension, and even rage.
Almost all those involved, from the locals who seized the painting to the officials
involved in this case, were seeking some sort of stability and security. It was not only
authorities and the University’s president who asked for prudence and caution. Local
residents demanded the same from their authorities. They did not want to sacrifice a sacred
image that brought about wellbeing and protection for their community in exchange for the
republic’s new and unfamiliar projects. Their notions of what stability and security meant,
and the emotions that revolved around them, were still shaped by a series of archetypes
from the colonial past. In the end, the republican plan to establish new schools and
universities ended up being relatively short lived. Many educational institutions were
forced to close towards the end of the 1820s. In most cases, lack of financial and political
support led to their extinction. In Tunja, for example, most of the Colegio de Boyacá’s
properties and tasks were passed on to the religious order of the Augustinians. 714 By the
1830s, the Church regained its almost absolute control over the education system.
In this case, archetypes from the past – embodied in a religious painting – ended up
moving people’s feelings of uncertainty, fear, and rage. For many of Villa de Leyva’s
residents, the Ecce Homo provided a sense of wellbeing and security that universities and
schools could never offer. The national government’s efforts to portray educational
institutions as symbols of wellbeing and moral growth fell short when confronted to the
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region’s religious beliefs and devotion. Thus, the prospect of losing schools and
universities – symbols of the republic’s new and uncertain projects – did not produce
apprehension, anxiety, and fury as happened with the Ecce Homo.
Racial discrimination and slavery
There were other cases in which colonial archetypes shaped racial and social
tensions and the emotions that emerged from those frictions. An illustrative example is that
of a black student who suffered all sorts of acts of discrimination from school
administrators and students in Caracas. In 1824, José Álvarez, a pardo (a mixed-race
person with African descent) from the town of San José, decided to enroll his child of
unspecified age in a school in Caracas. As happened with many schools at the time, the
institution was owned and administered by the clergy. Both father and son faced
innumerable obstacles as soon as they came in contact with the school’s directors. At first,
the principal claimed there was no room for the student. The principal then tried to convince
the student to change his mind, asking him to pray so that the Holy Spirit would enlighten
him and guide him in the right direction. Seeing that such efforts were futile, the principal
explained to father and son that the school’s reputation would suffer from his enrollment.
The principal even sent a petition to Caracas’ authorities asking them to stop the pardo
student’s enrollment. The request was apparently ignored and Álvarez’s son was finally
admitted despite the principal’s countless efforts to stop his entrance. 715
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The acts of discrimination against the student only worsened once he set foot in the
school building. A printed leaflet describing the case explained that Álvarez’s son
immediately faced “the affronts, the slanders, vituperation against the zambo, the
annoyance of his classmates, the displeasure of their parents, their desire to retire their
children to avoid staining them with the company of the zambo, the slanderous accusations
[of committing] the darkest vices.” The text claimed that the student’s admission saw “the
rise of a particular genre of vile malevolence with the only goal of exasperating the father
and compelling the son to leave.”716 The student suffered so many insults and offences that
he ended up abhorring the school. Seeing the child’s distress, the archbishop’s provisor
made the most of the situation and induced the student to write a letter describing all his
sufferings and requesting his own discharge. With the letter in hand, the provisor and other
school administrators accepted the student’s request and – without consulting Álvarez
senior – they put an end to the child’s matriculation.717
This case of racial discrimination became publicly known in Caracas and even
reached Bogotá. A series of letters requesting justice to be made were sent to congressmen
in the capital. Annexed to one of those dispatches was the printed leaflet commenting
Álvarez’s case. The pamphlet was signed by “unos patriotas pardos” (pardo patriots) and
was titled “La Humanidad Ultrajada” (“The Affronted Humanity”). The text was published
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by Valentín Espinal’s printing press in Caracas in 1825. 718 Apparently, this was one of
several papers the group of black patriots published at the time. 719 Towards the end of the
leaflet, they explained that they had denounced, time after time, how the enemies of
independence continuously tried to incite strife by perpetuating fanatism and “fostering in
their hearts the inhumane Spanish system.”720 The black patriots energetically repudiated
all those who opposed the new republican government and who contested the ideas of racial
equality it allegedly endorsed. At one point, the leaflet reminded the republic’s opponents
that they were “legally equal to the miserable black who had previously been their slave”
and invited them to “sacrifice their foolish pride” for the wellbeing of the nation. 721
In Bogotá, Álvarez’s complaints were met with reluctance. Members of Congress
and other public servants condemned what had happened to Álvarez and his son but were,
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at the same time, unwilling to do much to address his grievances even though Congress in
1823 had declared that it was unconstitutional to discriminate against pardos in admissions
to universities and seminaries.722 Moreover, following the 1821 Constitution, racial
categories from the colonial past, such as castas, had been erased from laws, censuses, and
legal documents. Only Indians and slaves were left as legal categories. 723 The case was
initially sent to the House of Representatives’ committee in charge of looking after the
proper observance of the constitution and its laws. The committee’s response was
somewhat ambiguous. It censured the acts of discrimination that the pardo student had
endured but also requested caution and discretion from all those involved. The committee
explained that “it is necessary for the Republic to suffer, for some time yet, from the
aristocracy’s evils. For enlightenment cannot spread from one single stroke nor,
correspondingly, can apprehensions fade away instantaneously.” “Prudence from all
citizens,” their answer continued, “is the antidote or the precise remedy to finally put an
end to these evils …”724 Following such line of reasoning, the committee decided that the
provisor who had misled Álvarez’s son into requesting his own discharge should not be
punished. From their point of view, the clergyman had simply acted prudently, trying to
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put an end to the black student’s unhappiness as well as to the other students’ reckless
behavior.725
Both the Colombian Congress and members of the executive branch concluded that
it was unnecessary and undesirable to take any concrete actions. The committee’s dispatch
maintained that a formal accusation against the school’s administrators was pointless and
that passing a law or decree that could prevent similar situations from happening again
would be futile. However, the note explained that congressmen could, with their cautious
conduct, “set an example of the prudence they expected from others.” Their letter made it
clear that they would also “point out to the school’s principal the discontent with which the
national legislature received these complaints and request him to educate his students and
to conform them to the liberality and equity of our institutions, as these do not exclude any
Colombian from enlightenment…”726 The committee’s conclusions were sent to the
Secretary of Interior for his consideration. In a short message, the Secretary ordered the
Intendency of Venezuela to take matters into their own hands. The Secretary instructed the
Venezuelan Intendant to “decree, with the upmost caution, all the necessary edicts so that
the school in Caracas admits youngsters of any class – while also ensuring that they will
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not be bothered in anyway – as long as their vices will not make them worthy of being
expelled from school.”727
Alvárez’s case was representative of the racial and social anxieties of the time. In
Venezuela, frictions over the standing and rights of non-whites had been growing
throughout the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. The rise of new republics,
with their language of rights, citizenship, equality, and freedom, exacerbated these
tensions. The concepts and notions that emerged at the time clashed with archetypes from
the past. Each group held different mental images that helped them understand the world
they lived in. Sometimes, the same model was given different interpretations. For instance,
while almost everyone held the Haitian Revolution as a mental reference, some viewed it
as a symbol of extreme violence while others as a dream of equality. 728 From these frictions
between a new language and past archetypes – and conflicting interpretations of these
mental images – arose fears of racial conflict and violence among Venezuelan and New
Granadian patricians and middle sectors. In the meantime, many slaves, free blacks,
pardos, and other people of mixed-race faced a combination of expectation and frustration
seeing that promises of equality and rights were being abandoned.
In the 1820s many in Venezuela and Bogotá still envisaged social and racial order
in accordance with colonial archetypes. Notions from the colonial past, such as sociedad
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de castas729 and limpieza de sangre, shaped the racial tensions that surfaced throughout
Álvarez’s case. During the colonial period, a person’s status was determined by a series of
factors such as place of birth, wealth, conduct, and education, among others. A central
aspect to determine a person’s standing in society was their racial lineage. Europeans and
their direct descendants as well as those closer to “whiteness” took up the upper stratums
of society while those with the most pronounced African lineage were placed on the bottom
of the social scale. In this abstract social stratification, anyone of mixed ancestry was
considered to belong to one of many categories of castas. People’s rights and privileges,
such as their occupations, the types of clothes they could wear, their access to education,
and the place they sat in during mass, were, in theory, defined by their casta. Classifying
and categorizing people according to their racial lineage was at the root of the conception
of sociedad de castas.730
Complementary to the notion of castas was that of “blood purity.” Christians in the
Iberian Peninsula, who for centuries were in close contact with Jews and Muslims,
developed the concept of limpieza de sangre to refer to those who were not “stained” with
Jewish or Muslim blood. In the Americas, such term took other connotations over time. It
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was not only used to refer to Christians whose ancestors did not include Jews or Muslims,
but also to denote whites whose lineages had not been “tainted” with indigenous or,
particularly, African blood. In the same manner that in the Iberian Peninsula “Jewish
blood” was seen as a “permanent stain”, in the Americas “African blood” was viewed as
an “inerasable mark.” This was particularly true during the first half of the colonial period.
Towards the late eighteenth century, such “inerasable mark” became ever more erasable as
there were numerous cases of people of African descent “passing” as if they had no African
blood or even “purchasing their whiteness.” Yet, despite this growing fluidity, still in the
early nineteenth century in Spanish America those who could not prove their “blood purity”
were barred from entering schools and universities or from taking up certain trades and
posts. The sociedad de castas and limpieza de sangre were roughly enforced through
numerous and usually disconnected laws and decrees. Some of them were issued by royal
courts and councils in Madrid, others by Royal Audiencias in the Americas, and a few
others by local cabildos.731
Despite the rigidity that characterized the society of castas, social mobility was
relatively common. Those belonging to a casta could move up and down the social scale
depending on a variety of factors such as their economic success, their conduct, and the
racial mixtures in which they were involved in. Certain lineages moved, generation after
generation, closer to “whiteness” and, thus, ascended in the social scale. Other lineages
moved away from “whiteness” and, thus, moved downwards in the social hierarchy. 732
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Towards the late colonial period, Caracas and Venezuela were among the main foci
of socioracial frictions and mobility in Spanish America. In the late eighteen and early
nineteenth centuries there were, proportionately, more pardos and free blacks in Caracas
and Coastal Venezuela than perhaps any other region in the Americas. Towards the turn of
the century, the free population of African descent in Caracas was somewhere around 40
to 50% of the city’s total inhabitants. Among such a large population of free blacks, there
were numerous cases in which pardos and other castas were able to move upward in the
social scale thanks to their economic success, their services to the Crown, and by whitening
through intimate connections. Caracas’ elites vigorously responded to such social mobility
as they attempted to ensure their status and the persistence of the existing social order.
Through different means, such as decrees from the cabildo and complaints to the King, the
city’s elites actively sought to restrain the social ascent of castas by limiting their access
to education, sanctuary goods, physical spaces, and certain occupations. 733
Caracas’ elites were relatively successful at obstructing pardos’ vertical mobility.
Yet, people of mixed ancestry found ways to sidestep such barriers. One of them was
through petitions of gracias al sacar with which some pardos were able to, as Ann Twinam
would phrase it, “purchase whiteness.” People of mixed ancestry who could afford it paid
a fee and presented documents demonstrating that their lineage had been “whitened”
through successive generations. Petitioners requested authorities to revise their legal status
and to decree that they should no longer be considered part of a casta. In the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, royal courts in Spain received more petitions of gracias al
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sacar from Caracas than from anywhere else. Likewise, the courts also received more
complaints and objections against these gracias al sacar from Venezuela than from any
other place in Spanish America. According to Twinam, Caracas’ case was unique. Few
other cities saw so many cases of casta social ascent at the same time that there was
possibly no other Spanish American city in which the elites resisted to this social mobility
with such hostility and antagonism.734
Racial discrimination is blatant all throughout Álvarez’s case, from the moment in
which he sought his son’s enrollment all the way to Congress’ inaction and the Secretary
of Interior’s insinuations against black students. As in previous examples, archetypes from
the colonial past were at play. The racial tensions that surfaced in Álvarez’s case were
shaped by colonial notions of racial order, such as sociedad de castas and pureza de sangre.
Despite the advent of republicanism and its language of equality and liberty, in the 1820s
most members of Caracas’ elites and some of the city’s middle and lower sectors continued
to categorically oppose pardos’ vertical mobility. For many of these Caraqueños, castas’
access to education was out of the question. They believed that allowing a black student to
enroll and attend school was a disruption in society’s order and propriety. They not only
believed that the school’s reputation or that of their sons that was at stake, but they also
feared that pardos’ access to education could mark the beginning of the collapse of the
social order they defended. This prospect simply fueled their anxieties and suspicions, as
archetypes of social and racial order from the colonial past guided and shaped these feelings
of fear and disquiet.
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In Bogotá, congressmen and the Secretary of Interior tried to cope with
Caraqueños’ anxieties as well as with their own apprehensions. Their recurrent calls for
prudence and caution were merely demonstrations of their fears at the possibility that free
blacks could abruptly ascend in the social scale. The Secretary’s response, implying that
the “vices” of black students could upset the schools’ harmony, is illustrative of their
reservations. But the congressmen and Secretary’s concerns were twofold, for they also
feared that their decisions in this matter could upset Caracas’ elites as well as the city’s
pardos. In that sense, their claims for caution sought to prevent any break from the
constitution’s promises of equality at the same time that they tried to avoid defying
Caracas’ implicit norms of racial discrimination. With their requests for prudence and their
inaction regarding Álvarez’s grievances, congressmen and the Secretary sought to offer a
sense of stability among all those involved. By doing so, they were managing their own
anxieties and fears as well as those of many Caraqueños.
Throughout the 1820s, dreams and promises of racial equality and manumission
were constantly broken. Álvarez’s case was simply one of many. The first years of
republican life saw the onset of several laws, policies, and promises of gradual
manumission and racial equality. The first of such laws was the Free Province of
Antioquia’s freedom of wombs law of 1814.735 All through the decade, amidst times of
war, both republican and royalist military leaders promised slaves that they would be
granted their liberty if they joined their armies. In 1821, the Colombian Congress passed a
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free wombs law similar to Antioquia’s 1814 law. Amidst discussions over the Cúcuta
Constitution, political leaders made numerous declarations in favor of racial harmony and
passed laws that eliminated racial identification from state records. 736
Yet, despite this apparent enthusiasm for racial equality, many of these policies and
promises were short lived or not fully implemented. For instance, in the 1820s several
slaves who had fought in the wars of independence or who had been granted their freedom
during times of unrest ended up in legal disputes trying to obtain their formal manumission.
Such was the case of José Joaquín Texada, a slave from the Province of Popayán. Texada’s
master, Antonio Gil de Texada, supposedly granted José Joaquín his liberty around 1817
or 1818. After Antonio’s death, the slaveowner’s widow, Ana Sandoval, pursued a legal
case trying to regain her ownership over several slaves, among them José Joaquín. She
argued that amidst times of violence, when many slaves and runaways had risen against
slaveowners, her husband made some vague and informal declarations claiming he would
free his slaves. Some of them, she explained, understood Antonio’s statements as their
formal manumission. Sandoval maintained that there was no proof that her husband had
granted José Joaquín his liberty and that Antonio had only made those ambiguous
declarations to appease his slaves out of fear that they would rise up against him. On June
8, 1828, after close to three years in court, a judge finally concluded that there was no proof
that Antonio had granted José Joaquín his freedom. The judge ordered José Joaquín to
continue under the possession of Ana Sandoval. This decision was taken despite the fact
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that José Joaquín had been living as a freeman for some years. 737 Similar to what happened
to Álvarez, the obstacles José Joaquín found in his pursuit for freedom were the product of
the fears and anxieties of the time. Models of social and racial order – such as that of
sociedad de castas – and mental images of past events – such as the violence that shook
Haiti or the dreams of equality it symbolized –guided and shaped people’s emotions. In
some cases, past archetypes gave form to feelings of fear and unease, in others they
produced frustration and disillusion.
Numerous barriers obstructed the implementation of policies promoting
manumission and racial equality. For instance, laws leading to the abolition of slavery were
gradually reformed or derogated in favor of the economic interests of slave-owning
families. Slaveowners in Popayán and other regions sabotaged manumission committees
and prevented many slaves from obtaining their liberty.738 As Marcela Echeverri explains,
in the 1840s slaveowners from Popayán were even successful at eliminating a law that
banned slave trade. Between 1843 and 1847, hundreds of slaves were exported from
Colombia to Perú and the United States.739 Aside from that, public support in favor of racial
equality quickly faded away. Simón Bolívar, who in the 1810s made several speeches in
favor of racial equality, by the mid-1820s was constantly waiving the flag of racial war and
making numerous references to the extreme violence that had taken place during the
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Haitian Revolution. Bolívar often alluded to the term pardocracia to refer to a government
run by pardos knowing that it would arouse fears towards the social ascent of free blacks
and to the possibility that they could hold positions of power. 740 The many barriers that
hindered the way to racial equality and manumission, from Ana Sandoval’s legal claims to
Bolívar’s overtly racist declarations, were the outcome of the anxieties that surfaced among
Colombian upper and middle social sectors in the 1820s. These feelings of fear and distress
were, to an extent, shaped by colonial archetypes hat many still held in their minds.
The monarchical plot
Bolívar’s anxieties not only revolved around his fears of racial mobility and racial
war, but also around the Republic’s lack of political stability. Colombians from all stratums
of society shared this feeling of uneasiness at the Republic’s apparent fragility. Bolívar,
other political leaders, and their supporters sought ways to have a stronger, more
centralized national government that could face threats such as a Spanish invasion or the
rise of secessionist movements within Colombian borders. Moreover, they also aspired to
have a powerful president that could enforce order and security and put an end to the many
intrigues that made Colombia seemingly ungovernable. Aline Helg argues that around the
mid-1820s, Bolívar and his followers began to profess the idea that only by adopting a
semi-monarchical constitution would Colombia be able to cure itself from the many ills
typical of a young, multiracial, and mostly illiterate nation. Around 1825, Bolívar’s
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constitutional project consisted of a federation of authoritarian republics under the supreme
authority of a president for life. In his project, the lifelong president would be himself. 741
By 1829, Bolívar openly endorsed the idea of adopting a monarchic government
with a European monarch sitting on the throne. In a series of letters, the Council of State,
the Council of Ministers, and Bolívar’s secretary discussed the president’s instructions
regarding the possibility of transferring control of the Republic of Colombia over to a
European monarchy, other than the Spanish one. One of the dispatches from the Council
of Ministers reflects on these instructions:
“It has been ordered to the Council of Ministers for the second time to choose
the means to obtain for Colombia the protection of one or more of the great
powers that may contain the torrent of anarchy that devastates the Americas
– former Spanish territory – and keeps them headed towards destruction, for
it undoubtedly will destroy them if prompt and efficient measures are not
adopted. The Council has paid long attention and the most serious reflections
to this important issue with the goal of choosing the proper means, without
being contrary to national independence, to open negotiations that will draw
to Colombia the support and aid of one of the great nations.”742

The councils also discussed Bolívar’s ideas on which form of government could
work best for Colombia. All those involved concluded that Colombia should become a
constitutional monarchy. As the Council of Ministers explained, they had “unanimously
decided that a constitutional monarchy offers all the vigor and stability that a well-
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established government should have at the same time that if gives its peoples and citizens
all the necessary guarantees to ensure their wellbeing and prosperity.” 743
By late 1829, the councils’ ministers and magistrates had apparently been
discussing for some time the best ways to contact the English and French monarchies in
order to present them a formal request. Yet, for a variety of reasons, the councils decided
that it would be more appropriate to present their request to the French monarchy. For one
part, the French, as the Colombians, were Catholics. Likewise, members of the councils
had close relations with the Duke of Montebello who could personally present their request
to the French monarch. The plan anticipated that, once the French accepted their request,
Bolívar would be named temporary monarch of Colombia. After his death or abdication,
he would be replaced by a new monarch chosen among the French dynasty. 744
The councils’ debates also touched on other details such as the need to have
Congress reform the Constitution so that constitutional monarchism become Colombia’s
new form of government. They also discussed how other American nations could react to
their project. Members of the councils believed that most countries would initially
condemn their decision, but they assumed that in the long run most of them would end up
seeing Colombia as an admirable example. As they argued, Colombia with its European
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monarch would “inspire security and confidence, for [Colombia] would be free from the
anarchy that agitates other states, guaranteeing our enjoyment of social goods…” 745
In the 1820s, this attempt to reinstate the monarchy and European control over
northern South America was perhaps the most explicit and manifest example of the
persistence of colonial and monarchic archetypes. Throughout the 1810s, republican
leaders, time after time, had to refute royalists who claimed that republicanism would only
bring about anarchy. By the late 1820s, some of these republicans ended up dooming
independence and the republican system, accusing them of simply bringing about chaos
and many other ills. By the 1820s, so many years of violence, unrest, and political
factionalism had left many feeling hopeless and fearful. Yet, in the case of many, these
fears and apprehensions also grew out of the fact that their references and models of
stability and security were now missing. The absence of a monarchy, a Crown, and a throne
fueled people’s misgivings, anxieties, and fears. In that sense, the persistence of these
monarchical archetypes helps explain why Bolívar and so many others believed that
returning to a monarchical system would bring about the political stability and wellbeing
they had been missing.
Conclusions
The persistence of colonial and monarchic archetypes helps explain why
independence and the rise of new republican nations did not bring about profound changes
in existing social relations and structures. Notions of power and symbolic representations
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of power continued mostly unaffected. Change and reform were often met with uneasiness
and uncertainty, particularly among patricians and middle sectors of society. The idea that
some reforms could produce even more violence and strife than that they had already
endured in past years made many hesitant of change. Amidst the troubled times they were
living, many continued viewing colonial and monarchic archetypes as sources of stability
and security. Many members of society did what was at their disposal to uphold these
models, even if that meant storming a convent and seizing a painting or harassing a student
and forcing him to resign. After all, many believed they were safeguarding society’s proper
social order and defending their own personal safety. The archetypes that many held in
their minds also shaped emotions, guiding people into feeling fear, rage, and even hope in
accordance with these models and mental images.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
I had never seen Manhattan’s streets so empty and quiet. The sun was only
beginning to rise as I made my way from the bus stop in Bryant Park towards the
Colombian Consulate. In just a few hours, thousands of tourists would be walking up and
down 5th Avenue. Some hours later, around noon, hundreds of Polish Americans would be
celebrating the Pulaski Parade in those same streets. As I hurried my pace, I could not help
thinking that my day was possibly not going to be as entertaining as that of those parading
or visiting New York City’s main sites. It was not only the idea of spending all day sitting
inside the consulate that worried me. For days I had been feeling both hopeful and anxious
about the outcome of the peace plebiscite. Even though I was aware that the peace
agreement with the FARC guerilla would not solve Colombia’s many problems – as
President Juan Manuel Santos and some of his advisors sometimes implied throughout the
campaign – I was convinced that its ratification would be highly beneficial for the country.
I was hopeful that it would be a first step towards a gradual decrease in violence and that
it would open the way for a series of much needed reforms. Yet, despite my hopes that the
peace accord could mark the beginning of a new Colombian society, I worried that the
plebiscite would not be approved. In the weeks leading to it, opposition against the treaty
had gained ground and become ever more fervent and pugnacious. The last polls before the
elections simply confirmed the opposition’s growth as well as the rising divisions within
Colombian public opinion.
That morning of October 2, 2016, I entered the Colombian Consulate just before 7
a.m. There were dozens of other people coming into the consulate, including some friends
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from Penn who had also volunteered as electoral juries. After all, it was the only way those
of us who were not registered to vote in a Colombian Consulate in the US could cast our
ballot in the plebiscite. For almost an hour we were given a brief training on our tasks as
jurors: from how to check a person’s ID before voting to how to fill out the required forms
after counting the ballots. The polls officially opened at 8 a.m. Electoral jurors were
allowed to cast their vote at the same time that the first voters slowly began to arrive. After
a first few minutes of hustle, things calmed down and jurors began to talk with one another.
After talking about our lives and the reasons we were living in the US, we began discussing
the plebiscite. Tensions quickly faded away as the jurors sitting in my table as well as those
around us all claimed to be in favor of the peace agreement. To deal with the monotony
and boredom, we began guessing each voter’s preferences. After some time, we reached
the conclusion that those coming in smiling and joyful were voting in favor while those
who came in annoyed and grumpy were voting “no” to the peace accord. Some of the
voters’ comments when depositing their ballots or when leaving simply confirmed our
hunches. One of them, a pregnant woman, shed tears as she deposited her ballot. As she
cleaned her cheeks and apologized for her outburst, she looked at her belly and began
telling us that she could not help getting emotional at the thought of her son growing in a
Colombia in peace and not one torn by war and violence as had happened to her as a child.
Those of us hearing her were left with a lump in our throats and close to having an
emotional outburst similar to hers.
The polls closed at 4 p.m.. We counted and recounted the ballots and filled out the
forms in a few minutes. As I had imagined with the two other juries, in our table the “yes”
won by a wide margin. Many of my apprehensions were eased as I heard that in other tables
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the same had happened. That afternoon, I began my way back to Philadelphia hopeful that
the peace agreement would be supported by a majority of the electors. Just before going
into Lincoln Tunnel, the first results showed the “yes” winning by a small margin. When I
recovered phone signal after close to twenty minutes of heavy traffic crossing the tunnel,
the outlook was quite different. The “no” was winning by a small, but definite margin. That
night, many young Colombians who had gathered in the cities’ main squares to celebrate
the peace treaty ended up crying out of sadness and impotence at the results. Yet, many
other Colombians celebrated. In Medellín, Colombia’s second largest city, fireworks
exploded all night long as many went out to the streets in their cars and motorcycles
honking to celebrate what they believed to be a victory over impunity, corruption, and
communism.746
The following morning, Colombia was perhaps even more divided than the
previous night. Many woke up feeling a sense of sorrow and despair. In social media,
supporters of the peace process claimed that they were heartbroken and compared what
they were feeling to the melancholy that came about after a difficult breakup. Some even
went so far as to connect their sadness with the sense of grief that comes with the loss of a
loved one. Right-wing political leaders were jubilant with their victory. Among them was
Juan Carlos Vélez, the chair of the “no” campaign. That morning, Vélez gave several
interviews to the press. In one of them, he explained that their strategy had been to make
people cast their votes feeling “verraca.” The term is used by Colombians in many different
ways; however, in this case, Vélez was referring to one of its most common usages: a sense
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of rage and anger. Vélez explained that while the promoters of the “yes” had tried to incite
feeling of hope, the “no” campaign had sought to stir outrage and ire. Throughout the
interview, Vélez’s confidence and excitement grew, and he began to reveal details and
anecdotes of how they had stimulated indignation and anger among Colombian voters. For
instance, he talked about an image sent out by the campaign that quickly became viral on
social media. It was an image with the pictures of President Santos and ‘Timochenko’, a
guerrilla commander, and a message claiming that the Santos administration was going to
give out thousands of millions of pesos to the guerrillas despite the country’s financial
troubles. Vélez explained that among lower classes, the campaign spread stories of how
the government was going to cut pensions, social programs, and subsidies to give out those
resources to the demobilized guerrilla. In the Caribbean Coast, Vélez maintained, “the
message was that we were going to become Venezuela” if the peace accord was ratified. 747
Vélez’s interview immediately caused an uproar in Colombian public opinion.
Supporters of the peace process accused Vélez and the promoters of the “no” campaign of
having deliberately lied to Colombian voters. Some even claimed that so many voters had
been misled with false accounts and fake news that authorities should repeat the plebiscite
or simply disregard its results. Members of Vélez political party, the Centro Democrático,
publicly reproached him and insisted that Vélez’s comments were not true or that they were
mere exaggerations. One of them went so far as to accuse Vélez of being drunk when he
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gave the interview.748 In the end, Vélez was forced to quit the Centro Democrático. During
the following months, Vélez defended himself claiming he never said such things and that
the interview had been edited to discredit him.749
Regardless of what Vélez said or did not say during the interview, the fact is that
emotions played an important role in the plebiscite. As my fellow jurors and I noticed the
day of the elections, those voting in favor of the peace agreement came into the consulate
displaying a sense of happiness and hope, while those opposing the treaty seemed to be
outraged and annoyed – or verraca, to use Vélez’s words. To an extent, the campaigns
were successful diving public opinion into two opposing and irreconcilable factions. So
much that not only ideas and policies divided one from the other, but also people’s lived
emotions and emotional expressions.
The Colombian peace plebiscite was not unique in any way. Some months earlier,
on June 23, 2016, electors in the United Kingdom voted to withdraw from the European
Union. Similar to what happened in Colombia, in the United Kingdom the “leave”
campaign also spread misinformation and tried to incite feelings of outrage against the
European Union, immigration, and free trade agreements. About a month after the peace
plebiscite, on November 8, Donald Trump was elected president of the United States in a
campaign in which false stories and feelings of fear and hate were also prevalent. Recent
elections in Brazil, France, Hungary, and other parts of the world have not been much
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different. This, of course, is not a new phenomenon. Misinformation, hatred, and fright
were also widespread in Europe during the interwar period as they have been in many other
periods of time, including the early nineteenth century that I study in this dissertation.
When Brexit, the peace plebiscite, and Trump’s election happened, I was
undergoing a transition in my intellectual interests. I had abandoned my previous research
topic, US-Latin American relations in the twentieth century, and was now studying
vagrancy during the Bourbon Reforms. The Bourbon’s efforts to create a new, useful vassal
and their endeavors to put an end to vagrancy had caught my attention and had become my
main research topic. About this same time, I began to think about written and oral culture
in the late eighteenth century. The role of orality transmitting information and moving
people’s actions was at the top of my mind. Towards mid-2017, as I started to think of a
possible dissertation topic, I came up with the idea of exploring the transition from “useful
vassals” to “virtuous citizens” in present-day Colombia. One of the goals of the project was
to explore how artisans, poor merchants, slaves, Indians, and other middle and lower social
groups experienced the rise of constitutionalism and the emergence of citizen-centered
republics. My questions revolved around how these members of society experienced this
transition and in what ways their lives changed or remained relatively the same. I sought
to tackle some of these questions by exploring the materiality and circulation of texts
relating to citizenship and constitutional rights. In that sense, the project explored how the
form and materiality of symbols, rituals, texts, and ideas shaped the different meanings
given to citizenship and constitutional rights.
Even though this dissertation is in many ways different from the project I
envisioned in 2017, it is, in part, its outcome. Even if only marginally, some of my original
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questions are present throughout this dissertation. Similarly, the dissertation is also an
offshoot of the emotional milieu that emerged from the 2016 elections in Colombia, the
US, the UK, and other parts of the world. These elections as well as others that have taken
place in recent times have continuously reminded me of the power of emotions shaping
people’s decisions, actions, and notions of reality. Hate, fear, anger, and other emotions
give form to the ways people understand the world they live in.
Ever since I began writing the dissertation, a series of events continued to shape my
sensibilities and questions about emotions. The protests that took place in Colombia in
November of 2019 and May of 2021, the killing of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, and
the global pandemic of 2019-2022 are only some of these happenings. On November 21,
2019 – as I was beginning to write about the panic attack that took place in Quito in 1815
– thousands of Colombians hit the streets to protest against President Iván Duque’s
administration. What began as peaceful protests ended up in riots, vandalism, and police
repression. The following days, authorities in Bogotá and Cali declared night curfews in
an effort to stop violence and disorders. In both cities, rumors spread claiming that vandals
and rioters were breaking into residential complexes to steal and destroy private property.
The accounts ended up being not true. Yet, dozens of videos circulated in the news and
social media showing residents screaming, arming themselves with sticks and kitchen
knives, and blocking the entrance to their complexes to avoid intruders from coming in.
The videos showed neighbors running, shouting, and crying, but there was never a
trespasser at sight. Not a single residential complex was vandalized or sacked. Only a
couple of people got hurt after being attacked by their own neighbors who confused them
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for vandals.750 The questions of why these rumors were believed to be true by so many
people and why they spread so quickly inspired me to think about the cultural and social
conditions that make a panic attack possible. In the case of Quito in 1815, part of the answer
laid in the city’s collective memory.
Most of this dissertation was written amidst a global pandemic. These were times
of much uncertainty, fear, and grief. There were long periods of time in which it was
unclear what was going to happen or if the pandemic was ever going to come to an end.
During the initial stages of the pandemic, it was not even clear what measures should be
taken to prevent its spread. Scientists and health authorities were constantly coming up
with new policies and measures. At times, it was safe to say that basically no one knew
what was happening nor what the future would look like. Later on, when the vaccination
process began, many felt joy and hope at the prospect that we would, once again, return to
our normal lives. Yet, going back to “normality” has been a slow and gradual process, with
much insecurity and confusion.
This atmosphere of widespread uncertainty and anguish has reinforced my thoughts
on how confusion and insecurity shaped the ways in which people in the early nineteenth
century gave meaning to the world they were living in. The feelings of uncertainty that the
pandemic brought about made me reflect on how people in Santafé experienced the news
that Ferdinand VII had been abducted. Although not the best comparison, the shock and
impotence that many felt once they knew that there was no longer a king and that they were
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now facing the threat of falling into the hands of Napoleon and Joseph Bonaparte may have
been somewhat similar to some of the emotions we have experienced amidst the pandemic.
Despite the many differences between the two cases, there are some similarities. In both
cases, uncertainty and confusion shaped the meanings society gave to what was happening
as well as to its prospects of the future.
In that sense, this dissertation maintains that emotions shaped the rise of new
republican nations in northern South America. As I explain throughout, emotions are a
constitutive part of people’s cognition. Emotions influence the meanings people gave to
the world they live in at the same time that emotions help express and convey meaning to
people’s actions. In the early nineteenth century, emotions, particularly fear and
uncertainty, shaped people’s meanings of the troubled times they were living. Rather than
focus on the apparent certainty and self-assurance of people’s decisions, interests, and ideas
– as has been done by most of the historiography –, I have stressed the feelings of
confusion, perplexity, and anguish that many of them experienced at the time.
Thus, this dissertation argues that the emotions that circulated during these years
gave form to the republican and national projects that emerged at the time. During these
years, there were moments in which certain emotions predominated over others or in which
their pace of propagation accelerated or slowed down. At times, parts of society
experienced fear and confusion with more intensity than in previous times. Ultimately,
these fluctuations shaped the tides of revolution and reform. At certain moments, emotions
incited and hastened political transformations. At others, they halted social and political
change. Likewise, I claim that independence and the onset of republicanism did not bring
about a critical break from the monarchical and colonial past. Widespread feelings of dread
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and uncertainty led many of the region’s residents to seek stability and safety at the expense
of their aspirations for social and political transformations.
This dissertation has shown that in the early nineteenth century the ebb and flow of
emotions ended up shaping periods of reform and counterreform. In recent times, as hate,
fear, and mistrust have taken over the political scene throughout most of the world, many
seemingly gained rights are now, ever more, at stake. Hopefully, new emotional tides will
come in the future, bringing with them better times.
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